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Abstract 
The international community is divided in understanding conflict-induced internal 
displacement. Within the confines of the doctrine of responsible sovereignty, it has also 
struggled to protect and assist Internally Displaced Persons and to provide durable 
solutions to their interdependent needs. In addressing these problems, this thesis 
examines the effectiveness of the joint political and humanitarian responses to civilians 
displaced by the low-intensity secessionist armed conflict in the Province of Aceh, 
Indonesia. The political response started in 2000, was facilitated by the Geneva-based 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and aimed to resolve the political violence through 
an unprecedented joint dialogue process between the two-armed sides: the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement. The concurrent humanitarian response 
involved relief and development programmes by an extensive range of international and 
indigenous organisations. 
Despite the combined potential for sustainable peace and development and some 
notable achievements, protection and assistance proved inadequate overall and the 
responses became inoperative by May 2003. To understand the shortcomings, it is 
argued that the neutrality of the joint responses was gradually discredited by two 
multifaceted challenges: manipulative constraints from the internal and external 
dimensions to state sovereignty and weaknesses in the application of the joint responses. 
The findings are drawn from a qualitative, comparative study of a representative 
displaced group from Aceh and its neighbouring Province of North Sumatra; semi- 
structured interviews with senior representatives from the responses and other key 
informants; and an analysis of the literature. The United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement are used to gauge the impact of the responses on the needs of the 
Internally Displaced Persons. 
Crucially, joint interventions occurred because there were strains within the state and 
overwhelming support from the international arena. The political response used a 
humanitarian mediation strategy, which successfully gained the dual acceptance of both 
armed sides, helped the initial alleviation of needs and culminated in December 2002 
with a promising framework for negotiating peace. In tandem, the humanitarian 
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response was able to advance relief and attempt development programmes. However, 
the Republic of Indonesia and foreign states added to the conflict's tradition of 
manipulation, which jeopardised the neutrality of the responses. In compounding this, 
the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue misrepresented the interdependency of needs and 
humanitarian mediation proved unsuitable to resolving the conflict since it allowed 
spoilers from both armed sides to oppose and manipulate the responses to fulfil vested 
interests. Furthermore, the ingrained politicisation of Internally Displaced Persons and 
humanitarian action in addition to gaps in protection were exacerbated by the joint 
responses' misunderstanding of displacement, their inappropriate integration and 
inability to provide adequate protection, respectively. 
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Introduction 
It is useful to begin by explaining the context of the research. Second, the author 
presents the main research question and hypothesis, then summarises the conclusion and 
central argument. The latter is subsequently clarified by outlining how its components 
interlock within the chapters. Last, it is appropriate to detail the research strategy. 
Context of the Research 
The thesis centres on the intersection of three phenomena, which heralded the 
possibility that the political and humanitarian needs of the Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) in the Provinces of Aceh and North Sumatra could be significantly improved. In 
1999, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoRI) invited the Geneva-based 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) to facilitate a process of joint dialogue 
between the state and armed insurgents (Free Aceh Movement; Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM)) in Aceh's prolonged secessionist conflict. ' Second, the innovative form of 
political intervention occurred primarily because there was a pivotal stalemate in the 
conflict. Furthermore, the HDC believed that if the political violence was not resolved 
then it would escalate and significantly increase the humanitarian deficit. Last, the 
emergence of democratisation in Indonesia, the election of President Wahid and 
international pressure created the necessary relaxation of state sovereignty for 
intervention. 
The IDPs form the focus of the inquiry because they represented an important group of 
conflict-victims. As beneficiaries, they were also specifically highlighted by the HDC 
as those most at risk and thus used as leverage for addressing and resolving the 
underlying reasons for the political violence in order to improve humanitarian needs 
overall. Consequently, the political response made humanitarianism proactive by using 
it to prevent the intensification of the conflict and its effects. The initial exploratory 
phase of the HDC consisted of conflict and risk analysis and was thus political in 
1 This is also referred to as the 'political process', `political intervention' and 'peace process'. The author 
also categorises it as the 'political response' to the IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra. 
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nature. After this, it was obliged to re-define its institutional profile to a humanitarian 
image, to prevent infringement of state sovereignty and to increase confidence and 
support within the GoRI. Under the first joint agreement, the Humanitarian Pause, state 
and rebel forces were persuaded to make unhindered humanitarian access a shared 
concern. Thereafter, the process of third party intervention switched back to addressing 
the more substantive, political disagreements through constructive and guided joint 
dialogue. Accordingly, in the two provinces, the HDC intervention formed the political 
response to IDPs since one of its proposed outcomes was to make the Republic of 
Indonesia (RI) more responsible for its IDPs by resolving the root cause of 
displacement. 2 
From 1976 until the HDC's entry, the secessionist conflict operated at a low-intensity 
with fluctuations in political violence. GAM employed guerrilla warfare and the RI in 
reply launched sustained counter-insurgency operations to maintain national unity and 
control over lucrative natural resources, in particular, oil and liquid natural gas. Basic 
security could not be guaranteed and the civilian population suffered indiscriminate 
killings from crossfire in addition to the systematic practice of terror, involving random 
and targeted assassinations, rape, torture, forced displacement and extortion. There 
were short-term humanitarian needs but the complex development and political needs 
were more significant and reflected the underlying causes of the conflict. Although 
contested state sovereignty through political violence formed the root cause of internal 
displacement, the thesis recognises other connected, underlying causes. This involved 
human rights violations, an absence of justice and compensation for victims, weakened 
state authority, entrenched polarisation, fractured livelihoods and perennial economic 
grievances between the Acehnese and the state. 
For IDPs in Aceh, the fundamental long-term need was sustained security to prevent 
deliberate and unintentional displacement and to create permanent return and 
resettlement. An ethnic dimension to the conflict emerged in 1999 and peaked between 
2000 and 2001, when tens of thousands of non-Acehnese civilians were forcibly evicted 
to resettle in the neighbouring Province of North Sumatra and further south. Although 
these IDPs were pushed beyond the direct effects of the conflict, they still experienced 
2 The thesis focuses on conflict-induced displacement where the root cause is political violence through 
low-intensity secessionist armed conflict. This is also referred to as forced internal displacement or 
simply, internal displacement. 
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short-term and more crucially, long-term needs. Pre-HDC, the emergence of IDPs in 
Aceh was treated with limited humanitarian concern. United Nations (UN) agencies 
and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had access but were limited 
in number and restricted to relief. Indigenous NGOs were enthusiastic but lacked 
capacity as they were banned under former President Suharto's New Order and only 
surfaced after democratic reforms. 3 
During the first HDC phase, there were high expectations inside and outside Aceh that 
humanitarian assistance would become more effective and sustainable with the gradual 
transformation of short-term cease-fires into sustained security and a comprehensive 
peace process. This assumption was based on strong foundations. Internationally, there 
was political and financial support because the intervention or political response to IDPs 
was considered low-key, timely and promising. In Aceh and Jakarta, enough reformers 
on both armed sides were convinced of the futility of political violence. Both sides 
respected the HDC, which could steer between the inviolability of state sovereignty and 
GAM's desire for international intervention. The role and strategy of the HDC enabled 
an entry point for intervention and ensured the delicate balance was maintained. 
Although the intervention was a form of mediation, the third party chose the more 
neutral and restrictive role of facilitation and used humanitarian mediation as the 
intervention strategy. Initially, the political violence was reduced, IDPs were returned, 
livelihoods became more secure and the two-armed sides continued to negotiate. The 
peace process also opened important extra space, which increased international 
involvement through the multifaceted programmes of UN agencies and international 
NGOs. In the short-term, this improved the delivery and coverage of humanitarian 
assistance and created the potential for implementing sustainable development, in 
particular, through partnerships with indigenous NGOs, community-based organisations 
and conflict-affected communities in general. For the IDPs, this became their 
humanitarian response. 
Contrary to early achievements, the conflict persisted in cycles in defiance of several 
promising joint agreements to control hostilities and resolve more substantive political 
issues. This process culminated in an internationally supported framework for peace, 
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), in December 2002. Overall, forced 
displacement continued despite the use of traditional and proactive forms of 
3 The New Order was the period of Suharto's rule (1966-98). 
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humanitarian action. Moreover, the delivery of humanitarian assistance became 
restricted and in some ways the political violence intensified. By May 2003, the RI 
unilaterally withdrew from the political process of joint dialogue and imposed martial 
law in Aceh. The political regression caused the humanitarian response to collapse. 
Central Research Question and Argument 
The thesis examines the effectiveness of using joint political and humanitarian 
responses in ensuring the adequate protection and assistance for two of the main types 
of IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra: repetitive displacement and illegal resettlement, 
respectively. 4 To illuminate the latter, the main findings are drawn primarily from a 
qualitative, comparative study of a representative displaced group from each province: 
the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic IDPs in Aceh and the Sei Lepan IDPs in North Sumatra. 
The inquiry was in response to the following central research question: 
Can the application of joint responses to IDPs, to address their political and 
humanitarian needs, significantly improve the provision of protection and 
assistance and thereby make the state more responsible for its IDPs, during low- 
intensity secessionist armed conflict? 
The impact of the joint responses is gauged by exploring the short (relief) and long-term 
(development) needs of the two IDP groups. These needs are evaluated based on the 
standards of basic human rights included within the UN's Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, as the formal response to internal displacement globally. 5 The 
thesis also refers closely to other groups and modes of displacement in the two 
provinces to supplement the empirical findings and to make wider, though tentative, 
conclusions. Accordingly, a correlative sub-question asks, how applicable are the 
Guiding Principles to the needs of IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra? To explain the 
specific strengths and weaknesses of the joint responses, the thesis focuses on the role 
of the international community, the home state and the impact of the HDC political 
4 The joint responses to IDPs are defined as the political response by the HDC, using joint dialogue to 
address and resolve the underlying reasons for political violence, which formed the root cause of 
displacement. The humanitarian response consisted of the more conventional provision of protection and 
assistance by the RI, and indigenous and international humanitarian actors. 
5 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. 
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intervention on the humanitarian response, since both responses worked in tandem and 
at times overlapped. 
Following the central research question, a preliminary hypothesis was reached: 
When low-intensity secessionist armed conflict is the root cause of forced 
internal displacement, the protection and assistance of IDPs are more effective 
and sustainable when the state adopts and supports a joint approach, consisting 
of indigenous and international actors, which addresses the political and 
humanitarian needs of IDPs. 
The research question and hypothesis are grounded in the international community's 
doctrine of responsible sovereignty, that is, the assumption that the democratic state can 
and should choose from several approaches to protect and assist its IDPs. Of course, the 
state can choose to do nothing and not accept responsibility because it does not have the 
capacity to respond by itself while regarding international intervention and assistance as 
undesirable interference. In addition, such action and/or third party scrutiny may not be 
considered to be in the interests of the state. 6 More preferably and for humanitarian 
reasons, the state can support a range of approaches and mechanisms, for example, the 
top-down approach, protecting and assisting using appropriate state policies, delivered 
by government departments and agencies. To supplement this or as an alternative, the 
state can tacitly or actively support a bottom-up approach involving indigenous 
humanitarian organisations. As a third approach towards responsibility, the state can 
consent to international humanitarian actors protecting and assisting IDPs on its behalf. 
Typically these three options are reactive in nature and seek to resolve the humanitarian 
deficit by offering relief and/or development-based programmes. 
The joint political and the humanitarian responses in Aceh and North Sumatra reflected 
the dual needs of the IDPs and therefore in theory had the potential to create sustainable 
solutions to displacement. Therefore, they are of special interest to the study of forced 
migration and the application of responsible sovereignty for two reasons. First, the 
humanitarian response involved the three options above, using specific state policies 
and agencies alongside indigenous humanitarian organisations and international actors, 
which all focused on alleviating humanitarian needs through relief and development. 
Second, in addressing the political needs and the root cause of IDPs, the GoRI invited 
6 This could be for strategic military or political reasons, for example, the home state choosing not to act 
as a form of punishment. 
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the HDC to resolve the political violence between GAM and the state. Defusing the 
conflict also aimed to prevent further displacement by restoring basic security. 
The research question and hypothesis are also based on four main assumptions. First, to 
implement both responses in low-intensity internal conflict, there needs to be 
intervention by an international, neutral third party and indigenous mechanisms in order 
to best protect and assist IDPs. This provides greater checks and balances, 
accountability and legitimacy for the responses in restoring the responsibility of the 
democratic state. Second but most importantly, effective international responses for 
IDPs must remain neutral and impartial both in practice and in image. Neutrality is 
essential in gaining and maintaining the consent and co-operation of all the stakeholders 
in the conflict. Based on the first two, the third assumption is the willingness of the 
state to consent to the responses, in particular the operations of international actors. The 
last assumption is that IDPs have both political and humanitarian needs. Thus, it is 
argued that both sets of needs should be addressed to improve protection and assistance 
and to create sustainable solutions. 7 
The thesis concludes that the joint responses made some achievements in strengthening 
the responsibility of the RI but ultimately did not fulfil their combined potential and 
could not build on opportunities from within the state and the international community. 
This significant assertion is based on the representative findings from the comparative 
case study approach and the extensive interviews with senior representatives from the 
joint responses and other key informants. In particular, the thesis focuses on 
predominating constraints from the internal and international dimensions to state 
sovereignty and weaknesses in the application of the joint responses, which linked 
together to discredit the neutrality of the responses. Since neutrality is the basis of an 
effective response, it pinpoints the eventual obstruction of protection and assistance and 
the prevention of sustainable development and peace. This conclusion therefore 
exemplifies the limitations of responsible sovereignty in ensuring the adequate 
protection and assistance of IDPs. In answering the sub-question above, the selected 
Guiding Principles were applicable to the two main types of displacement in Aceh and 
North Sumatra and were insightful in evaluating the needs of IDPs and the impact of the 
7 IDPs are a product of the conflict and represent a fundamental break in the relationship between 
sovereign and citizen. 
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responses. Nevertheless, the Principles demonstrated some weaknesses in capturing the 
complexities of displacement. 
This conclusion is based on a twofold argument. First, the thesis explains the important 
achievements of the joint responses. The primary achievement was gaining dual 
acceptance of the RI and GAM. From this, the political response had the potential to 
resolve the root cause of displacement and bring sustainable peace. It also made 
sustainable development possible by initially strengthening access for an extensive 
structure of indigenous and international humanitarian actors, which worked alongside 
the RI. This achievement occurred because the responses were initially respected for 
their neutral, international status and from opportunities created by the state and the 
international community. Accordingly, the joint responses made some progress in 
advancing the protection and assistance of IDPs and thus the responsibility of the state. 
That is, the short-term needs of IDPs were mainly fulfilled. For long-term needs, there 
were concerted attempts by the international organisations to move the GoRI and 
indigenous NGOs to a more long-term mindset by improving local capacities and 
through some positive instances of return and resettlement. 
Nevertheless, sustainable development and peace were prevented because the responses 
became inoperative when their neutrality was discredited by the combination of the two 
multifaceted challenges: manipulative constraints from state sovereignty and 
weaknesses in the practical application of the joint responses. The thesis focuses on the 
following manipulative constraints from state sovereignty: 
¢ the historical dynamics of the secessionist conflict; 
¢ the hijacking of the responses by foreign states to fulfil vested political and 
economic interests; 
¢ the superficial use of the responses by the RI to improve its international image; 
> the ingrained politicisation of IDPs; and 
> the traditional gaps in protection for IDPs, as demonstrated by the politicisation 
of protection and assistance, the corruption of aid and the specific opposition to 
return and resettlement. 
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The following weaknesses in the practical application of the joint responses also put 
their neutrality at risk: 
¢ the HDC's narrow restriction of beneficiaries to IDPs and its misrepresentation 
of humanitarian needs; 
¢ humanitarian mediation was unsuitable as a conflict resolution strategy, as 
proven by the ability of spoilers on both armed sides to oppose and manipulate 
the responses; 
¢ both responses misunderstood the nature of internal displacement; 
¢ the inadequate provision of protection, as demonstrated by insufficient 
preparation by both responses and the vulnerable structure of the joint dialogue 
process; and 
¢ humanitarian protection and assistance were politicised directly by the 
inappropri ate integration of the joint responses. 
The neutrality of the responses ultimately became discredited and they became 
inoperative when the above weaknesses and constraints linked. Accordingly: 
¢ the HDC added to the manipulative dynamics of the context by misrepresenting 
the nature of humanitarian needs as leverage for political intervention; 
¢ the GoRI preferred assistance to development so it could limit intervention 
while superficially improving its international image as a responsible state. 
Similarly, the humanitarian mediation strategy demanded the fulfillment of 
short-term needs to help maintain momentum in joint dialogue; 
¢ the ingrained politicisation of IDPs became more entrenched because the HDC 
made them special beneficiaries and the joint responses misunderstood the 
nature of displacement; and 
¢ the politicisation of protection and assistance became more extreme and resulted 
in the complete restriction of humanitarian access to IDPs. This outcome 
stemmed from the wider unsuitability of humanitarian mediation as a strategy 
for addressing and resolving the reasons for the conflict, the particular inability 
of the responses to fill the original gaps in protection for IDPs and their 
inappropriate integration. 
Consequently, the joint responses unintentionally had fuelled the conflict by 2003. 
Some short-term needs for IDPs were still threatened but it was more significant that 
long-term needs remained unresolved, in particular, livelihoods, education, trauma, 
social structures and tensions with host communities. The main predicament of each 
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case study group, repetitive displacement in Aceh and illegitimate resettlement in North 
Sumatra, overwhelmingly demonstrated this impact. 
Structure of the Chapters 
It is important to clarify the key components of the central argument and how they are 
addressed within the chapters. Chapters One and Two review the academic literature on 
the main themes within the thesis. Chapter One focuses on two approaches to 
understanding conflict-induced internal displacement, the universal (Cohen & Deng, 
1998) and the situational or needs-based (Bennett, 1998a; Helle, 1998; and Sorenson, 
1998). Although the two main approaches have greatly improved the understanding of 
conflict-induced displacement, the division reflects the international community's 
uncertainty in responding to IDPs. This chapter moves to examine the global 
significance of the number of IDPs and their fundamental political relationship with 
refugees (Jean, 1992; and Barutciski, 1998). The latter is important because it 
contributed to the Western policy of containment, which in turn reflected the constraints 
from state sovereignty in providing adequate protection and assistance. Last, internal 
conflict through political violence centres on complex underlying and proximate factors 
but the low-intensity stage represents opportunities for conflict management (Brown, 
1997; and Synder & Jervis, 1999). To provide further insight into this root cause, the 
chapter examines the argument that the reasons and dynamics of modern internal 
conflict or `new wars' represent significant deviations from previous variants (Kaldor, 
1997; and Munck, 2000). 
Chapter Two examines the practical responses to protecting and assisting the needs of 
IDPs to ensure sustainable solutions. The chapter begins by analysing needs as multi- 
layered and interdependent, that is, the political and the humanitarian, short and long- 
term and the last interdependence is the importance of linking assistance and protection, 
which has proven problematic. The critique of international responses starts with the 
Guiding Principles (Cohen & Deng, 1998). They represent the cornerstone of the 
doctrine of responsible sovereignty but their application and implementation have 
provoked criticism (Bennett, 1998; and Helle, 1998). After providing three main 
justifications for consensual international intervention (Weiss & Chopra, 1995; and 
Dowty & Loescher, 1997), the chapter reviews the mechanisms typically used to 
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provide international humanitarian intervention while recognising the long-term 
importance of harnessing the coping skills of IDPs. Political intervention is more 
difficult because it implies greater interference and the international community has not 
established a viable response (Roberts, 1996). Therefore, Chapter Two closes by 
examining the viability of humanitarian mediation as a strategy for political intervention 
in resolving internal conflict as the root cause of displacement. With an emerging and 
innovative international role, Conflict Transformation Agencies (CTA's) are considered 
as the relevant third party (Rigby, 2001; and Crocker, Osler & Aall, 1999). Their 
primary appeal is the ability to transcend the pejorative connotations of international 
intervention while upholding the sovereignty of the state. However, it is important to 
consider the significant challenges of establishing a ceasefire, overcoming opposition 
from spoilers, maintaining momentum and preventing the politicisation of humanitarian 
needs (Ebersole, 2000; Hay & Sanger, 1992; and Posen, 1997). 
The qualitative methodology for collecting and analysing the primary data is presented 
in Chapter Three. The holistic approach, using interrelated qualitative methods and 
techniques, was justified because of the paucity of empirical data on the subject matter 
and the practical restrictions of the armed conflict. The chapter moves to outline the 
field and desk research during the pre-study and the comparative case study stages. 
This is followed by presenting the approaches used to identify gatekeepers, select key 
informants and the gaining and maintaining of access. 
Semi-structured interviews were completed with key informants in Aceh, North 
Sumatra, Jakarta, Geneva and the United Kingdom (UK), therefore, it is pertinent to 
review their design. In addition, semi-structured interviews, based on the standards 
codified in the Guiding Principles, were conducted with a sample of IDPs from the two 
case studies. These interviews were supplemented by a focus group session with each 
IDP committee and in-camp structured field observations. Based on this, it is important 
to explain the reasons for using the IDP household as the strategic unit of analysis and 
the technique of modified, non-random, cluster sampling. Furthermore, it is asserted 
that the findings are representative of each case study group because of the inclusion of 
marginalised sub-groups and the holistic approach to methods and techniques. 
Justification for tentative conclusions on other similar groups of IDPs in each province 
stems from the comparative case study method and the in-depth knowledge of 
displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra based on secondary sources. The chapter 
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closes by reviewing the processes of recording and analysing the data. Data validation 
and the multifaceted challenge of recognising and controlling bias are examined 
throughout Chapter Three. 
In pinpointing the unique paradox addressed by the thesis, Chapter Four examines the 
strategies of the political and humanitarian responses to IDPs in Aceh and North 
Sumatra. In theory, the joint responses had the potential to make the RI more 
responsible for its IDPs. The political response by the HDC was based on an innovative 
intervention strategy, which tried to address the underlying reasons for the secessionist 
conflict and created the space for an extensive structure of international and indigenous 
humanitarian actors. Typically, humanitarian assistance alone is reactive and can only 
assist IDPs through relief. However, the joint responses aimed to create sustainable 
peace and development by addressing political and humanitarian needs and by 
improving protection and assistance. 
As their primary achievement, the responses managed to gain the consent of the RI and 
the co-operation of GAM. In understanding the reasons for this significant dual 
acceptance, it is important to consider first the opportunities created by the international 
dimension to state sovereignty. In particular, the joint responses were respected initially 
because of their international, neutral status. In addition, they received direct political 
and financial support from the international community, which also encouraged the RI 
and GAM to protect the basic human rights of IDPs and to seek a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict. Furthermore, by 1999, the military stalemate between the RI and GAM 
was an opportunity from within state sovereignty, as it demonstrated the need for 
international political intervention. 
Despite these opportunities, constraints from state sovereignty jeopardised the neutrality 
of the responses. Fundamentally, manipulation was a recurring and perpetuating factor 
of the conflict. Similarly, manipulation also occurred within the international arena. 
Although the United States (US) and the UK promoted the responses, these states had 
conflicting interests since they fundamentally supported the RI because of the 
inviolability of state sovereignty and vested economic interests. Consequently, these 
ulterior agendas tainted the neutral image of the responses. The GoRI was also not fully 
committed to the long-term aims of the responses and used them superficially to 
improve its international image as a responsible state. 
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As the first two weaknesses of the political response, the HDC initially ignored long- 
term needs since the humanitarian mediation strategy was based on the rapid delivery of 
assistance and successful, short-term humanitarian outcomes. This approach stemmed 
from the limited space for political intervention, that is, the GoRI wanted short-term 
assistance only. Although the HDC successfully gained the consent of the state, the 
initial misrepresentation of needs added to the manipulative dynamics of the context. 
Last, the HDC inaccurately restricted its beneficiaries to IDPs, who were only one of 
several conflict-affected groups in Aceh. Both weaknesses made the HDC's neutrality 
questionable. 
Chapter Five demonstrates the limited achievements of the political response in 
strengthening the responsibility of the state through the successful outcomes of joint 
dialogue during 2000-2001 and the development of the CoHA in 2002. To complete the 
understanding of why the responses gained the consent of the RI, the chapter identifies 
the opportunity for intervention created by strains upon sovereignty: the emergence of 
democratisation, several ongoing internal conflicts, the impact of a national economic 
crisis and strong grassroots support in Aceh for peace. 
Nevertheless, implementation of the political responses was problematic, which had 
knock-on effects for the humanitarian response. As a significant weakness, the 
humanitarian mediation strategy was inherently flawed in addressing and resolving the 
substantive reasons for the conflict. The ingrained manipulative dynamics of the 
conflict/state predominated and security deteriorated. In particular, spoilers from the 
military and GAM were able to oppose and use the responses to suit their vested 
military, political and economic interests. Primarily, the insurgents gained new 
importance from the joint dialogue and used it to further their political and military 
strength. This increased opposition within the RI and the military gradually launched 
more stringent operations. In sum, the neutrality of the political response became 
contested in the field and the political violence intensified since the HDC lacked 
sufficient power to protect its mandate. 
Chapter Six argues that the joint responses misunderstood the multi-layered process of 
becoming an IDP and this became a fundamental weakness in their practical 
application. This significant mistake stemmed from the ingrained politicisation of IDPs 
by the state, which reductively categorised groups as real and false. Regrettably, the 
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responses upheld and perpetuated this damaging dichotomy. Therefore, in introducing 
the two case study groups, Chapter Six presents a flexible or composite approach to a 
typology of displacement in order to understand its complex nature. In sum, the 
political violence within the low-intensity armed conflict formed the root cause and was 
the predominating influence within the causal process of displacement. However, it 
was only one of several layers of push and pull factors, which inter-played and 
overlapped with varying effects. The typology and composite approach also allows for 
the prevalence of deliberate or politicised displacement to demonstrate how IDPs 
represented both an effect and tool of the armed conflict. As the two case studies 
proved, displacement must be recognised as a variable phenomenon and addressed 
according to political and humanitarian needs. To demonstrate the validity and 
representative nature of the case study findings, the chapter identifies the main pattern 
and characteristics of displacement at each provincial level based on the fluidity of 
displacement and the typical profile of IDPs. 
Using the Guiding Principles as a framework for investigation and analysis, Chapter 
Seven demonstrates that the responses and coping mechanisms of IDPs largely met the 
short-term needs of each case study group. Therefore, in these ways and at least on the 
surface, the state became more responsible. However, deficiencies are noted in 
security, sanitation, shelter and access to basic supplies. Moreover, long-term needs 
were inadequately fulfilled, which prevented sustainable development. Livelihoods 
remained fractured and education debilitated. Social structures were challenged and 
eroded, there were high-levels of trauma and simmering tensions with each host 
community. In particular, the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic IDP group required 
permanent return while the Sei Lepan group in North Sumatra needed their settlements 
to be sanctioned by the RI. Therefore, Chapter Seven argues that the protracted neglect 
of long-term needs resulted in significant instability for the IDPs despite indigenous 
sources of protection and assistance and the coping mechanisms of the displaced. This 
proves that the joint political and humanitarian responses failed to tackle the cyclical 
and interdependent nature of short and long-term humanitarian and political needs. The 
Guiding Principles proved applicable overall, especially for long-term needs. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note how some of these provisions missed the contextual 
nuances of displacement. 
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Chapter Eight, as the first of two concluding chapters, examines the opportunities 
created by the joint responses for the RI to take greater responsibility for its IDPs. In 
particular, the author focuses on the efforts of the humanitarian response to deliver 
relief and implement development programmes. Despite some notable progress in 
assistance, it is argued that the ingrained absence of protection from the RI prevailed, 
constrained sustainable development and jeopardised the neutrality of the responses. 
The constraint consisted of three gaps: the politicisation of protection and assistance, the 
corruption of aid and opposition to return and resettlement. Therefore, it is concluded 
that the RI did not use the potential developed by the joint responses to assume greater 
responsibility. Chapter Eight also reviews the potentials and limitations of the Guiding 
Principles in improving the pragmatic provisions of protection and assistance in the two 
provinces. 
Chapter Nine, as the second concluding chapter, examines how the last two weaknesses 
in the application of the joint responses contributed to the inadequate provision of 
protection for the IDPs. This inability to fill the protection gaps explains the prevention 
of sustainable development and peace. The first weakness consisted of the insufficient 
preparation by indigenous and international NGOs and the HDC in meeting protection 
needs. This is demonstrated by a review of their mandates, their overly reactive efforts 
in the field and the evidence that the level and type of protection concerns were 
misjudged. Against the instruction of the Guiding Principles, the responses were slow 
to integrate the provisions of protection with assistance. Accordingly, the main 
designated mechanism for protection in Aceh, the joint dialogue structure of the 
political response, proved too vulnerable to spoilers. This was demonstrated by the 
continuation of forced displacement in spite of the security agreements, which formed a 
facet of the intensification of political violence overall. The vulnerability is explained 
by the powerlessness of the joint committees and the monitoring teams and the 
restriction of civil society from the negotiations between the RI and GAM. 
The second weakness concerns the inappropriate integration of the joint responses 
through the exclusionary pursuit of peace dividends. This exacerbated the politicisation 
of protection and assistance in Aceh and North Sumatra, which was an original 
constraint from state sovereignty. Consequently, security for IDPs and the staff of the 
responses could no longer be guaranteed in Aceh. The introduction of martial law in 
May 2003 signalled that neutrality had been discredited. 
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This thesis closes by revisiting the research question, central argument and conclusion. 
The research findings are then connected with the main themes addressed by the 
literature review, followed by some ideas for further research. 
Research Strategy 
Based on a review of the relevant academic literature, it was concluded that greater 
insight was needed into forced internal displacement in low-intensity secessionist armed 
conflict. This coincided with an emerging interest in the dynamics and significance of 
the conflict in Aceh, which was furthered as a researcher for the Post-war 
Reconstruction and Development Unit's (PRDU) commissioned evaluation of the 
HDC. 8 The one-year research project provided unique insight into the role of the third 
party through valuable access to elites. This involved a study of internal reports and 
interviews with the policy makers in Geneva, HDC international staff and other senior 
informants in Aceh, North Sumatra and Jakarta that were connected to the political 
process. 
Following a review of field-based literature, it was clear that there was a paucity of 
information on forced displacement in the two provinces. In particular, there was no 
comparative study of IDPs. Therefore, qualitative methods were employed to explore 
and explain, in a systematic manner, the nature and impact of conflict-induced internal 
displacement for two IDP groups within North Sumatra and Aceh and to provide 
tentative conclusions on the overall effectiveness of the joint responses in providing 
adequate protection and assistance. The Guiding Principles were chosen as a useful 
analytical framework to examine the short and long-term needs and thus the impact of 
the joint responses while simultaneously testing the applicability of the Principles. 
Overall and within the confines of the doctrine of responsible sovereignty, the goal of 
the research was to promote improvement in the understanding of and responses to 
forced displacement caused by this variant of internal armed conflict. To achieve this 
goal, five main objectives were set: 
8 The PRDU is based at the Department of Politics, University of York. 
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¢ to adopt a progressive "focusing approach" to the research, starting with a 
literature review of IDPs in the global arena to forced displacement through low- 
intensity armed secessionist conflicts (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 18); 
¢ to use the PRDU evaluation as part of the pre-study based on context-specific, 
field-based secondary sources and interviews with key informants in the field; 
¢ to provide a thorough understanding of the needs and vulnerabilities of the 
displaced, with focus on two case studies, which in certain ways were 
representative of the main modes of displacement in the two provinces caused 
by the conflict; 
> to examine the relevance and applicability of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement to the two contexts; and 
> to illuminate the effectiveness of the two response strategies in alleviating short 
and long-term needs of IDPs through protection and assistance based on the 
standards codified in the Principles. 
From the pre-study, the following observations were made: 
9 
¢ there were limited though differing views on the best approaches to 
understanding, defining and responding to the global phenomenon of IDPs, 
especially when the main cause was political violence within the aforementioned 
context; 
> there were differing views as to the most effective and proper role of 
humanitarian protection and assistance; 
> the profile of internal displacement in Indonesia, in particular, Aceh and North 
Sumatra, was under-researched and therefore demanded close, qualitative 
analysis, which would be further strengthened by a comparative study of two 
case study groups; 
> the GoRI had tried a multifaceted approach to protecting and assisting IDPs in 
Aceh and North Sumatra but this was not examined in a systematic manner. As 
above, a comparative case study approach would therefore yield preliminary 
though insightful conclusions; 
> the process of third party intervention in the conflict in Aceh since 1999 
impacted on, inter alia, internal displacement in the two provinces and the joint 
responses; 
9 This involved a critical review of a sample of the academic literature and field-based secondary 
resources between 2000 and 2002 in addition to a period of exploratory field research in Aceh and North 
Sumatra in March 2001. The latter assessed the political process of international third party intervention. 
The last element consisted of interviews with key informants in Geneva in 2002, which focused on the 
challenges raised by forced internal displacement. 
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¢ the above also needed to be examined to provide lessons for other similar 
contexts and to improve the overall understanding of, and response to internal 
displacement caused by low-intensity secessionist armed conflict. 
Based on the aims and objectives of the research, developed and refined during the pre- 
study, the following strategy for the comparative case study research was followed. 
> To complete a qualitative, comparative study of a group of IDPs from each 
province, using the standards for basic human rights specified in the Guiding 
Principles to explore the nature of displacement and the needs of each group by 
focusing on their capacities and vulnerabilities. To collect data from a sample of 
IDPs from each case study, through semi-structured interviews with mainly 
open-ended questions, a focus group interview (per case study) and structured 
observations completed by the researcher. The "pivotal aspects" would be the 
focus, however, the study would stop before a quantitative stage (Arksey & 
Knight, 1999: 18). 
> To complete semi-structured interviews with key informants and where relevant 
to revisit organisations interviewed in 2001. To use open-ended questions 
primarily, focusing on the two case studies with reference to displacement in 
each province and the impact of the wider socio-economic and political context. 
To concentrate on the applicability of the Guiding Principles, the progress made 
by the joint responses and the impact of protection and assistance. To complete 
a longitudinal aspect to the research on the conflict, the role of the political 
intervention process and its impact on the humanitarian response strategy. 
¢ To maintain the collection and analysis of context-specific, field-based 
secondary sources. '0 
Exponents of forced migration or displacement studies stem from various academic 
disciplines (for example, anthropology, sociology, jurisprudence and geography) and 
employ a range of methods and techniques, including, qualitative and quantitative, 
ethnography and social surveys. The research primarily identifies with the discipline of 
political science and the sub-discipline of international relations. In essence, it studies 
the impact of the state's responses to its vulnerable citizens during secessionist armed 
conflict and the input of non-state and international actors in this political phenomenon. 
More distinctly, the research falls under the field of conflict resolution though 
converges with the study of development and post-war reconstruction. Within 
displacement studies, the doctrine of responsible sovereignty and the Guiding Principles 
are proposed as the international community's formal response and the latter form the 
10 Apart from references to the history of the conflict in Aceh, the HDC's entry in late 1999 and the 
introduction of martial law in May 2003 forms the scope of the thesis. 
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framework for the empirical research. These multiple links and layers merely reflect 
how theory is decided by practice. 
It is now appropriate to move to Chapter One, which reviews the academic literature on 
internal displacement from low-intensity secessionist armed conflict. 
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1. Internal Displacement from Low-Intensity 
Secessionist Armed Conflict 
This chapter focuses on two approaches to understanding conflict-induced internal 
displacement. It also examines the significance of this global phenomenon and political 
violence from low-intensity secessionist armed conflict as a root cause and context of 
displacement. As detailed in Section 1.1, the universal approach advocates a broad- 
based definition of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and treats them as a special 
group of vulnerable persons that demand a distinct status among conflict-affected 
victims (Cohen & Deng, 1998). Conversely, the situational approach argues that IDPs 
can only be defined according to each context. Although they recognise that IDPs have 
special needs, the approach prefers them to be treated inclusively with all conflict- 
affected groups (Bennett, 1998; Helle, 1998; and Sorenson, 1998). 
Moving on from the dichotomy, Section 1.2 examines the global significance of IDPs by 
briefly outlining their total numbers and focusing on their fundamental political 
relationship with refugees (Jean, 1992; and Barutciski, 1998). The latter is important 
because it contributed to the Western policy of containment, which in turn reflected the 
constraints from state sovereignty in providing adequate protection and assistance. 
The root causes of forced internal displacement vary from the natural to the man-made 
but this chapter focuses on political violence through secessionist armed conflict at its 
pivotal low-intensity stage. As a form of internal armed conflict, Section 1.3 analyses 
the dynamics of low-intensity secessionism according to underlying and proximate 
factors (Brown, 1997; and Synder & Jervis, 1999). To provide further insight into this 
root cause, the last section examines the argument that the reasons and dynamics of 
modern internal conflict or `new wars' represent significant deviations from previous 
variants. In particular, it is asserted that civilians are more susceptible to forced internal 
displacement since it has become a means and effect of new wars and the situational 
approach also supports the theory that displacement has diversified (Kaldor, 1997; and 
Munck, 2000). 
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The chapter makes three preliminary conclusions, which demand further investigation. 
Primarily, the two main approaches to conflict-induced displacement have greatly 
improved the understanding of conflict-induced displacement. The universal approach 
is important because it provides a workable definition, which may strengthen legal and 
operational responses. However, the situational approach reminds that displacement is 
conditioned by each context and should be treated in relation to actual needs as opposed 
to categories. Second, internal conflict based on political violence centres on complex 
underlying and proximate factors but there are opportunities for conflict management at 
the low-intensity stage. Last, the nature and dynamics of armed secessionism contradict 
aspects of the new wars thesis. 
1.1 Understanding Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement 
The universal approach includes conflict-induced internal displacement within a broad- 
based and flexible IDP definition and treats IDPs as a distinct category of persons with 
vulnerable needs. Although this approach has gathered the support of the international 
community, the situational approach points to ethical and logistical polemics in theory 
and in application. 
1.1.1 Universal approach 
There have been several attempts to improve the understanding and thus protection and 
assistance of IDPs. The predominating approach stems from the concerted attempt by 
the international community to establish a codified broad definition as a basis for a legal 
framework (Korn, 1999: 12-13). The IDP Representative of the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations (UN), Francis Deng, refined the UN working definition, as persons 
or groups of persons: 
... who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural 
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized border (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 18). 
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Cohen & Deng note there are two distinctive features in framing the definition: 
movement can be "coerced or voluntary" and the population affected remain within their 
national borders (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 16). Thus, it is the "coercion" behind the 
internal displacement that impels their movement, subjection to human rights violations 
and a lack of protection (Cohen, 1998a: 5). 
The IDP definition is defended since it is "not a derogatory designation", nor does it 
seek to attach blame. Instead, it is a "designation of vulnerability, and thus a recognition 
of the necessity of assisting these people. " (Doebbler, 1999; and Cohen & Deng, 1998: 
26-27). It is accepted that while some humanitarian organisations and non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) adopt context-specific definitions of IDPs, there is 
a general acceptance of the need for a flexible definition. The definition was broadly 
welcomed through the Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action which sythesized the 
proposals of hundreds of NGOs and the United Nation High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 191). 
1.1.2 Situational approach 
As an alternative to the universal approach, critics argue that it is better to address the 
"situation" of conflict as opposed to "categories" (Davies, 1998: vi). They raise the 
negative conceptual, legal and practical ramifications of the IDP definition/category and 
status. Conceptually, internal displacement is extremely varied. Sorenson asserts that 
during conflict, internal displacement usually involves a collapse in formal and informal 
structures at all levels but overall is "typically a continuous, indeterminate process" and 
may take different forms (Sorenson, 1998: 78). Consequently, labels can be reductive 
and categories meaningless, instead it is the "corresponding entitlements" which give 
them particular significance while definitions like `refugees', are for "legal purposes". 
For implementation, Barutciski argues that it is futile to re-codify since states are 
already bound by international law (Barutciski, 1998: 1). An advisor to the UNHCR 
concurs: "if humanitarian law principles were respected there would not be internal 
displacement" (Interview 40,3 December 2002). Instead, the vulnerability of groups "in 
particular scenarios is a matter for operational priorities, not for legal or conceptual 
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development" and consequently a problem for humanitarian intervention (Barutciski, 
1998: 3). 1 
However, practitioners also identify concerns since the IDP category could discriminate 
against non-displaced groups and create further inequity and conflict (Davies, 1998: vi; 
and Barutciski, 1998: 3). 2 This is reflected by the policy of the ICRC, which prefers to 
focus on the `war-affected population' (Bennett, 1998a: 14). Moreover, an International 
Organisation of Migration (IOM) representative reminds that, "in some cases, IDPs are 
those that are better off, that is, they can move and go elsewhere, others have to stay 
back. " (Interview 44,5 December 2002). 3 Similarly but from a different angle, Bennett 
prefers to de-politicise the concept, to make it neutral and impartial (Bennett, 1998a: 
12). He asserts that the definition makes intervention more difficult since it reinforces 
sovereignty, notions of state responsibility, and that, paradoxically: 
... for the still Northern dominated 
donor world [... ] intervention is 
disengagement, for it is associated with containment which supports populations 
in war zones, discourages refugee flows and internalises causes and 
consequences (Bennett cited in Davies, 1998: viii). 
Alternatively, he defines forced migration as "the involuntary movement of (usually) a 
large group of people due to external pressure" (Bennett, 1998a: 14). 
The definition can also create dilemmas, as a representative from the Internal 
Displacement Unit at the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (OCHA 
ID Unit) argues: "at what point do we stop assisting these people? How do you judge 
when these people want to go back? Maybe they want to stay here now but later they 
might change their minds. " The informant believes the central problem is, "should the 
definition have a bearing on whether these people receive assistance and move into an 
ICRC area? Who says we should focus on vulnerability? IDPs are part of the broader 
community. " (Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
1 Similarly, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representative thought the IDP definition 
"was useful, however, it is usually cut at the operational level/stage [for other organisations]. " (Interview 
38,3 December 2002). 
2 There are considerable overlaps between the two, consequently, the labels are perceived as "reductive" 
and "potentially dangerous" since the category, IDP "masks their heterogeneity". Perhaps, it is more 
accurate to consider that women and children make up 70 per cent of the world's IDP population (Davies, 
1998: vii). 
3 People stay because of resources and active resistance against migrant pressure, thereby encouraging 
new forms of collective action, as demonstrated by the case-study of San Jose de Apartado in Colombia, 
see Bennett, 1998a: 14. 
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In prioritising context before categories, the situational approach is also known as the 
"needs approach" (Davies, 1998: vi). The UNHCR advisor confirms, "this is the only 
way we can talk about solutions from the outset. Intervention should have a solution- 
oriented approach. " (Interview 40,3 December 2002). The IOM representative agrees 
that, "it is better to approach the problem based on needs and not limit it to IDPs since 
each context has its own [political] factors"" 4 Therefore, the IDP definition, "sometimes 
seems artificial in making this distinction when it doesn't really affect the needs of the 
people. " (Interview 44,5 December 2002). 
The situational or needs approach proposes that definitions must assess the context- 
specific "perceptions of displacement". This would in turn challenge the limitations of 
terms such as `vulnerable groups', `beneficiaries' and `target groups'. It is thus critical 
of the trend of the international community to present displacement as a series of linked 
events (from war to flight, refugee, return and resettlement. 5 Instead, it is important to 
consider the kind of coping mechanisms IDPs "use to allay further hardships" (Bennett, 
1998a: 12). 6 That is, people can "create social networks and may still shape their own 
present and future". 7 Furthermore, for those caught up in the social upheaval, the 
experience of displacement "may be punctuated" by more "fundamental changes" and 
may just be one phase in "gaining a living in trying circumstances" (Sorenson, 1998: 
78). 
Another problem with the definition is the constant fluctuation in numbers of IDPs, 
which creates differences in opinion as to who should be included. Two examples, 
which stretch the definition, are demobilised soldiers and their families and former 
4 He raised a recent example in Afghanistan, where the same assistance and development was given to 
different areas even though the needs differed in magnitude. This exemplified the joint relevance of 
protection and politics or the risks of appearing impartial. This was extremely relevant in the volatile 
situation in Afghanistan among competing ethnic groups. Thus, the ICRC helped hospitals in Kabul, 
Kandahar and Jalaabad where needs were great, however, it also applied the same assistance to hospitals 
in Bamiyan where it was needed but not to the same extent (Interview 38,3 December 2002). 
S Sorenson agrees that reaching a clear and workable definition of different categories of IDPs is a 
political process since it involves decisions regarding responsibility and legal and moral rights to 
protection, relief assistance and development resources (Sorenson, 1998: 75). 
6 Davies concurs that it is preferable to consider how IDPs view themselves and act "in their own changed 
or changing circumstances" since displacement, "may not be the primary point of reference for IDPs in 
their overall efforts to survive and to provide for their families". Accordingly, it may be easier to identify 
the most appropriate kind of assistance to be provided (Davies, 1998: viii). 
7 For example, despite widowhood through the 1994 Rwandan genocide, women emerged as community 
leaders, land rights were challenged and women increasingly sought work outside the home. In 
Afghanistan, the opposite occurred with IDP women increasingly confined within camps, thereby 
"reinforcing radical conservatism of the mainly Pushtun menfolk" (Bennett, 1998a: 12). 
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refugees that have returned to their country of origin but are unable to go back to their 
original place of residence (Helle, 1998: 34). For Bennett, the category should include 
rural-urban drifters and the homeless (Bennett, 1998a: 14). Saha proposes the definition 
of IDPs needs to be confined solely to the human rights abuse-induced (Saha, 2000: 27) 
while Helle also defends the inclusion of the disaster status in case it creates internal 
displacement in a hostile area. For example, in Somalia, floods forced tens of thousands 
to seek refuge in areas controlled by rival clans (Helle, 1998: 34). Furthermore, 
Jacobsen inquires if the IDP status should end, for example, after long-term integration 
and resettlement and more centrally, questions if there should "be a cut off point? " For 
instance, the Angolan government stops the IDP status after six months of integration 
regardless of change (Jacobsen, 2001: 22). 
Since the early 1990s, the international community displayed a gradual interest in 
understanding and defining IDPs as a vulnerable group with special needs. Although 
this progress can be praised, critics argue that the principle of a definition is counter- 
productive to meeting needs and prefer to address all the context-specific needs of a 
conflict-affected population. 
1.2 Global Significance of IDPs 
IDPs are primarily significant because of the immediate implications of their total 
numbers and wide geographical base. One way to explain the increase in IDPs during 
the 1990s is to consider their political relationship with refugees. This stems from a 
shift in the international community's perception of refugees and the subsequent policy 
of containment, which reflects the sanctity of state sovereignty. 
1.2.1 Implications of total numbers 
IDPs can be interpreted to equal or even slightly outnumber refugees. When the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) first considered internal 
displacement in 1992, there was an estimated 24 million IDPs and by 1994 this had 
reached a total of 30 million in addition to 20 million refugees (Deng, 1994). Of 
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countries with major conflicts since 1980, ten had more than 40 per cent displaced, 
"with cataclysmic consequences for the population as a whole". When areas are either 
depopulated or overcrowded through displacement and resettlement, there can be severe 
consequences for the land, thereby creating "a multiplier effect. " (Korn, 1999: 17). The 
main knock-on effect is refugee flows since "only infrequently do the crises that 
generate this displacement remain confined to a single country", which can cause 
turmoil for neighbours and may trigger regional instability (Korn, 1999: 3; and Deng, 
1998b: 10). 
1.2.2 Political relationship with refugees 
The global awareness of IDPs comes at the end of a narrative involving the politics of 
international relations, that is, a shift to a negative perception of refugees as 
demonstrated by more stringent border control and a policy of containment. 
8 During the 
Cold War, massive exoduses were caused by the increase in East-West tension and the 
rise of "peripheral" conflicts. Nevertheless, refugees arrived in manageable numbers 
and were initially welcomed for political reasons (Korn, 1999: 4; and Jean, 1992b: 123). 
The mass flights that took place during the wars of decolonisation became visible to the 
western public at the end of the 1970s. 9 In Afghanistan, Central America, Southeast 
Asia and the Horn of Africa, millions of refugees provided evidence of the brutality of 
war and the distress of civilian populations. Consequently, third world refugees became 
a central item on the international agenda, UNHCR resources expanded and Western 
governments increased their initiatives in camps on borders of countries at war. 
However, temporary became more permanent and this uncertainty in turn became a 
perpetuator of the conflicts (Jean, 1992b: 123). 
With the demise of the Cold War, it was thought that refugees would be able to return 
but the explosion of new states through high-intensity internal conflict was matched by a 
Western policy of containment. Refugees were considered illegal and potential 
8 Ager argues that the growth of global refugee numbers over the past three decades has "established an 
increasingly high profile for the issue of forced migration within the political and public debate". In sum, 
the flow of refugees has brought "major political, economic, social, cultural and personal consequences 
across all continents" (Ager, 1999: 1). 
9 Jean states that at first these displaced people were seen as symbols, as victims of war and were 
welcomed by those who felt "a special responsibility for their fate" (Jean, 1992b: 122). 
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economic immigrants (Jean, 1992b: 122; and Davies, 1998: vii). Deng concurs that 
since the end of the Cold War, the number of refugees declined while IDPs increased, 
which is a "trend which suggests a correlation" (Deng, 1998b: 1; and 1994). In sum, 
Western governments preferred to assist and protect the displaced in their own countries 
if it "keeps them from becoming refugees. " The Kurdish crisis exemplified the 
international community's concern to avoid any new refugee problem even if it meant, 
"protecting the repatriated Kurds in their own country however temporarily". In sum, 
the once `freedom fighters' became a burden (Korn, 1999: 4; and Jean, 1992b: 123). 
10 
The second link in the relationship with refugees is the difficulty of finding suitable 
response to IDPs. While refugees have an "established system of international 
protection and assistance", IDPs fall under the domestic jurisdiction and responsibility 
of the state, without there being, "specific legal or institutional bases for their protection 
and assistance" (Deng, 1998b: 2). Since the principle of state sovereignty protects 
against non-consensual intervention, Hampton reminds us that the international 
community has a "limited option to protect these people" (Hampton, 1998: xv). 
1.3 Low-Intensity Secessionist Armed Conflict 
This section focuses on political violence through low-intensity secessionist armed 
conflict, as a root cause of displacement. Low-intensity conflicts are significant because 
they are prevalent and represent a pivotal stage in the direction of the violence. 
Although it is necessary to allow for multiple causes in each context, it is important to 
identify and define the root cause. To analyse the nature and dynamics of armed 
secessionism, as a multi-layered variant of internal conflict, it is instructive to consider 
the impact of the widespread crises in national identities and the end of the Cold War. 
To further this analysis, underlying and proximate factors are examined. 
10 Albanian boat people have been abandoned by Italians; Haitians returned to a dictatorship by American 
Coast Guards, contributing a "total disregard of the 1951 Convention on Refugees" (Jean, 1992b: 121- 
122). 
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1.3.1 Definitions of root cause 
Political violence through secessionist armed conflict is a root cause since it produces 
push and pull factors, which determine the process of forced displacement. Horowitz 
describes secessionism as a "variable phenomenon" but as a form of ethnic conflict 
(Horowitz, 1985: 230). For the purpose of this thesis, it represents the aspiration of a 
group of persons to gain political and economic independence for their territory by 
formally separating from their home state, using armed violence as the means. It is thus 
categorised as an internal conflict or civil war. Deutsch defines the former as typically 
involving "change by violence, or the threat of violence of a government's policies, 
rulers or organisation" (Deutsch, 1964: 104). Focusing on the security dilemma, Synder 
& Jervis identify civil war as the "situation in which each party's efforts to increase its 
own security reduces the security of the others", that is, when strategic conditions make 
aggression the "most advantageous form of self-defense. " (Synder & Jervis, 1999: 15). 
The United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) defines civil war as the "conflict 
between a government and a minority" and considers it to be one of the principal causes 
of internal displacement. " (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 21). Of 101 internal conflicts, the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) notes they "are 
largely identity-based civil wars, fought over imbalances in the distribution of 
economic, political and social resources" (IDEA, 1998: 49). 
Within internal armed conflicts, those of low-intensity are significant for two reasons. 
First, they are widespread; for example, one survey towards the end of the 20`h Century 
noted 70 "low-intensity conflicts" globally. " A low-intensity armed conflict is 
classified as that which has caused 100 to 1000 deaths a year (PIOOM, 1997). Deutsch 
defines the quantitative aspects of internal war based on the duration and scale of 
hostilities and the number and percentage of people involved (Deutsch, 1964: 104). 
Conversely for Munck, the "old distinction between low-intensity (guerrilla) warfare 
and high-intensity (regular) war has faded". As furthered below, he considers new wars 
11 They ranged from Central and South America to West, Central and East Europe. Several countries 
were affected in Africa in addition to the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia (Interdisciplinary 
Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), 1997). Similarly, IDEA notes 
that of the 101 armed conflicts from 1989-1996,95 took place within existing states and 6 were interstate 
(IDEA, 1998: 49). 
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to be informal, open-ended and community based which concern cultural and identity 
factors (Munck, 2000: 1). 
Therefore as the second reason, low-intensity is a useful gauge in predicting trends 
although it is not a rigid classification. Based on precedents, once armed conflict ignites 
there is a tendency for it to spiral downwards through an intensification of political 
violence based on the security dilemma. Therefore, addressing low-intensity conflicts is 
significant for conflict management since it promotes prevention and the identification 
of early warning signs. The IOM representative confirms, "if you have low-intensity, 
hostilities are not everywhere, this may make it possible to provide some humanitarian 
help to assist communities where IDPs are concentrated" (Interview 44,5 December 
2002). Conflicts remain protracted until either a winner is produced or a settlement 
(long-term or short-term) is reached. For the latter, third party intervention is necessary 
but this requires both a military and political stalemate in the conflict and requires the 
consent of the state concerned. This time Munck agrees since in this context, the 
warring parties cannot get out of the situation unaided and need "external parties 
engaged as mediators at crucial points along the way" (Munck, 2000: 10). 
Although it is essential to identify and define the root cause, it is equally important to 
allow for multiple additional causes and overlaps when examining the reasons for 
internal displacement. For example, Birkeland recognises (of an IDP case study in 
Angola) that causes were "multiple and interlinked" and that IDP is a social identity, 
which forms one of many co-existing "axis" for a person (Birkland, 2001: 25-26). In 
recognising the complexity, Deng calls for a "pool of information" on the different 
dimensions to internal displacement, for example, the causes and manifestations; the 
degree of access to basic services; protection concerns; the capacity and willingness of 
governments to address their needs and the responsibility of the international 
community (Deng, 1998a: xiii). 12 
12 For a complete breakdown of conflict-induced displacement, see Deng, 1998a: xiv. 
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1.3.2 Crises in national identities and end of the Cold War 
Internal conflicts in the 1990s represented a "background of a rise in minority interests, 
exacerbation of old antagonisms and an explosion of nationalism. " (Jean, 1992b: 122). 
While circumstances varied, Deng selects "a crisis of national identity" as the common 
denominator and the nature of this crisis as one, "that generates cleavages between the 
affected population and the controlling authorities, governments, or insurgent groups. " 
(Deng cited in Korn, 1999: 6-7). Similarly, while Korn asserts that instances of larger 
internal displacement usually arise from "complex causes", all represent a, "breakdown 
in the basic mechanisms of society [... ] a crisis of national identity. " (Korn, 1999: 4). In 
Tajikistan, IDPs felt the government was not theirs as it, "represented an alien, 
competing, and often hostile, racial, linguistic, religious, cultural or tribal group" (Korn, 
1999: 7). 13 
Some of the literature concurs that when internal displacement appears to be about other 
issues, the "identity factor is clearly present". In Somalia (considered as one of Africa's 
few racially and linguistically homogenous countries), identity is based on clan 
membership and forms the key to understanding the conflict that has deeply split the 
country. 14 For governments, IDPs are usually treated as, "an alien and threatening 
group, usually with a different language, culture, or religion, and most often a minority 
subjected to abusive rule by the majority". This is confirmed by the common complaint 
by both sides that "these are not our people". Alienation is defined in terms of race, 
ethnicity, language, culture or religion and these have all been present in internal 
displacement (Korn, 1999: 7). 
For Cohen & Deng, Cold War policies between the United States (US) and the Soviet 
Union were catalysts in conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 15 All of these 
13 Other crises of identity occurred in Rwanda and Burundi with Hutus against Tutsis; in Sudan between 
the Arabised north and the more indigenous African south; the former Yugoslavia among Muslims, Serbs 
and Croats; in Sri Lanka with Sinhalese pitted against Tamils; and in Turkey between Turks and Kurds 
(Korn, 1999: 8). 
14 In El Salvador during the 1980s and early 1990s, civil war displaced mostly peasants based on class and 
economic disparity but also because peasants were of perceived Indian racial stock while the government 
and landowners were of European or mixed ancestry. Similar trends were found in Colombia and Peru 
where indigenous populations were internally displaced (Korn, 1999: 8). 
15 Soviet arms were used to help fight Eritrean independence and Tigrean insurgency from 1978-1991. 
Conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, EI Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua were 
also "deeply influenced by Cold War policies. " (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 19-20). 
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conflicts in turn produced high levels of internal displacement. In particular, Cohen & 
Deng write that in Africa, the countries that experienced the most extreme violence and 
highest levels of displacement were those that were "most closely aligned with and 
received the highest levels of aid from the two Cold War protagonists. " (Cohen & Deng, 
1998: 19-20). Helle concurs that the end of the Cold War was the "contributing element 
to the rise of internal conflicts, whereby the removal of a symptom has allowed latent 
antagonisms to erupt into the open. " (Helle, 1998: 31). 
1.3.3 Underlying and proximate causes 
Alternatively, Brown dismisses removal of authoritarian rule as a "single-factor 
explanation" of why ethnic and ancient rivalries ignite and instead explores the myriad 
of underlying causes of internal conflict (Brown, 1997: 3). In internal conflicts, Brown 
highlights four types of political factors. 16 For the first, discriminatory political 
institutions, the prospects for conflict depend on a significant degree on the type and 
fairness of its political system. The second political factor, exclusionary national 
ideologies, can be based on ethnic distinctions. In Indonesia, civic nationalism prevails 
and is Java-centric despite many other ethnic conceptions of nationalism (Brown, 1997: 
8-9). The third, the dynamics of domestic inter-group politics, conflict is especially 
likely when groups, based on political, ideological, religious, or ethnic affinities, have 
ambitious objectives, a strong sense of identity and confrontational strategies (Brown, 
1997: 9). The last factor involves elite politics by desperate and opportunistic 
politicians during political and economic turmoil often to fend off domestic challenges, 
consisting of ethnic bashing and scapegoating (Brown, 1997: 10). Encompassing all 
these factors, Korn writes that problems arise when a dominant group seeks to impose 
its identity on others or to further its interests, for example, "when political leaders 
exploit resentments, prejudices and passions in their attempt to gain or retain a hold on 
power (Korn, 1999: 8). 
Economic problems can contribute to intra-state tensions, in particular, the move from a 
centrally planned to market-based transition which typically creates high unemployment 
16 Brown admits these compartments are not watertight and conflicts can have more than one (Brown, 
1997: 17). 
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and rampant inflation. Financial reforms in the short-term can destabilise through 
"slowdowns, stagnation, deterioration, and collapse" (Brown, 1997: 10). 
Discriminatory economic systems can generate feelings of resentment and levels of 
frustration prone to the generation of violence. Unequal economic opportunities, 
unequal access to resources such as land and capital and vast differences in standards of 
living are all signs of economic systems which disadvantaged members of society will 
see as unfair and perhaps illegitimate, as seen in Sri Lanka (Brown, 1997: 11). Cohen & 
Deng similarly point to conflict through the consequences of sharing power, resources 
and opportunities (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 22). Helle also includes an unequal 
distribution of wealth, underdevelopment and poverty as causes (Helle, 1998: 31). 17 
Last, economic development and modernisation, for example, industrialisation and new 
technologies can "bring about a wide variety of profound social changes" such as 
migration and urbanisation. Brown notes that at the very least, they can place strains on 
existing political systems, raise economic and political expectations and can lead to 
mounting frustration (Brown, 1997: 11). 
Cultural and perceptual factors represent Brown's final underlying cause of internal 
conflict. Cultural discrimination can be directed against minorities through inequitable 
education, legal and political constraints on the use and teaching of minority languages 
and constraints on religious freedom. '8 Group perceptions and histories of themselves 
and others can lead to legitimate grievances and the glorification of histories, as 
demonstrated by Serbs and Croats during the 1990s (Brown, 1997: 12). 
Moving on from the underlying causes of internal conflict, Brown provides a number of 
proximate causes. The latter are considered catalytic or triggers of internal conflict (see 
Table 1). 
17 For example, in Central America, vast disparities in wealth, land ownership and access to power were at 
the root of conflicts that became geopolitical (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 20). 
18 Examples include Stalin's policies in the Caucasus in the 1930s and 1940s and China's approach to 
Tibet in the 1950s (Brown, 1997: 12). 
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Table 1 Brown's Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict 19 
Internally-driven Externally-driven 
Elite -triggered Bad Leaders Bad Neighbours 
Mass-triggered Bad Domestic Problems Bad Neighbours 
The first set of proximate causes, Mass-triggered/Bad Domestic Problems, typically 
involves rapid economic development, for example, modernisation in Punjab and Sri 
Lanka. The second, Mass-triggered/Bad Neighbours, are indicated by spill over effects, 
with refugees and fighters bringing turmoil and violence. The third set, External/Elite, 
involves decisions by governments to trigger conflicts in nearby states for political, 
economic and ideological purposes. Brown notes this only works where the potential 
for conflict exists (Brown, 1997: 16). Helle agrees that differences of identity can be 
used a tool to manipulate genuine group concerns (Helle, 1998: 31). The latter refers to 
Tajikistan where the two sides to the conflict, Soviet Marxists and Islamicists, were also 
ethnically divided (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 22). The final set, the Internal/Elite level, is 
power struggles involving civilian or military leaders, ideological contests and criminal 
assaults on the state, as happened in Columbia (Brown, 1997: 16). 
Weaknesses in state structures are a common factor. Some are born weak as artificial 
constructs from colonial empires and lack political legitimacy, politically sensible 
borders and political institutions capable of exercising meaningful control over territory 
placed under nominal supervision 20 They are "increasingly unable to cope with societal 
demands" and frequently lead to intra-state, security concerns, with defensive actions 
leading to the offensive resulting in a security dilemma, violent conflict and a 
humanitarian deficit (Brown, 1997: 5-6 and 14). The security dilemma is particularly 
intensified by greed and scarce resources, which makes actors predatory and incites 
elites to manipulate concerns to consolidate their position and extract additional 
19 From Brown, 1997: 15 
20 Many states, especially in Africa, have become weaker over time through reductions in aid and from 
international financial institutions and falls in commodity prices. They can be further weakened by 
internal problems, for example, endemic corruption, administrative incompetence and the inability to 
promote economic development (Brown, 1997: 5). 
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resources from society (Synder & Jervis, 1999: 23). Another feature of a failed or 
failing democratic state is a civilian government's inability to control its military and 
cannot protect its citizens' basic human rights. Consequently, it is the level of political 
violence and the extent of the humanitarian consequences, which determine the viability 
of the state, that is, if it is functioning, failing or failed (Synder & Jervis, 1999: 17). 
Political violence through armed secessionism is one of several forms of internal 
conflict and is insightfully analysed based on underlying and proximate factors. To 
further this understanding, it is pertinent to consider some manifested changes. 
1.4 Changes in Internal Armed Conflicts 
The new wars thesis asserts that internal conflicts from the 1990s represent a shift from 
previous variants based on changes in the motivations of combatants, the dynamics of 
violence and its impact. The increase and diversification in forced internal displacement 
exemplifies the latter and supports the fundamental concerns of the situational approach. 
Despite the validity of new wars, it is important to consider some qualifications of its 
main claims. 
1.4.1 New wars 
Some authors perceive the proliferation of internal armed conflicts as just one of several 
changing features of new wars, which Kaldor defines as a "conflict between politically 
organized groups involving large-scale violence. " (Kaldor, 1997: 7). Defining military 
features include the lack of formal armies and insurgents operating below the level of 
sophistication of a state's weapons system (Munck, 2000: 1). Consequently, organised 
violence is fragmented and decentralised, involving local militia, breakaway units from 
disintegrating states, paramilitary, organised crime groups and the ready availability of 
weapons and mercenaries. It is also difficult to distinguish between state and non-state 
actors, outsiders and insiders. Warring parties are commonly supported by "diaspora 
elements", "transnational commercial networks" (legal and illegal) and various 
"international actors", for example, military experts, NGOs and journalists (Kaldor, 
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1997: 11 and 14-16). Time constraints are also less important and as a result new wars 
"tend to be longer, more pervasive and less decisive" (despite cease-fires) (Kaldor, 
1997: 6; and Munck, 2000: 1). 
More significant for sovereignty, new wars do not presuppose the existence of states, are 
less concerned with the boundaries and goals of the state, compared with previous wars 
to consolidate "state power" and emanate from the disintegration or erosion of state 
structures. An example of the latter is "disillusion with centralized states and state-led 
policies" (Kaldor, 1997: 6 and 11). New wars rely on new technology, in particular, 
modern communications to co-ordinate small units, for propaganda and for "connecting 
transnational networks" (Kaldor, 1997: 16). A war economy is an additional feature, 
especially the taxing of humanitarian assistance where the money collected remains in 
the hands of a few, the role of widespread violence and criminality. Therefore, since 
"the war accentuates the very economic tendencies which contributed to the outbreak of 
war, it generates additional reasons to continue the war" (Kaldor, 1997: 18). 
The main point of contention is the assertion that new wars are less concerned with the 
state, which is contradicted by armed secessionist conflicts and other forms of internal 
political violence. Second, humanitarians in the field disagree with, or at least qualify 
the theory that the dynamics are different. The ICRC representative argues that the 
conflict in Yugoslavia during the 1990s was similar to occurrences during World War II 
and explained the perceived changes by pointing to the international community, which, 
"gives the impression it is more concerned and this makes public opinion more 
sensitive" or "perhaps there is just more interest now. " (Interview 38,3 December 
2002). Similarly, the representative from the International Federation of the Red Cross 
(IFRC) points to a common objective: "to make sure the people are too afraid to do 
anything, like with the Palestinians and in Rwanda. s21 
However, the same IFRC representative appreciated the more intense hatred during 
ethnic conflict, noting in World War I the two sides "played football on Christmas Day. 
This would never happen in Rwanda where the hate level is so high that it is now 
inbred. " (Interview 39,3 December 2002). A senior ICRC representative concludes, 
21 He continues that, "with the last 10-15 years in Yugoslavia and Burundi, it was exactly the same thing " 
(Interview 39,3 December 2002). 
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"after 11 years of conflict experience we are losing our humanitarianism in general but 
not in all conflicts. " For some contexts, he notes "a lot of confusion" on "the laws and 
customs of war" since "recently the war is about annihilation. " As a consequence, it is, 
"increasingly difficult to go to a place and say we are here just to improve water etc". In 
sum, the "distinction of humanity versus the reasons for war only exists in our heads and 
"the distinction between different types of victims and combatants is breaking down" 
(Interview 45,5 December 2002). 
1.4.2 Changes in conflict-induced internal displacement 
For Kaldor, the increase in IDPs and the change in push factors are significant changes 
in new wars. Destabilisation and displacement have become the main goals (Kaldor, 
1997: 16). In the past, IDPs could normally count on their government and fellow 
citizens for support since most conflicts were between states and the internal 
displacement of civilians represented incidental effects. 
2 In more recent internal 
conflicts, the enemy is within, creating less "spirit of solidarity" and making internal 
displacement an effect and means of conflict (Helle, 1998: 31). 
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Peripheral actions (systematic rape, hostage taking, forced starvation, targeting of 
civilians) have also moved to the fore (Kaldor, 1997: 16). Therefore, displacement 
represents one of several humanitarian needs, which when combined are "deeply 
destructive in societal terms, involving widespread physical destruction of homes, 
economic centres such as factories and power stations" (Kaldor, 1997: 8). 
Correspondingly, although casualties and direct participation in wars tend to be lower, 
22 Nevertheless, during the Cold War, between one third and one half of each of the populations in 
Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia and El Salvador were uprooted and in Turkey, two million 
Kurds were displaced because of a government counterinsurgency campaign (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 4-5). 
23 Bennett agrees that one of the chief characteristics of internal war is the strategic use of citizens as 
shields for combatants, as the focus of ethnic cleansing, or simply, "as expendable individuals in a fiercely 
contested resource war. " (Bennett, 1998a: 11). Jean concurs but links the control of populations with the 
control of territory, as demonstrated in eastern Sri Lanka, Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh, post-referendum 
East Timor and between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia (Jean, 1992b: 125). 
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"the ratio of civilian to military casualties appear to have risen quite dramatically". 
24 
The emphasis on the context by the situational approach provides key terms to analyse 
the complex and varied nature of displacement. Temporally, displacement can be brief 
or can persist for decades, making return "more complicated [... ] than is generally 
understood", for example, when land and homes are occupied by others, in particular, by 
a hostile and ethnic group or country. Resettlement although difficult may be the only 
practical solution (Bennett, 1998a: 14). Second, within brief and prolonged 
displacement, another distinction can be made between `spontaneous' and `organized' 
population displacements. However, the existence of temporary location also can be 
interpreted as a pragmatic solution to social violence, for example, in Uganda, 
`nocturnal displacement' was common, where people fearing attack left their homes at 
night and returned during the day to farm the land (Bennett, 1998a: 14). Third, people 
can flee in small clusters, for example, the desplazados in Colombia that gradually 
crowded into shantytowns around major cities or drifted for months around the 
countryside (Bennett, 1998a: 10). 
Forced relocation or regroupement is the forced movement of an entire community by a 
government, to permanent or semi-permanent sites often directly or indirectly under the 
control of military units. Bennett argues this form of depopulation is a counter- 
insurgency technique under the guise of protecting civilians from political insurgency 
(Bennett, 1999: 27). `Forced evictions' are defined as "the permanent or temporary 
removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes 
and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate 
forms of legal or other protection. " (Bennett, 1999: 27). 
The concept of "voluntary displacement" is equally problematic in societies where 
political conformity is pervasive. For example, in China thousands of the dominant Han 
Chinese were forcibly sent as "civilising envoys" to outlying areas. Local ethnic 
u IDEA concurs that a significant feature of these conflicts is the noticeable increase in civilian casualties. 
For example, World War I had 5 per cent, World War II had 50 per cent while civilian fatalities during 
the conflicts in 1990s reached 80 per cent (IDEA, 1998: 51). An ICRC representative similarly argues 
that one change was the increase in civilian fatalities and injuries because of the, "evolution of warfare 
techniques. In World War I, you could only bomb quite close whereas now bomber jets fly at such a high 
altitude, they cannot be attacked. " (Interview 38,3 December 2002). However, 'precision bombing' has 
not resulted in safer conflict zones for civilians. For more on the impact of warfare evolution, see 
Ignatieff, 2000: 91-114. 
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conflicts over the years were closely related to these Han Chinese migrations where the 
officially sanctioned ethnic group challenged existing power relations even where they 
were a minority. In Myanmar (Burma), tens of thousands were instructed to move to the 
outskirts of the capital, Yangoon, to make way for new construction projects, however, 
the government maintains movement is `voluntarily adhered to' (Bennett, 1998a: 14). 
The close context-analysis from the situational approach supports the new wars thesis, 
which jointly suggest that conflict-induced displacement is varied because it has become 
an effect and means to conflict. Although some of Kaldor and Munck's assertions are 
valid, the existence of armed secessionism suggests that the more traditional dynamics 
of guerrilla wars are still relevant and clearly this discrepancy demands further 
investigation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the phenomenon of conflict-induced internal displacement by 
comparing insight from the universal and situational approaches. The universal 
approach is important because it provides a workable definition, which may strengthen 
legal and operational responses. However, the situational approach reminds that 
displacement is conditioned by each context, should be treated in relation to actual 
needs as opposed to categories and points to the pitfalls of exclusive responses. 
Together, both approaches have merit but the significant division underlines the 
uncertainty in understanding internal displacement. 
To further this debate, the chapter focused on the root cause of political violence 
through armed secessionism, as a form of civil war or ethnic conflict. Definitions are 
important but it is necessary to allow for overlapping causes and influences. 
Accordingly, internal conflict was analysed based on its underlying and proximate 
factors. Despite the complexity of the context, it was argued that the low-intensity level 
of violence was pivotal and thus represented crucial opportunities for third party 
intervention to prevent the violence from spiralling. In addition, it was clear that low- 
intensity internal armed conflicts have proliferated globally. Finally, the diversification 
in displacement has links with the socially destructive tendencies of modem conflict. 
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However, the nature and dynamics of armed secessionism contradict aspects of this new 
wars thesis. Appropriately, it is now important to consider the legal and operational 
responses to protect and assist IDPs. 
50 
2. Protecting and Assisting Humanitarian 
and Political Needs 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) endure two sets of needs when political violence 
through secessionist armed conflict is the root cause of displacement. The effects of the 
conflict create humanitarian needs and the political needs reflect the underlying and 
proximate reasons for the political violence. Solutions to displacement require both sets 
of needs to be addressed by adequate protection and assistance and resolved through 
sustainable development and peace. However, home states can be unable or unwilling 
to accept these duties and are commonly shielded from international intervention by the 
inviolability of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, based on the doctrine of responsible 
sovereignty, it is still possible to gain the consent of the home state for international 
intervention. Accordingly, this chapter critiques the conventional humanitarian 
response used by the international community to provide adequate protection and 
assistance for IDPs. Furthermore, it examines the potential for providing a viable 
political response to resolve internal conflict, as the root cause of displacement. 
The chapter begins by analysing needs as multi-layered and interdependent. First, it 
argues that IDPs have political and humanitarian needs. The former are typically long- 
term in nature while the latter are both short and long-term, reflecting the cycle of 
vulnerability. The last interdependence is the importance of linking assistance and 
protection, which reflects the nature of needs. Compared to assistance, the provision of 
adequate protection has proven more problematic. It is also pertinent to consider the 
two main approaches to protection and assistance. For the universal approach, IDPs 
have particularly vulnerable needs, which demand distinct IDP responses. In particular, 
the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are 
grounded in the IDP definition, form the international community's written, formal 
response to providing protection and assistance (Cohen & Deng, 1998). 1 Conversely, 
the situational or needs-based approach appreciates the significant vulnerabilities of 
IDPs but prefers to respond more inclusively to conflict-affected communities and the 
dynamics of each context (Bennett, 1998a; and Helle, 1998). 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. 
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The critique of international responses starts with the Guiding Principles in Section 2.2. 
They represent the cornerstone of the doctrine of responsible sovereignty but their 
application and implementation have provoked criticism. After providing three main 
justifications for consensual international intervention in Section 2.3 (Weiss & Chopra, 
1995; and Dowty & Loescher, 1997), the fourth section reviews the mechanisms 
typically used to provide international humanitarian intervention while recognising the 
long-term importance of harnessing the coping skills of IDPs. Political intervention is 
more difficult because it implies greater interference while the international community 
has not established a viable response (Roberts, 1996). Therefore, Section 2.5 closes the 
chapter by examining humanitarian mediation, which is the strategy of using 
humanitarian needs as leverage to address and resolve the reasons for conflict. With an 
emerging and innovative international role, Conflict Transformation Agencies (CTA's) 
are considered as the relevant third party (Rigby, 2001; and Crocker, Osler & Aall, 
1999). Their primary attraction is the ability to transcend the pejorative connotations of 
international intervention while upholding the sovereignty of the state. However, 
significant challenges involve establishing a ceasefire, overcoming opposition from 
spoilers, maintaining momentum and preventing the politicisation of humanitarian 
needs (Ebersole, 2000; Hay & Sanger, 1992; and Posen, 1997). 
2.1 Interdependency of Needs 
The needs of IDPs are multi-layered and interdependent. First, it is important to 
identify the political and the humanitarian. The former are prerequisites to sustainable 
peace and are typically long-term in nature. The latter are both short and long-term, 
reflecting the cycle of vulnerability. The last interdependence is the importance of 
linking assistance and protection because of the nature of needs and the goal of 
sustainable development. It is also pertinent to consider the two main approaches to 
protection and assistance. The universal approach promotes the IDP definition and 
distinct responses, as demonstrated by the Guiding Principles. Alternatively, the 
situational approach stresses the contextual complexities of needs and responding more 
inclusively to conflict-affected communities. 
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2.1.1 Humanitarian and political needs 
Humanitarian needs are complex and reflect the effects of the political violence (Deng, 
1994; and 1998b: 10). They range from the short-term or relief-oriented, for example, 
security, food, water, shelter, sanitation and health to the long-term or development- 
oriented, that is, livelihoods, education, trauma, return and resettlement (Interview 48,6 
December 2002). For the international community, the ultimate goal is sustainable 
development. Security is often the priority since IDPs are more susceptible to "round- 
ups, forcible resettlement, and arbitrary detentions or arrests" and, "forcible 
conscription or sexual assaults. " (Deng, 1998a: xiii; and 1994). 2 Prolonged 
displacement is particularly damaging as it often leads to "marginalisation" through the 
separation from land, limited markets and the loss of skills when tools are sold or lost 
(Cohen & Deng, 1998: 35 and 37; and Korn, 1999: 17). However, there is a lack of 
consensus and existing mandate for a returning process. For some, "displacement ends 
when returnees have both security and the means to re-establish themselves in their 
areas of origin" (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 35 and 37). 
When the long-term is not addressed then short-term concerns come to the fore. 
Therefore, where relevant both need to be addressed to prevent the continuation of the 
cycle of displacement. A representative from the International Federation of the Red 
Cross (IFRC) concurs, with emphasis on avoiding dependency: "relief is only a 
temporary support function to help people stabilise and become self-sufficient again 
themselves. So when you give relief at the same time you must be looking at your 
structure, your development programmes so that people can become self-sufficient. " 
(Interview 39,3 December 2002). For integration with a local population, often aid 
agencies provide temporary shelter for large numbers of IDPs and fail to take account of 
longer-term impact on the environment and local resource base (Bennett, 1998a: 15). 
Political needs are long-term in nature and are particularly relevant when political 
violence through secessionist armed conflict is the root cause of displacement. They 
reflect the underlying and proximate factors of the conflict, that is, the contention of the 
2 The United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) highlights the abuses of starvation, rape, 
enslavement, arrest, torture, forced conscription and labour. Furthermore, families are torn apart, 
communities dispersed, cultures are suppressed, normal systems destroyed and affected populations 
forced to depend on others for safety and survival (USCR World Refugee Survey, 1997, cited in Deng, 
1998b: 1). 
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home state's sovereignty through weaknesses in the system of governance, the rule of 
law and the wider political identity. Deng highlights the latter, describing internal 
displacement as a "symptom of a serious crisis in nation-building which has 
international ramifications" (Deng, 1994; and 1998b: 10). Therefore, sustainable 
solutions to displacement require the root cause of displacement to be addressed 
through a long-term process of conflict management to resolve the contest of state 
sovereignty. Such solutions begin with a cessation of the political violence and are 
based on a process, which maintains this cessation by addressing the reasons for the 
conflict through dialogue with the aim of peacefully accommodating the demands of the 
state and its contestants. 
2.1.2 Linking assistance and protection 
To respect further the interdependency of needs, responses should link assistance with 
protection. The Guiding Principles outline basic standards for both (see Appendix A) 
but as a minimum definition of humanitarian assistance, Jean argues it must aim to 
"preserve life and human dignity and to restore people's ability to choose". While it 
must not transform a society, it should help its members get through a crisis period and 
thus represent, "a break with a previous balance". It should be implemented peacefully 
and without discrimination by independent and impartial organisations so that it sets 
both the shape of the stage and outlines of the actors. 3 
For Helle, humanitarian assistance is simply a "substitution" but protection is "any 
measure or activity aimed at securing their physical safety and legal rights" and 
involves close co-operation with the government at the central and local levels (Helle, 
1998: 38) a However, he urges clarification to prevent misperceived interference with a 
state's sovereignty. This is especially problematic since there is no legal instrument that 
defines protection for IDPs, nor is there consensus on who should provide it (Cohen, 
1998b: 66). A representative from the Internal Displacement Unit at the Office for the 
Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA ID Unit) agrees that, "protection is very 
3 Furthermore, Jean proposes that for humanitarian assistance, motivation should be guided by the sole 
concern for others; the context of a crisis environment; and to create trust through organisational 
independence (Jean, 1992a: 7). 
4 Cohen also notes that protection has moved from provisions of food, medicine and shelter to the 
integration of respect for the human rights and physical safety (Cohen, 1998a: 6-7). 
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subjective and it is difficult to find common ground between international and 
indigenous NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and human rights workers" 
(Interview 48,6 December 2002). The informant expressed hope in the Unit's 
"protection coalition" consisting of focal points from UN agencies and the "Protection 
Policy Paper". The latter outlines steps for countries to take and reinforces that the 
humanitarian co-ordinator or resident co-ordinator has "overall responsibility" but 
admitted that country teams were still unclear and that progress on the ground was not 
forthcoming (Interview 48,6 December 2002). The representative from the United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) also notes that expertise in child protection is 
increasing "much more than before, this is definitely a growth area for us. " (Interview 
36,2 December 2002). More generally, Cohen proposes that working directly with 
IDPs, local communities and local authorities advances protection. 5 
In the field, assistance and protection cannot be seen as totally separate activities 
(Cohen, 1998b: 66). 6 A failure to recognise threatened fundamental human rights and 
physical security can make assistance programmes meaningless. 7 At a minimum, there 
should be preventive steps to enhance the security of beneficiaries by creating 
assistance programmes to strengthen protection, for example, fuel to women so they do 
not have to go to unsafe areas and proper lighting in camps. Preventive protection can 
be implemented by reinforcing presence when protection problems arise, combined with 
some form of action to deter abuse and violations should be reported to groups that can 
act (Cohen, 1998a: 7). Assistance can also deter human rights violations as 
humanitarians can act as witnesses and assistance to all those in need can reduce 
tensions among populations and vice versa. Similarly, Helle recognises that addressing 
both secures long-term improvement, generates goodwill and enhances credibility 
(Helle, 1998: 39-40). A UNHCR representative describes that in the past, "protection 
5 For example, in Central America, NGOs campaigned to get legal recognition for IDPs and one NGO 
developed a warning system that watches routes and fields at night in the Andean region of South 
America. One way to become more effective in engaging in protection is for NGOs to take a joint stand 
which can strengthen the overall impact of an initiative and reduce the risks through solidarity (Cohen, 
1998a: 8). 
6A report asked for better integration of protection concerns into the provision of material assistance to 
IDPs, which requires the improved negotiation of humanitarian space. Within states affected by 
displacement, it emphasises increased democratisation, stronger civil society at the national level and a 
decrease in the power of the military to avoid internal displacement (Brookings Institution, 2000: 2) 
7 Except for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), most organisations traditionally focused on food, medicine and 
shelter, based on the belief that keeping people alive with food was the basic human right and that their 
presence alone would discourage governments or rebel organisations from perpetrating serious human 
rights abuses (Cohen, 1998b: 65; and Korn, 1999: 69). 
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was not linked to assistance and the classical UNHCR approach was these are our 
people, don't touch them, we do everything for them. " Now, "protection is more 
oriented to engaging the beneficiaries to develop their capacities" to make them "part of 
their own assistance. " He provides the example of the shift to Cash for Work as 
opposed to the classical Food for Work projects, which have "worked very well. " 
(Interview 37,3 December 2002). However, Helle advises that when neutrality and 
impartiality is questioned by the authorities then protection should be the "secondary 
position" (Helle, 1998: 39-40). Therefore, an understanding of the context decides the 
emphasis placed on the respective areas of assistance and protection and the degree to 
which they should be linked together. 
2.1.3 Universal and situational approaches 
There are two approaches to addressing needs, which stem from the division in 
understanding forced internal displacement. Both appreciate the importance of contexts 
but to different degrees. For example, Deng advises that root causes, the various phases 
and needs of displacement must be recognised but ultimately prefers IDP-specific 
policies and mechanisms, for example, the Guiding Principles and the OCHA ID Unit 
(2002) (Deng, 2000). Alternatively, Helle and Bennett emphasise more the need to 
tailor the understanding of needs based on each humanitarian impact since internal 
conflict and the consequential displacement is "typically an evolving process involving 
the collapse of essential support structures" at the individual, community and national 
levels (Helle, 1998: 32; and Bennett, 1998a: 11 and 15). It also stems from the varying 
range of options open to citizens, for example, the proximity of international borders, 
urban centres, the location of family and community members, financial resources and 
the type of assistance. All of these factors are further conditioned by the decision to 
flee, which is predominantly a communal one. 8 Furthermore, IDPs have specific needs 
but the situational approach prefers general programmes to address broader sectors of 
the populations since "assisting IDPs is an integral part of dealing with emergency 
situations" (Helle, 1998: 36-37). Therefore, the response to social trauma needs to be as 
varied as it is culture specific (Bennett, 1998a: 15). 
8 Either women, children and the elderly are the first to flee, leaving behind able-bodied men to protect 
their homes or property as occurred in Bosnia. Conversely, in Afghanistan (1980s-1990s), the 
breadwinners were the first to seek a relatively safe area (Bennett, 1998a: 11). 
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Although humanitarians differ on the status awarded to IDPs, there is agreement that 
displacement produces interdependent and particularly vulnerable needs. For 
sustainable development and peace, the political and the humanitarian must be 
addressed, the cycle of needs planned for and assistance without protection is 
meaningless. However, protection is more challenging and IDPs are often neglected 
overall by their home state and remain sealed off from external assistance. Since the 
reasons and contexts of displacement often make international intervention unwelcome, 
the international community primarily advocates the Guiding Principles to promote the 
diplomatic doctrine of responsible sovereignty. 
2.2 Purpose of the Guiding Principles 
The Guiding Principles represent the concerted attempt by the international community 
to develop a "normative framework derived from human rights law, humanitarian law, 
and refugee law by analogy" and are intended as leverage in encouraging states to 
respect the rights of civilians during and after displacement. They are also proactive in 
their attempts to prevent displacement (see Appendix A). 9 Despite notable strengths, 
the implementation of the Guiding Principles is problematic because they are too 
general and not legally binding. 
2.2.1 Existing legal protection 
After a review of the relevant law, Cohen & Deng raise several deficiencies but 
conclude that IDPs are sufficiently protected due to the abundance of applicable 
norms. 10 Although IDPs can invoke human rights and humanitarian law, international 
law does not explicitly mention guarantees (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 74). In sum, the 
provisions of existing law are too dispersed, diffuse and unfocused to be effective in 
9 They "identify the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of the internal displacement in all 
phases of displacement". This is fulfilled by providing protection against arbitrary displacement and 
laying down guarantees for safe return, resettlement and reintegration (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 125). 
10 Cohen & Deng propose that "displacement in and of itself may contradict basic human rights 
guarantees". Among some of the specific problems the authors note, human rights violations, no access 
to food, inadequate health and shelter, the break-up of familial and cultural ties and poor or no education. 
As a consequence, IDPs are especially vulnerable to acts of violence (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 73-74). For 
a comprehensive review of the legal protection for IDPs, see Cohen & Deng, 1998: 80-90 and 95-111. 
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providing adequate protection and assistance. Therefore, the UN requested the Guiding 
Principles as an appropriate written framework to "reinforce and strengthen existing 
protection" by restating and consolidating "dispersed and diffuse" norms "in one 
coherent document" and to "ensure gaps and gray areas in the law are addressed. " 
(Cohen & Deng, 1998: 75). 11 
International law provides "substantial coverage" for IDPs (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 74). 
In situations of non-international armed conflict, human rights and humanitarian law 
"share a common purpose of protecting human life and dignity" and the two "converge 
to a large extent in situations of purely internal conflict and thus reinforce each other. " 
(Cohen & Deng, 1998: 80). Neutral and impartial international humanitarian law is to a 
degree binding upon dissident forces and supplement domestic laws against terrorism. 
It is also relevant to intervention in armed conflicts and in convincing belligerents to 
respect certain basic laws of war relating to POWs, medical personnel and non- 
combatants. Basic rights in international law in situations of non-international armed 
conflict are important since governments frequently cause or tolerate internal 
displacement and are unwilling or unable to provide protection. 12 
Nevertheless, there are "significant areas in which the [international] law fails to 
provide sufficient protection". There are consensus gaps, including the need for an 
expressed right not to be lawfully displaced, to have access to protection and assistance 
during displacement and secure return and reintegration (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 74). 13 
However, the prohibition of return to situations of imminent danger can be deduced 
from the prohibition of inhumane treatment. For non-discrimination, IDPs only qualify 
under the basis of "other states" and an authoritative body has not yet stated this. The 
prohibition of arbitrary detention in domestic and international practice and the 
preconditions of lawful detention of IDPs in closed camps are unclear (Cohen & Deng, 
11 General Assembly Resolution 50/195 of 22 December 1995 and Commission Resolution 52 of 19 April 
1996. The Guiding Principles were formally presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 
1998 and were in turn accepted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (Davies, 1998: xii). 
The Principles have also gained pragmatic significance, for example, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights of the Organisation of American States directly applied the Principles to Columbia (Cohen 
& Deng, 1998: 21). 
12 Although some principles of refugee law may be applied by analogy, the strong and effective protection 
accorded refugees in the 1951 Refugee Convention cannot be applied directly to IDPs despite sharing 
common experiences since it is the situation of "having fled one's country" that is addressed (Cohen & 
Deng, 1998: 74; and Barutciski, 1998: 2). 
13 Helle agrees that the relevance of existing rights to IDPs has often not been clarified by case law, "at 
least not in the relevant context" (Helle, 1998: 44). 
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1998: 123). As an applicability gap, international humanitarian law cannot be used in 
"some situations of tensions and disturbances short of armed conflict" (Cohen & Deng, 
1998: 74). 
Ratification gaps are numerous and represent a "vacuum of legal protection" for IDPs in 
states that have not ratified key human rights treaties and/or the Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions. Overall, in substantive or international law, most aspects of 
rights sufficiently protect the needs of IDPs, however, if these are violated frequently 
then the real reason is the unwillingness of states and dissident forces in non- 
international conflicts to observe these binding obligations (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 123). 
In situations of non-international armed conflict, human rights law in general limits only 
the abusive practices of the government and its agents but states can restrict or 
derogate. 14 A further obstacle to human rights obligations is the state's inability to 
enforce domestic law and national legislation to regulate the conduct of non-state actors 
(Helle, 1998: 44). Non-state actors/groups can only be held accountable to human 
rights conventions where private acts are instigated, encouraged or acquiesced in by the 
government. 15 Last, there are normative gaps, for example, the right to personal 
documentation, the restitution of property or compensation. 16 
2.2.2 Value of the Principles 
The literature and interviews with key informants point to several strengths. As a 
concise framework, the Principles are designed to create awareness and the 
International Organisation of Migration (IOM) representative recognised change in this 
respect (Interview 44,5 December 2002). Another concurs, "they have been widely 
recognised by the UN and different countries as laws that are applicable specifically to 
IDPs. By now the Guiding Principles are the internationally accepted standard for the 
treatment and protection of IDPs. " (Interview 40,3 December 2002). Korn also 
14 For instance, population movements can occur during genuine emergencies but must be "strictly 
required by the exigencies of the state" and not be inconsistent with other state obligations under 
international law or involve "invidious discrimination towards even the enemy" (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 
89-90). 
15 As an exception and under Common Article 3 of humanitarian law, private actors may incur individual 
penal responsibility for acts such as genocide and torture in internationally recognised crimes that fall 
under the jurisdiction of international tribunals (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 81). 
16 Helle concurs (Helle, 1998: 43). 
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acknowledges a noticeable difference: "[s]o long as no one knew just what international 
legal rights applied to the internally displaced, it was easy to abuse them. " (Korn, 1999: 
87). From this, the Principles are intended to contribute to the creation of a moral and 
political climate through customary law (Cohen, 1998a: 3). Francis Deng's assistant 
believes the latter has achieved, "a lot of progress", with governments "using the 
Principles as a basis for national policy and guidelines" (Interview 48,6 December 
2002). From the gradual moral authority, it was hoped the Principles could help 
governments develop national laws to protect IDPs (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 75-76). 17 
In the field, the Principles are to provide valuable practical guidance to governments 
and competent authorities, international and indigenous NGOs and all those that protect 
and assist (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 125). In this sense, the representative from the IOM 
thinks they are "extremely viable", welcomed their call for "better co-ordination and 
interaction among the players" and noticed some benefits on the ground (Interview 44, 
5 December 2002). 18 In particular, Cohen emphasises their "immense practical value in 
providing a yardstick for monitoring the treatment of IDPs" and as a way to identify 
human rights issues (Cohen, 1998a: 3). Helle and the IOM representative praise basing 
the provision of assistance in international humanitarian law (Helle, 1998: 48; and 
Interview 44,5 December 2002). 19 
Nevertheless, there are notable weaknesses and it is appropriate that those who disagree 
with the IDP definition and special status are also sceptical of the Principles. Barutciski 
argues that the Principles "do not really fill any legal gaps, they simply state and 
interpret existing norms" (Barutciski, 1998: 3). More generally, Helle calls for a 
tailored-to-IDP approach and a specific legal framework to stimulate relevant actors to 
protect IDPs from being exposed to violence and abuses. The argument is grounded in 
17 For this overall, Deng's assistant did not perceive progress (Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
However, an UNHCHR representative raised the example of the Philippines, which placed the Guiding 
Principles in national legislation (Interview 41,4 December 2002). Another raises Angola and Colombia 
which "do use them to form the basis of law". A representative from the Global IDP Project outlines an 
approach: first "encourage the senior/government level to adopt the Principles; second is the local level, 
those dealing with IDPs on daily basis. " (Interview 43,4 December 2002). 
18 The UNHCR representative appreciates the, "Principles are useful when we are involved in an IDP 
situation. " (Interview 37,3 December 2002). Despite the ICRC's policy of non-categorisation, it 
endorsed the preparation of the Principles and the UNHCR developed a manual for field staff (Cohen & 
Deng, 1998: 75). 
19 A report echoed this recommendation and called for the introduction of the Guiding Principles into the 
Asia Pacific Forum for National Human Rights Institutions; the formation of an Asian regional network 
of NGOs to work together on internal displacement, to improve NGO capacities, increase co-ordination, 
help standardise NGO methods; and facilitate their undertaking of joint efforts to promote the observance 
of the Principles (Brookings Institution, 2000: 3). 
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the inadequacy and inconsistently of protection and the main problem that internal 
displacement "often" occurs in states, which fail to ratify the relevant treaties (Helle, 
1998: 43,48 and 50). However, Barutciski argues that a distinct category of particular 
rights cannot be granted and an IDP international treaty would reinforce non-entree 
policies by states and justify containment strategies through the right to remain or not to 
be displaced (Barutciski, 1998: 3). Therefore, the development of new legal standards 
might undercut efforts to implement existing standards of human rights and 
humanitarian law. This includes where case law is codified in the form of a provision 
and where regional conventions have been utilised as a basis for interpreting global 
ones, in particular, where the relevant wording of the two instruments differs. 20 
Fundamental disagreements aside, Helle also asserts there is no "clear distinction" in the 
way the norms are addressed, that is, between the gaps and grey areas (Helle, 1998: 48). 
The application of the Principles is especially challenging because they are not legally 
binding although they are based on binding legal instruments. An IOM representative 
states, "we believe in the Guiding Principles" but "we are sceptical in practice and the 
application. " Unlike the implementation of the "Geneva Conventions", the Principles 
are, "extremely difficult because of the characteristics of conflict, for instance in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola. " (Interview 44,5 December 2002). The progressive 
`moral authority argument' is used as a countermeasure but this is equally challenging 
since such authorities are often responsible for displacement in the first instance (Cohen 
& Deng, 1998: 75-76). Deng's assistant, in clarifying the optimism expressed above, 
appreciates that their moral authority, "is not going to happen overnight" and this 
realism was representative of the findings. 2' For example, although the Philippines 
have adopted the Principles within national legislation, "implementation is weak" 
(Interview 41,4 December 2002). 
20 As another central weakness, it is asserted that a normative framework for IDPs would discriminate 
against others. However, Cohen and Deng highlight other disadvantaged groups, for example, refugees, 
minorities, women, the disabled, children and indigenous peoples who are already singled out for 
attention (Cohen, 1998a: 3). 
21 For the concerted efforts in the former Yugoslavia, Angola and Colombia, Deng's assistant recognises 
that, "it is a slow process and there are problems ahead. " (Interview 48,6 December 2002). The Global 
IDP Project representative recalls their workshop, conducted every year and aimed at targeting local 
authorities to be more effective for IDPs, but admitted it was, "hard to measure the impact" (Interview 43, 
4 December 2002). Similarly, another concludes, "I have no evidence to suggest they have gathered 
moral authority. " (Interview 37,3 December 2002). 
61 
Perhaps the main obstacle to implementation is to make, "military and rebels aware and 
to formally accept them" (Interview 43,4 December 2002). A state will typically 
perceive the Principles as unwelcome international interference, "as an outside set of 
principles infringing on national sovereignty", thus "usually IDPs are only recognised 
by other governments. " (Interview 43,4 December 2002; and Interview 44,5 
December 2002, respectively). Politics is the key variable. For example, an ICRC 
representative notes that in Pakistan Kashmir the ICRC, "can co-ordinate with the 
authorities and can assist and there is no problem with protection. " However, on the 
Indian side of Kashmir, the government, "sees it as purely an internal consideration and 
that it is their obligation to assist and therefore do not need intervention" (Interview 38, 
3 December 2002). 
The Principles cannot be implemented properly because they are also too general and 
thus fail to capture the complexities of specific contexts, according to the needs-based 
or situational approach. Lund suggests that they "need to be reformulated and 
contextualised prior to implementation. " (Lund, 2001: 35). The UNHCR advisor 
concurs that, "assistance depends on the situation and on the specific needs and 
capacities of governments to provide assistance that is required (Interview 40,3 
December 2002). Therefore, they "cannot be used as a blueprint for all countries" and 
need to be made context-specific through national legislation, the police and other 
channels (Interview 41,4 December 2002). 
While grounded, in international law, the Principles rely on advocacy from the UN 
Secretary-General's Representative on IDPs and all humanitarian actors. Although they 
have demonstrated some progress in addressing gaps and clarifying rights, their 
implementation is weak because they ultimately depend on co-operation from those 
responsible for causing or allowing displacement. The provisions are also too general 
and difficult to apply to specific contexts. Therefore, the provision of adequate 
protection and assistance and the doctrine of responsible sovereignty require more 
effective operational responses. Before these are examined, it is essential to review 
justification for international humanitarian and political intervention. 
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2.3 Justification for International Intervention 
International humanitarian and political responses are required to address both sets of 
needs of IDPs to create sustainable development and peace. It is therefore important to 
justify international intervention, focusing on: the internal responsibilities of the home 
state as reminded by the doctrine of responsible sovereignty and the Guiding Principles; 
the stretching of sovereignty through its international or external dimension; and as a 
prerequisite to resolving internal conflict. 
2.3.1 Responsible sovereignty (internal dimension) 
Justification for consensual intervention stems from the doctrine of responsible 
sovereignty, which assumes that sovereignty "cannot be dissociated from 
responsibility". Since a state has primary legal responsibility for its IDPs, it should not 
be able to claim the "prerogatives of sovereignty unless it carries out its internationally 
recognized responsibilities to its citizens". At a minimum, this entails "protection and 
life-supporting assistance. " (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 7). 22 Similarly, Weiss & Chopra 
argue individual sovereignty has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading 
consciousness of individual rights. States are now widely understood to be instruments 
at the service of their peoples and not vice versa. For example, it is apparent that a 
majority of Acehnese do not identify with the Republic of Indonesia, hence sovereignty 
is in question, the same for Catholics in Northern Ireland, Tamils in Sri Lanka and 
Basques in Spain (Weiss & Chopra, 1995: 88). 
Pragmatically, "international involvement is necessary" because of the "cleavages 
generated between the affected population and the government or controlling 
authorities" which "force the displaced into a vacuum of responsibility" (Cohen & 
Deng, 1998: 6). 23 Therefore, when "states are incapable of discharging those 
responsibilities", Korn asserts that "they are excepted to request, or at least accept, 
international cooperation in providing assistance and protection", which can ultimately 
22 This should not be seen as completely new doctrine. 
23 Similarly, Kofi Annan notes there is "the need for timely intervention by the international community 
when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and when the state nominally in 
charge is unable or unwilling to stop it. " (Annan, 1999). 
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safeguard sovereignty (Korn, 1999: 8). Responsible sovereignty in principle argues that 
intervention is justified where a state fails to maintain responsibility, regardless of 
consent. 24 Nevertheless, the thesis focuses on this consent as a prerequisite for 
intervention. Furthermore, even if the home state does not have the capacity to protect 
and assist basic human rights, it is preferable for the international political and 
humanitarian responses to work in tandem with the state. 25 The latter can involve 
specific policies and programmes for IDPs or to include them within more general 
assistance and development programmes. 
Accordingly, IDPs and conflicts are treated as internal issues, using the Guiding 
Principles and responsible sovereignty as the "normative framework" and "concept" of 
responsibility, respectively. To instil responsibility further, institutional arrangements 
were also examined to focus on these problems and to enter into dialogues with 
governments on behalf of IDPs world-wide (Deng, 1998b: 2-3). 26 Responsible 
sovereignty may be grounded in diplomacy but it also allows for any form of 
appropriate intervention for IDPs. As furthered below, this can include multilateral 
humanitarian intervention and unilateral third party political intervention through 
mediation to address the reasons for an internal armed conflict as the root cause of 
displacement. 
2.3.2 External dimension to sovereignty 
The prescription of internal responsibilities also stems from the external dimension to 
state sovereignty. When internal conflicts threaten regional stability, in particular, 
refugee spill over; Dowty & Loescher argue that prevention through international 
24 An advisor to the UNHCR reminds if, "the authority of a government is acted upon with responsibility 
and the government is acting to protect its civilians then that is fine but if not then the international 
community would have the right according to this doctrine to intervene. " (Interview 40,3 December 
2002). 
25 The UNHCR representative agrees, "that the ultimate objective" is the "devolution of responsibility to 
the government by involving the "government in the strategy" and making them "realise their primary 
responsibility" (Interview 40,3 December 2002). Another concurs that the, "most important thing is the 
third party is working with the government" and to "have an agreement with both sides otherwise you are 
going to be hindrance. " (Interview 37,3 December 2002). 
6 Deng's assistant naturally supported the doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility, recognising states' 
sensitivity to intervention: "Myanmar and India jump on sovereignty. " (Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
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intervention is becoming a de facto norm in state declaration and practice. 27 In raising 
practical, preventative concerns as justification, the authors argue that rather than 
waiting for considerable refugee flows and risk interstate humanitarian problems, it is 
prudent to consider that IDPs are frequently evidence of internal humanitarian crises 
and human rights violations. 28 In addition, the Western policy of containment was non- 
productive for home and external states. 29 Therefore, internal displacement and low- 
intensity armed conflicts provide both warning signs and opportunities for the 
international community to take part in resolving the humanitarian plight either in the 
form of humanitarian assistance or as part of a wider process of conflict management or 
political intervention. Moreover, since there are weaknesses in the application of the 
Guiding Principles, then such responses and mechanisms could be the most appropriate 
guarantor of rights to protection and assistance for IDPs during an internal conflict. 
Furthermore, in transcending both dimensions to sovereignty, it is pertinent that the 
"identity of populations is also expanding beyond nationality" due to a "developing 
global humanitarian space". From this transnational perspective, humanitarian space is 
not linked to territory and moves beyond sovereign boundaries, becoming "increasingly 
difficult to speak of interventions within it". Therefore, identity is being conceived at 
"levels below and beyond the level of nationality, and it is the intersection of these 
trends that presents opportunities for international action" (Weiss & Chopra, 1995: 88). 
For example, international pressure through human rights treaties and co-operation 
through global trade can also influence state and non-state armed sides and thus 
demonstrates a re-definition or at least a relaxation of sovereignty. 30 Based on this, 
humanitarian assistance shifts from being a potential violation of sovereignty to acting 
27 Based on this evidence, the authors contest that there is an "increasingly inclusive view of threats to 
peace". For the latter, the imposition of refugees on other states falls under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and therefore legitimates enforcement action not subject to the limits of purely humanitarian 
intervention (Dowty & Loescher, 1997: 320 and 322). 
28 Barutciski emphasises the need for "genuine mechanisms", in particular, "preventive protection" 
(Barutciski, 1998: 3). Cohen defines preventive protection as practical measures needed to avert abuse, 
thus pointing to the recurrence of internal racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious wars through political 
exploitation and competition for scarce resources (Cohen, 1998b: 64). 
29 Jean argues that conflicts must not be allowed to become the norm as has happened in Afghanistan and 
Mozambique where conflict has fed upon itself. With the state in ruins and the absence of a referee, these 
conflicts have been privatised with armed factions turning to crime and warlordism, as exemplified by 
Somalia (Jean, 1992b: 124). 
30 Similarly, Kaldor writes that new wars are transnational, therefore any solution has to be transnational. 
Since the sovereignty of states is eroding, the control of violence has to become the primary responsibility 
of international institutions (Kaldor, 1997: 23). In Europe, the integration of armed forces into the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact, multinational peacekeeping and arms control 
agreements, the International Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals all take away responsibility from 
nation-states (Kaldor, 1997: 20). 
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as a safeguard for fundamental human rights as demonstrated by Security Resolution 
688, which insisted that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organisations to all those in need (Weiss & Chopra, 1995: 88). 31 
2.3.3 Resolving the conflict 
International intervention is necessary to reach a peaceful resolution based on the 
dynamics and reasons for armed secessionism. This type of internal conflict is the 
gradual product and cause of alienation and a collective identity crisis of a population 
within a state. However, in the short-term, third party political intervention can help 
overcome the security dilemma by increasing transparency, giving timely warnings and 
accurate information about each party and by overseeing local arms control using 
international personnel on the ground to guarantee agreements. 32 For the long-term, it 
has the capacity to bridge the divide between state and citizen by introducing the 
viability of other modes of governance, for example, increased autonomy. Such efforts 
can at least move armed sides away from the non-productive mindset of winning and 
losing. Furthermore, when a conflict produces a military stalemate and the futility of 
the violence comes to the fore, then it might be in the interests of the state and its 
contestants to discuss pacific alternatives. Last, and as examined in Chapter One, the 
low-intensity variant represents several opportunities for political intervention. 
Stemming from these justifications, it is important to gauge the effectiveness of the 
humanitarian response based on a selected range of institutional and operational 
mechanisms, which aim to protect and assist with the consent of the home state. 
31 However, human rights were linked with international peace and security "by asserting that failure to 
protect the Kurds would threaten the security and sovereignty of neighbouring countries. " (Weiss & 
Chopra, 1995: 89). 
32 Alternatively, poorly designed interventions can inadvertently institutionalise the security dilemma, as 
demonstrated by Bosnia, through a failure to understand tactical trade-offs (Synder & Jervis, 1999: 33). 
During civil war, it is argued that third party intervention must confront both "the circumstances that 
constitute the security dilemma - namely anarchy and offensive advantages - but also the ideas and social 
forces that produced the dilemma in the first place and that may reproduce it unless the interveners can 
neutralise them". However, this is not to say that contemporary civil conflicts are motivated solely by 
security fears (Synder & Jervis, 1999: 16). 
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2.4 International Humanitarian Intervention 
... there is a lot of confusion over IDPs, when we should and should not act and 
who should act" (Interview 38,3 December 2002). 
International humanitarian intervention for IDPs relies on five main mechanisms: UN 
agencies, the UN Secretary-General's Representative on IDPs, regional associations, the 
ICRC and international NGOs. Each mechanism displays important strengths but it is 
also important to identify their operational weaknesses. In particular, the UN has not 
settled on a preferred approach and struggled to co-ordinate its relevant agencies. Last, 
the section critiques the coping mechanisms of IDPs, as a crucial link to creating 
sustainable development. 
2.4.1 UN, regional associations and the ICRC 
Multilateral humanitarian intervention by the UN is often essential, bringing vast 
resources and experience in meeting short and long-term needs. 
33 IDPs can benefit 
from `corridors of tranquillity', `zones of peace', `humanitarian cease-fires' and `safe 
havens' within the context of traditional peace-keeping. They are also proof of 
increased recognition of the importance of establishing an early presence of UN and 
international NGO relief workers to permit international monitoring of the treatment of 
people, in-county protection, and confidence-building among warring factions (Dowty 
& Loescher, 1999: 329). The main weakness with UN intervention is its common 
politicised image and is consequently sometimes undesirable by states with internal 
conflicts. An IFRC representative concludes, "you cannot be neutral or impartial if you 
are working for the UN because it is neither impartial nor neutral. " (Interview 39,3 
December 2002). 34 
33 Although there have been some noted strengths of unilateral (single state) and multilateral humanitarian 
intervention by the military; these responses are excluded as they are unlikely to secure the consent of the 
state with IDPs and are outside the scope of the thesis. Inaction during the Cold War and specific 
inadequacies within the UN Charter also restricted multilateral military intervention. 
34 During the 1991 General Assembly, representatives of developing countries were particularly 
concerned that reform of the UN humanitarian machinery might be a "trojan horse" for great-power 
intervention after the Cold War (Weiss & Chopra, 1995: 87). Chomsky described the 1990s as the era of 
politicised New Humanism with the late intervention in Bosnia, the questionable bombing of Kosovo in 
1999, the reluctance to address the roots of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
the disastrous US intervention in Somalia (Chomsky, 1999: 74). 
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The UN has two preferred options to protect and assist the humanitarian needs of IDPs. 
The first consists of enlarging the mandate of an existing agency, in particular the 
UNHCR because it has already developed special expertise in working with the 
displaced (Cohen, 1998a: 5). 35 However, the UNHCR needs rapid, unhindered and 
secure access to the affected population and acceptance of its non-political, impartial 
and humanitarian nature. It also needs to work in collaboration with other relevant 
organisations but this requires tight co-ordination (McNamara, 1998: 57-58). 36 A 
UNHCR representative states that operations in Iraq and former Yugoslavia caused, 
"our budget to rise from US$ 600 million to US$ 1.4 billion. " Consequently, "we don't 
have enough funds to cover our core objectives and the High Commissioner at the 
moment is to bring back UNHCR's activities to focus on core objectives. " (Interview 
37,3 December 2002). Another UNHCR representative confirms the, "best option is 
UNHCR but it is not interested and IDPs are beyond the capacity of any one agency at 
the minute" (Interview 40,3 December 2002). McNamara also concludes that the 
UNHCR is reluctant to extend its mandate to IDPs (McNamara, 1998: 60). 
The second or "residual" option is using the emergency relief co-ordinator (ERC) to 
improve co-ordination by strengthening collaborative arrangements among UN agencies 
whose mandates and activities relate to IDPs (Cohen, 1998a: 6). 37 Several UN agencies 
have been designated on an ad hoc basis by the secretary-general to administer IDP 
programmes and the interagency approach can, "provide more flexibility to react" and 
creates a "more tailored and accurate approach to needs" (Interview 40,3 December 
2002). The most recent addition was the inter-standing OCHA ID Unit, "to provide a 
nucleus of expertise to advise and support the ERC in his role as the UN focal point and 
to guide the response of the IASC" (Interview 39,3 December 2002). 
35 By 1997, after the announcement of UN reforms, the UNHCR appeared more willing to expand its role 
but would not agree to shoulder the entire responsibility (Cohen, 1998a: 5). In addition to refugees, the 
High Commissioner may, "engage in such activities [... ] as the General Assembly may determine within 
the limits of the resources placed at their proposal" and this forms the "basis for past actions. " 
(McNamara, 1998: 53). It led in the return of IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Sri Lanka it used 
"open relief centres" as viable alternatives (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 30). Creating a new agency is 
regarded as unrealistic for financial and political reasons and would create unnecessary overlaps (Cohen, 
1998a: 5). 
36 This includes the Representative of the Secretary-General for IDPs, the UNCHR, Office of the ERC, 
the ICRC, UN bodies and non-governmental agencies. 
37 In an instance of internal displacement, the first step is to assign principal responsibility for IDPs to one 
operational organisation in each acute emergency, which should be done by the ERC with the appropriate 
IASC. The organisation should also be expected to monitor the IDPs' situation and take a lead in 
developing strategies to ensure their protection and assistance while directly addressing some of these 
needs itself, in collaboration with other agencies (Cohen, 1998a: 6; and Korn, 1999: 6). 
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However and reflective of wider institutional limitations, co-ordination is often weak 
because it is unpopular and often resisted since "the ERC has the mandate" but "has not 
been given the material resources to make its presence felt. " (Interview 40,3 December 
2002). The OCHA ID Unit also suffers from the same financial and political 
weaknesses" (Interview 44,5 December 2002). 38 For Cohen, the ERC needs a global 
mandate and depends on the UNHCR and the ICRC as the only agencies that can 
provide physical protection. Within and between agencies, recurring weaknesses 
involve limited capacity building to meet needs, especially for human rights and 
protection (Cohen, 2000). The IDP Unit representative concludes that, "none of the 
agencies want to take on IDPs by themselves but at the same time they do not want 
anyone else to take it on. " (Interview 48,6 December 2002). Consequently, the 
preferred co-ordinated collaborative option is "fraught with dilemmas, ambivalence, 
even tensions, and is for the most part therefore inadequate and ineffective" (Davies, 
1998: ix; Deng, 1998b: 3; and Korn, 1999: 3). 
In addition to the formation of the Guiding Principles, the short-term aims of the UN 
Secretary-General's Representative on IDPs included making institutional capacities 
more effective through diplomatic country missions, and in the long-term it was hoped 
that major innovations would occur in international systems. Based on this, the 
Representative was described as a, "catalyst, a liaison, and an advocate for the 
displaced. " (Deng, 1994). Mutual confidence, trust, discussions with governments and 
other relevant actors have been, "cordial and constructively candid". 39 However, this is 
probably because the countries had other reasons to be receptive to the missions 40 
Therefore, strategies are needed to engage those less responsive and resistant (Korn, 
1999: 8). More crucially, the country missions need to be supported by realistic 
expectations of international action and tangible results in protection and assistance. 
39 Another states that, `just because you establish a unit doesn't mean it is operational or has the required 
resources. Agencies will not give up unless they see value-added for them or if it will improve their 
operations. " (Interview 37,3 December 2002). 
3 The visits have resulted in positive steps in improving the conditions of IDPs (Korn, 1999: 8). Deng's 
assistant recalls: "Deng wanted to mission in Turkey but the government did not want to know about 
IDPs. However, Deng met with the Turkish representatives every year in Geneva for thirty minutes and 
then two years later in 2002 we went to Turkey, so there was an opening from the government. " 
(Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
40 For example, Deng's assistant admits that "Turkey wants to be in the [European Union] EU, so there 
were international pressures as well. " (Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
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As the third mechanism, regional institutions are attractive, being typically familiar with 
the actors in a dispute and with the situation on the ground, as demonstrated by 
institutional innovations in the Americas (Cohen, 1997: 1-3). Nevertheless, regions can 
have a subjective and unhealthy influence which can fuel a conflict, especially in cases 
of common ethnicity or kinship and when hegemonies "unduly influence decision- 
making. " (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT), 
1999: 2-3). Cohen also notes common constraints in capacities, including staff and 
resources (Cohen, 1997: 6). IDPs can also rely on the ICRC, which has a clear mandate 
to provide protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict based on the "faithful 
application of international humanitarian law". However, there are situations where 
humanitarian law does not provide a comprehensive basis for the protection of IDPs or 
for promoting appropriate solutions. Therefore, the ICRC's mandate must, "leave room 
for collaboration with other actors in this field. " (McNamara, 1998: 4). 
2.4.2 International and indigenous NGOs 
As the fourth mechanism, international NGOs and their indigenous counterparts have 
increased in number, becoming prevalent and far-reaching. 41 Some focus solely on 
displacement issues while others prefer a more inclusive approach to conflict-affected 
communities. 42 Independence from governments can enable neutrality, impartiality and 
greater flexibility, which can strengthen protection duties. For example, at one stage 
they were the only humanitarian actors in Somalia. Furthermore, annual budgets have 
increased with some major international NGOs operating on up to US$ 500 million 
(Korn, 1999: 67). 43 As furthered below, they are conducive to sustainable development 
by tailoring programmes to contexts, empowering through partnerships with indigenous 
41 NGOs and other civil society actors are perceived not only as disseminators of information or providers 
of services but also as, "shapers of policy, be it in peace and security matters, in development or in 
humanitarian affairs. " (Annan, 1997). They have become the "main implementing partners of UN 
agencies in emergency situations", with 40 major NGOs in Europe and in the US (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 
188; and Korn, 1999: 68). 
42 Defining NGOs is a difficult affair but this trait should be welcomed since it is reflective of their, 
"multi-dimensional characteristic and flexibility. " Consequently, this feature demands that NGO types 
are tailored to local needs and conditions (EPCPT, 1999: 4). 
43 Cohen concurs that international NGOs have provided strong protection responsibilities in situations of 
internal displacement. The author raises the Medecins sans Frontieres' (MSF) policy of temoignage or 
witnessing which includes establishing a presence near people in danger, reporting on their condition and 
engaging in public condemnation when there are massive and repeated human rights abuses (Cohen, 
1998a: 7-8). 
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organisations and harnessing local coping mechanisms. This can be more cost effective 
while providing a closer understanding of internal displacement. 
Nonetheless, individual mandates and convictions can create bias while the proliferation 
of organisations demands strong co-ordination to avoid duplication and unhealthy 
rivalry. These weaknesses can create destructive tensions with armed sides, 
beneficiaries and other humanitarian actors. For co-ordination, NGOs often look first to 
the host government and then the UN (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 188 and 192-193; and 
Korn, 1999: 68). The UNHCR advisor reflects that the Guatemalan Government, 
"regarded international NGOs as politically motivated and illegitimate". Consequently, 
the organisations "felt very uncomfortable for security reasons" and "demanded UN 
coverage to work in the field" (Interview 40,3 December 2002). However, as 
examined above, UN agencies are sometimes unwelcome in politically sensitive 
contexts. Consequently and despite protection responsibilities, many international 
NGOs are reluctant to raise or become involved in protection issues (physical safety and 
human rights) to prevent attacks in the field and restriction of access. In this way, 
"freedom of action" is constrained and as examined above, assistance can be 
meaningless where protection is needed but not provided (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 188). 
2.4.3 Coping skills 
The emphasis on coping skills and local empowerment through capacity building stems 
more from the situational or needs-based approach. The coping skills of IDPs range 
from spontaneous life-saving actions at the individual level to the more organised, self- 
sustainable and collective-based community-based organisations (CBOs) and local or 
indigenous NGOs. 45 The latter are crucial actors, with their roots in local culture and 
authority, which present opportunities for international NGOs in particular to foster ties, 
44 In Mozambique in 1992, the problems consisted of a lack of access to victims and of control over aid. 
Therefore, donor governments and organisations need to assess needs and their right to control aid 
delivery and the support to negotiate and manoeuvre daily activities (Jean, 1992a: 5). Cohen & Deng 
praise the adoption of several codes of conduct (International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Relief in 1994 and by NGOs in Liberia). However, the authors argue that more needs 
to be done to minimise the "danger of doing harm through their assistance" (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 194- 
195). 
45 CBOs can be based on shared experiences, for example, widows, or on commercial interests, such as, 
credit, protection and transportation. In Somalia, nomadic women created elaborate trading networks 
involving resources and capacities of educated female relatives living in urban areas and armed male 
relatives who could protect them (Sorenson, 1998: 86-87). 
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build capacities and create sustainable development (Korn, 1999: 77). 46 The IFRC 
representative argues if, "a third party comes in and tries to set something up for other 
people, they have got to be sure there is a level of ownership among the people that are 
involved with it, otherwise it is money for nothing. There has got to be an 
understanding of the objective and why that objective is there. " (Interview 39,3 
December 2002). In sum: "humanitarian intervention can be legitimate only when those 
dismissed as `victims' become the agents of their own regeneration. " (Bennett, 1998a: 
15). The unpredictability of this approach raises challenges but Bennett identifies two 
lessons 47 Local initiatives and coping mechanisms will always be a most effective 
barrier to human rights violations while organised communities can be a significant 
force for peace. Second, the importance of international support for such initiatives 
should not be underestimated (Bennett, 1998a: 10). 
Beyond the positive theory and examples, local coping mechanisms and partnerships 
may be unavoidably constrained, with insurmountable problems stemming from the loss 
of family, friends, homes, possessions, identity, volatile security and a fragile political 
environment (Bennett, 1998a: 12; and Sorenson, 1998: 83). CBOs can also be a source 
of dissent, jealousy, suspicion and tensions, especially during armed conflict where 
predatory actors can control scarce resources and dominate the context (Sorenson, 1998: 
85). In addition, coping skills cannot be made sustainable where IDPs receive minimal 
support. Therefore, the key challenge is to shift from the rapid delivery of goods and 
services, which can undermine coping mechanisms and create long-term dependency, to 
development programmes, for example, income-generating activities" (Sorenson, 1998: 
82; and Paklar, 2002: 31-32). However, since local participation is "inherently a 
political-and politicising-process", the fear of adding to the war has made many 
humanitarian organisations guard their own resources in order to hold partners 
accountable for aid disbursements (Bennett, 1998a: 15). 
Evidently, a context-specific understanding and harnessing of local coping mechanisms 
is a prerequisite to sustainable development. Since there is no single UN agency willing 
or capable to intervene consistently on behalf of IDPs, the main approach is through 
improved co-ordination. However, this has proved intricate and confusing, as described 
46 Sustainability stems from "conformity with prevailing sociocultural values, institutions and practices" 
and the "availability of local capacities and resources. " (Sorenson, 1998: 76). 
47 Bennett uses the case study of San Jose de Apartado (Bennett: 1998a: 10). 
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by the informant at the start of this section. Deficiencies aside, the humanitarian 
response remains open to multiple international mechanisms and partnerships with 
indigenous humanitarian actors. It also creates space and emphasises the need for 
additional and innovative approaches, of which political intervention is the most crucial. 
2.5 Political Intervention through Humanitarian Mediation 
To provide sustainable solutions to displacement in the context of armed secessionism, 
it is essential to address the political needs of IDPs, which centre on the resolution of 
the conflict as the root cause of displacement. Although the doctrine of responsible 
sovereignty constrains the type of actors and their strategy, humanitarian mediation has 
potential as a form of political intervention. In this respect, a CTA is selected as an 
appropriate international third party. 
2.5.1 Potential of Conflict Transformation Agencies 
A CTA, as an international NGO variant, can act as a mechanism for unarmed, low-key 
and skeletal political intervention in conflict. Rigby characterises CTAs as, "national or 
international, non-profit, charitable organizations committed to working with or 
alongside local and international actors in analysing, understanding and responding to 
violent conflict in constructive and creative ways. " (Rigby, 2001: 960). In 2002, the 
secretary-general of International Alert noted there were 480 CTAs operating world- 
wide (Barakat, Connolly & Large, 2002b: 2). 
48 
More generally, international NGOs, "whose new operational tools have facilitated 
unprecedented access to conflict areas", have emerged as the "key players - for better or 
for worse - in the conflict management strategies of the international community. 
Through this "increasingly important role in international affairs, the nature of 
humanitarian assistance in these complex emergencies has changed" (Ludlum-Taylor, 
48 For example, Sant' Egidio, acted as an international third party in establishing dialogue between 
Frelino and Renamo in Mozambique in 1992. 
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1998: 34)"49 Similarly Roberts asserts that the "place for humanitarian action in 
international policies" is not in doubt but inquires "what that place is, and what forms 
such action can usefully take. " Perhaps CTAs as `new international NGOs' can satisfy 
Roberts' "urgent need to appreciate what humanitarian needs can and cannot achieve" 
and break away from the reluctance and apathy among the international community in 
response to the increase in internal conflicts during the 1990s (Roberts, 1996: 7). 50 
In theory, unarmed, unilateral political intervention by a CTA offers unique incentives. 
It can possess sufficient capacity to transform the pivotal breathing opportunities within 
low-intensity armed conflicts while remaining flexible enough to cope with volatile 
conflict dynamics. Humanitarian intervention can appear threatening to a state but the 
non-political nature of this mandate makes it comparatively easier to gain consent. 
Conversely, the state is usually more sensitive and protective with international 
intervention for political needs. 51 Therefore, the low-key image of a CTA may be more 
expedient, compared to a UN agency or regional association, considering the limited 
space for international political intervention. The UNICEF representative confirms, 
"perhaps CTAs are better placed than other mechanisms because they will not draw 
attention to themselves, they are not all high profile. You need an entity that is self- 
effacing and can work behind the scenes. " This contrasts with other mediators that 
"want to take credit", which limits "leverage and ability". Since, "some of the parties to 
the conflict want to maintain very confidential relationships", this role "is difficult with 
the UN agencies and with other governments. " (Interview 46,6 December 2002). Last, 
Roberts asserts that multilateral mechanisms and humanitarian international NGOs may 
not have the capacity or will and the OCHA ID Unit representative concurs that they 
49 The EPCPT outlines three main approaches. First, they can operate at the official level as third party 
intermediaries, for example, Sant' Egidio in Mozambique and the FAFO Institute for Applied Science in 
the Oslo Peace Process. Two-track diplomacy involves unofficially bringing together influential 
members of the policy-making community, those with access to decision-makers for problem-solving 
workshops. Finally, the Carter Centre and its International Negotiation Network steer a compromise 
between official and unofficial approaches. The latter is termed Track One and a Half (EPCPT, 1999: 4). 
50 The humanitarian failures include: the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the retreat in 
Somalia and the shameful UN response in Srebrenica 1995, the decision not to renew operations in 
Liberia, the contradictory `safe havens' in northern Iraq and the attacks on the refugee camps in Zaire in 
1996 (Roberts, 1996: 7). De Silva concurs that since "the end of the Cold War, the range of 'complex 
emergencies' and scope for peacemaking, conflict management and humanitarian action have expanded 
exponentially. However, the political will, leadership, ability, motivation and financial backing to deal 
with these situations has not kept pace. " (de Silva, 2000a: 244). 
51 This stems from the confines of responsible sovereignty and the wider politics of intervention and is 
particularly relevant in the context of secessionist armed conflict. Predominating opposition to 
intervention can also be the result of both/either side not wanting to stop the violence. 
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would consider such a role "to be a slippery slope with too many political implications" 
(Roberts, 1996: 7; and Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
Therefore, political intervention by a CTA is possible without threatening sovereignty 
while trust is instilled when there is no attachment to the ulterior agendas of foreign 
states. As addressed by the thesis, in Aceh, the CTA further satisfied the constraints of 
sovereignty by presenting itself as a facilitator rather than a mediator. Facilitation 
entails less power for the third party but conceptually it is still a form of mediation. 52 
For IDPs directly, CTAs offer the prospect of filling some of the residual gaps in 
protection, which have so far eluded conventional humanitarian intervention. They can 
also operate alongside other humanitarian actors, while overall reducing the 
bureaucratic tendencies of a large international organisation. 
For the strategy of political intervention, humanitarian mediation is viable at least in 
theory. 53 It consists of using humanitarian concerns as justifiable leverage in 
convincing armed sides to address and resolve the reasons for the political violence 
through guided dialogue. Using humanitarian needs as justification for addressing the 
political reasons for conflict may appear less threatening to sovereignty since it "reaches 
people in a very neutral way" and "on the back of that you bring in mediation. " 
(Interview 46,6 December 2002). The strategy is particularly feasible where a low- 
intensity conflict has reached a stalemate or breathing space. At this point, a ceasefire 
can allow the armed sides to consider pacific alternatives to prevent a spiralling in 
violence. 54 
52 Crocker, Olser & Aall suggest that, "in these kinds of activities, third parties are supposed to play a 
neutral and essentially facilitating role, enabling and encouraging a mutual learning process rather than 
guiding or still less influencing and directing the parties to mutually acceptable approaches to problem 
solving" (Crocker et al, 1999: 22). 
53 The thesis focuses on this intervention strategy although appreciates that other strategies for political 
intervention can be used. 
54 For more on humanitarian mediation see httl2: //www. hdcentre. orgl? aid=22 
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2.5.2 Establishing and maintaining a ceasefire 
For the CTA using humanitarian mediation, establishing a ceasefire is the most difficult 
initial challenge. " A UNICEF representative refers to, "Aceh, DRC and Sudan", where 
humanitarian cease-fires have been able "to bring parties to conflict to agree together 
free access for humanitarians". It reduced the intensity of the fighting and suffering for 
a short period and "allows them to reflect on the wisdom of fighting as a solution" 
(Interview 46,6 December 2002). Pre-defined humanitarian interludes are not new and 
have probably co-existed with war, with the work of Florence Nightingale during the 
Crimean War and the immunisation campaigns in the 1980s as the most renowned. 56 
The latter in particular used short-term child immunisation to "help build the 
momentum for the negotiation of lasting peace". 57 
In El Salvador in 1985, three "days of tranquillity" or informal cease-fires between 
rebel and state forces allowed the ICRC and local health authorities to immunise 
400,000 children. 58 In Sudan in 1988, the UN Secretary General organised one-month 
of tranquillity, where humanitarian needs were prioritised by securing eight corridors of 
peace (Operation Lifeline Sudan). They were then extended and developed into peace 
negotiations in June 1989 (Hay & Sanger, 1992: 166-67). In Lebanon, UNICEF 
followed the precedent set in El Salvador by highlighting a child-health deficit from the 
conflict, resulting in a series of three-day cease-fires in September, October and 
November 1987.59 In all three cases, the parties to the conflict actively co-operated in 
the relief effort, which involved logistical, communicative and other forms of assistance 
between the belligerents. Although minimal in nature, the cease-fires demonstrated the 
shift from conflict resolution to that of partial transformation (Hay & Sanger, 1992: 
168). Despite these common roots, the thesis focuses on a more ambitious application 
55 Despite the challenges, Posen considers external intervention "to elicit a pause in the fighting in order 
to ease the plight of refugees" easier than "imposing a permanent political solution to end an internal 
conflict" (Posen, 1997: 370). 
56 Ebersole writes that "[h]umanitarians have long pinned their hopes on impacting peace processes 
through their humanitarian efforts by bringing a minimum of trust and a sense of common humanity to 
the most inhuman circumstances. " (Ebersole, 2000: 1). 
57 Hay & Sanger define the, "immunization ceasefire" as a "cessation of fighting for a predetermined 
time" (Hay & Sanger, 1992: 161). 
58 UNICEF and the Roman Catholic Church were the main facilitators, with two leaders from the latter 
acting as interlocutors with the rebels. This allowed the government to maintain a necessary distance 
(Hay & Sanger, 1992: 162-63). 
59 Unlike El Salvador, UNICEF acted without a mediator in the negotiations with Israel, Syria and 
Hezbollah (Hay & Sanger, 1992: 165). 
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of the humanitarian mediation strategy for political intervention, which aimed not only 
`to transform' but resolve the conflict in Aceh. 
Successful cease-fires can create important knock-on effects. Their implementation 
depends on and strengthens moderates (within armed and unarmed sides) that can then 
become influential stakeholders in delivering sustainable peace. For example, the 
church in El Salvador strengthened its mediation mandate and increased its credibility 
among both sides in the conflict through the immunization campaign. In Sudan, the 
"corridors of tranquillity" and the subsequent relief effort were judged instrumental in 
paving the way for the peace talks in July 1989 (Hay & Sanger, 1992: 170-171). 
Ebersole asserts that, "humanitarian ceasefires are seen as turning points for building 
the trust upon which peace can be built at both local and national levels. " (Ebersole, 
2000: 1). 
2.5.3 Spoilers and moving to the substantive 
Spoilers and moving to the substantive contentious issues are two interlinked obstacles. 
First, short-term cease-fires are difficult to secure and maintain because there will 
always be opposition from those that prefer to continue with the conflict to fulfil vested 
political and economic interests. 60 Second and as Posen, Brown and the UNHCR 
representative advise, time-outs and pauses may reduce hardship and save lives in the 
short-term but they do not solve the underlying political problems or the root cause of 
internal displacement. Therefore, conflict management needs to consider the long-term 
and its stakeholders (Posen, 1997: 370; Brown, 1997: 24; and Interview 40,3 December 
2002). Accordingly, the mediating CTA must maintain momentum during the 
negotiations on the more substantive political polemics while remaining outside the 
conflict through neutrality and impartiality (Posen, 1997: 370). 
The process of political negotiations must be then structured in a constructive way and 
at an early stage, in particular, the choice of venue, participants, agenda design, 
60 Cease-fires are obviously necessary but can come before or during political dialogue. Unlike Sri 
Lanka, where a ceasefire preceded dialogue, in Columbia both the government and guerrillas were talking 
for three years without a ceasefire. Sri Lanka had impartial mediators, Colombia had the US military 
while the UN took the lead in Sierra Leone (Steele, 2002). Similarly in Northern Ireland, the cease-fires 
in the 1990s were prerequisites to the 1998 Belfast Agreement but the paramilitaries and their political 
representatives had a history of dialogue with both the Irish and British Governments. 
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structure and ground-rules for talks. The International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) argues that in Northern Ireland, "a renewed focus on the 
process by which negotiations took place" had a huge impact on its success. The 1996- 
1998 negotiation process was overhauled with an influential chairperson, more informal 
channels of communication were added, time limits were eventually imposed and talks 
were more inclusive. In particular, "extremists from both sides" were "brought into the 
process as equal players" (IDEA, 1998: 407). 
2.5.4 Integration of the political and humanitarian 
Moreover, the main concern is that the humanitarian mediation for political intervention 
strategy is fundamentally unsuitable because it can instil or contribute to the 
politicisation of humanitarian needs within the conflict. Two distinct responses and 
processes may be required since humanitarian and political needs are very different. 
Where access and the delivery of aid is restricted, the traditional humanitarian strategy 
involves negotiation with combatants to stop the armed violence to fulfil the limited 
objective of meeting humanitarian needs. Alternatively, to meet political needs, the 
third party facilitates processes aimed at relaying messages between armed sides and 
guiding the dialogue agenda. More crucially successful outcomes depend on the 
willingness and commitment of the parties to the conflict (Barakat et al: 2002b, 12). 
Based on these differences, the ICRC representative states unequivocally: 
"humanitarian intervention must be neutral and independent, you should not mix 
politics with a humanitarian agenda even though it may have positive consequences" 
(Interview 38,3 December 2002). A representative of UNICEF argues that, "there 
needs to be a coalition between the two [aid and mediation] but you need to keep 
identities separate so, for example, there are no adverse affects on groups and NGOs. " 
(Interview 46,6 December 2002). 
Furthermore, focusing on combatants through political dialogue runs the risk "of 
legitimising violence as a means to the negotiating table and [... ] of narrowing visions 
of the future to stated positions rather than broadly representative needs. " (Barakat et al: 
2002b, 12). It can also unintentionally support the role and influence of spoilers. 
Kaldor agrees that the aim should be limited to the control of violence so that space can 
be created for the emergence or re-emergence of civil society. The more normal the 
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situation, the greater the possibilities for developing political alternatives since 
combatants "may at worst have a shared interest in continued violence and, at best be 
ready to reach a dirty and generally unstable compromise involving some form of 
apartheid based on identity". This is based on the assumption that such "fighting is a 
form of political mobilisation, a way of entrenching a politics based on identity". 
Therefore, Kaldor argues that talks between armed sides must occur "in a framework in 
which the aim is to establish conditions for an alternative political mobilization". This 
requires "mediators to be clear about international principles and standards and refuse 
compromises that violate those principles, otherwise the credibility of the institutions 
will suffer and any kind of implementation could be very difficult" (Kaldor: 1997,23- 
24). 
Mixing the humanitarian and the political and making the combatants sole 
representatives in dialogue can inflict further damage because, "you are using affected 
populations as pawns, punishing them as victims of the conflict" (Interview 40,3 
December 2002). Humanitarian assistance even in its traditional form has 
unintentionally fuelled conflicts since it repairs the damage while simultaneously 
allowing combatants to re-arm, consolidate and even assume a more offensive position. 
This occurred in Angola, Columbia and Operation Lifeline Sudan became an 
entrenched feature of the conflict (Interview 40,3 December 2002; and Interview 44,5 
December 2002). 61 Jan Egeland reflects that in "the ten conflict resolution efforts in 
which I have been involved, all the leaders at all times claimed their goal was 'to end 
the suffering of our peoples'. In reality, there were always influential political, military 
or economic warlords who had their interests tied to continuing the conflict" (Egeland, 
1999: 544). More optimistically, Ebersole concludes, "the professed willingness of an 
army leader to participate in the fight against polio" can be considered "as either a step 
towards a peace process, or as a tactic to gain time and military advantage. Perhaps it is 
both. " (Ebersole, 2000: 1). 
Finally, political intervention through humanitarian mediation by a CTA demands 
sound co-ordination and a concerted rejection of institutional jealousy to prevent inter- 
organisation rivalry and misunderstandings. In addition this small mechanism may "not 
61 The Horn of Africa was not chosen for immunisation in the 1980s because both the Tigrayan Peoples' 
Liberation Front and the Eritrean forces could not trust each other not to re-build during a ceasefire (Hay 
& Sanger, 1992: 170-171). 
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have the prestige, accountability and impartiality to intervene politically for IDPs" 
(Interview 44,5 December 2002). Similarly, it may be incapable of defending its 
political intervention from the ulterior agendas of foreign states, which could add more 
damaging and complicated dynamics to the conflict. 
This section examined the potential of a CTA to meet the political needs of IDPs by 
resolving the root cause of displacement by addressing the reasons for the political 
violence using humanitarian mediation. Based on the limited space for intervention 
there is value in using humanitarian needs to highlight the conflict-deficit, implement a 
ceasefire and kick-start a political process of dialogue between the armed sides. 
Although three fundamental concerns were raised, this form and strategy of political 
intervention evidently demands further investigation. 62 
Conclusion 
The chapter crucially emphasised the interdependent nature of the needs of IDPs and 
juxtaposed the requirements of meeting political and humanitarian needs with the actual 
capacity of international intervention. Despite the main institutional and operational 
advances, the international community has struggled to provide adequate protection and 
assistance. Finding viable responses to creating sustainable development and 
sustainable peace remains elusive because of the inviolability of state sovereignty and 
insufficient international willingness and capacity. In particular, the norms of 
responsible sovereignty have been disseminated and strengthened by the Guiding 
Principles but quiet diplomacy alone cannot monitor and restore gaps in protection and 
assistance in the field. Existing mechanisms for humanitarian intervention can alleviate 
to a degree but co-ordination is still teething and protection is especially deficient. 
Furthermore, for sustainable peace and development, more far-reaching, sovereignty- 
friendly forms of international political intervention are necessary. 
62 Hay & Sanger outline a basic checklist for a third party: what is the possibility of actually achieving 
some progress toward a ceasefire and peace negotiations? How long has the war continued and are there 
signs of war-weariness? Is the intervention a new idea to the conflict and is it likely to be resolved before 
the idea could be introduced? And, what is the potential of reaching influential actors in the conflict? 
(Hay & Sanger, 1992: 170-171). 
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Based on these weaknesses in international intervention and the recognition that 
sustainable solutions require both political and humanitarian needs to be addressed; the 
chapter primarily focused on two preconditions for sustainable development: the need to 
link assistance with protection and to harness local coping mechanisms. For sustainable 
peace, the chapter examined the feasibility of political intervention based on the strategy 
of humanitarian mediation by a CTA. When political violence through armed 
secessionism is the root cause, it advances the international community's advocacy of 
state responsibility but represents a low-key compromise between the polar opposites of 
`hard' intervention and a sovereignty that is sensitive to outside interference. It is also 
appealing because it can reach combatants in a neutral way and fill short-term 
protection gaps through a humanitarian ceasefire. Building on this, further guided 
dialogue can be used to address and resolve the reasons for the political violence. 
Clearly, this political response alone is insufficient but it has the ability to work jointly 
with a more conventional humanitarian response to IDPs, ideally involving national and 
international humanitarian actors. 
Nevertheless, the literature and interviews with experts in the field raised three main 
concerns. First, defending active opposition from spoilers and maintaining momentum 
to address the substantive political polemics through constructive dialogue with all 
stakeholders are interlinked obstacles. Second, although IDPs endure political and 
humanitarian needs, some proposed that tension could be caused by directly linking 
humanitarian needs to a process with a political conflict management mandate, which in 
theory demand two separate intervention strategies. Last, as a possible consequence 
and considering the new wars thesis, the political response and the CTA risk the 
politicisation of humanitarian needs and becoming a feature of the conflict. To 
ascertain the validity of these salient concerns, the thesis examines the role and impact 
of the joint application of political and humanitarian responses for IDPs in Aceh and 
North Sumatra. Before this, Chapter Three details the methods used to conduct this 
empirical study. 
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3. Methodology 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to using qualitative methods to conduct field research on 
forced internal displacement is recognising and controlling bias. Suitably, this 
multifaceted challenge is examined throughout this chapter, thereby reflecting its 
ubiquity and the constant efforts to identify its impact. Similarly, the process of data 
validation through triangulation and further cross-referencing was continuous. The 
chapter begins by justifying the use of qualitative methodology and details the nature of 
the field and desk research during the pre-study and the comparative case study stages. 
Section 3.2 follows by outlining the steps to identify gatekeepers, select key informants 
and the gaining and maintaining of access. 
The third section focuses on the interrelated methods and techniques used and 
developed to gather the empirical data. This involved the use of semi-structured 
interviews with key informants in Aceh, North Sumatra, Jakarta, Geneva and the United 
Kingdom (UK). In addition, semi-structured interviews, based on the standards codified 
in the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, were 
conducted with a sample of Internally Displaced Persons from the two case studies: 
Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, Aceh and Sei Lepan, North Sumatra. ' These interviews 
were supplemented by a focus group session with each IDP committee and in-camp 
structured field observations. Based on this, Section 3.4 explains the reasons for using 
the IDP household as the strategic unit of analysis and the technique of modified, non- 
random, cluster sampling. Furthermore, based on the inclusion of marginalised sub- 
groups and the holistic approach to methods and techniques, the findings are 
representative of each case study group. Justification for tentative conclusions on other 
similar groups of IDPs in each province stems from the comparative case study method 
and the in-depth knowledge of displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra based on 
secondary sources. The chapter closes with Section 3.5, which reviews the processes of 
recording and analysing the data. 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. 
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3.1 Qualitative Methodology 
Justification for interrelated qualitative methods and techniques stems from the 
combination of the under-researched subject matter and the volatility of its context. The 
pre-study involved a review of specialised academic literature and field-based sources, 
in addition to semi-structured interviews with a cross-range of representatives from the 
humanitarian and political responses and other relevant experts. The empirical research 
culminated in an intensive comparative study of two IDP groups, the Lhokseumawe 
Polytechnic IDPs in Aceh and the Sei Lepan group in North Sumatra. This data was 
supplemented further by additional qualitative interviews with key informants in the two 
provinces. Last, it is important to identify the main methodological lessons and 
concerns during the two stages of the research. 
3.1.1 Justification 
Qualitative methodology was employed for the empirical research (pre-study and case 
study) because of the paucity of systematic investigation into forced internal 
displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra. 2 By focusing on small numbers of IDPs and 
inter and intra-group behaviour, the thesis proposes to explain the process of internal 
displacement and the subsequent impact of the response strategies. Accordingly, the 
research was "more interested in describing and understanding complexity", in 
particular the "thinking and the behaviours of individuals and groups in specific 
situations. " (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 5,8 and 19). It was thus hoped that the 
methodological approach would be of more benefit to the intellectual capital of forced 
migration studies, while possibly impacting on relevant policy at the field level. 
Furthermore, the insightful data could then be used to drive subsequent quantitative 
studies. In sum, it recognised that effective research "must be tailored to fit the specific 
problem" (Pratt & Lozios, 1992: 1). 3 
2 Pratt & Lozios define systematic research as "the desire to eliminate errors in gathering information and 
solving particular problems. " (Pratt & Lozios, 1992: 2). 
3 Other methods and techniques were considered for the case study research, for example, Participatory 
Rural Appraisal was ruled out based on conclusions from the pre-study and time constraints in the field. 
This technique would not have been possible with the Polytechnic group because of their low-morale and 
fatigued state. 
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In recognising the volatile dynamics of armed conflict, the qualitative methodology also 
allowed for variables and bias so they could be recognised and controlled or 
appropriately measured. 4 Barakat & Strand point to the challenge of establishing the 
"impartiality and objectivity of the data gathered" in such contexts since trauma restricts 
responses, which means researchers can "no longer assume the existence of a body of 
verifiable data. " (Barakat & Strand, 2000: 135-136; and Barakat, Chard, Jacoby & 
Lume, 2002a: 992). For example, a respondent's memory of flight may be "superseded" 
by those of survival, which makes it difficult to "attribute the correct significance to 
important variables influencing the research" (Barakat et al, 2002a: 993). As for all 
techniques, cross-checking was the key counterbalance since "in an emergency situation 
people can accept data uncritically and appear to want to believe in a worst-case 
situation. " (Pratt & Lozios, 1992: 16). 
Accordingly, several qualitative methods and techniques (the holistic or composite 
approach) were employed in appreciation of the unique "restrictions imposed by armed 
conflict" (Barakat et al, 2002a: 991 and 1001; and Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 153). While 
keeping to the original aims of the research, Barakat and Goodhand both call for a 
"flexible, innovative and reflective approach" since "highly structured methods" are 
prevented by the "multitude of unpredictable parameters which tightly control 
appropriate and possible action". Dangerous variables for the researcher include 
shifting battle lines, personal safety and restrictions of movements Accordingly, the 
researcher was actively aware to feed into the research "any potential alternatives" 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 149-150; Barakat & Strand, 2000: 135-136; and Goodhand, 
2000: 12). Arksey & Knight concur that "[a]pproaching research questions from 
different angles and bringing together a range of views" can create "new and alternative 
explanations", which "better capture the social complexity that the fieldwork explores. " 
(Arksey & Knight, 1999: 22). 
4 As detailed below, Chambers highlights the most common form of research biases (Chambers, 1983: 13- 
25). 
i With reference to impact on field research, Goodhand writes that wars are characterised by "ongoing 
militarized violence, widespread human rights abuses and a culture of impunity" (Goodhand, 2000: 12). 
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The empirical research is valuable considering the paucity of on-site/in-camp interviews 
within forced migration studies. 6 Similarly, Barakat & Ellis promote the need to avoid 
"battle bias" by engaging during conflict (Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 151). Goodhand 
agrees and points to practical, ethical and methodological challenges, which are suitably 
addressed within this chapter (Goodhand, 2000: 12). However, conflict is textured and 
often subtle in nature. In particular, in low-intensity armed conflict, the violence and 
battle lines can move quickly and suddenly, erupting and dissipating without warning. 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that violence through its myriad of 
manifestations, for example, intimidation, may not be visible to the researcher. Overall, 
the security of the respondents, interpreters and the researcher took priority (Barakat & 
Strand, 2000: 135-136). 
Last, the qualitative methods and techniques were selected because of the practical 
constraints of time and manpower (Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 152). For field research in 
Indonesia, time was a constraint because of the type of visa available, as examined 
below. Nevertheless, based on the aims of the research, there were adequate resources 
to gather the data in a careful and consistent manner (Barakat & Strand, 2000: 135-136). 
3.1.2 Pre-study 
The pre-field stage involved a `progressive focusing' review of the literature, starting 
with forced internal displacement in the global arena and moving to IDPs as a result of 
low-intensity armed conflict. This was followed by a desk study of field-based 
secondary sources on all forms of displacement and the range of humanitarian needs in 
the two provinces, with reference to displacement within Indonesia. 7 The selection 
aimed to be representative, in particular, for the field-based sources the objective was to 
cover a cross-section of actors within the humanitarian response. Although time was a 
natural constraint, the review was maintained until saturation point. Overall, the 
6 This observation is exemplified with focus on one volume of Journal of Refugee Studies (Jacobsen & 
Landau, 2003: 98). 
7 The sample of sources was chosen from an extensive range of archival and updated field and context 
(qualitative and quantitative) reports from governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental 
indigenous and international organisations. This consisted of regular and occasional or special reports by 
UN agencies operational in the two provinces, in particular the Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); internal documents from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) 
and press releases from the media (Indonesian and international). 
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secondary sources were used to validate the field findings, supplement the author's 
arguments and where relevant, to provide contextual information on forced 
displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra. 8 
The review of field-based secondary sources encountered two main constraints. The 
range and depth of field-based secondary sources were limited compared to other 
contexts of displacement because of the strict conditions placed on the movement of 
humanitarian actors and the relatively quiet international coverage of the conflict. 
Second, the researcher was unable to directly access sources written in Indonesian. 
However, this constraint was either compensated for or overcome by access to 
translations by the authors or a credible third party. In addition, Indonesia has a number 
of respected national English-language newspapers. 9 Moreover, the aim of the 
empirical research was to capture these indigenous perspectives. 
Exploratory field-research was completed in Aceh and North Sumatra during March 
2001. It consisted of semi-structured interviews (with mainly open-ended questions), 
with senior representatives from the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)), consular officials, civil society leaders, local 
academics, field staff from the HDC, UN agencies, and indigenous and international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 10 In December 2002, the researcher 
interviewed 14 senior representatives from the main UN agencies and international 
NGOs in Geneva on the Guiding Principles and challenges to responses to forced 
migration within the provincial and national contexts and with reference to the global 
arena. 11 
8 Other sources included: the Trondheim Conference Norway on Internally Displaced Persons, March 
2000; and two workshops in London, 2002, which focused on forced displacement and the conflict in 
Aceh. 
9 For example, The Jakarta Post and the Indonesian Observer. Newspapers from other countries in the 
region also provided relevant and updated insight. 
io It examined the impact of the process of joint dialogue/political response to IDPs on the major 
stakeholders, specific changes in the nature of the conflict and progress in humanitarian assistance. In 
total, 34 self-designed interviews were completed, encompassing Jakarta, Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, 
and Medan. 
11 This involved 13 separate interviews with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR), OCHA, International Organisation of Migration (IOM), International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and the Global IDP Project. 
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The pre-study produced four important lessons (Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 151; and 
Goodhand, 2000: 12). As Goodhand advises, war is not always the only point of 
reference for the people affected and this was remembered when gathering statistical 
and background information on those killed and injured by the conflict (Goodhand, 
2000: 15). Or to paraphrase an imam from Banda Aceh: "such totals and facts are less 
relevant for those suffering from the political violence". Connected to this 
consideration, when trying to ascertain the patterns of displacement, it was essential to 
be persistent but to have realistic expectations. Inaccuracies stem from the frequent 
politicised nature of displacement and pragmatic constraints of an ongoing conflict 
(Barakat et al, 2002a: 993). i2 Third, although the researcher had `lived experience', the 
pre-study reminded that some conditions are not caused but accentuated by conflict 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 150). 
Last, Barakat et al draw attention to bias from imposed, foreign analytical frameworks 
and this demanded continuous assessment (Barakat et al, 2002a: 994). The research 
was completed by a `foreigner' and while it examined the universal phenomenon of 
internal displacement, the case study research planned to use a western or pro- 
democracy analytical framework. The latter was grounded in, for example, the term 
`Internally Displaced Persons', the doctrine of `responsible sovereignty', the 
dissemination of the `Guiding Principles' and the use of 'international third party 
intervention' in conflict. Acknowledging these facets does not weaken the research, 
conversely it is argued that self-awareness strengthens the validity of the findings. 
Nevertheless, the pre-study frequently raised the same caveat, which insightfully 
qualifies rather than threatens the nature of the research. As an (Western) ICRC 
representative with extensive experience in Indonesia advises: 
... we should not look at it [displacement and conflict] with 
Western eyes. One 
way to confront problems in Indonesia is to ignore them and hope a problem 
resolves itself. Instead, Westerners identify a problem and apply solutions, using 
the Cartesian approach. Indonesians have their own approach, dialogue is not 
the same for us as it is for them. There is a misunderstanding of cultures and 
this creates fairly schizophrenic situations with Western standards causing 
problems. It is a question of a clash of cultures and a question of finding 
individuals being torn between their own and influences from outside (Interview 
45,2 December 2002). 
12 In addition and based on the research objectives, the researcher did not focus on securing exact totals of 
IDPs but instead used informed estimates through personal observation where appropriate and the cross- 
checking or validation of primary data with secondary sources. 
87 
While appreciating the truth in this statement, in the interest of making progress in IDP 
protection and assistance, the research proposes that "Western standards" are useful but 
the reader is frequently reminded that the application needs to be context-specific. 
Second, while Indonesia is a relatively new democracy, it nonetheless aspires to such 
political aims and principles. From this standpoint, such frameworks and standards may 
be imported but that does not make them incongruous to the political culture. 
3.1.3 Comparative case study research 
The two case study IDP groups were selected based on the "orienting phase" or the pre- 
study stage (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 18). The comparative study was restricted to two- 
months, including three weeks living with, selecting and interviewing a sample of IDPs, 
making in-camp/on-site structured observations and gathering background data relating 
to the aims of the research. 13 Accordingly, an ethnographic approach was adopted to 
gather the primary data from the case studies (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: 8; and 
Barakat et al, 2002a: 995). The comparative approach was used to focus on two single 
areas to establish and contrast the interrelationship among common variable factors. It 
thus provided insight into the narratives and nature of displacement; a more robust 
critique of the conflict; short and long-term needs and coping mechanisms; and the 
effectiveness of protection and assistance by the humanitarian and political responses. 
The comparison focused on two different types of displacement, repetitive displacement 
(the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic group) and illegal resettlement (the Sei Lepan group). 
The differences demonstrated that displacement was a variable phenomenon within a 
contained geographical area. Alternatively, commonalities also proved that the root 
cause produced common traits among IDPs at the individual and group level. These 
traits may be relevant and useful in understanding similar processes in other contexts. 14 
A selection of the Guiding Principles acted as the framework for the case study and 
wider field research during January-March 2003. They enabled the researcher to gain 
13 It also consisted of one week of preparation (finalising gatekeepers and the viability of conducting the 
case study research and translating and piloting the interviews); three weeks interviewing key informants 
in both provinces; and one week for internal travel. 
14 The patterns of displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra and the deliberate reasons for selecting the 
two case studies are reviewed in Chapter Six. 
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insight into the factors outlined above by gauging directly the provision of protection 
and assistance. Correspondingly, it was possible to assess the applicability of the 
Principles. Key informants were interviewed to confirm and challenge the case study 
data. These interviews also introduced a longitudinal element to the research, providing 
an update on the dynamics of the conflict and the progress of the joint responses in 
relation to IDPs. 15 
4 
The case study research raised new issues and revisited a number of considerations 
raised by the pre-study. Potential bias from using the Guiding Principles as the 
analytical framework was allowed for and controlled during the data collection, analysis 
and conclusions. For example, some interview questions were either abandoned or 
modified. Nevertheless, the framework mirrored the introduction of the Principles to 
indigenous policy at the national and local level in Indonesia. 16 
The same conflict displaced both case study groups. However, the ongoing proximity of 
the conflict to the Polytechnic IDPs, unlike for the Sei Lepan group, was a significant 
consideration. The latter group was outside the immediate impact of the conflict but 
still had significant protection concerns. Third, when investigating the protection and 
assistance for IDPs, care was taken to differentiate between similar programmes for 
non-displaced civilians. '? On this note and as reflected by ICRC policy, some key 
informants disagreed with granting special status to IDPs, pointing to the general need 
for all civilians to be protected and assisted in Aceh. The challenges from these 
theoretical concerns were examined during the data gathering and analysis. 
15 Between January and March 2003,30 interviews were also conducted with senior officials from 
relevant government departments, civil society representatives, local academics, and senior 
representatives from UN agencies, indigenous and international NGOs and CBOs that focused on forced 
migration. 
16 Further imposed categories were short and long-term displacement. Nevertheless, this was a relative 
construction, made by comparing the obvious differences in lengths of displacement between the two 
7 
ýroups. 
Differences were identified during the stages of sampling, interviewing and analysing. 
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3.2 Gatekeepers, Key Informants and Access 
i 
This section focuses on the challenges to the gradual processes of identifying 
gatekeepers, selecting key informants in addition to gaining and maintaining access. 
The main challenges were: establishing those that possessed power and articulated the 
culture of the community; avoiding and controlling biases; and reaching a balance when 
relying on indigenous and international NGOs for gaining access to the IDP groups. 
3.2.1 Identifying the gatekeepers and selecting key informants 
There were important overlaps between the identification of gatekeepers and the 
selection of key informants since the former frequently became the latter. Gatekeepers 
are "people with the power to grant or restrict access to research settings" and "are likely 
to be at senior manager level" (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 64). Identification is not always 
straightforward (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: 63-64). During conflict, Barakat et al 
assert that the selection of key informants is inherently politicised, therefore, choice may 
be seen as partisan since, "it is often neither possible to gain equal and uninhibited 
access to all groups nor to ensure that the research sample contains representative 
informants. " This occurs because "[m]any people disguise their identities or claim 
leadership or spokesperson status which they do not in fact possess, while some 
vulnerable groups remain deliberately invisible under threat of reprisal or through a 
general fear of strangers. " Consequently, the procedures for choosing the subjects, 
locations and time frames are less reliable compared to contexts of non-conflict (Barakat 
et al, 2002a: 992). 
Within each province, gatekeepers were identified and key informants were selected for 
interview progressively through four main stages: the analysis of field reports, 
exploratory field research in 2001, interviews in Geneva in 2002 and during the case 
study research in 2003. The field research aimed to reach a cross-section of key 
informants, that were representative of the range of actors within the two response 
strategies, that is, governmental, non-governmental indigenous and international 
organisations, community-based organisations (CBOs), HDC staff in Banda Aceh, 
representatives from the joint committees and monitoring teams and civil society. Care 
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was also taken to interview actors that had both short and long-term engagements. For 
the two case studies, the IDP committee representatives and leaders were selected based 
on the knowledge of power structures and of those perceived to have the power (Barakat 
et al, 2002a: 999). Overall, the continuity of interviewees and the subsequent analysis 
of commonalities and shifts in perception ensured the respondents' credibility. For all 
interviews, there was informed consent, providing full information on the nature of the 
questions, confidentiality and anonymity was ensured and the researcher was proactive 
in being sensitive to informants' needs (Barakat et al, 2002a: 994). 
When using key informants for planning or during research where time is limited, 
Chambers (1983) raises professional or elite biases. These occur where development 
professionals communicate with people based on convenience and thereby exclude 
significant voices. 18 This was prevented on two levels during the empirical research by 
looking beyond those most visible and readily at hand. First, interviews were conducted 
with informants from the elite levels (Jakarta, Banda Aceh, Medan, Geneva and the 
UK) down to two samples of IDPs. For the latter, interviews with households living 
beyond the obvious areas of community activity and marginalised sub-groups provided a 
more complete understanding of each group. First, to grant the research credibility and 
respect, access was gained through community leaders but to overcome diplomatic 
biases it was essential to insist politely on exploring other areas and talking to other 
people. This also demonstrated awareness of active, present and living biases by 
including and showing sensitivity to issues involving the sick or dead of the 
communities. To control male bias, it was important to try and establish interviewees 
and responses that were gender equal by seeking a representation of female respondents 
and raising gender issues as part of the research aims. To overcome seasonal bias, IDP 
respondents were asked to consider the long-term (past and future) when answering 
relevant questions. Bias overall was acknowledged but controlled by discussing and 
sharing knowledge at several intervals before and during the collection of data. 
18 Also known as selection, interview or interaction bias. 
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3.2.2 Gaining and maintaining access 
Access for empirical research is based on consent, which resides at three levels: national 
and local (state or official) and at the individual or IDP group (non-state or unofficial). 
For the latter, in particular with the two IDP groups, it was crucial to gain "acceptance 
by local communities and their leadership". Consent was carefully negotiated and 
gained from those in control at this level by making the research objectives clear 
(Barakat et al, 2002a: 1001; and Barakat & Strand, 2000: 135-136). At the 
Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, the risks (for IDPs, interpreter and researcher) and the 
overall security situation were assessed and monitored based on the advice of the IDP 
leaders and key informants to determine if and when access should occur and then if the 
research should continue (Goodhand, 2000: 13-14). 
However, for both periods of field research, there was no consent from local or national 
government authorities, that is, a research visa was not obtained nor were the relevant 
authorities directly aware of the research. The GoRI's resistance and mistrust of social 
science research on the conflict is well documented and after long consideration it was 
decided not to inform the government authorities in this official manner. 19 
Nevertheless, representatives of local government were interviewed, in addition to a 
senior representative of the military. Therefore, there was indirect consent and 
representatives of the state were informed or made aware during both visits. 
Furthermore and as the researcher was frequently reminded by western aid workers, it 
would have been unusual to conduct research in Aceh without the knowledge of 
someone in the government or military. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the 
research did not go unnoticed but was tolerated because it was low-key in nature while 
during the case study research members of GAM were not knowingly interviewed nor 
20 were rebel bases ever visited. 
19 This has extended far beyond social science research, other foreign researchers have also been denied 
visas to study, for example, Orang-utans at the Bukit Lawang nature reserve in North Sumatra. 
20 There are obvious ethics arising from this position. Goodhand sees ethical decision-making as 
"inherently highly context-specific for it addresses profoundly political questions, about power, 
information and accountability. " (Goodhand, 2000: 15). In sum, the research would never have been 
approved officially simply because of the ingrained political climate and bureaucracy. Second, at the time 
of the research, foreign NGO workers were operating in Aceh with tourist visas which does not justify the 
lack of direct consent but it does elucidate some of the contextual nuances and accepted or tolerated 
practices during the conflict. Nevertheless, this is a topic that would benefit from further context-specific 
research experiences. 
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Gaining and maintaining access to key informants from indigenous and international 
NGOs in each provincial capital was fundamental to identifying and accessing 
gatekeepers from CBOs and the IDP committees within each case study. This focusing 
approach demonstrated "ways to mitigate and compensate for" the "severe limitations to 
access. " (Barakat et al, 2002a: 992; Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 151; and Goodhand, 2000: 
12-13). Birkland clarifies that since "the state is so weak, it is the informal mechanisms 
among the displaced and NGOs that provide opportunities for survival both for the 
established and IDP populations"'(Birkland, 2001: 25). 21 
In Sei Lepan, access was greatly improved because the researcher was introduced and 
initially accompanied by members from the CBO, Candhika, and the main international 
NGO, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). 22 The CBO had recently started operations and 
lacked budget, therefore, their close relationship with the IDPs was not based on 
financial incentives, rather the CBO had spent some time simply helping the IDPs 
maintain their livelihoods and had developed a strong rapport. In particular, one 
member of the CBO was a helpful guide within the sprawling, rural settlement, 
confirming the pre-selected sample and was the point of familiarity in introductions 
since the IDPs were understandably suspicious of outsiders. After the layers of 
introductions, each respondent proved welcoming and eager to share their experiences. 
Furthermore, extra respect was granted since the researcher was the first Western, 
independent outsider to live in-camp and take an active and prolonged interest in 
listening to their narratives and needs from displacement. 23 
Similarly at the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, the researcher gained important insight into 
the composition and background of the IDP group from the local branch of a provincial 
NGO, People's Crisis Centre (PCC). The NGO also initially accompanied the 
researcher to the Polytechnic. This was important to ensure access since the IDPs were 
reportedly and as confirmed by the research, fatigued with assessment by international 
21 Birkland notes the paucity in information regarding the role of local NGOs in facilitating access for 
researchers (Birkland, 2001: 25). It is therefore hoped that the research helps address this lacuna. 
22 All the relevant humanitarian actors in Aceh and North Sumatra are examined in Chapter Four, Section 
4.4. 
23 For the first two days in Sei Lepan, the IDPs were extremely welcoming but certain background 
information (deemed private) was unclear, for example, the number of IDP families, the layout and 
politics within the settlement and between the two settlements. After building trust and when the IDPs 
realised the researcher would keep to his word and stay for the full week, this type of information became 
more forthcoming. 
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NGOs. Similar to Sei Lepan, there was scepticism of outsiders, especially with the 
common perception that Westerners came to the Polytechnic, promised but rarely 
delivered aid. Therefore, the NGO helped communicate that my research was purely 
academic and not linked to aid. 
Local insight from the key informants also complimented existing knowledge of the 
types of displacement common in Aceh and North Sumatra as provided initially by field 
reports from the joint responses. More directly, access was maintained by listening to 
the advice from these case-study specialists and guides, which allowed the researcher to 
display a greater "sensitivity to the local culture. " (Barakat & Strand, 2000: 135-136). 
For example, interviews were conducted to suit the religious and work obligations of the 
respondents. 4 Linked to this issue was the consideration given to researcher's self- 
presentation, that is, respecting the Muslim code of attire and the cultural emphasis on 
politeness and ceremony. 
Notwithstanding the benefits, in Sei Lepan it was also important to maintain a distance 
from the Candhika representative to avoid bias in responses. For example, despite 
making the purpose of the research clear before every interview, it was crucial that the 
IDP respondent did not colour their answers based on a perceived association between 
the research and the operations of the CBO. This was the same regarding access and the 
PCC at the Polytechnic. 
Although there were notable achievements in gaining and maintaining access, it is 
prudent to assume the research inevitably had positive and negative impact on the Sei 
Lepan and Polytechnic groups. Barakat et al and Goodhand emphasise the impossibility 
of a researcher remaining neutral, especially during conflict. 25 Similarly, Jacobsen & 
Landau raise the issue of "reactivity", where a researcher's presence potentially 
influences the behaviour and responses of informants (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003: 102). 
This includes the possibility that the research may have unwittingly supported vested 
interests, for example, Pratt & Lozios remind that research can empower, which can 
24 This included always inquiring if permission was needed from the husband if an interview was to be 
conducted with his wife alone; being flexible in the time taken to introduce the purpose of the interviews; 
adopting customs and respecting cultural and religious traditions, in particular, either refraining from or 
limiting the interviews on a Friday, the most important day in the mosque for the men. 25 See Barakat et al, 2002a: 991. Goodhand perceives research as a form of intervention (Goodhand, 
2002: 12). 
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make others hostile (Pratt & Lozios, 1992: 17-19). Where possible, this was alleviated 
and controlled by making the aims of the research clear and by using the guidance of 
key informants and gatekeepers. While reactivity is inevitable, it is also important to 
give respondents, informants and populations some credit in their ability to listen, 
understand, form realistic expectations and to differentiate among types of outsiders, for 
example, between a university researcher and an aid worker. Furthermore, there may be 
potential benefits for interviewees, "[k]nowing they are contributing to a worthwhile 
endeavour can be gratifying; it may increase confidence. " (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 
127). 
I 
It is important to identify some of the challenges related to identifying the relevant 
gatekeepers, and gaining and maintaining access, which proved either difficult to control 
or insurmountable. First, gathering basic statistical information was challenging, 
although it was alleviated by building trust, triangulation and in some cases multiple 
cross-checking. Linked to this was the important and recurrent cultural trait, known as 
`Javanese in-direction'. It is sufficient to note that for the outsider this obfuscatory trait 
can delay and prevent a straightforward and immediate gathering of basic, impersonal 
information or commonly accepted facts. It can also distort the appearance of actual 
processes of power, discourage an up-front approach to personal interactions; delay 
seemingly simple agreements and blur the actual significance of social and cultural 
values. 
One of the main challenges with researching the group of Acehnese IDPs was 
interviewing the committee, moreover, making sure the right members were 
interviewed. This was also reflected in the occasional reluctance of the Polytechnic 
respondents to talk about the politics of their displacement or the "culture of silence 
from the violence. " (Goodhand, 2000: 13). 26 Second, in Sei Lepan, at the start there was 
a problem with selecting the sample as the interpreter would try and show the names of 
potential interviewees to the committee leader. The researcher would in turn prevent or 
politely ask the interpreter to refrain. This led to some suspicion from the leader but the 
issue was resolved by the end of the first day of interviewing. 
26 The challenges of arranging the group interview are detailed in subsection 3.3.2. 
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For both groups, there was also the unavoidable problem of writing down respondents' 
responses, which may have caused suspicion. This was countered by remaining aware 
of the respondent's reactions, explaining the aims of the research, ensuring anonymity 
and by getting introduced by the gatekeepers (in-line with local custom) at collective 
and individual levels (Pratt & Lozios, 1992: 53-54). For the Polytechnic, it was 
sometimes difficult to find appropriate respondents (as designed by the sample) since 
people slept a lot during the day. It was speculated that low morale from the 
displacement and the conflict, unemployment and general boredom were the main 
causes. In Sei Lepan, the household heads worked during the day. 
3.3 Collecting the Empirical Data 
This section details the interrelated methods and techniques used to gather the empirical 
data. The focus is on the nature and purpose of the semi-structured interviews for the 
key informants and IDP respondents. This insight was complemented and given extra 
validity by the focus group session with each IDP committee and the structured, non- 
participant observations of each IDP group. Last, it is important to detail the efforts to 
ensure the data was carefully recorded and translated. 
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
In the context of armed conflict, semi-structured interviews are an appropriate 
technique. Their "open and flexible" structure and nature allows "informants to 
elaborate on their values and attitudes and account for their behaviour" and researchers 
to explore subjective experiences and the meanings attached to them (Devine, 1995: 
138). In particular and reflecting internal displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra, 
Jacobsen & Landau align `in-depth' interviews with contexts where little information is 
known to "reveal much about how forced migrants live, the problems they encounter, 
their coping or survival strategies, and the shaping of their identities and attitudes. " 
(Jacobsen & Landau, 2003: 100). Therefore, they are more appropriate to studying 
processes and draw attention to the context (Devine, 1995: 138). Furthermore, the data 
was complex and since "assumptions" were "non-positivist", the emphasis was on 
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subjectivity, that is, "warmth and empathy to help understand informants' subjective 
perceptions" (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 8). Thus, this technique meant becoming a 
participant in the social setting and the researcher could not claim a positivist sense of 
detachment (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 10). Alternatively in such contexts, "rigidly 
structured interviews" are not useful techniques and may even appear "threatening" 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996: 154; Barakat et al, 2002a: 993; and Arksey & Knight, 1999: 
110-111). 27 
The standards of adequate protection and assistance, as codified by the Guiding 
Principles, were used as the framework for the interview questions for the 2003 field 
and case study research. Therefore, the questions were based on the overarching 
research aims and designed to explore the research question and test the hypothesis. 
However, only a selection of the Principles was examined during the interviews with the 
key informants and the two samples of IDPs. Certain Principles were excluded because 
they were deemed irrelevant to the aims of the research and the contextual process of 
displacement. This process of elimination was based on the findings from the pre-study 
while some questions were dropped during the case study research once it became 
overwhelmingly clear they were irrelevant to the experiences of the IDP respondents. 28 
The majority of the questions were in-depth, open-ended and some were progressively 
modified to reflect the gradual learning process. 29 They were based on a checklist of 
topics with the intention of drawing spontaneous responses not restricted to the original 
framing (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 87). Fixed but also more improvised follow-up 
questions or "detail-oriented probes" were used to clarify and explore meanings and 
areas of interest that emerged (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 8). Overall, respondents could 
only explain their perspective on the questions chosen by the researcher apart from the 
final question. The latter requested a general opinion on some aspect of the research, 
which allowed the interviewee to further develop their argument and to a certain degree 
27 All interviews were conducted in an environment free from immediate threatening parties, influences 
and disturbances. For the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic group, interviews were completed in a student's 
dormitory room. Apart from the focus group interviews, the only people present in the interviews were 
the researcher, the interpreter and the respondent/s. In Sei Lepan, the respondents were interviewed in 
their own homes. 
28 During the interviews with the IDPs and informants, minor modifications were made. 
29 Changes were made to some of the questions, for example, when asking the IDPs to recommend 
changes to protection and assistance, it became clear that the respondents preferred to answer under lose 
and basic headings. See notes on modifications in Appendix B. 
97 
explore previously unconsidered issues, for example, when the IDPs were asked how 
they would improve protection and assistance. It also reconfirmed the belief in the 
value of the respondent. Some closed questions were used but were limited to collect 
background data (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 5). 
The questions followed a strategic structure of clusters linked to specific themes, which 
was important for several reasons. The order reflected the degree of potential 
sensitivity, from an initial request for straightforward information to socio-economic 
data as the last cluster (see Appendix B). The strategic structuring strategy was used to 
develop trust before more personal questions were asked and allowed the researcher to 
proceed through the questions in a logical manner, which made sense to the respondents 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999: 39). The questions that, in subject matter, were relevant to 
two question clusters, were placed at the end of a section to provide a logical lead 
question to the next one. Reflecting the overall strategy, the more basic and less 
sensitive questions within each cluster were placed before questions of a sensitive or 
opinion/value-based composition. To initiate trust and rapport prior to each interview, a 
uniform method was employed to briefly and informally introduce the reasons for the 
research and how information would be used while stressing and demonstrating 
confidentiality. 30 
In 2003, prior to the interviews, the questions were first translated and then pre-tested in 
each province, to identify possible weaknesses in the interview design and to gain 
confidence. This included for example, that re-checking the wording and syntax was 
clear, the appropriateness of the questions (length, format and manner) and to predict the 
time requirement. 31 Although the questions for key informants (government 
representatives, indigenous and international humanitarian actors) were unproblematic 
overall, the questions for the IDPs required adjustments. The purpose and nature of the 
inquiry remained unchanged but complicated wording, for example, the rights outlined 
by the Guiding Principles, was made simpler to allow for IDPs with insufficient 
30 The interpreter also received guidelines for during and closing the interview (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 
102). For both groups, the interviews were limited to 45-60 minutes on average. This included 10-15 
minutes for preparation with the respondents to make the nature of the questions clear. 
31 Care was given to avoid ambiguous words or phrases that may have been understood in a way contrary 
to the original purpose of the question. A key linguistic consideration was deciding on the best word for 
IDP. In Indonesian, pengungsi is used to include IDPs and refugees. Depending on the situation, either 
this word was used or the more literal translation orang terlantar (displaced person). 
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comprehension. Overall the respondents were keen to articulate the story of their 
displacement, their needs, their coping mechanisms and their own evaluation of how 
they had been protected and assisted. 
Consideration must be given to the possibility of bias in semi-structured interviews 
since respondents may be motivated by the perceived intentions of the researcher, 
mistrust the aims and credibility of the process or "use it for their own purpose", 
resulting in "false or incomplete" information (Barakat et al, 2002a: 993-994). 
Alternatively, the time taken by semi-structured interviews can reveal inconsistencies 
and instil more trust (Barakat et al, 2002a: 993). Pratt & Lozios draw attention to the 
danger of specialists attaching too much causal weight or interest because of their own 
`specialism'. This bias was balanced by asking the IDPs to prioritise and explain the 
major problems facing their community and by gathering their opinions on the provision 
of protection and assistance. This act itself generated insightful observations (Pratt & 
Lozios, 1992: 2 and 6). 32 
3.3.2 Focus group interviews 
A focus group interview or `guided discussion' was completed with each IDP group 
committee using "a method of participatory evaluation" and structured around three 
themes (cause/s of displacement, coping mechanisms and protection and assistance). 33 
The flexibility of focus group discussions allowed debate through the introduction of 
new ideas and differences in opinion. They provided unique insight into the same issues 
asked to individuals but from the point of view of the group while exploring their 
qualities as leaders and representatives of the IDPs. Furthermore, they add an extra 
layer of validation while minimising the risk of bias (Barakat et al, 2002a: 1000; Arksey 
& Knight, 1999: 78; and Pratt & Lozios, 1992: 54). 
32 Validity depended on the skill of the interviewer, the time available and the rapport that allowed 
respondents to be as informative as possible (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 16). 
33 Regrettably the groups consisted of men only and were therefore unrepresentative of each population 
but reflected the real restrictions on female participation at the collective leadership level. Nevertheless, 
these voices were included within the individual interviews. Two focus group interviews were completed 
in Sei Lepan because there were two IDP committees. 
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At the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, the focus group interview was quite tense and a 
challenge to arrange and make sure the right committee members were interviewed. 
By this stage, the researcher had stayed with the IDPs for seven days and had gained a 
lot of ground in terms of trust and rapport. Nevertheless, it was clear that the leaders 
either did not fully trust the researcher or that the leadership was fragmented and not as 
organised as they pretended. Their answers to basic questions confirmed their lack of 
experience as community representatives and they were clearly uncomfortable talking 
about their leadership qualities. All of this was in stark contrast to the same questions 
conducted with the IDPs in Sei Lepan. 
3.3.3 Structured field observations 
Structured field observations during the exploratory and more so during the case study 
empirical research were used to complement the primary data and secondary sources. 
Barakat et al write that by "living among the different local communities that are 
experiencing armed conflict or its effects, a researcher can collect information 
informally and more comprehensively through observation and indirect questions 
(Barakat et al, 2002a: 998). Direct observation was possible and reliable since the 
researcher lived with each case study group. This also assisted in getting to know the 
IDPs and in recognising bias. 4 Observation of social and economic activities and 
support mechanisms helped confirm the IDPs' means of livelihood. In adding to 
understanding the needs of the IDPs, the observations focused on the main coping 
mechanisms of the two groups. This demonstrated the limitations of each group's 
capabilities and acted as a suitable link to the impact of protection and assistance. 35 
Observations were recorded in a diary and challenged by asking respondents and 
34 This helps "to get to know the subject more deeply and reduce the risk of cultural bias. " (Barakat et al, 
2002a: 998). For more, see Arksey and Knight, 1999: 16. 
35 Structure for field observations: health (signs of sickness, fevers, sanitation and hygiene); social and 
political (leadership and processes of power, gender relations); physical and environmental (construction 
of individual and communal shelter, intra-comparative approach); economics (means to livelihood, 
kinship and exchange networks); and visiblettangible evidence of protection and assistance from the joint 
responses. These categories linked and overlapped. 
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informants if the researcher's understanding was correct. 36 
i 
3.3.4 Recording and translating the data 
Throughout the collection of the primary data, there was utmost care and accuracy in 
recording and summarising the data since there were "constant value judgements of 
information flow between informant, researchers and translators" (Barakat & Strand, 
2000: 136). For most of the informants, interviews were conducted in English and were 
recorded by tape and transcribed shortly after by the researcher or an exact written copy 
was taken during the interview. 
Translation and interpreting was essential to meet the aims of the research but these 
processes may result in bias (Barakat et al, 2002a: 993). For all the IDP respondents 
and some of the Indonesian informants, a reliable and trusted interpreter was trained to 
convey the questions and relay the answers in Indonesian. An exact written translation 
was taken (and frequently checked) between each answer. All efforts were made to 
ensure continuity during translation and in the way and manner the questions were 
asked. After the interview questions were translated into Bahasa Indonesia, other 
translators (Sei Lepan, Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe) then tested them for linguistic 
equivalency (translated back into English) before seeing the original English 
translation. 37 
3.4 Selection and Representation 
This section examines the primary and secondary units of analysis, with focus on the 
advantages and disadvantages of using the IDP household. It is also important to detail 
the limitations of each sampling frame and the resultant use of modified, non-random, 
36 Barakat & Ellis instructively suggest that the, "daily practice of making field notes is a good opportunity 
to reflect on new information and check its continued relevance to the initial objectives" (Barakat & Ellis, 
1996: 152). In addition, photographs and sketches of the camps elucidated the validity of the 
observations. Although limited in number and importance, the thesis states where the various methods 
produced differing findings. 
7 Four interpreters were used in total (Medan, Sei Lepan, Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe) because of the 
dynamics of the conflict and basic logistics. 
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cluster sampling for the case studies. Each IDP sample was representative of their 
group and to a degree of other similar IDP groups in their respective province. This 
assertion was based on the selection criteria, the aims of the research and the 
comparative case study approach. Similarly, it is argued that the key informants were 
representative of the political and humanitarian responses. 
r 
3.4.1 Unit of analysis 
Pratt & Lozios identify two levels within the unit of analysis. For the case study 
research, the first or primary level was the Polytechnic and Sei Lepan. The second or 
"strategic" level was the typical or average IDP household for each IDP group (Pratt & 
Lozios, 1992: 38). The latter was determined by the research aims and by constraints of 
geography and time. The IDPs operated on a household basis, although sometimes this 
included an extended family. 38 In Sei Lepan, the IDPs had lived in the same settlement 
for two to three years, most did not want to return and only a few wanted to resettle. 
Therefore, they tended to define themselves according to the name of their settlement 
(Barak Induk Major and Barak Sei Minyak) or some identified even with their small 
neighbourhood within the settlements. The Polytechnic group had been displaced for a 
significantly shorter length of time and continued to work on a household basis, which 
sometimes included an extended family. From observation, each household shared a 
mat within the Polytechnic but sometimes these mats were joined or placed alongside 
relatives. 
It was advantageous to use the household as the basic unit of analysis for several 
reasons. When more than one member of the household was present for the interview 
(the desired though not always possible arrangement) then it allowed individuals to 
address issues of shared responsibility, mutual capacities and vulnerabilities. It also 
provided a suitable linkage of analysis between the individuals and the community. In 
38 It is common for Indonesians to live as an extended family and often 3-4 generations live under one 
roof. For IDPs, especially in Sei Lepan because they had to construct their own shelter with limited 
materials, shelters were typically small and therefore one household per shelter was more typical. 
Otherwise, extended families living in one shelter was often a sign of a coping mechanism, in particular 
where one family had only one parent and therefore relied on extended family members for support (Field 
notes, Sei Lepan, February 2003). 
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general, where more than one household member was present, respondents appeared 
less suspicious or inclined to misinform (especially pertinent to the Polytechnic group). 
0 
There were also disadvantages with using the household as the unit of analysis. It 
assumed that it was a functional unit of mutual support but as mentioned above, for 
some IDPs, the definition of the household differed culturally with some living as an 
extended family. Thus, it was possible that information may not have reflected inter- 
household relations in terms of gender, age, capacities and vulnerabilities. When this 
occurred, either the IDPs were not interviewed or out of politeness an interview was 
completed but the data was ignored during analysis. As an alternative, some of these 
respondents agreed to answer the interview based on their immediate family as the 
household. When more than one household member was present, sometimes the male 
dominated the female during the responses. 39 To counteract this and although it 
appeared to happen only a few times within the sample, a near-equal proportion of the 
interviews were conducted with only the female-head present. To identity further 
possible bias, interviews were conducted with the male-head only. For the last two 
options, this also occurred because of pragmatic constraints in Sei Lepan, with the IDPs 
continuously tending to daily tasks 40 Therefore, both household heads could not always 
spare the time to be interviewed. 
3.4.2 Modified, non-random, cluster sampling 
Sampling and selection "are principles and procedures used to identify, choose, and gain 
access to relevant data sources" to generate data using chosen methods (Mason, 2002: 
120). The selection of units is "chosen to represent the target population" (Nichols, 
1991: 128). Qualitative research involves some form of sampling or selection for 
practical reasons and to allow focus. The sample helps provide the data needed to 
39 Arksey & Knight acknowledge that this combination risks stirring up antagonisms and friction (Arksey 
& Knight, 1999: 76). Also, some females were reluctant to either answer some questions alone or with 
their husband because of socio-cultural traditions. Despite these barriers, overall both male and female 
respondents were keen to answer the questions. 
40 The IDPs had to work intensively in the fields and their plots to harvest and plant the crops. Other 
restrictions on time stemmed from the health of some interviewees (for example, old and/or sick) and the 
level of interest in the questions, that is, if they were assessment fatigued, generally dejected by their 
traumatic experiences or where they felt the nature of the questions too intrusive and were afraid to answer 
in case there was a backlash. 
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address the research questions and focuses on "useful and meaningful empirical 
contexts" to allow the development of "an empirically and theoretically grounded 
argument about something in particular. " (Mason, 2002: 121). Jacobsen & Landau 
contest that research on forced migration has a tendency to ignore this procedure 41 
The sampling frame was the operational population or primary unit of analysis from 
which the sample was chosen. To determine the samples in Sei Lepan and at the 
Polytechnic, the researcher used modified, non-random, cluster sampling. Key 
informants were also mainly chosen non-randomly from a gradual compilation of those 
within the response strategies and other relevant experts. 42 The method was deemed 
suitable because it reflected the aims of the research, which were to gain a close, in- 
depth knowledge of known problems and issues and to study specific characteristics of 
each community or population. It was also appropriate that the research was small-scale 
and limited by time, budget and manpower. 43 Last, it was impossible to know every 
single unit of analysis before undertaking the interviews because of the "instability of 
populations and conditions" (Barakat et al, 2002a: 992 and 995). Therefore, the 
samples from the case studies and key informants could not be based on a trusted and 
complete sampling frame. 44 To establish estimates, the frame and sample were based on 
information gathered from key informants and IDP representatives (experience, 
knowledge and estimation), combined with the judgement of the researcher. Upon 
access, some of the `leaders' of the IDPs were interviewed, then once `inside' the 
researcher targeted the sample of IDPs. 
41 Jacobson & Landau criticise the paucity in sampling and selection within one volume of Journal of 
Refugee Studies (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003: 99). 
42 Potential key informants were identified then interviewed or avoided either because organisations had 
stopped or their representatives had changed. Unlike for the IDP respondents, some informants were 
identified using the snowballing technique, where it was deemed appropriate to the aims of the research. 
43 As possible alternatives, Barakat et al note that experiments are ideal but are not feasible in such 
contexts and quasi experiments (comparing a control group with an affected group) to study "significant 
difference" have limited application in the field. Surveys are limited with their "emphasis on control" and 
are typically based on a single frame of a cross section of the population at a particular time, acting as 
"inadequate means of examining the evolution of the armed conflict and its effects", which are situations 
in flux (Barakat et al, 2002a: 994-95). In addition, baseline surveys are also difficult in such contexts 
(Barakat et al, 2002a: 1001). 
44 The main challenge was determining the sampling frame or the total number of IDPs (and households) 
in each case study. Difficulties in obtaining accurate data are common in forced migration studies since 
IDPs can be mobile and reluctant to be identified while information is rarely neutral. Therefore what we 
gain are "estimations" and improved methods of collecting information and statistics are required (Davies, 
1998: xi-xvi; Jacobsen, 2001: 22-23; and Cohen & Deng, 1998: 32 and 34-35). 
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In Sei Lepan, the composition of a typical household or the selection criteria 
(composition and location) was based primarily on an unofficial register of households, 
supplemented and triangulated by information from the IDP committees, JRS and 
Candhika. 45 As a precaution, data was always confirmed with each respondent prior to 
the interview. In general, the original household information was accurate, where not, 
the information was amended and if the respondent actually fell outside the selection 
criteria then they were politely ignored. 46 At the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, there was 
no register, although since the IDPs were all located in one building it was possible to 
attain an estimated sampling frame through triangulation of information from the main 
indigenous NGO, the IDP committee and observations made by the researcher. 
Consequently, the selection process was made closer to each interview. 7 
For both groups, special efforts were made to include the more marginalised members, 
that is, women, old and/or sick. 48 Taking a representative sample provided insight into 
the condition and background of a typical family within the group while also including 
those outside this predominant grouping. In Sei Lepan, once typical households were 
selected, they were divided up according to their location within the camp. Efforts were 
made to ensure the inclusion of those both living near the centre and those at the outer 
45 There were 300 households (1300 IDPs) approximately in Sei Lepan. The researcher expected the 
number of IDP families to be inflated by the committee since their main aim was to attract more aid, 
assistance and international attention. This was a problem for the first day but was overcome in three 
main ways. The researcher checked statistics with JRS and second, the number of families within the 
registration book was broken down for analysis. Third and most importantly, after two days the 
researcher was able to gain a significant increase in trust because the committee realised the intention was 
to undertake accurate research, to live with them for one week and not leave after a few days and not to 
directly bring aid. The IDP register was created and maintained by the IDP committee (Pentani Indonesia 
Peng Aceh) but was neither completely inclusive nor updated, for example, IDP families had left but their 
names were still included. Nevertheless, it was an approximating guide to total numbers and at least 
provided insight into the typical composition of an IDP household and sub-groups. 
46 In Sei Lepan, the typical household profile was defined as: two parents who were married with 2-4 
children under the age of 18, at least one working parent, Javanese and had been in the camp for 2-3 
years. Therefore, the average household size was 6 people (2 parents and 4 children). Approximately 99 
per cent of the households were ethically Javanese, with some Batak and Sundanese. Therefore, the 
interviews focused on the Javanese with some inclusion of Batak and Sundanese representatives. Within 
the scope of the research, ethnicity was not deemed a determining factor. 
47 In Aceh, misinformation or nebulous totals may have been a deliberate device used by armed 
combatants to gain from manipulating the true humanitarian picture. This challenge was experienced first- 
hand by the researcher with the IDPs at the Polytechnic. Before arriving, local NGOs and an IDP 
representative consistently confirmed there were 220 families or 1107 persons (Interview 72,8 March 
2003). However, based on the researcher's daily calculations and observations, it was difficult to see 
more than 100 families or 500 persons. It is possible that the IDP committee wanted to inflate the total in 
order to exaggerate the humanitarian deficit. Alternatively, the local NGOs had not visited the 
Polytechnic around the time of the case study research, therefore, it is possible that some IDPs had 
returned or moved elsewhere. 
48 The latter approach was met with a lot of suspicion from the IDP leaders and trust was re-built only 
after persuasion through reassurance and a reminder of the research objectives. 
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boundaries of the settlement. Judgements were also made based on the condition of the 
houses to guarantee a (relative) mixture of economic status. 49 Based on the responses, 
the IDPs living by the edges of the forest were typically more marginalised politically 
and economically. However, geographical position was not always a definite indicator 
of exclusion from the community. Similarly in the relatively small settlement of the 
Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, leaders camped in the middle of the hall while those less 
connected to the group positioned their basic shelters in the far edges. 
3.4.3 Representative samples 
Generalisations (from sample to population) can be made but must remain speculative 
and tentative when based on non-random sampling and semi-structured interviews 
(Arksey & Knight, 1999: 64; and Devine, 1995: 145). The responses were not pre- 
defined and the interviews examined a few characteristics in depth: the narratives of 
displacement, the needs of IDPs and how the two groups had been protected and 
assisted by the joint political and humanitarian responses. Therefore, explanations were 
developed "through detailed scrutiny of how processes work in particular contexts". 
The chosen categories permitted the researcher to "generate data to explore processes 
through the similarities and differences and to test and develop theory and explanation 
to account for those similarities and differences in particular contexts" (Mason, 2002: 
135). 
Moreover, the samples were chosen to yield an inclusive view and to be representative 
of each respective group. For the key informants, a cross-range of actors and 
organisations were interviewed within the response strategies. The sample of IDPs was 
representative because of its size, the careful pre-selection, the use of the average or 
typical household as the strategic unit of analysis and the inclusion of marginalised sub- 
49 Most of the IDPs in Sei Lepan and at the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic were farmers and of low economic 
class. Because of their displacement they lived in poverty and typically had lost their more valued 
possessions. 
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groups (Mason, 2002: 122) 50 Furthermore, the data was validated by cross checking 
and triangulation using a holistic approach to methods and techniques. Barakat et al 
argue that this approach in particular allows "general conclusions about the most 
beneficial ways to deliver aid to war-affected populations. " (Barakat et al, 2002a: 997- 
998). 
Based on the pre-study of all forms of displacement within Aceh and North Sumatra, it 
is proposed that, where stated, the primary data was representative or at least provided 
reliable insight into the needs of other similar groups of IDPs in each respective 
province. 51 Accordingly, the Polytechnic group was representative of short-term though 
repetitive and politicised IDPs in Aceh. The Sei Lepan group was representative of the 
long-term, non-Acehnese that could not return nor secure legal resettlement in North 
Sumatra. When the research subject is "complex, nuanced, situated and contextual", 
there are increased chances of using "that very detail not only to understand how things 
work in specific contexts, but also how things work differently or similarly in other 
relevant contexts" by sampling strategically across two case studies. Based on this 
method, "cross-contextual generalities" are developed and "are very well founded 
because they are based on the strategic comparison of sensitive and rich understandings 
of specific contexts, " which allows the research to demonstrate their "significance in 
relation to a wider universe. " (Mason, 2002: 125). 
3.5 Data Analysis 
To produce the evidence, the validation of the data occurred through the triangulation 
and further cross-referencing of the findings with the range of sources: IDP respondents; 
focus group interviews; key informants; and secondary field-based sources (Arksey & 
50 In Sei Lepan, 57 households were interviewed overall, representing 19 per cent approximately of total 
households within the population. 44 households were interviewed at the Polytechnic, representing either 
15.7 per cent (based estimates from IDPs and key informants) or 48.9 per cent (based on researcher's 
estimates). Chapter Six examines and compares the social, economic and ethnic profile of the displaced 
within the two case studies, which demonstrates how both the sample and case study were representative 
of forced displacement in their respective provincial context. 51 While focusing on the specific findings of the case study research, the author frequently juxtaposes 
these findings with secondary source data on the provincial context to demonstrate where and how the 
case studies were representative, for example, to identify particular trends in displacement. 
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Knight, 1999: 21). The research used "between-method triangulation", that is, two or 
more methods to measure the same phenomenon but from different angles (Denzin 
(1970) cited in Arksey & Knight, 1999: 23). It also used "data triangulation" or the use 
of diverse data sources to explore the same phenomenon. This was split into time (for 
example, the role of the joint responses for IDPs); persons (at the levels of the individual 
or aggregate, the interactive/familial and the collective through organisations, groups 
and communities); and space. All of these provided a more complete though not 
necessarily more objective picture (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 23-24). 
Connections were made but the data analysis process proved difficult and time- 
consuming since it is typically more difficult to categorise qualitative data (Arksey & 
Knight, 1999: 6). The rudimentary stage of the analysis involved the identification of 
similarities and differences between two case studies. The answers to the interviews 
were coded under the main and sub-themes, as outlined by the question clusters. 
Additional or miscellaneous answers were also grouped together. The more complex 
and longitudinal aspects were restricted to the patterns in displacement within each 
province, the conflict, the role and impact of the responses and the challenges faced by 
the humanitarian actors in the field. Some of the original concepts and themes were 
refined to structure the analysis. Once relationships were identified, the interrelating 
themes were grouped under the core chapters. The findings were reduced to 
understandable patterns using descriptive terms or markers. 2 From this, conclusions 
although tentative, were then linked back to the wider review of the academic literature. 
Where a conflict in opinion occurred and remained unresolved, conclusions were stated 
as speculative assumptions. This was particularly relevant to the `internal' unreliability 
of statistical information. 
Despite many similarities (causes of displacement, needs and impact of protection and 
assistance), there were a number of important differences to consider. For example, 
both case studies received different forms of protection and assistance in terms of the 
actors involved and the nature of the response. As furthered in Chapter Eight, Aceh 
directly experienced the impact of the HDC and an extensive range of indigenous and 
international NGOs. The IDPs in North Sumatra were still dependent on the two 
52 The answers of the IDPs could not be summarised using percentages because of the small sample from 
each case study and respondents. Instead, the analysis used more stark descriptive terms, which also 
reflected the qualitative aims of the research. 
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responses for sustainable solutions but there were fewer actors directly operating there, 
restricted to indigenous NGOs and some international organisations while the United 
States Aid and International Development and Save the Children-United States used 
implementing partners. The GoRI had assisted both groups but in different ways. 
When reaching conclusions, lessons were taken from mistakes commonly made by the 
mass media, which has a tendency to treat mediation efforts, peace processes and 
humanitarian operations as either successes or failures. Large writes: "[s]uccess and 
failure are presented as polar opposites, when in fact conflict mitigation is a fluid, 
stop/start process with multiple variables over time" (Large, 2001: 7-8). Therefore, it 
was essential to balance the incorporation of perspectives to investigate progress in 
dialogue talks, agreements in discussion, levels of violence in Aceh and humanitarian 
assistance. 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how the research was conducted based on its original aims 
and objectives, which were dichotomised by the pre-study and case study research 
stages. The main purpose of the chapter was to justify the qualitative methodology and 
the holistic approach involving several methods and techniques. This was based on the 
paucity of systematic research, the volatility of the context and the practical constraints 
of time and resources. The research incorporated three main `voices': the relevant 
literature (field-based secondary sources and forced migration), key informants (elite 
and grassroots levels) and most importantly, the sample of JDPs from the Polytechnic 
and Sei Lepan groups. Accordingly, the research focused on understanding and 
explaining the processes of displacement and used the Guiding Principles as the 
framework for exploring the role and impact of the response strategies in providing 
adequate protection and assistance. Using the household as the strategic unit of 
analysis, the inclusion of marginalised sub-groups and the employment of several 
complementary methods generated the careful construction of broader generalisations of 
each respective population. Furthermore, the comparative case study method and the in- 
depth knowledge of displacement in each province allowed wider tentative conclusions. 
Notwithstanding, the researcher identified the constraints of the findings and 
demonstrated an awareness of ethical considerations and the control of bias. 
109 
Reflecting on the methodology points to important commonalities and differences 
between the two case study groups. Particular differences were evident in the use of the 
focus group interviews and the process of building trust. The nature or politics of the 
displacement and the proximity of the conflict for the Polytechnic group made these two 
aspects more challenging. However, the two groups were similar when comparing the 
process of identifying gatekeepers, gaining and maintaining access and the problems 
associated with establishing reliable quantitative data. Overall, the use of interrelated 
qualitative methods and techniques allowed the study to be systematic and self- 
conscious. It is now appropriate to move to Chapter Four, which examines the 
implications of the context of forced internal displacement and the international 
dimension to state sovereignty for the joint responses. 
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4. Conflict Analysis and Strategies of the Responses 
This chapter examines the strategies of the political and humanitarian responses to 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Aceh and North Sumatra. In theory, the 
combination of these joint responses had the potential to make the Republic of 
Indonesia (RI) more responsible for its IDPs. Section 4.3 details how the political 
response by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) was based on an innovative 
intervention strategy, which tried to address and resolve the underlying reasons for the 
secessionist conflict. This then created the space for an extensive humanitarian 
response based on indigenous and international humanitarian mechanisms, as outlined 
in Section 4.4. The joint responses together aimed to create sustainable peace and 
development by addressing political and humanitarian needs and by improving 
protection and assistance. 
As their primary achievement, the responses managed to gain the consent of the RI and 
the co-operation of the armed insurgents (Free Aceh Movement; Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM)). ' In understanding the reasons for this significant dual acceptance, 
Section 4.5 considers first the appeal of the HDC's humanitarian mediation strategy and 
the opportunities created by the international dimension to state sovereignty. In 
particular, the joint responses were respected initially because of their international, 
neutral status. In addition, they received direct political and financial support from the 
international community, which also encouraged the RI and GAM to protect the basic 
human rights of IDPs and to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
Despite these opportunities, the international dimension also imposed constraints on the 
responses, which jeopardised the privileged neutrality of the responses. The United 
States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) each had conflicting interests since they 
promoted the responses and yet fundamentally supported the RI because of the 
t Several acronyms and abbreviations are used to refer to GAM. Armed GAM is sometimes called 
AGAM or Aceheh/Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF). Throughout the thesis, the author refers 
to them simply as GAM. Units within GAM are not given specific names but are referred to according to 
their geographical base where necessary. Factions within GAM are acknowledged but not identified by 
specific names. 
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inviolability of state sovereignty and vested economic interests. Consequently, the 
ulterior agendas of foreign states tainted the neutral image of the responses. Second, the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoRI) was not fully committed to the 
responses and used them superficially to improve its image as a responsible state within 
the international arena. 
The restricted space for political intervention also contributed to two initial weaknesses 
in the HDC strategy. In order to gain the consent of the GoRI and in its eagerness to 
intervene, the HDC strategy focused on the rapid delivery of assistance and successful, 
short-term humanitarian outcomes. However, this meant ignoring the more significant 
development needs and this initial misrepresentation added to the manipulative 
dynamics of the context. Last, the HDC inaccurately restricted its beneficiaries to IDPs, 
who were important but only one of several conflict-affected groups in Aceh. Both 
weaknesses made the HDC's neutrality questionable. 
Before the varying impact of the international dimension is examined, Sections 4.1 and 
4.2 analyse the nature of the armed secessionist conflict in Aceh, which formed the root 
cause of displacement. By 1999, the military stalemate between the RI and GAM 
represented a crucial opportunity for the HDC intervention. However, various acts of 
manipulation traversed the underlying and proximate factors for the conflict, from the 
early requests for autonomy to armed secessionism. The recurrence of manipulation by 
both armed sides eventually helped discredit the neutrality of the responses. 
4.1 Roots of Secessionism 
Two political extremes were created when former President Suharto manipulated local 
governance in Aceh to benefit the central government and GAM transformed the 
province's primordial tradition of rebellion and relative independence into modern 
secessionism. The guerrilla insurgency was subsequently framed by three main stages, 
from 1976-82,1989-90 and 1998 onwards. 
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4.1.1 Suharto's manipulation of governance 
The perennial dissatisfaction with local governance formed an underlying political 
factor in the conflict. From 1953-1962, Aceh was a significant ally in the unsuccessful, 
though tenacious, Darul Islam rebellion against the central government (see Figure 1 
Map of Indonesia). 2 Robinson interprets that this was "partly driven by a desire to 
maintain the considerable autonomy" it enjoyed in late 1940s, coupled with the 
realisation that its contributions to the RI had not been "properly appreciated or 
recognized" (Robinson, 1998: 134; and Smith, 2002). As a result of this Islamic-driven 
though non-secessionist rebellion, in 1957 Aceh gained special region status (Daerah 
Istimewa) and two years later it was given control over its education, religion and 
customary law (adat) (Law No. 5/1974) (Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 
(TAPOL), 2000: 1). 3 
When Suharto became president in 1965, the New Order regime brought all 
"countervailing sources of power to that of the state under tight control. " Similar to the 
fate of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), there was no room for Aceh's regional 
autonomy. With Aceh's indigenous gentry class (uleebalang) conveniently diminished, 
Suharto co-opted two emerging elites within the province during the 1960s to 
implement the New Order's centrist-heavy policies. The technocrats, consisting of 
Acehnese secular intellectuals and economists, were the first group to be manipulated 
and later formed a formidable coalition with the Indonesian army (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI)) (Kell, 1995: 30-31). The orthodox/conservative Islamic scholars and 
2 Aceh's 3.2 million inhabitants (as of 1998) are divided into earlier pre-Malayan hill peoples, the Gayo, 
the Alas and the low land coastal people that are the product of centuries of intermarriage between several 
ethnic and national groups. Banda Aceh is the administrative capital city with 2.3 million inhabitants. 
The majority of the people are concentrated in and around the coastal towns and cities, except for 
Takengon in Central Aceh. The province has eleven regencies: North, East, West, South, Southeast and 
Central Aceh, Bireuen, Pidie, Aceh Besar, Simeulue and Aceh Singkil; and four municipalities, Banda 
Aceh, Sabang, Lhokseumawe and Langsa. It is further divided into 147 districts (as of 2002) and 5526 
villages (as of 1998). A governor runs provincial affairs, with 3 assistant governors, 16 regents and 8 
assistant regents. The village (gampong) is the smallest administrative territory and the village-head 
conducts the daily administrative duties (NanggroeAceh Darussalam (NAD), 2001; Dalton, 1995: 821; 
Badan Pusat Statistic, 1998: 3; Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2002h; and 
Regional Department of Tourism, undated: 2-13). North Sumatra covers 70,687 square km, is home to 
Bataks (6 tribes), coastal Malays and Nias islanders (Dalton, 1995: 763). The administrative capital city 
is Medan. 
3 For more on the prolonged Darul ! slam rebellion, see Kell, 1995: 11; Robinson, 1998: 130; and Smith, 
2002). 
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community leaders (ulama) became the second group since powerful Islam was also not 
conducive to the centralisation of power (Kell, 1995: 11; and Kooistra, 2001: 15). 
Gradually, the Acehnese became alienated from the RI because of little social cohesion 
and a lack of "vertical structural integration" (Kell, 1995: 3 and 11). 4 
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Figure 1 Map of Indonesia (United Nations (UN), 2004) 
Adding to local social and political control, from the 1970s Suharto's New Order regime 
began to exploit (in extraction and distribution of revenue) Aceh's natural resources, in 
particular, liquid natural gas (LNG). This industrial boom strengthened the 
centralisation of economic decision-making in Jakarta, fulfilled the regime's "close 
relationship" with "foreign capital" and enriched its leadership (Robinson, 1998: 134). 
° From 1968-80s, provincial governors (technocrats and supporters of the centre) were appointed to lead 
the region and enforce the policies of the central government despite objection by the Acehnese (Kell, 
1995: 32-35). Furthermore, all political parties in Indonesia under the New Order were Java-based and 
Law No. 3/1985 required them to adopt the state ideology of Pancasila (Kell, 1995: 41-43). 
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Correspondingly, economic grievances became an underlying factor in the conflict since 
"the greater part of the Acehnese population" simply did not experience the benefits 
(Kell, 1995: 45-46). 5 
I 
4.1.2 GAM's manipulation of Acehnese tradition 
GAM's mobilisation in 1976 started the gradual transformation of the perennial 
yearning for full and proper autonomy into a struggle for the independence of Aceh- 
Sumatra. 6 In some ways, GAM was continuing the province's primordial roots of 
rebellion against external domination. Moreover, up until the 17th Century at least, 
Aceh enjoyed independence but this was far removed from modern definitions. In 1514, 
Aceh's sultan resisted Portuguese invasion and succeeding sultans fought and expanded 
control through to the 1600s (Kell, 1995: 3-4). Under Sultan Iskandar Muda in the 17`h 
Century, Aceh became "the most powerful state in the region", with "unprecedented 
expansion of territory and involvement in the region's spice trade, which became as 
vital to the global economy then as oil is today". By 1629, regional rivals ended the 
"golden age" and Aceh's political power was weakened significantly when the Dutch 
gained control of the Malacca Straits in 1641 (Kell, 1995: 4-5). 
The biggest threat to Aceh came with the Dutch gaining control of Sumatra (south of 
Aceh) from the British in the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra. For Acehnese nationalists the 
new treaty contravened the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London, which did not include 
the province (Kell, 1995: 1). In order to prevent possible "French annexation", the 
British-authorised Dutch invasion struggled to gain complete control, with the 40-year 
Aceh War giving Aceh a reputation for strong Islamic identity and resistance (United 
States Committee for Refugees, 1999: 1; Kell, 1995: 7; and Robinson, 1998: 129). As 
the main objection to inclusion within the RI and the basis of secessionist claims, 
3 For example, in the LNG hub of Lhokseumawe, there were no links between the national, international 
and local industries, which explain why farming remained the dominant economic activity in the province. 
Moreover, "rapid industrialisation" had a damaging impact on livelihoods through pollution and steep 
rises in prices. For further analysis of the impact, see Kell, 1995: 16-20. 
6 Robinson describes GAM's "burst onto the scene". Primarily, it gained support in the Tiro district of 
Pidie, the home of its leader, Teungku Hasan di Tiro. Di Tiro lived abroad from the early 1950s and 
returned to the province in 1976. On 4 December that year, di Tiro's GAM unilaterally declared 
independence, causing a military response (Robinson, 1998: 130). The ulama did not approve of GAM's 
secularism, which made popular support impossible at the start (Kell, 1995: 68). In 1979, di Tiro left and 
formed a government in exile in Sweden (Robinson, 1998: 130). 
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Acehnese nationalists maintain there was no surrender (until the 1942 Japanese 
invasion) and were thus illegally annexed into the Netherlands East Indies. 
Symbolically, GAM's bases were in the historical strongholds of resistance ("north- 
eastern coastal areas of Pidie, Aceh Utara [North] and Aceh Timor [East]") and Hasan 
di Tiro, claimed he was the grandson of an Aceh War hero and associate of the Darul 
Islam leader. Last, it is reasonable to assert that the New Order would have been less 
concerned with GAM without this "presumed tradition" (Robinson, 1998: 132-133). 7 
As the antithesis, RI nationalists maintain that Aceh cannot claim independence as it 
was included in the Netherlands East Indies (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 19). Kell undercuts 
the independence claim further since Aceh did not have sovereignty over all of Sumatra 
at the time of the Dutch invasion (Kell, 1995: 63). After four years of territorial 
disputes between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the UN-brokered 1949 Round Table 
Conference Agreements led to the end of the Dutch East Indies and the start of the 
sovereign RI with Aceh included. 
Furthermore, instrumentalist interpretations of Acehnese nationalism argue that GAM's 
secessionism "cannot be properly understood solely as the continuation of a tradition" 
and instead point to grievances "stimulated" by the New Order's discriminatory 
economic system (Robinson, 1998: 132-133). This is demonstrated by overlaps 
between the timing of the resistance and the start of the LNG boom in 1976, the location 
of rebel strongholds within the industrialised areas, and the direct targeting of the LNG 
facilities (Robinson, 1998: 138). As further proof, the province posed no threat and was 
loyal to the centre from 1945-1949, for most of the 1960s and 1970s and "even much of 
the 1980s". 8 Moreover, the two previous rebellions, Darul Islam and the Aceh War, 
were struggles to protect Islamic law and culture as opposed to political and economic 
independence. Despite occasional misperceptions, GAM's guerrilla campaign was not 
concerned with Islam and unlike Darul Islam, GAM did not harness the support of the 
7 The Acehnese are also considered distinct with their own language (four regional dialects), which is 
related to "the Cham minority of Vietnam and Cambodia" as opposed to Malay (the basis of Indonesian) 
(Buiza & Risser, 2003: 21; and Regional Department of Tourism, undated: 4). Villages in Aceh are also 
shaped by customary law (adat) as opposed to the modernist Islam mores of urban areas (Tiwon, 2000: 
101). 
8 Kell concurs since Aceh initially welcomed Suharto because of his anti-Communist stance and joined in 
the purges of the PKI, 1965-66 (Kell, 1995: 28). 
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ulama (Robinson, 1998: 132-133). 9 
Without grassroots support, by 1982 GAM "appeared to have been crushed, with most 
of its leaders either killed, in exile, or in prison" (Robinson, 1998: 130-131). By 1989, 
economic resentment among the Acehnese had increased and was compounded by 
emerging vacuums of government authority. 10 These factors provided impetus for the 
rebels to resurface, gain support in Pidie, North and East Aceh and launch attacks on 
military posts and LNG plants as deliberate efforts to draw attention (Robinson, 1998: 
130-133 and 138; Kell, 1995: 66; and International Crisis Group (ICG), 2001b: 13). In 
sum: "[a]lienated from the technocrats, bereft of the traditional leadership of the ulama, 
and lacking other channels for political expression, in the late 1980s the Acehnese were 
presented with an alternative means of redress" (Kell, 1995: 60). To understand how 
GAM emerged "as a genuine grassroots insurgency" by the start of 2000, it is necessary 
to examine the impact of the prolonged cycle of violence (HRW, 2000b). 
4.2 Enduring Cycle of Violence 
In reply to GAM, state forces launched sustained counter-insurgency operations to 
maintain national unity, which ironically further cemented the polarisation between the 
Acehnese and the RI. In particular, both sides deliberately displaced civilians as a tool 
of warfare, which was most visibly demonstrated by GAM's mass ethnic evictions of 
non-Acehnese, 1999-2001. Parallel to the polemic of governance, the conflict was also 
fuelled and guided by competing desires to control the province's lucrative natural 
resources and to maintain predatory systems of profiteering. By early 2000, the conflict 
had inflicted significant losses for the rebels, the military and especially for the civilian 
population. A stalemate was produced as enough reformers were convinced of the 
9 The inhabitants of Aceh are predominately Muslim (97.6 per cent) followed by Christianity (1.76 per 
cent), Buddhism (0.55 per cent) and Hinduism (0.08 per cent) (Dalton, 1995: 821). The Acehnese follow 
a moderate strand of Islam but are invariably devout and religion is a major influence on their lives. Some 
'experts' have erroneously interpreted religion as a salient factor within the conflict and labeled GAM 
"radical Islamic fundamentalists" (O'Rourke, 2002: 333). 
10 By 1987 the Acehnese had become frustrated with Golkar's (the political party of the New Order) many 
broken promises (Kell, 1995: 55). In strengthening GAM's presence, the provincial government failed to 
establish full authority in rural areas because of "geographical isolation" and a lack of "close contact". In 
these areas, Golkar paid village heads for their support and the TNI forced people to vote (Kell, 1995: 57- 
59). 
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futility of violence as a way forward. Despite the early achievements of the subsequent 
HDC intervention, from its initial humanitarian objectives to the significant shift to 
managing substantive political differences, the cycle of conflict persisted. 
4.2.1 Polarisation of civilian support 
A Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM)) was imposed in Aceh 
between 1989 and 1998, similar to other peripheral regions. This permitted a sustained 
anti-insurgency campaign in the name of protecting the five main LNG facilities, which 
were of extreme national importance. For the Acehnese, DOM resulted in widespread 
human rights violations. In particular, Operation Daring Merah started a more severe 
campaign where "terror was employed systematically", institutionalised and perfected 
by the military. This "deepened opposition", became an "integral part" of GAM's 
resurgence and thus increased the violence. " By mid-1990, the Acehnese naturally 
hated the military but the threat from GAM had "to all intents and purposes" been 
crushed for a second time. 12 By 2000, it was estimated that 2000 people had been 
killed. Estimates were politicised and varied as human rights organisations were 
typically prevented from operating and monitoring. 13 However, overwhelming evidence 
stemmed from the mass graves found by the GoRI special parliamentary team and the 
Indonesia Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) (TAPOL, 2000: 5). In August 
1998, TNI Commander, General (Gen. ) Wiranto, apologised to the Acehnese for the 
military's past violations and promised to reduce the number of troops, which instigated 
criticism from the more conservative factions of the military while others claim it was 
11 Colonel Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law, was one of the first new commanders to arrive and his 
unit started the burning of houses in Aceh. This was followed by a "systematic campaign" of "armed 
night-time raids, house-to-house searches, arbitrary arrest, routine torture of detainees, the rape of women 
believed to be associated with the movement, and public execution". For two years after, bodies were 
dumped by night in public places as a warning not to join or support GAM. This echoed Petrus (1983- 
85), the government-sponsored extra judicial killing of 5000 suspected petty-criminals by Special Forces 
(Kopassus) and the police in various cities across Indonesia (Robinson, 1998: 139-41 and 144; and 
Schwarz, 1999: 247-249). Other techniques included the pervasive, "systematic and forced mobilisation 
of civilians to serve as auxiliaries and spies [cuak] in counter-insurgency operations". Civilians were used 
to hunt rebels, including "local vigilante units and night patrols" and the "fence of legs" to flush out rebels 
and to discourage gunfire, similar to East Timor and the anti-Communist campaign, 1965-1966 
(Robinson, 1998: 143-44; and Kell, 1995: 75). Schwarz reminds that the "Indonesian legal code provides 
? rotection from all these abuses" (Schwarz, 1999: 247). 
2 In addition, the ulama actively persuaded the people not to support GAM. They did not approve of the 
TNI's campaigns either but they were politically neutralised (Kell, 1995: 77-79 and 83-84). 
13 See Schwarz, 1999: 399; John Aglionby, 2001b; TAPOL, 2001a and 2002; and Kell, 1995: 74). 
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opportunistic and manipulative. 14 Regardless, succeeding Operations Authority 
(Wibawa) and Acehnese Dagger (Sadar Rencong) in 1999 featured overt massacres and 
a return to shock therapy (TAPOL, 2000: 7-8). 15 
More visibly, there were an estimated 45,000 IDPs by April 1999 and 70,000 across 
Pidie, North and East Aceh by July, with journalists predicting a severe deterioration 
(McBeth Indrapatra, Thayer & Linter, 1999). Although some of the IDPs were 
Acehnese and indiscriminate victims, an ethnic dimension to displacement surfaced just 
before the 1999 general election and continued through to 2001. Non-Acehnese (mainly 
Javanese) transmigrants were caught in a sandwich position, forced by GAM not to vote 
and by the military to use their vote. Transmigration sites were attacked and the 
Acehnese called them, "Children of Suharto" ("Anak Anak Suharto") as the 
transmigrants fled, thus signifying the far-reaching support (TAPOL, 2000: 17-18; 
Kooistra, 2001: 17-18; McBeth et al, 1999: 16-19; and Santoso, 1999). 16 Decades of 
ethnic harmony were quickly shattered and for the first time significant numbers of non- 
Acehnese spilt over the provincial border with little hope or desire to return. 17 
Following the precedent of East Timor's secession, GAM believed independence was 
achievable or would at least be aided by UN intervention and a subsequent referendum. 
Accordingly, this outcome required a humanitarian emergency and increased 
international awareness of state weaknesses in Aceh. As detailed in Chapter Six, 
forcing villagers and persuading sympathisers mainly to flee locally and for short 
periods became one way to further social disruption and exacerbate humanitarian needs. 
State forces also practised deliberate displacement to flush out GAM, inflict collective 
punishment and terror on the Acehnese, confiscate land and property and pillage goods. 
14 Knowing the apology would start official investigations, Wiranto may have used it as an opportunity to 
discredit his main rival, Subianto (Robinson, 1998: 145). Pointing to separate manipulation by the GoRI, 
TAPOL argues that the DOM status was lifted because it discouraged foreign investment, suggesting 
economics rather than compassion as the main motive (TAPOL, 2000: 3) 
15 A local NGO recorded 393 fatalities during the year, consisting of 278 civilians, 74 police and army and 
41 GAM (Kontras & Aceh Human Rights Care Forum, 2000). 
16 In March 2001, GAM reportedly kidnapped and killed seven Javanese transmigrants employed at the 
PT Blang Simpo plantation, Perlak district, East Aceh. It was also accused of other similar attacks in East 
and Central Aceh (US Department of State, 2002: 3). Between mid-1990 and 1992, GAM was accused of 
killing and forcibly evicting non-Acehnese, particularly in North Aceh, that had moved informally to Aceh 
or as part of the RI's transmigration programme (transmigrasi) (Kell, 1995: 72; Robinson, 1998: 131). 
Schwarz reminds that the Javanese were not the first to be evicted. During the anti-Communist purges, the 
Chinese "were all but driven out of Aceh and parts of North Sumatra" (Schwarz, 1999: 105). 
17 ICG notes that Aceh has a longer history of ethnic tolerance, with frequent intermarriages between its 
three main ethnic groups (Acehnese, Gayo and Javanese) (ICG, 2002: 7). 
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Forcible return occurred when a displaced group was deemed politicised, that is, when 
the state forces perceived GAM to be responsible. Reflecting the level of low-intensity 
armed violence, from 1999-2003, forced displacement continued despite the joint 
responses to IDPs 
During 1999, state authority and the rule of law were severely weakened in GAM's 
strongholds (Pidie, East and North Aceh), causing stagnation in local economic and 
educational activities (TAPOL, 2000: 2; and The Jakarta Post, 1999e). 18 By the end of 
2000, rebel influence had extended to Central Aceh (Global IDP Project/Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2002: 53). The Wall Street Journal described how the "[m]achinery of 
civil society" had virtually ceased to function and the "law-and-order void" was "filled 
by shadowy threats from rogue military units, separatist guerrillas and bandits" 
(Wagstaff, 1999). 
With civil society squeezed by counter-insurgency operations and lawlessness, popular 
support for GAM increased and the calls for independence grew more fervent and 
frequent during 1999. By early November, an estimated one million Acehnese rallied in 
Banda Aceh demanding an East Timor-styled referendum (Smith, 2002). Consequently, 
Jakarta became increasingly pressured to implement a programme of national 
decentralisation to prevent a domino effect of secessionist demands among its provinces 
(Schwarz, 1999: 425). 19 
Although the Acehnese and the RI were polarised, civil society was not unified in its 
support for independence. The PRDU at the University of York found in 1999 that the 
Acehnese in general want "self-determination in religion, politics and economics rather 
than independence" and "different groups did not articulate a common position on 
behalf of the people" (Barakat, Lume & Salvetti, 2000: 34 and 36). As an example and 
frequently reliable indicator of the middle ground in conflict, the Aceh Women's 
18 For example, village chiefs from Pidie resigned because of inadequate security, criminals were released 
from prison and local elections were cancelled (TAPOL, 2000: 16; and The Jakarta Post, 1999a). 
19 The Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) evaluation team state that the "highly 
charged" atmosphere in Aceh in 1999 and the possibility of an early referendum may have encouraged 
separatist demands from other parts of the country and contributed to the perception that territorial unity 
was threatened (Barakat et al, 2000: i). Large concurs: "[b]y most measures the conflict was 'ripe' for 
many reasons, fears of escalation were running high" (Large, 2001: 4). 
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Congress neither supported nor opposed a referendum in February 2000 and 
consequently experienced intimidation by both sides (TAPOL, 2000: 21). 
4.2.2 Manipulation of political violence 
Prolonged conflict typically produces obfuscating objectives and insane methods, with 
each armed side choosing to adopt seemingly contradictory methods to maintain the 
cycle of violence. Aceh was no exception and it was obvious the conflict was not a 
simple two-way battle between GAM and state forces. In examining the subtleties of 
the post-DOM period of 1999, TAPOL describes it as the "[p]honey war" since the 
military "somehow was powerless to contain GAM activities" and "seemingly impotent 
to respond. " (TAPOL, 2000: 15). In defiance of the GoRI's decision to end DOM and 
to justify its official return, Gen. Wiranto's critics and associated factions were alleged 
to have encouraged the re-emergence of GAM or apparent GAM activity. 20 Despite the 
frequency of attacks, perpetrators were never caught, which suggested they were highly 
trained while OTK (orang tak dikenal meaning unidentified person) became a recurring 
word within the lexicon of witnesses. 21 Beyond complicity, there was also evidence of 
ongoing collusion between disgruntled military and splintered GAM members, 
commonly and vaguely referred to as a third force. 22 
The need to maintain blatant and covert profiteering practices by both armed sides was 
one reason for manipulating the direction of the political violence. Robinson notes that 
DOM "created unrivalled opportunities for the emergence of a semi-official mafia with 
close links to the military and to Kopassus in particular" with soldiers allowed to profit 
20 See Robinson, 1998: 131-132; Schwarz, 1999: 399; and Kell, 1995: 72. There are parallels to the 
burning of minibuses in 1999, which Siegel blames on unidentified persons in their attempts to destabilise 
the ethnic balance and create conflict (Siegel's Rope of God cited in Tiwon, 2000: 103). 
21 The state forces allowed GAM flags to be "raised on 6-foot masts outside police stations, and painted 
onto government buildings" and could not catch the rebels even though "journalists came and went from 
GAM training camp to HQ, armed with the mobile phone numbers of GAM commanders" (TAPOL, 
2000: 11-12). On the main Banda Aceh to Medan road, the word "referendum" was frequently written in 
huge chalked letters on the road often outside the myriad of Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob), TNI and 
Polri bases. The researcher wondered how a civilian or GAM could write this so frequently on the roads 
with the extensive presence of state forces (Field notes, March 2001). 
22 There was both hard and circumstantial evidence suggesting the existence of a false GAM (GAM- 
gadungan or GAMpalsu). Members of security forces admitted belonging to third parties to destabilise 
the conflict further, ranging from cordial relations between factions from the two-armed sides to the 
supply of arms. See TAPOL, 2000: 14; McCulloch, 2002a; and Kell, 1995: 68. 
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through debt collecting and acting as security guards and extortionists. Evidence for 
this is naturally anecdotal but it matches similar patterns in other provinces and explains 
the TNI's reluctance to leave Aceh (Robinson, 1998: 137-138). 
For the rebels, this pointed to a myriad of splinter factions (TAPOL, 2000: 14). To 
borrow from the learned observations of several Acehnese: "for every village there is a 
different GAM" and this made it difficult to ascertain who commanded overall 
authority. It is obviously difficult to verify the exact size of GAM and its arsenal, with 
estimates varying among military experts. 23 Although GAM was unable to defeat the 
state militarily, the rebels had enough resilience to produce a stalemate. Apart from 
some single acts of military might, the key to GAM's strength resided in its guerrilla- 
based tactics and asymmetric warfare, using hit-and-run attacks on mobile infantry, 
isolated assassinations of state actors (military, political and civil) and small-scale, 
isolated explosions on state infrastructure. In addition to collusion with rogue elements 
from the state forces, GAM could rely on "extensive network of informers and lookouts 
with good communications" based on fear and passive acquiescence (ICG, 2001a: 7 and 
11-12). 24 
Politically, GAM was divided into two main factions. Di Tiro led the main political 
wing from Sweden but in November 1999, Malaysian-based Don Zulfahri split to form 
Majelis Permerintahan-Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (MP GAM) (Stratfor. com, 2000). 25 In 
the 1960s, the di Tiro faction shifted to wanting secessionism with a sultanate restored, 
whereas MP GAM favored an Islamic democracy with greater autonomy within the RI 
(TAPOL, 2000: 14; Kell, 1995: 61-62). Di Tiro's GAM claimed to represent the 
combatants while MP GAM were considered more pacific and accommodating on talks 
with Jakarta. Unlike di Tiro, MP GAM preferred another state to mediate, rather than 
an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) and wanted "every element of 
27 Militarily, GAM was split into six regional commands and had a similar command structure to the 
military, with small units supervised by battalion commanders covering a number of sub-districts (Jane's 
Intelligence Review, 2001). During the 1990s, it was estimated to have had 200-2000 fighting volunteers, 
with 500-750 trained in Libya during the 1980s (McBeth et al, 1999: 18). Another source estimated 
GAM was at its strongest with 10,000-15,000-armed members (Smith, 2002). During the conflict, 
weapons were smuggled from Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia (TAPOL, 2000: 16). 
24 The 1982 trials suggested the core of GAM consisted of people from the lower social strata. However, 
support came from all sections of Acehnese society, with some evidence of involvement from the 
"provincial bureaucracy" (Kell, 1995: 69-70). 
When the author refers to the political wings of GAM, di Tiro's GAM is simply referred to as GAM and 
Zulfahri's faction as MP GAM. 
122 
Acehnese society (including civilian movements) to be represented" in all discussions 
(Stratfor. com, 2000; and Serambi, 2000). Therefore, while GAM blamed colonialism 
for its loss of independence, ironically it looked to international intervention as its best 
hope for secession. As a senior representative of the rebels states, Aceh is an 
"international concern that cannot be resolved without international intervention" 
(Daud, 1999). 
4.2.3 Completing the cycle 
The HDC intervention in 1999 was timely with a stalemate in the conflict and enough 
reformers from both sides realising a military victory was unachievable. The 
internationally supported framework for peace, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
(CoHA) of December 2002, represented the apex of the peace process and political 
response to IDPs. However, basic ideological differences between both armed sides 
proved indelible and progress made by the HDC and the humanitarian response was 
wiped out (at least in the short-term) by the imposition of martial law in May 2003. 
This decision by President Megawati's was direct retaliation for the perceived defiance 
of GAM during joint dialogue. Symbolically and as an overwhelming flexing of 
sovereignty, it was the biggest military operation since the 1975 invasion of East Timor. 
Second, it marked the end to three years of an innovative, context-tailored and 
sovereignty-friendly process of international third party intervention, combined with 
significant financial and political support from the international community. 
Three months into the 2003 operation, the ICG states succinctly: "[t]he government 
appears to have no clear objectives in this war, no criteria for `success' other than 
control of territory and body counts, and no exit strategy. " It reached further than DOM, 
undermined Aceh's newly enshrined autonomy law, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
(NAD) and created a substantial humanitarian deficit. 26 Between May and November 
26 Presidential Decision No. 43/2003 banned any activities by Indonesian or foreign NGOs that might run 
counter to the aims of martial law (ICG, 2003c: 1). The UN predicted international humanitarian 
operations would continue to be hampered (TAPOL, 2004). For the first time since the fall of the New 
Order, there were forced demonstrations of mass loyalty and civil servants were screened (used during 
Suharto against PKI suspects) (ICG, 2003c: 2-3). By mid-July, between 40,000 (state figures) and 
90,0000 (Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) figures) were forcibly displaced. For more on the conditions of 
IDPs, see ICG, 2003c: 4-5; and JRS, 2003b). For details of the human rights violations see IIRW, 2004. 
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2003, it was reported at least 1300 people were killed (Agence France Presse (AFP), 
2003b). Similar to TAPOL's suspicion of the hidden motives of the military after 
DOM, the ICG argues that the 2003 military emergency would generate more support 
for separatism (ICG, 2003c: 1). 
Clearly the context in Aceh consisted of hazardous dynamics, with the conflict 
manipulating civilian support and blurring divisions between the two-armed sides to 
perpetuate the cycle of violence and profit-making practices. In juxtaposing the 
imposition of DOM in 1989 and the martial law in May 2003, on the surface it would 
seem that the approach of the RI remained uniform despite the fall of Suharto and three 
presidential successors. Conversely, the GoRI in 2000, attempted to resolve the political 
violence and the humanitarian problems using joint dialogue and an extensive range of 
humanitarian mechanisms. This two-pronged approach formed the political and 
humanitarian responses for IDPs and it is therefore pertinent to examine each specific 
strategy. 
4.3 Innovative Political Response 
The HDC's primary achievement was to gain the consent of the RI and the approval of 
GAM for its ambitious mandate in Aceh. The former is particularly commendable since 
the state was zealously protective of sovereignty and thus instinctively suspicious of 
outside interference. The nature of the intervention strategy, humanitarian mediation, 
was an important factor in gaining dual acceptance. First, the HDC appeared as 
facilitators in the process of joint dialogue rather than mediators although facilitation is 
a form of mediation. This was for substantive reasons since the HDC did not have the 
power or authority to reward and sanction the combatants as a means to delivering 
peace. Instead, it could only quietly and gradually convince GAM and the RI that it was 
in their interests to respect security guarantees and engage in dialogue in order to reach a 
political settlement. 
Dialogue was thus built precariously on the joint recognition that the conflict was futile 
and the hope that both sides could connect on joint concerns through close, sustained 
and guided contact. As the intermediary, it was crucial that the HDC agreed to respect 
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the laws and sovereignty of the RI and to remain impartial and neutral. These promises 
were credible since it was independent from outside governments and had no position or 
particular interest in the political future of Aceh (Barakat, Connolly, Aitken & Strand, 
2001: 6-7). The adoption of facilitation was also cosmetic, compared with mediation it 
sounded less officious and more sovereignty-friendly to opponents within the RI. As 
Professor Barakat recalls, in 1999/2000, "[w]e were not allowed to use the word 
mediation in public because for the GoRI it showed the two parties accepted each 
other. " (Interview 76,16 July 2004). 
Second, the HDC strategy was grounded in humanitarianism: "to assist in the prevention 
of humanitarian consequences of violent conflict" and meet humanitarian needs by 
charting constructive dialogue between varying aspirations, designing more effective 
operational approaches to humanitarian assistance and investing in analysis (Barakat et 
al, 2000: i; and 2001: 7). Accordingly, the strategy made humanitarianism proactive 
and IDPs were singled out as special beneficiaries. Overall, concerns started with 
unrestricted access for relief but moved to sustainable development. 
These aims were accepted because the HDC was based in Geneva and registered under 
Swiss Law as an international independent institute for promoting humanitarian 
dialogue 27 Its links to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided 
an ethos of trust and an international background of experience and diversity (Barakat et 
al, 2001: 6-7). 28 A representative from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) pinpoints that, "the HDC is in Aceh because of its tradition and 
reputation. " (Interview 37,3 December 2002). Based on these two reasons, the HDC 
was able to intervene without affecting the principle of state sovereignty while placating 
the demands of the state's contestants. 
There were at least two accounts of how HDC became involved in Aceh. 
Demonstrating the GoRI's sensitivity to sovereignty, the official story was that President 
27 Under its preceding name, the Henry Dunant Centre, the HDC was established in November 1998 to 
develop and strengthen universal, intercultural and multidisciplinary dialogue in which all players 
concerned by humanitarian issues could exchange their experiences; and to devise and promote 
sustainable solutions to humanitarian problems (International Review of the Red Cross, 1999: 70). The 
structure included a foundation council, an executive director and a programme committee (Barakat et al, 
2002b: 6). 
28 Before 1997, it was known as the Henry Dunant Institute and conducted field-training for ICRC staff 
(Large, 2001: 20). 
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Wahid directly initiated the HDC mission because of the escalating political crisis. 29 
Alternatively, Large writes that originally the HDC was not asked to come to Aceh but 
"offered its services following a regional scoping study which identified Aceh as a 
powder keg not addressed or fully noticed by the international community" (Large, 
2001: 10). 30 
The HDC engaged officially in August 1999 and Phase I lasted until that December. 
This entailed a series of exploratory meetings with the Acehnese, government leaders in 
Jakarta and all stakeholders (including business leaders) in Indonesia and abroad .31 At 
this stage, the HDC was "uniquely positioned" to facilitate constructive dialogue and 
address the conflict-related factors, in partnership with all the relevant representatives. 
During Phase I, the HDC urged the GoRI to: establish a contact group and a 
representative body of all interest groups in Aceh, "including minority and displaced 
people"; build capacities for negotiation; explore the use of "involving an independent 
impartial party as mediator"; constantly assess humanitarian needs; and offer a public 
apology and material compensation. 
Despite its untarnished third party credentials, after the first phase opponents from the 
GoRI believed the focus of the HDC was too political and it was obliged to re-adjust to 
the sole promotion of humanitarian dialogue, reject mediation and adopt facilitation 
(Barakat et al, 2001: 11). During Phase II, January-April 2000, the Humanitarian 
Action Plan (HAP) was drafted and the HDC determined the negotiating partners but 
could not secure a satisfactory role for civil society. 32 
29 The PRDU team notes that President Wahid in particular requested the HDC's Director, Mr Martin 
Griffiths, for assistance (Barakat et al, 2000: 7). 
30 Before Aceh, the HDC was interested in intervening in East Timor but, "[t]here were too many 
[organisations] [... ] and in Aceh it was brewing" (Interview 76,16 July 2004). At this point, the ICRC 
gave background information and it became the alternative (Large, 2001: 21). Since 2000, the HDC was 
the only independent organisation in Myanmar facilitating dialogue between the military junta and 
opposition groups. 
31 The PRDU identified 100 local NGOs with 500 members, of which most were formed after President 
Suharto. Other groups were the GoRI, the military, GAM, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
multinationals, students, the business community, intellectuals, the ulama and other leaders from the local 
Population (Barakat et al, 2000: 19-20). 
2 There were a total of seven meetings between both sides in Switzerland, 26 January-end of September 
2000 (Track I), and another aiming at convening the leaders of the conflicting parties for dialogue outside 
Indonesia, mainly in Switzerland (Track II) (HDC, undated (a)) 
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4.4 Extensive Humanitarian Response 
The humanitarian response to IDPs consisted of an extensive range of indigenous and 
international mechanisms, with the capacity to provide adequate protection and 
assistance for the IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra. Although the humanitarian actors 
acted independently according to their mandates with the consent and constraints of the 
GoRI, they also became indirectly and directly linked to the HDC political response 
based on joint dialogue. 
4.4.1 GoRI 
The national termination policy in October 2001 remained the state's main approach and 
presented the IDPs with three options: return, resettlement or empowerment, which 
reflected the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 33 Once the IDPs chose 
an option, they were entitled to financial assistance from the state, their status as 
displaced was terminated and they were reclassified as vulnerable persons. Each 
provincial governor continued to act as the focal point for the management of IDPs, with 
overall co-ordination from government departments and agencies (with mainly relief 
and some development mandates) at the national and provincial level (OCHA, 2003g). 34 
National authorities unrealistically professed the problem of displacement would be 
resolved by the end of 2002.35 It could also rely on indigenous humanitarian NGOs, 
community-based organisations (CBOs) and host communities for IDPs. The 
termination policy was applied to IDPs in North Sumatra but conversely there was a 
more context-specific and interconnected approach in Aceh. This involved the 
provision of some financial and food aid, encouraging IDPs to return and asking 
33 It was part of the directive concerning the National Policy on the Acceleration of the Handling of IDPs 
(OCHA Internal Displacement Unit, 2002) 
34 The main governmental agencies in North Sumatra were the Provincial Co-ordinating Unit for the 
Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees (Satkorlak PBP) and the District Executing Unit for the 
Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees (Satlak PBP). At the national level, Bakornas PBP was the 
overnment body in charge of providing IDP assistance. 
The European Commission (EC) states the policy emerged because of the previous abuse of the 
emergency relief system. Although the new policy involved little consultation, it showed that the GoRI 
recognised IDPs as not just a humanitarian issue (EC, 2002: 12). Reflecting the impact in the field, the 
Consortium for Assistance to Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) writes, "with an increase in 
the absolute number of poor and vulnerable people in Indonesia over the past five years as a result of the 
economic crisis, the government has not focused its attention specifically on IDPs, as there are many 
needy groups in the country" (CARDI, 2002: 6). 
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humanitarian agencies to focus on conflict-affected communities rather than assisting 
IDPs in camps. 
4.4.2 UN agencies 
The international community considered the RI's provision inadequate in meeting needs 
and was encouraged also to focus on IDPs. Before this, indigenous NGOs focused on 
forced migration assistance but extra international attention increased the number of UN 
agencies and international NGOs in Aceh and North Sumatra. This added a further 
layer of support, offering expertise and specialised programmes for IDPs and conflict- 
affected communities in general. In 2001, the GoRI requested the UN to co-ordinate 
international assistance and the UN's resident co-ordinator acted as focal point for IDPs. 
In November 2001, the UN launched a consolidated appeal requesting US$ 40 million 
to implement multi-sectoral programmes to assist IDPs nationally (OCHA, 20011). In 
Aceh, active UN agencies included United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), OCHA 
and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 36 However, a representative 
from the Global IDP Project states, "there is a need for the UN and international NGOs 
to focus more on Aceh. " (Interview 43,4 December 2002). Furthermore, OCHA did 
not have an office in North Sumatra but conducted occasional field visits to IDP camps 
and met with government officials (Interview 54,8 February 2003). In addition to UN 
agencies, the ICRC, in collaboration with the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), engaged in a 
wide range of activities, visiting detainees, distributing hygiene material to families in 
displaced camps as well as shelter material to a small number of families whose houses 
were burned down. 37 
36 The UNHCR had a limited role in Aceh but did not focus on IDPs. 
37 The ICRC had stocks for the water and sanitation needs of 30,000 people and materials to assist a 
further 35,000 people with hygiene and household items. It also provided psychological support, 
evacuation and first aid material to several branches of the PMI to help them maintain their capacity to 
treat and evacuate casualties. Crucially, the ICRC and the PMI were regularly invited by the military and 
police to provide pre-deployment sessions on basic international humanitarian law. The ICRC resumed 
operations at the end of 2003 after a four-month break during the government's declaration of a military 
emergency (ICRC, 2004) 
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4.4.3 Overlaps with the political response 
The political and the humanitarian responses remained integrated (connected and 
interdependent) from the start. 38 Security guarantees through the joint dialogue 
impacted on humanitarian access and programmes while progress in joint dialogue 
depended on successful humanitarian outcomes. During the first joint ceasefire 
agreement, the Humanitarian Pause (or Pause), the HDC and the joint committees (Joint 
Committee on Security Matters/Modalities and Joint Committee for Humanitarian 
Action (JCHA)) were directly linked to improving the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance for IDPs and conflict-affected communities. From the end of the Pause, the 
JCHA worked closely with the UNDP funding project and as of March 2001,24 
projects were identified involving 14 NGOs (12 local NGOs, Oxfam and the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC)) (Interview 5,11 March 2001). 39 Not only did 
the Tokyo funding package in 2002, as the enticement for both sides to fulfil the CoHA, 
promise the injection of substantial funds for development into the province; the 
humanitarian response was encouraged to focus on the peace zones in 2003 to secure 
peace dividends. Despite the significant number of IDPs that fled the conflict to North 
Sumatra, the HDC was confined to operating in Aceh. 
4.4.4 International NGOs 
From 2000-2003, there were some major international NGOs operating in the two 
provinces. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) provided support to IDPs in Aceh 
through the CARDI, which aimed to include protection in its programme by using the 
Guiding Principles (CARDI, 2002). 40 The JRS was another major international NGO 
38 International and indigenous humanitarian actors operated in Aceh and North Sumatra before 2000. 
However, in 2000, the HDC political response began and worked in tandem with the other humanitarian 
actors. The thesis interprets the entry point of the HDC as the beginning of the combined use of the joint 
responses. 
39 The "UNDP was given a total of US$ 400,000 by the US and the Norwegian Governments. " (Interview 
13,13 March 2001). 
40 CARDI was a consortium of the Danish Refugee Council, the International Rescue Committee and 
Stichting Vluchteling. At the national and provincial level, it focused on economic empowerment, water 
and sanitation, education and youth programming, emergency preparedness and protection and aimed to 
implement all programs through a combined strategy of capacity building of partners, micro-grants and 
peace-building initiatives (CARDI, 2002). 
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for IDPs in both provinces and the International Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC) was prominent in Aceh 41 
4.4.5 Indigenous NGOs 
There were several important indigenous NGOs with a focus on or inclusion of IDPs 
within their mandate, as a result of the mushrooming of local organisations through 
democratisation and the ending of the DOM. In Aceh, the Women's Volunteer Team 
for Humanity (RPuK) operated four programmes for IDPs: emergency aid for specific 
needs, alternative education for IDPs or returnees, economic recovery mostly for 
returnees and trauma-healing mostly for returnees. 2 The People's Crisis Centre (PCC) 
developed an Aceh-wide reputation for assisting IDPs from 1999. It typically consisted 
of students, with some simultaneously coping with their own displacement (TAPOL, 
2000: 13; and Interview 62,25 February 2003). Another group of indigenous NGOs in 
Aceh focused on advocacy for victims of human rights abuses 43 
4.4.6 Community-based organisations 
Similar to the number of indigenous NGOs, close community relations inspired the 
creation of CBOs. For the case study group of IDPs at the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic in 
Aceh, the Student Executive Body (Badan Executive Mahas (BEM)) started in 1982 and 
had assisted four different groups of IDPs: "in 2000, we started looking after the IDPs, 
back then it was very crowded. 10,000 people stayed here during that year" (Interview 
41 In Aceh, JRS was involved in advocacy and community building activities. It started working in North 
Sumatra in 2001 and provided limited though valuable assistance in the IDP camps (Interview 54,8 
February 2003). ICMC worked in East, West and South Aceh but not in Central Aceh (Interview 71,4 
March 2003). 
42 RPuK adopted a community perspective and participatory strategies in assistance and adhered to the 
principle of neutrality. They gave the aid directly to the IDPs, rather than operating through an IDP 
committee (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
43 The Coalition of Human Rights NGOs (Koalisi NGO HAM) and Human Rights Investigation Forum 
(FP-HAM) were umbrella organizations for human rights groups. A local NGO director in 2001 
explained that "[a]fter the New Order, the ban on advocacy NGOs was lifted. Advocacy is the main need 
because of the human rights abuses in the past. It is therefore a reaction to the situation. However, we are 
now trying to shift to delivering humanitarian aid. " (Interview 12,12 March 2001). 
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74,11 March 2003) 44 BEM was part of a wider tradition with student network groups 
across Aceh assessing IDP needs, conducting registration, raising funds among local 
communities, constructing wells and distributing aid (Barakat et al, 2000: 18). 45 The 
second case study, the group of Sei Lepan IDPs in North Sumatra, received limited 
assistance from the CBO, Candhika. However, members were in need of external 
funding in order to continue their operations (Interview 56,13 February 2003). In other 
camps in North Sumatra, the IDP-operated CBO, Aceh Refugee Service in North 
Sumatra (ARSINS) consisted of 17 camp co-ordinators, which helped generate and 
distribute assistance and conveyed the aspirations and problems of the IDPs to the 
provincial government (OCHA, 2002j). 
4.4.7 Host communities 
IDPs frequently relied on host communities at least for short-term, basic help and they 
played a significant role in preventing the deterioration of needs and thus formed an 
important safety net. A PCC co-ordinator notes in, "Bireuen, every day people will visit 
and bring food and water. In Pidie, the local people organise the food. " The 
communities contributed because of the "character of the Acehnese" and the IDPs 
"become a direct responsibility of the local communities - even when they are there for 
nine months" (Interview 62,25 February 2003). Although extremely valuable, 
assistance from this mechanism was typically informal, reactive and naturally limited in 
capacity. As typically impoverished communities, they could not be treated as 
guarantees in meeting basic needs never mind durable solutions since such social and 
economic strains risked their own long-term welfare 46 
Evidently, the joint responses had the capacity to make the RI more responsible for its 
IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra by significantly improving protection and assistance. 
Based on the strong layer of indigenous mechanisms there was also the potential for 
44 "There are 40 people in BEM, 20 people do the assistance for the IDPs" (Interview 74,11 March 
2003). 
45 The UNICEF representative concurs but notes a lack of co-ordination and "a lot of infighting" as two 
weaknesses for capacity building (Interview 36,2 December 2002). 
46 "In Bagok, the people started complaining that this is the third time the IDPs had sought shelter [... ] the 
school teachers threatened to quit if the IDPs came to the village again" (Interview 58,23 February 2003). 
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sustainable development. Since the responses depended on international intervention, it 
is important to consider the varying impact of the international arena. 
4.5 Impact of the International Arena 
The international dimension to state sovereignty created and strengthened opportunities 
for the two responses. In addition to financial support, politically, foreign states 
encouraged the RI and GAM to protect the basic human rights of IDPs and to seek a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict during periods of inertia. Nevertheless, the 
international community also imposed constraints, which jeopardised the intrinsic 
neutrality of the responses. The US and the UK promoted the responses but also 
fundamentally supported the RI because of the inviolability of state sovereignty. In 
particular, the US hijacked the political response to protect the ExxonMobil oil and 
LNG industries in Aceh. Consequently, these ulterior agendas of foreign states tainted 
and politicised the neutral actions and image of the responses. Second, the GoRI was 
not fully committed to the responses from the start and used them superficially to 
improve Indonesia's international image as a responsible state. This was exemplified by 
weaknesses in the design of the national IDP policy and basic constraints on the capacity 
of the HDC. Linked to this reluctance to address long-term needs and the limited space 
for political intervention, the neutrality of the HDC strategy was questioned by two 
initial weaknesses. It focused on the rapid delivery of assistance and successful, short- 
term humanitarian outcomes to gain the consent of the GoRI and in its eagerness to 
intervene. Last, beneficiaries were narrowly restricted to IDPs, who were important but 
only one of several conflict-affected groups. 
4.5.1 Opportunities for the responses 
The international community warmed to the humanitarian mediation strategy by the 
HDC because it was innovative and it was hoped that it could address and resolve the 
secessionist conflict. It was further appealing when IDPs, as a modish humanitarian 
concern, were targeted as the main beneficiaries. In addition, it was low-key, 
comparatively minimalist and thus economical. It could also work in tandem with the 
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more conventional international humanitarian response and promised to make 
development sustainable through peace as opposed to ongoing conflict and perpetual 
relief. A peaceful settlement also ensured the sanctity of the RI's sovereignty and 
protected international trade. 
Once the process of joint dialogue was established, foreign governments recognised it as 
a political channel to encourage the GoRI and GAM to keep pursuing peaceful 
outcomes. 7 In 2002, Sweden and the US significantly persuaded the insurgents to 
abandon the aim of independence and accept the NAD autonomy law as the basis for 
future negotiations (Emmanuelle, 2002). Although it proved largely ineffective in 
reducing the violence, the HDC facilitated further direct international involvement at the 
field and elite levels. In particular, the informal involvement of the International 
Advisory Group (four foreign statesmen) was timely in augmenting third party 
facilitation prior to the signing of the CoHA48 In February 2003, seven peace zones 
were established in Aceh and under a unique arrangement the truce was monitored by 
sizeable teams of representatives from Southeast Asian countries, officially employed by 
the HDC. 49 A Thai General acted as the senior envoy of the Joint Security Committee 
(JSC), the highest joint body in Aceh. 
The political response also became a direct economic channel of foreign funds, which 
created stability, promoted the longer-term perspective and gave the Geneva-based 
agency additional clout since the states funding the HDC were respected by the RI. 
Prior to the CoHA, Japan, the US, the European Union (EU) and 23 other countries 
promised significant funding for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh through the 
Tokyo funding package. It represented significant international pressure on both sides to 
continue the parley, in particular to induce GAM to enter into dialogue and accept 
47 Kofi Annan praised the Humanitarian Pause (Reuters, 2000). President Bush called the CoHA a 
"courageous effort" (Smith Craig, 2002). 
48 The statesmen urged both sides to abandon the military approach and reinforced international 
commitment to a peaceful outcome. Demonstrating the sensitivity to RI sovereignty, the GoRI only 
accepted the four statesmen as advisers to HDC, not as representatives of their respective countries (ICG, 
2003a: 5). In May 2002, the HDC's Rupert Smith was to visit Jakarta and Aceh to discuss modalities for 
a cessation of hostilities. At these talks, Lord Avebury, Anthony Zinni and Pitsuwan (former Thai 
minister) were present (Emmanuelle, 2002). American Gen. Zinni visited Banda Aceh in August 2002 to 
assist the HDC and meet with both sides. 
49 An OCHA representative raises the innovation of making the foreign monitors employees of HDC and 
believed that this was the first time such an arrangement had been agreed by a state (Interview 47,6 
December 2002). The GoRI accepted international monitors in return for GAM agreeing to autonomy as 
the starting point for further negotiations. 
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autonomy. In 2000, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Department for Human 
Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance) financed Phase II of the humanitarian 
dialogue 50 The United States Aid and International Development (USAID) financially 
supported the joint committee arrangements through its Office for Transition Initiatives 
(OTI) (Large, 2001: 16; and Interview 5,11 March 2001). 51 
Globally, human rights came to the fore during the 1990s, which created general 
international pressure on the GoRI to improve the basic protection of its civilians 
(Mann, 1999: 137-138,143; and Robinson, 1998: 146). In particular, the Clinton 
administration exerted enormous pressure on former Presidents Habibie and Wahid to 
accept international intervention in East Timor and Aceh while upholding Indonesia's 
territorial integrity (The Jakarta Post, 1999c; and Smith, 2002). During the Bush 
administration, US Senators remained critical of the GoRI's return to the offensive in 
Aceh (US Senate, 2001). In 2002, an independent ten-member UN panel and 13 
Members of the European Parliament criticised Indonesia for its human rights abuses 
(TAPOL, 2002). After the upsurge in violence in East Timor in 1999, there was 
particular attention paid to improving the conduct and accountability of the military and 
the US suspended military contracts until human rights conditions were met (Leahy 
amendment, 2002) (Indonesia Human Rights Network, 2001; and Smith, 2002). 
4.5.2 Constraints for the responses 
Despite the opportunities and support, there were four main international constraints, 
which jeopardised the neutrality of the responses. First, the international support for the 
responses and their criticism of the GoRI's human rights record was trumped by the 
inviolability of state sovereignty and post-2001 global terrorism concerns. An ICRC 
representative, while not expressing an official view, states, "it seems there has been a 
lot of international pressure on the lack of human rights but there is not much interest, 
just a lot of rhetoric. " (Interview 45,5 December 2002). Compared with strained 
50 NOK 5,500,0001SFr 1,085,000 for Phase II, 26 January-30 September 2000 (HDC, undated (a)). 
51 By 2002, the OTI had continued support to HDC for its Public Information Unit and District 
Monitoring Teams (USAID-OTI, 2002). Overall, assistance also came from the UK and EU. Although 
the HDC had budget and resource restrictions, it was more financially resourceful than other small 
international NGOs and Conflict Transformation Agencies (Barakat et al, 2001: 7). 
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US/Indonesia bilateral relations during the 1990s, the War on Terror made the RI's 
territorial integrity paramount again. The US (at least) believed national and provincial 
stability in Indonesia deterred Al-Qaida activity while the Bali bombings in 2002 fixed 
human rights on the "back burner" and stymied the national agenda of reform (The 
Jakarta Post, 2002d) 52 
Second, the vested economic interests of foreign states determined international 
relations with the RI. These additional and competing agendas imposed significant 
constraints and at times further complicated the neutral aims of the joint dialogue. 
Similar to the fervency created by the pepper trade in the 17th Century, Aceh's oil and 
LNG became a significant catalyst of the conflict as they were extremely valuable assets 
for the RI, ExxonMobil, the US and several importing countries. 3 Indonesia was the 
world's highest LNG exporter and the GoRI derived 40 per cent of its oil and gas 
reserves from Aceh, with LNG representing 20 per cent of the nation's export revenue 
and 5 per cent of its annual budget. Jakarta also took US$ 100 million per month in 
taxes and other fees from ExxonMobil (HDC, 2000a). The HDC's project assistant 
states the oil and gas was extracted using natural conditions, which meant the GoRI had 
long-term interests in holding on to Aceh (Interview 33,25 March 2001). 
The Acehnese and GAM resented not receiving an adequate proportion of the oil and 
LNG profits. Moreover, the petrochemical industry became linked to violations of 
human rights by the military since it was situated in the strongholds of resistance. An 
HDC report recognises the role of Mobil Oil Indonesia "in the spiral of insurgency and 
repression", with the caveat that Exxon did not play a role in Aceh prior to the merger in 
June 1999. It states that 39,000 people are believed to have disappeared from the area 
during two decades and mass graves were uncovered (HDC, 2000a). The International 
52 In particular, the GoRI's Anti-Terrorism Decree (18 October 2002, Government Decree in Lieu of Law 
No. 1,2002), represented a "grave threat to basic human rights" (TAPOL, 2002). Strategically in 2002, 
the GoRI labelled GAM a terrorist group for the first time and made other failed attempts to make GAM 
part of the War on Terror. TNI Commander, Gen. Sutarto, accused the Acehnese of being behind the Bali 
bombing. Perhaps, the GoRI looked to President Arroyo's example (and military success) in making Abu 
Syaff part of the global threat and garnering US troops to increase the state's strike force. During 2002, 
there were several rumours in the media that Bin Laden had sent Al-Qaida operatives to Aceh to 
investigate its potential as a safe-haven or possible base. Since they had everything to lose from such 
links, GAM repeatedly distanced itself. Overall, the accusations did not stick, however, GAM's 
international support or sympathy was undoubtedly weakened after 2001. 
53 Oil and LNG are strategic industries and a "legal designation that appoints the army as the agency 
responsible for providing security to the company's infrastructure and staff', which means it has "become 
an important component of the conflict" (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 23). 
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Labor Rights Fund, on behalf of 11 plaintiffs in Aceh, filed a lawsuit against 
ExxonMobil in a US district court for human rights violations committed by the 
Indonesian military hired by the company. 54 As proof of the resultant high level foreign 
concern, the US State Department intervened, stating the adjudication would "risk a 
potentially serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States, including 
interests related directly to the on-going struggle against international terrorism" 
(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2002). 
With a more direct impact on the responses, the US directly hijacked and tainted the 
first set of peace zones in March 2001 by demanding the inclusion of the ExxonMobil 
and LNG sites in Aceh. Before this, ExxonMobil had stopped its operations in 
Lhokseumawe, which in turn caused the LNG plant, PT Arun NGL Co, to close, 
shipments to South Korea and Japan to stop and threatened additional detrimental 
knock-on effects on the Indonesian economy (Arnold, 2001). The US oil-company 
blamed the closure on an increase in attacks on staff and facilities by GAM. 
Lhoksukon, Arun and Pase were traditionally violent locations and direct attacks and 
ambushes were reported, with some on foreign staff. 
55 However, it was unclear if the 
sudden increase in attacks was actually the cause nor was it certain that GAM was solely 
responsible, thereby suggesting the work of rogue military elements or a third force 
interested in destabilising the peace process (Simbolon, 2001). 
In understanding the reasons for the closure, it is insightful to consider possible motives 
and those that benefited from the eventual outcome. Although ExxonMobil lost income 
in the short-term, the company's long-term interests were made more secure when the 
closure caused the inclusion of the oil and gas fields in the peace zone (Large, 2001: 
26). As a logical extension of this assertion, Professor Barakat deduces that, "[t]he US 
were involved to protect ExxonMobil. " (Interview 76,16 July 2004). If attacks were 
causing genuine disruption for ExxonMobil, then it is reasonable to assume the 
company further benefited from and approved of the heightened military operation in 
June 2001 (when the peace zone collapsed) and the imposition of martial law in May 
sa The suit alleged that ExxonMobil contracted with the Indonesian military to provide security for its 
natural gas project and offered its facilities to the military, which used them to torture and interrogate 
possible guerrillas. While not denying the military's atrocities occurred, ExxonMobil refused to accept 
direct responsibility since it had already condemned them by voicing their concerns to Jakarta and internal 
investigations proved they had not co-operated in any way (Arnold, 2001). 
55 For a history of the attacks, see Arnold, 2001; and Simbolon, 2001. 
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2003 (when the CoHA collapsed). Despite the extra security, the attacks continued 
though ExxonMobil remained open. 
State forces also benefited from the closure, since it resulted in the biggest security 
deployment to protect an installation in Indonesia (Jane's Defence Weekly, 2001). The 
need to protect the strategic industries provided enough justification (against national 
and international scrutiny) for the more stringent military operation in June. In addition, 
the increase in troops and military authority in Aceh added official and non-official 
funding (Cochrane & Janssen, 2002). Explanations aside, the widespread perception of 
a manipulated connection between ExxonMobil, joint dialogue and the military 
operation meant the neutrality of the responses appeared compromised. 
As the third constraint, the GoRI were not fully committed to the aims of the joint 
responses and can be criticised for using them superficially to placate international 
pressure for rapid improvement. The GoRI's national IDP policy in 2001 was 
influenced primarily by OCHA's input and it reflected the spirit of the Guiding 
Principles, in particular, the focus on the three options for IDPs. However, when the 
GoRI announced the national policy, most international and indigenous aid agencies 
were sceptical about the GoRI's timeframe since most of the contexts had ongoing 
conflicts, which meant that conditions were still not conducive for the return of IDPs. 
Humanitarians voiced concern that the government's willingness to get rid of the 
problem in such a hasty manner would potentially lead to the forcible return or 
resettlement of IDPs (OCHA, 2002d). More generally, the role of the UN, the ICRC 
and international NGOs was limited in Aceh and North Sumatra (Interview 37,3 
December 2002; and Interview 45,5 December 2002). Professor Barakat notes that, 
"the government did not want development but wanted assistance as it made them look 
good/responsible in accepting international help. " (Interview 76,16 July 2004). 
The political response also strengthened the GoRI's image but beneath the surface, strict 
constraints were imposed on the role and capacity of the HDC. Continual tension 
stemmed from the perception that the HDC was a mediator and not a facilitator, which 
eventually proved pivotal in failing to maintain its image as a neutral organisation, 
among opponents within the RI. Adding to the problem, the GoRI was divided on this 
issue: "President Wahid has a different opinion, unfortunately, [Cabinet Ministers] 
137 
Susilo and Mahfud were against the idea. It is the president versus the military. " 
(Interview 2,10 March 2001). From at least December 2000, the GoRI made regular 
statements in the press announcing the reduction and eventual removal of the HDC. 
4.5.3 Initial weaknesses in strategy 
The HDC strategy from the start ignored and misrepresented the more significant long- 
term, development needs because the humanitarian mediation strategy demanded the 
quick delivery of aid and successful, short-term humanitarian outcomes. The strategy 
was acceptable to the GoRI because it reflected the state's approach and limited the 
scope of international `interference'. Therefore, this weakness directly linked with a 
constraint from state sovereignty and reflected the restricted space for political 
intervention. However, the approach by the GoRI and the HDC fundamentally 
conflicted with the Acehnese who in 1999 wanted, "big development in agriculture, 
recognition of long-term rights and control of resources" (Interview 76,16 July 2004). 56 
The HDC's project manager admits that, "both before and during the Humanitarian 
Pause, there was no humanitarian crisis. " (Interview 5,11 March 2001). Consequently, 
Professor Barakat concludes, "the humanitarian needs were created on the back of the 
political process" (Interview 76,16 July 2004). 
As the second initial weakness, the HDC also misrepresented the nature of humanitarian 
needs by narrowing the beneficiaries to IDPs, who were actually just one of several 
conflict-affected groups. 57 A representative from OCHA agreed that IDPs were only 
one aspect within crucial though wider protection concerns, which were a perennial 
feature of the conflict (Interview 47,6 December 2002). Similarly, UNICEF's Regional 
Director for Europe, who also visited the IDPs in Aceh in 1999, concurred (Interview 
36,2 December 2002). By focusing on IDPs, a special category of conflict-affected 
persons constructed and underlined by the international community during the 1990s, 
the HDC seized a provocative and propitious humanitarian issue to secure an entry 
56 The PRDU report for the HDC agrees though adds, "security, social and economic safety and prosperity 
as well as the safeguarding of their cultural traditions and religious values" (PRDU, 2000: 2). 
37 The HAP states: "[t]he successful implementation of the Humanitarian Pause will in fact stop the forced 
displacement of populations" (HAP for the Humanitarian Pause in Aceh, 2000: 3). Subsequently, IDPs 
were identified (first) as those affected by the conflict (JCHA, undated: Ch. IV). 
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point. Of course forced migration is a perennial consequence of conflict but it can be 
tentatively argued that the HDC would not have been able to use this term or category as 
a humanitarian justification for international intervention during the 1980s. Therefore, 
by misrepresenting the nature of humanitarian needs (beneficiaries and type), the HDC 
added to the manipulative dynamics of the context and thus brought the neutrality of the 
responses into question. 
Clearly, the two responses were strengthened by the support and opportunities created 
by the international community. However, the international dimension also imported 
constraints for the responses which jeopardised the neutrality of the responses. This 
included the deliberate connection between the closure of ExxonMobil, the hijacking of 
the peace zone and the subsequent return to the heightened military approach in 2001. 
Furthermore, the RI used the responses to improve its international image but restricted 
the scope of the responses in the field and the HDC misrepresented the nature of 
humanitarian needs. 
Conclusion 
It was important first to examine the nature of the armed secessionist conflict in Aceh, 
from the manipulation of local governance and the Acehnese tradition of rebellion by 
Suharto and GAM, respectively. These two political extremes were strengthened by 
widespread human rights violations by the military and rebels, exemplified by 
indiscriminate and deliberate internal displacement. Competition to control natural 
resources and maintain illegal profiteering perpetuated and guided the direction of the 
violence. 
Therefore, the ability of the responses to transgress these seemingly intractable 
dynamics by gaining the dual acceptance of the RI and GAM was commendable. 
Furthermore, the joint responses demonstrated significant potential in creating 
sustainable solutions to the conflict and for IDPs. Respect for their neutrality in tandem 
with the political and financial support of the international community enabled this 
achievement. 
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Nevertheless, the international dimension to sovereignty also imposed crucial 
constraints. Foreign states used the responses to fulfil vested political and economic 
interests, the RI was more interested in superficially improving its international image 
and the HDC acquiesced by misrepresenting the nature of humanitarian needs to secure 
an entry point. These manipulative agendas, together with the ingrained dynamics of the 
conflict, formed the foundation of the responses' discredited neutrality. Accordingly, it 
is pertinent to examine the limited progress in addressing the reasons for the conflict and 
the opportunities and constraints within the RI for the political response. 
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5. Implementation of the Political Response 
This chapter examines the problematic implementation of the political response for 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Aceh and North Sumatra. Section 5.1 examines 
the achievements of this response, which sought to address and resolve the underlying 
reasons for the armed conflict in Aceh through a three-year process of joint dialogue 
between the two sides: the Republic of Indonesia (RI) and the insurgents, Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM). To this end, the joint dialogue aimed to build co-operation between 
the two parties and focused on the implementation of short-term humanitarian cease- 
fires. For the IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra, sustained security was a prerequisite for 
permanent return and resettlement and necessary in preventing further displacement. 
The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), as third party facilitators of the joint 
dialogue, oversaw some notable success in co-operation and played a crucial role in 
establishing joint security guarantees. The joint dialogue culminated in the momentous 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002, which at the time 
represented an important building block in sustainable peace. ' 
To understand further how the political and humanitarian responses gained and 
maintained the co-operation of the RI, the second section examines four significant 
strains upon state sovereignty: the emergence of democratisation, several ongoing 
internal conflicts, the impact of the 1997 national economic crisis and strong grassroots 
support in Aceh for peace. Accordingly, the RI was stretched politically and 
economically, which made the acceptance of international assistance expedient. For the 
Acehnese, the joint responses promised to bridge the divide between state and citizens, 
thereby patching some of the widespread alienation from the state. In this sense, 
intervention had the potential to strengthen the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the RI. 
1 The achievements of the humanitarian response to IDPs are examined in Chapter Eight. 
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Despite these opportunities, both political and humanitarian responses collapsed in May 
2003 when martial law superseded the process of joint dialogue. In explaining this 
regression, Section 5.3 focuses on the continuous role of spoilers from both armed sides 
that opposed and manipulated the responses to suit vested interests. In 1999, there were 
enough reformers on both sides to allow the introduction of pacific alternatives. 
However, opposition and manipulation were ingrained because of underlying structural 
weaknesses in democratic state authority, which permitted factions within GAM and the 
RI, in particular the military, to derive power and financial gains from the continuation 
of the conflict. By 2001, opposition intensified when GAM gained new importance 
from the joint dialogue and used it to further political and military objectives. 
Consequently, the RI's political, military and financial interests in Aceh appeared 
threatened and more stringent military operations were launched when hawks within the 
RI reclaimed their influence and power in Jakarta. Overall, security guarantees were 
never maintained and trust could not be instilled. In sum, the manipulative dynamics of 
the conflict predominated, security deteriorated and the neutrality of the political 
response became contested in the field. Since the political and humanitarian responses 
were linked, the latter also suffered the same effect. 
Appropriately, Section 5.4 closes the chapter by examining how humanitarian 
mediation, as the HDC strategy for addressing and resolving the armed conflict, was 
unable to accommodate and control the conflicting motivations of the combatants. In 
particular, the strategy was unsuitable as the HDC lacked sufficient power to enforce its 
mandate and could not protect its neutrality. 
5.1 Achievements 
It is important to detail the main achievements during the implementation of the 
political intervention. In general, it was significant that the HDC kept the two-armed 
sides negotiating for three years. The two most important joint agreements consisted of 
the inceptive ceasefire, the Humanitarian Pause (the Pause) signed in May 2000 and the 
final CoHA of December 2002. 
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5.1.1 Joint dialogue (2000-2002) 
Joint dialogue could not persuade the two sides to abandon the armed struggle but it 
successfully encouraged them to establish some shared humanitarian and political 
concerns and then explore the more contentious issues (Interview 5,11 March 2001). 
The first breakthrough came at the start of April 2000, when President Wahid 
announced that the leader of GAM's political wing, Hasan di Tiro, had agreed to a 
ceasefire and negotiations. This signalled the start of unprecedented official co- 
operation between the state and its contestants. 2 
After gaining the dual acceptance of the RI and GAM, the Pause was the first 
substantive achievement. Symbolically, it aimed to avoid the charged connotations for 
both sides of a conventional truce or ceasefire. The latter for the GoRI would have 
implied formal recognition of the secessionist conflict, for GAM such terms would have 
resonated of defeat (Interview 76,16 July 2004). In this sense, the Pause was a face- 
saving agreement and a breathing space "as much as or more than a genuine response to 
humanitarian need. " (Barakat, Connolly & Large, 2002b: 17). 
Pragmatically, under the Pause both armed sides agreed to suspend the political 
violence to grant "unimpeded delivery of aid and assistance during a predetermined and 
specific [three month] period". Its "simple and flexible" nature was perhaps the key to 
acceptance (Barakat et al, 2001: 25). The initial phase of the Pause, 1 June-31 August 
2000, was the most effective, resulting in a dramatic improvement in security and IDPs, 
as the HDC's 'special beneficiaries', were returned (Interview 76,16 July 2004). In 
sum, proactive humanitarianism proved successful; practice followed theory. 
Moreover, the HDC's programme manager asserts that the Pause was a timely, 
"safeguard against elements within the GoRI at the national level from waging an all 
out war against GAM" (Interview 5,11 March 2001). 
2 Several joint meetings were convened and facilitated by the HDC in Switzerland from 26 January to the 
end of September 2000, using classic "shuttle mediation". During the first two meetings, the parties 
expressed the desire to reduce the violence and tension in Aceh and to seek a peaceful solution. In April 
2000, the two sides invited other stakeholders from the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoRI) 
(Home Affairs and Human Rights Ministries), the military, indigenous non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and civil society to participate in a four day meeting (Barakat, Connolly, Aitken & Strand, 2001: 
22). 
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As a building block, the Pause signified "the first symbolic act towards constructive 
dialogue" and enabled joint structures based on working groups (Barakat et al, 2002b: 
7). It thus appeared to mark a turning point in the conflict, confirming there were 
enough reformers among the combatants that considered the conflict futile and that 
politically, "Acehnese independence or the unity of the Republic of Indonesia were non- 
absolute or negotiable. " (Barakat et al, 2001: 28). Furthermore, the international 
community praised the GoRI for its pursuit of a peaceful resolution and GAM for its co- 
operation. 
During the second phase of the Pause, 1 September-15 January 2000, joint talks failed 
to produce agreement. Dialogue resumed in Geneva in January 2001 and a one-month 
ceasefire, the Moratorium on Violence, was agreed in Switzerland and Banda Aceh. 
From 10-20 February 2001, a ten-day pact was implemented to reduce the rising 
violence and open channels of communication between commanders of both sides. The 
Moratorium also allowed discussion of the more substantive issues of democratic 
consultations and a mechanism for resolving future disagreements. Apart from the first 
phases of the Pause and the CoHA, this was the only other time there was a significant 
decline in civilian fatalities. 3 
The introduction of a joint structure for security and humanitarian affairs was a 
significant achievement of the Pause and created varying co-operation between the RI 
and GAM (see Figure 2 Structure of the Humanitarian Pause). The highest-decision 
making body was the Joint Forum based in Geneva. It was composed of five RI and 
five GAM representatives and aimed to ensure a reduction of tension and cessation of 
violence by guaranteeing "the absence of offensive military actions" and facilitating the 
presence and movement of combatants. It also agreed to guarantee the rule of law and 
the role of police (Joint Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM), undated (a): Ch. II). 
As the main implementing body in the field, the JCSM aimed specifically to establish 
non-offensive monitoring procedures, basic implementation rules and to reinstate and 
specify police peacekeeping duties. Its partner, the Joint Committee on Humanitarian 
Action (JCHA) was designed "to mobilize resources to fulfil basic human needs, 
3 Fatalities dropped to 58 between 15 January and 15 February 2001 (Barakat et at, 2001: 93; and British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 2001b). 
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including physical security and rehabilitation of damage caused by conflict". It was 
instructed to conduct the policy of the Joint Forum in Geneva; prioritise basic needs; 
ensure unhindered humanitarian access; co-ordinate the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance; promote confidence-building measures towards peace; and collect data and 
analyses (JCHA, undated: Ch. I-II). 
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All humanitarian assistance was to be channelled through a donor-appointed institution 
with co-ordination from the JCHA and all humanitarian actors were "encouraged to 
accelerate their activities during the Humanitarian Pause and to inform the JCHA" 
(JCHA, undated: Ch. IV). The two joint committees were the senior bodies in the field 
but were monitored by a separate team, which was instructed to report its findings to the 
Joint Forum. After the Pause, the same joint structure continued, although with 
modifications, as the basis for negotiations and as the implementing bodies for the 
security agreements until joint dialogue officially collapsed in May 2003. 
The two rounds of negotiations during March 2001 produced the Peace Through 
Dialogue stage (Damai Melalui Dialog), which marked further substantial achievements 
in co-operation, in particular, it involved consultation among opposing operational 
commanders. Both parties agreed to develop and improve communication among the 
field commanders, re-emphasised their commitment not to commit violence, reaffirmed 
the ten day pact from 10 February 2001 as the foundation and working guidelines for 
the field and promised to conduct two weeks of consultations with civil society. 5 The 
Monitoring Team for Humanitarian Action was disbanded "to avoid duplication", 
leaving the Monitoring Team for Security Matters to shadow the two joint committees 
(Interview 66,25 February 2003) (see Figure 3 Structure of Peace Through Dialogue). 6 
4 The joint committees and their monitoring teams were composed of an equal number of representatives 
from the two sides, in addition to a token representation from Acehnese civil society. 
S The Joint Forum was renamed the Joint Council for Political Dialogue and the Joint Committee on 
Security Modalities changed its name to the Joint Committee on Security Matters (JCSM). 
6 The monitoring team was divided into four district teams (three members per team) for Pidie, North 
Aceh, East Aceh and South Aceh and the HDC planned to set up another in Bireuen (Interview 5,11 
March 2001). A Public Information Unit was also included among the new structures, to socialise the 
process among the Acehnese. 
146 
Joint Council forPolitical Dilague 
(Geneva) 
I 
i 
Joint Caumittee for Humanitarian Action 
(Banda Aceh) 
1 
Joint Committee for Security Matters 
(Banda Aceh) 
Democratic Consultations 
(BandaAceN 
MonilonngTeam 
(BandaAceh) 
II 
I 
District Monitoring Team 
(East Aceh) 
District Monitoring Team 
(South Aceh) 
i 
District Monitoring Team 
(Pidie) 
L 
District Monitceini 
Nod Aceh; 
Possible Membership 
RUGAM 
Local Govemmmnt 
Civil Society 
Intellectuals 
Student Organisations 
Wonn'sMovemeniseý 
Consultation Areas 
Dcnwatic Process 
Human Rights& 
Humanitarian Iaw 
Socio-Economic 
Development 
SecurityAn ngenrents 
Figure 3 Structure of Peace Through Dialogue 
During Peace Through Dialogue, the HDC encouraged the two sides to extend the 
structure in two ways: vertically, that is, down through the ranks of the combatants to 
secure a permanent ceasefire; and horizontally, by opening the negotiations to include 
Acehnese civil society. Realising that a ceasefire was impossible to implement across 
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the province, Peace Through Dialogue piloted a 13-day peace zone in the districts of 
North Aceh (location of ExxonMobil and the liquid natural gas (LNG) facilities) and 
Bireuen. It was supervised by the Monitoring Team for Security Matters, facilitated by 
the HDC and provided for a vague witness protection programme for the reporting of 
incidents to the joint committees (Interview 5,11 March 2001). Reflecting the peace 
process overall, the peace zone was successful at the start in reducing the political 
violence but eventually collapsed because joint promises on security were not kept. 
A new set of political and military dynamics emerged in April 2001, which frustrated 
progress in joint dialogue until December 2002. First, President Wahid authorised a 
more stringent security operation (President Order No. 4/2001) to implement six 
comprehensive steps to solve the Aceh problem. Second, in July 2001, Wahid's 
successor, President Megawati Sukarnoputri, adopted a less compromising approach to 
negotiations and strengthened the military approach. Furthermore, six GAM 
negotiators were later arrested and joint dialogue was suspended. Last, in August 2001, 
the GoRI granted special autonomy to Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)). By 
2004, the latter remained symbolic and inoperable. However, it was significant for joint 
dialogue because the GoRI insisted that GAM accept it as the starting point for all 
future dialogue. In sum, the rebels were given an ultimatum: renounce the campaign for 
independence or continue with the conflict. 7 
GAM wavered during most of 2002 despite several rounds of negotiations and input 
from the International Advisory Group. 8 The conflict continued along with the GoRI's 
ambivalent approach, which simultaneously threatened marital law while proposing a 
draft peace agreement and future dates for dialogue. The GoRI's precondition was 
accepted in November 2002 although this was later denied by GAM (Farida & 
Moestasfa, 2002a). 
International Crisis Group (ICG) writes that the GAM leadership may have accepted the concept of 
autonomy as a starting point for discussions but not as a political end, leaving little incentive for GAM 
"to reinvent itself as a political party working within the Indonesian electoral system. " (ICG, 2003a: 3). 
8 As examined in Chapter Four, this consisted of four statesmen, employed by the HDC to provide advice 
and encouragement to both sides during periods of inertia. 
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5.1.2 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
The CoHA, signed in Geneva on 9 December 2002, was a framework for negotiating a 
resolution of the conflict and represented a notable achievement, considering the 
stuttering dialogue process during 2002.9 It immediately resulted in a dramatic, though 
ephemeral, drop in the level of violence and the limited return of IDPs. Although it 
continued to use the same joint structure, there were more concerted attempts to realise 
previous objectives by introducing several innovative precedents to third party 
international intervention and conflict resolution. First, the HDC was responsible for 
the entire operation, which was the first time any group other than the United Nations 
(UN) had taken on such a role (The Economist, 2002). 
Second, international monitors seconded to the HDC (from Thailand, Philippines and 
Norway) were installed in eight districts to investigate and report violations. The Joint 
Security Council (JSC), which became the most senior body in the field, agreed to 
impose sanctions on the two sides, ranging from verbal warning to disciplinary actions. 
Concurrently, "a political process was to run parallel to the security arrangements, 
including an all-inclusive dialogue on NAD, leading to free and fair elections in Aceh 
and a democratic autonomous government in 2004. " (ICG, 2003a: 3). Fourth, GAM 
agreed to decommission and the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
(TNI)) were to relocate to defensive positions. 1° Fifth, to repeat the approach used in 
March-April 2001, the sub-district capital, Indrapuri, became the first new peace zone. " 
Last, the JSC set up an information exchange between the two sides and initiated an 
anti-extortion project (Boediwardhana, 2003). 
9 The CoHA was supported "at the highest levels of the Indonesian government and by a broad range of 
international donors. " ICG describes it as "the best - and maybe the last - chance [... ] for a negotiated 
peace. " (ICG, 2003a: 3). The Economist interprets it as "de facto admission by Indonesia that it cannot 
win [... ] by military means alone" and appreciates the significant use of the words "cessation of 
hostilities" but recognises that the "distance between the two sides remains enormous" (The Economist, 
2002). 
10 GAM was expected to lay down 20 per cent of its arms at 32 secret designated sites in 8 regencies 
across Aceh every month until July 2003 and the TNI and the police were to move back to their barracks 
(Saraswati, 2003). 
11 It covered 52 villages (146 square-kilometer area) in Greater Aceh with a total population of 16,846, of 
whom most were farmers (Tempo Magazine, 2003). After Indrapuri, six other peace zones were 
announced: Kawai XVI sub-district, West Aceh; Peusangan sub-district, Bireuen; Sawang sub-district, 
South Aceh; Tiro sub-district, Pidie; Simpang Keramat sub-district, North Aceh and Idi Tunong sub- 
district, East Aceh. ICG describes all the zones as "areas hard hit by conflict" (ICG, 2003a: 10). 
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Overall, the process of joint dialogue was most successful at the elite (Geneva) level 
and was commendable for keeping the RI and GAM in negotiations. There was limited 
impact in the field with some instances of improved security and the return of IDPs. 
Clearly, the HDC and the international community pushed the boundaries of state 
sovereignty while retaining the consent of Presidents Wahid and Megawati. To 
understand how this occurred, it is essential to consider the opportunity for international 
intervention created by strains upon state sovereignty. 
5.2 Opportunity for Intervention 
The effects of other internal conflicts, a faltering economy, weakened state institutions 
through democratisation and grassroots support for peace in Aceh stretched the RI 
politically and economically. This strengthened the need for international intervention. 
5.2.1 Effects of internal conflicts 
Aceh was perhaps "Indonesia's worst internal conflict" but the RI was strained in 
coping with violent unrest in several of its provinces: the separatist struggles in Papua 
and East Timor and communal violence in Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi 
and West Kalimantan (Smith, 2002). Furthermore, all these conflicts erupted or re- 
ignited within less than three years (Aglionby, 2001a; and Office for the Co-ordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 20011). In addition, several regional movements 
wanted more autonomy for their province or district and this ranged from freedom to 
choose leaders without interference from Jakarta and to greater control over local and 
regional revenues. Where there was political violence, commonalities included the 
weak integration of provinces under Dutch colonialism, economic grievances and 
human rights abuses by the military. Communal conflicts surfaced as inter-ethnic or 
inter-religious violence, for example, violence against the Sino-Indonesian community 
and socio-economic tensions from official and non-official transmigration. However, as 
demonstrated in Aceh, divisions were also frequently manipulated by political elites, at 
the national and provincial levels, to fulfil vested economic and political interests 
(Gersham, 2002: 3-4). 
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Between 1999 and 2002, these internal conflicts claimed 10,000 lives and produced 2-3 
million conflict-affected and other vulnerable groups totalling 40 million persons. 
Similar to the effects in Aceh and North Sumatra, these provincial contexts demanded 
extensive relief and complex development programmes. Particular problems involved 
the large-scale destruction of houses, schools and other public facilities, which were 
exacerbated by the ramifications of the 1997 economic crisis (see 5.2.2 below). For 
example, the unskilled labour force remained unemployed and did not receive enough 
food, leaving children, pregnant and nursing women especially vulnerable (OCHA, 
2002iv). 
The international community raised the particular vulnerability of the forcibly displaced 
(World Food Programme (WFP), 2002). Specific concerns involved security, return 
and resettlement and inadequate social services (OCHA, 2002iv). By 2001, there were 
1.3 million IDPs in Indonesia (Aglionby, 2001a; and OCHA, 20011). Totals varied 
considerably but by 2002 there were more than 12,000 in Aceh (14,351 in 2001) and 
48,000 in North Sumatra from Aceh. In comparison, there were: 
> 260,000 IDPs in Maluku (338,000 in 2001) and at least 200,000 in North Maluku 
(166,000 in 2001); 
> 189,000 in Central and East Java (195,000 in 2001); 
> 301,000 in Sulawesi (293,000 in 2001); 
> 61,000 displaced Madurese in Kalimantan in 2001 (with an estimated 40,000 
Madurese in IDP camps in West Kalimantan and Madura since 1999); 
> 16,000 in Papua; and 
¢ 80,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor (United States Aid and International 
Development-Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID-OTI) Indonesia, 2002; and 
US Department of State, 2002). 
As a result of these multifaceted strains, the UN acknowledged that the Indonesian 
"governmental, community and local institutional efforts" required "support from the 
international community throughout 2003 to meet the needs of the target population. " 
(OCHA, 2002iv). As early as 2001, the GoRI admitted that it needed to supply Rupiah 
151 
(Rp) 1500 and 400g of rice per IDP per day. 12 However, this was rarely possible 
because of corruption in general and from the military (Laksamana. Net, 2001). Based 
on the national IDP policy, the GoRI also deliberately limited or stopped its provisions, 
for instance, in West Kalimantan and North Sulawesi (USAID-OTI, 2002). Therefore, 
the national realisation of these systemic weaknesses in state authority and capacity 
strengthened the opportunity for the international community to assist. However, 
political intervention and international scrutiny in sensitive conflicts still faced 
formidable obstacles, as demonstrated by the ingenuity required by the HDC to engage 
in Aceh (Interview 43,4 December 2002). 
5.2.2 1997 economic crisis 
The RI was also stretched because it was still trying to recover from the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis. 13 By May 1997, the rupiah, over a very short period of time, was 
slashed in value by 80 per cent, inflation rose, output was down by 13 per cent per 
annum and poverty levels increased. 14 In 1998, Aceh's economy contracted 5.3 per 
cent while the national economy contracted 14 per cent. One year later, Aceh 
contracted a further 2.9 per cent and national economic growth was flat (ICG, 2001b: 
5). 
Overall, the crisis "almost wiped out 30 years of material gains" (Kooistra, 2001: 5). 
Indonesia's banking system was saddled with non-performing loans, which raised the 
need for new capital injections, mainly from foreign capital flows. 15 However, the RI 
found demand low in value for its principle exports of oil and LNG because of a decline 
in prices after an international supply glut. In an attempt to address its balance of 
payment difficulties, the GoRI applied economic liberalisation through external 
regulation and supervision of its fiscal and monetary policies in accordance with advice 
12 At the time of field research, Rp 10,000 (approximately) equalled US$ 1. 
13 At this time, the lives of millions in Indonesia were also adversely affected by the El Nino weather 
system (Barakat et al, 2001: 1). 
1 Poverty increased from 10 to 14 per cent (approx. ), engulfing around 30 million people (World Bank, 
1999: 1.3-1.5). The US Department of State writes that the "downturn affected most severely the urban 
poor, particularly in Java, partly as a result of a wholesale shift in employment from the higher-paying 
formal sector to the less secure informal sector. " Furthermore, "large disparities in the distribution of 
wealth and political power contributed to social tensions across the country and continued to create 
demands for greater regional autonomy" (US Department of State, 2002). 
15 Indonesia's foreign debt of US$ 134 billion equalled its GDP (The Jakarta Post, 2002c). 
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received from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian 
Development Bank. 16 
5.2.3 Democratisation 
Perhaps the most powerful source of instability was the collision in 1999 between the 
over-centralised, authoritarian state (1950s-1998) and democratisation. Although the 
reform process remained slow, it created sudden strains upon the state, which increased 
the need for international engagement. 
Dutch colonial rule instilled ethnic hierarchy and an over-centralised state, which were 
maintained after Indonesian independence in 1949 (Kooistra, 2001: 9). Indonesia's 
1945 Constitution granted the President sweeping authoritarian powers over parliament 
and there was little provision for human rights. Although the constitution was drafted in 
an emergency situation (pre-independence) and originally regarded as provisional, it 
formed the basis of governance from 1959-1998 (International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2000: 17-18). During President Sukarno's Guiding 
Democracy in the 1950s, political parties and legislative bodies were closed down, the 
press was censored, politicians and intellectuals were jailed and a handpicked national 
council was created. Following severe economic decline and national instability in 
1964, the commander of the main army reserve, Suharto, replaced Sukarno in 1967 and 
became full President the following year. Suharto continued and augmented the 
centralised state under the New Order, in particular, the economy remained in the 
control of a wealthy elite, which stayed tightly connected to the President and the 
Javanese were perceived as the dominating ethnic group (Kooistra, 2001: 9-10). 
16 The IMF was blamed for the economic crisis as it tackled the independent factors (corruption, 
monopolies and crony capitalism) but the crisis was actually speculative. Thus, capital fled when the 
IMF tackled these factors (Mann, 1999: 31). 
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As a nascent democratic state, strains were also inevitable because of the RI's straggling 
geographical boundaries and its extremely artificial construction. 17 Accordingly, 
Sukarno and Suharto developed and used the state doctrine of Pancasila to hold the 
national concoction together. It professed the belief in one god, justice and civility 
among peoples, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through deliberation and consensus 
among representatives and social justice for all. Further efforts to instil a national 
consciousness included the development of the Indonesian language (Bahsa Indonesia), 
the constitutional provision for the freedom of religion and the state motto of Unity in 
Diversity (Bhinneka Tungal Ika) (Kooistra, 2001: 5; and Gersham, 2002: 2). 
Nevertheless, Kooistra writes that Pancasila in practice "became an ideological 
instrument in the hands of an authoritarian, anti-Communist military regime and it was 
not the diversity but the unity of Indonesia [... ] that became the leading principle" 
[author's emphasis] (Kooistra, 2001: 9). Suharto's New Order continued by 
manipulating electoral processes and fusing political parties (Woodward & Sulistyo, 
2000: 2). Furthermore, it benefited from economic growth and a form of corporatism 
through the political party, Golkar (Gersham, 2002: 2). 
However, this "fuzzy doctrine" was not enough to "defuse the notion of a Javanese 
dominance" especially after decades of dictatorial rule and the exploitation of the outer 
regions (Schwarz, 1999: 9; and Kooistra, 2001: 5). The centralised system of 
governance "became more dysfunctional by the late 1990s" and Suharto's "politics of 
destablization" (to dispose of credible democratic opposition), combined with "the 
social tensions aggravated by the monetary crisis, unleashed a wave of violence in the 
country. " (Kooistra, 2001: 10). Consequently, Suharto resigned in May 1998 amidst 
popular and violent protests. 
17 Indonesia became the largest archipelago after 2000 years of migration by several national (Arab, 
Chinese and Indian) and a myriad of ethnic groups through trade, which resulted in the fusion of 
religions, languages and cultures. The Javanese represented 40 per cent of the population; Sundanese 
(central and eastern Java) 15 per cent; Acehnese 1.4 per cent; Melanesians and the Sino-Indonesians 3 per 
cent. For religious groups: Muslim were 90 per cent, Christians 8 per cent, Hindu 1-2 per cent and 
Buddhist 1 per cent. Indonesia stretches 3,200 miles from east to west, had the fifth largest population in 
the world with 200-210 million persons and included 25 language, 300 ethno-linguistic and 250 dialect 
groups. There were 28 provinces, 346 regencies and municipalities, over 4004 sub-districts and 69,065 
villages (Kooistra, 2001: 5; and Gersham, 2002: 2). 
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The post-Suharto, Reformasi period of democratisation, under President Habibie (1998- 
99), focused on the rule of law, human rights, the electoral system, political parties and 
political culture. Fundamentally, there was a separation of the executive and legislative 
branches with the President and the appointed Cabinet becoming accountable to the 
parliament, the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR)). In November 2001, the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution to provide for 
direct presidential elections, a bicameral legislature with a regional representative's 
chamber and a constitutional court with power of judicial review of legislation (US 
Department of State, 2002). 18 A human rights chapter was added to the constitution in 
August 2000, which included protection against discrimination (Article 281 (2)) and for 
equality and fairness (Article 28H (2)) (IDEA, 2000: 18). A separate police force was 
created and took responsible for internal security. Consequently, the military was 
limited to national defence, was supervised by a civilian defence minister for the first 
time and agreed to relinquish its seats in the national and regional legislatures by 2004 
(US Department of State, 2002). Reformasi also directly focused on wiping out the 
systemic practice of collusion, corruption and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme). 
Overall, the democratic reforms proved sluggish because, for example, Suharto's 
political network or cronyism remained indelible. Habibie's successor President Wahid 
replaced only 15 per cent of the New Order regime by 2001 (Mann, 1999: 11; and The 
Jakarta Post, 2001a). Nevertheless for Aceh, it was pioneering for President Wahid, as 
the first elected President of Indonesia's democracy, to try a non-military approach to 
the conflict, which at least represented a "new climate of openness" (Large, 2001: 10). 
Correspondingly, it also exemplified the temporary weakening of the military's 
perennial influence in Jakarta. 
18 In the June 1999 general election, 462 members were directly elected and another 38 appointed to 
represent the military and police in the state legislature, the People's Representative Assembly (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)). The DPR was also part of the 700-member MPR, where 200 were appointed 
representing the regions (130) and functional groups (65). IDEA recognised the direct presidential 
elections as positive as long as the elections were conducted fairly (IDEA, 2000: 19). 
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5.2.4 Grassroots support in Aceh 
With the advent of democratisation, the secessionism of East Timor and the removal of 
the Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM)) in Aceh, there was 
freshly mobilised and zealous civil society support for alternatives to local 
governance. 19 For President Wahid's administration, the demonstrations for a 
referendum on independence became regular and highly visible by 1999 and thus 
formed an important strain within the RI. In particular, the November rally in Banda 
Aceh by one million Acehnese was alarming for Jakarta. 
Increased autonomy for Aceh was a possible alternative but perhaps the timing and 
urgency of the problem encouraged Wahid to opt immediately for the HDC 
intervention. Moreover, the process of joint dialogue promised the chance to address 
and perhaps resolve the conflict and to keep its restive province secure within the RI by 
strengthening the middle ground. At a minimum, joint dialogue promised to defuse the 
referendum campaign. For civilians and GAM, the HDC intervention provided a 
necessary source of trust, some assurance that the RI would act responsibly and in good 
faith, the possibility of improved security and for some it maintained the hope of 
independence. As a by-product, the political process also increased international 
attention to the emotive plight of the Acehnese and their struggle for improved 
accountability. 
The combination of the four strains upon state sovereignty in the late 1990s created 
conducive conditions for international intervention. In particular, the eruption of 
internal conflicts produced large numbers of IDPs while the faltering economy and the 
inability of the GoRI to provide adequate humanitarian assistance compounded their 
vulnerability. At the same time, the democratic reforms tackled the over-centralised 
state and the pioneering approach by President Wahid opened the traditional barriers of 
sovereignty. Furthermore, the fervent political protests in Aceh exposed the cracks in 
Pancasila and thus increased fears of national fragmentation, which made a peaceful 
settlement an imperative. Last and as a crosscutting feature of all these strains, the 
political influence of the military in Jakarta also declined. Suitably and as examined 
19 During Reformasi, troops withdrew and GAM re-established itself but civil society also "revived and 
blossomed", NGOs grew in size and reached down to village level while people came forward to talk 
about human rights abuses (Stockwin, 1999). 
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below, it was the eventual resurgence of the military in Aceh and Jakarta, which 
contributed to the frustration of the joint dialogue process. 
5.3 Spoilers 
Although the internal strains made political intervention conducive and the joint 
agreements achieved some progress in addressing the reasons for the armed conflict, the 
full implementation of security guarantees proved impossible. Consequently, the peace 
process was gradually eroded by the continuation of the political violence and was 
eventually replaced by martial law. In pinpointing the main reason for the 
intensification of the political violence, this section examines the role and impact of 
spoilers from both armed sides that had more to gain from the conflict. The joint 
agreements recognised this danger, for example, under the Pause the Joint Forum 
agreed to "assist in the elimination" of "offensive actions by armed elements" not party 
to the Pause (Joint Committee on Security Modalities, undated (a): Ch. II). However, 
both sides were unable to enforce unity. For the spoilers, one way to perpetuate the 
cycle of violence was to oppose and manipulate the HDC and the humanitarian 
mechanisms in Aceh. In their pursuit of vested political, economic and military 
interests, spoilers engulfed the neutrality of the joint responses for IDPs. 
5.3.1 Military opposition and manipulation 
From 1998-2000, there was a brief decline in the TNI's political standing in Jakarta, as 
exemplified by the introduction of the HDC intervention and the space for the extensive 
range of humanitarian actors in Aceh. 20 However, the decline proved ephemeral and the 
HDC intervention, from its inception, faced varying degrees of opposition from the TNI 
and its hawkish supporters among the political elite within the RI. In particular, 
President Wahid's Cabinet was deeply divided and this absence of complete and 
20 Nationally, the military was on the defensive when its role in parliament and its capacity to raise funds 
were reduced to a degree (ICG, 2001a: 14). It was more difficult for military officers to become 
governors, regents and mayors, as they were no longer appointed. This loss of privileges increased 
"anxiety and frustration among active officers while retired servicemen were being tried for human rights 
violations in the civilian courts" (Sasdi, 2003). 
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uniform approval prevented joint dialogue from attaining momentum. 21 The project 
manager for HDC notes, "the problem is the domestic political problem in Jakarta and 
not enough trust in the HDC. " (Interview 5,11 March 2001). The division was 
publicised as a schizophrenic approach to political intervention, wavering between 
human rights and security concerns in Aceh from one press statement to the next 
(Interview 45,5 December 2002; and Interview 76,16 July 2004). 22 
Moreover, in juxtaposing the military before and after Reformasi, it would seem that 
their influence and power remained unchanged. Despite the commitment to democratic 
reforms, the US Department of State asserts that the TNI kept its "broad nonmilitary 
powers and an internal security role". It also appeared likely to retain seats in the MPR 
until 2009. By 2002, the TNI was still "not fully accountable to civilian authority" and 
largely remained unaccountable for their repressive campaigns in the past (US 
Department of State, 2002). Military defendants were acquitted, escaped before trial or 
senior officers were never charged, despite the international outrage at the role of the 
TNI in East Timor and in the Bantaqiah massacre in Aceh during 1999 (Tempo 
Magazine, 2003; Kooistra, 2001: 17). 
On the ground in Aceh, the military retained the capacity and freedom to hinder the 
joint dialogue continuously by breaking security promises and perpetuating the cycle of 
violence. ICG reminds us that this problem formed a pattern: "it stretches credulity to 
believe that provocative incidents that preceded or followed efforts by both Presidents 
Habibie and Wahid to contain the violence and seek a solution to Aceh's problems were 
coincidental" (ICG, 2001b, 14). At the elite level, by 2001, the more conservative 
ministers had completely defeated the reformists within Wahid's Cabinet and furthered 
21 The Cabinet was the result of bargaining among the major political forces. The first Cabinet had four 
active military officers in non-military posts and General (Gen. ) Wiranto refused to be Vice President in 
1999 for tactical reasons. In October 2000, Wahid dismissed Wiranto from the Cabinet after the General 
was accused of human rights violations in East Timor. President Wahid also annoyed the hawks when he 
freed the remaining 196 political prisoners from the Suharto era (The Jakarta Post, 1999b). 
22 Senior hawks or conservatives were the Army Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacuda, Gen. 
Endriartono Sutarto and Gen. Widodo. In comparison, Mann describes Wiranto as a reformist (Mann, 
1999: 146). Current Indonesian President, though at the time, Co-ordinating Minister for Political, Social 
and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was considered a reformist although his frequent 
ambiguity placed him somewhere in the middle (ICG, 2002: 8). Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirajuda and 
Minister for Human Rights, Hasballah Saad, were two of the main reformists or doves and were thus pro- 
joint dialogue. 
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their pivotal influence into President Megawati's administration. 23 This was 
demonstrated by the re-securitising of the GoRI's main approach to Aceh through the 
gradual implementation of stringent military operations. 24 By May 2003, GAM's 
negotiators were stripped of their status and the international actors within the two 
responses evacuated their international staff. 
Manipulation was a crosscutting theme of the opposition at the elite and field levels and 
focused on discrediting the neutrality of the responses. The hawkish Cabinet ministers 
gradually eroded the neutral image of the HDC in public. 25 To make these claims 
credible, it was essential for the spoilers that the violence continued on the ground. In 
addition to using official combat methods, the military covertly used militias to stoke 
underlying tensions, starting in 1999 and peaking during 2002-2003.26 During the 
CoHA, it was reported that militias were used to damage directly the work of the JSC 
during the peace zones. 27 The military had a nation-wide reputation for using militias as 
a tool or proxy to further conflicts by creating general disruption, polarising local ethnic 
groups and blurring the identity of perpetrators, as demonstrated in East Timor. 28 
Consequently, even by 2001, Large concludes, "it would seem that while for ICRC 
neutrality is a stance from which to perform specific tasks, for HDC neutrality has come 
to be the task itself' (Large, 2001: 18). Since spoilers preferred the security-based 
23 Megawati came to power with the backing of a coalition of big political parties and the military (Sasdi, 
2003). 
24 In 2002, Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, stated that the direct role of the TNI in 
domestic security affairs should be reinstated, particularly given the threat of separatist movements and 
other security disturbances. This was followed by controversy arising from a military bill proposed by the 
TNI, which proposed that the TNI commander, in an emergency, could deploy military forces within 24 
hours and only report to the President afterwards. The proposed bill was seen as a political manoeuvre 
and an attempt by the military to intervene in the national political scene (Siboro, 2002). 
25 Amien Rais and a top adviser to Susilo Yudhoyono criticised HDC in April 2003 for infringements on 
sovereignty and stated that HDC's involvement showed Aceh as a contested area rather than an integral 
part of Indonesia. Some TNI accused the JSC of being pro-GAM (ICG, 2003b: 3). This was not the first 
time, as the HDC defended itself from numerous accusations that it was siding with the rebels and on one 
occasion, its office was deemed a spy centre (The Jakarta Post, 2002a). 
26 Several sources disclosed that the military trained militias, composed mainly of Javanese transmigrants 
in Central Aceh, to guard communities and commit violent acts as a reaction to the forced evictions and 
the territorial gains made by GAM, as examined below (ICG, 2002: 7). 
27 A fact-finding team of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) found 
that the local military trained 500 militiamen involved in an attack on JSC personnel in Bukit regency of 
Takengon, Central Aceh. Several of the perpetrators were believed to be members of the Army's 
Strategic Reserves Command. Kontras found that the militia were transported tojoin 2500 civilians from 
Bandar district in the Buntul Kubu area. The accusations were denied by a military spokesperson (The 
Jakarta Post, 2003b). 
28 Militias obscured those influencing the violence and the Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob) sometimes 
did not wear uniforms (similar to practice in Ambon) (Interview 11,13 March 2001). The TNI also 
sometimes used police uniforms to perform the role of the police because at times during the dialogue 
process the GoRl promised the TNI would refrain from launching operations (Large, 2001: 13). 
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approach to Aceh they also opposed sustainable development by the humanitarian 
response, for example, by restricting the number of international personnel, access to 
those in need and the scope of mandates. 29 In general, all forms of international 
presence were perceived as unwelcome scrutiny and interference and this aggressive 
flexing of sovereignty was proved by several high profile cases. 30 
As a slightly different explanation of the opposition, though still pointing to 
manipulation, some informants asserted that the GoRI deliberately allowed the peace 
process in Aceh to proceed and then fail. This would have acted as suitable justification 
for the more stringent security operation, considering the level of international human 
rights scrutiny (Interview 5,11 March 2001). 31 In addition, based on the damaging 
effects of the 1997 economic crisis and the instability during Reformasi, the process of 
joint dialogue reassured foreign investors (The Jakarta Post, 1999d). McCulloch 
concurs, noting that "the conflict is not conducive to the smooth running of international 
business interests and as such is of grave concern to the political and business elite" 
(McCulloch, 2002c: 3). This matched past practice, with accusations that DOM was 
`officially' lifted in 1989 because of pressure from foreign investors. 
It is important to understand why spoilers from within the military and its supporters 
opposed the pacific approach. First, the military perceived itself as the glue of the 
nation. Under the New Order, the TNI, in particular the army, was the most powerful 
and influential institution within the over-centralised state. It had seats reserved in 
parliament, the Cabinet and it controlled state companies (Kooistra, 2001: 11). Under 
Suharto, its role and power was protected by the oppressive 1945 Constitution and its 
preference for a strong state gathered wide support within the RI (Schwarz, 1999: 16 
29 The State Intelligence Agency screened foreign members of international NGOs and institutions and 
were then required to be cleared by the Intelligence Co-ordination Agency (US Department of State, 
2002). 
30 When the American nurse and British academic (Sadler and McCulloch) were arrested and imprisoned 
in Aceh, Jakarta intelligence sources said they were private intelligence agents, "operating as agents for a 
fifth column of anti-Indonesian NGOs" (Laksamana. Net, 2002). An Australian film student was deported 
from Medan and banned from Indonesia for one year after filming a women's demonstration. In 2003, 
Aceh, Papua and Ambon (Maluku Province) were closed to foreign researchers for security reasons (The 
Jakarta Post, 2003a). 
31 Furthermore, by pressing GAM to accept the NAD autonomy and the CoHA, the GoRI was perhaps 
hoping that the rebel's reluctance would justify the full military approach. 
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and 28-29). 32 The TNI maintained their pivotal role by acting as the guardians of 
national unity and harmony and reacted to "challenges to the territorial integrity of 
Indonesia [... ] primarily through repression" (Gersham, 2002: 2). East Timor, Aceh 
and Papua formed the main trouble spots and justified the need for a powerful military 
in the outlying provinces (Robinson, 1998: 127-128). 33 Moreover, the massacre of 
more than one million supposed Communists in 1965 across Indonesia demonstrated 
that their influence was not restricted to the peripheries (Schwarz, 1999: 16). 
Therefore, post-Suharto and with a new constitution, the military fundamentally 
depended on the perpetuation of the internal conflicts to justify the need for it to take 
control of internal security (Robinson, 1998: 128; and ICG, 2001a: 12). 34 Rather than a 
pacific approach, the military wanted to maintain and control the cycle of violence, 
thereby providing a martial version of conflict management. 35 In particular, Aceh's 
leading role during the revolution [for independence] made it "an emotive symbol of 
Indonesian nationalism", therefore, secession would have "threatened to jeopardise the 
underlying rationale for Indonesian unity" (O'Rourke, 2002: 333-334). Similarly, Jones 
argues that "Aceh, unlike East Timor, is critical to Indonesia's concept of itself as a 
nation" (Jones, 1999). For example, during presidential campaigning in mid-1999, 
Wahid told journalists that he supported the demands for a referendum in Aceh, which 
eventually "caused a moderate stir in Jakarta and Southeast Asian capitals". After 
Wahid restated his support for a third time in public, Major Gen. Sudrajat, an ally of 
Gen. Wiranto, added that Wahid was "expressing a personal opinion" and "not speaking 
in his capacity as President". In November 1999, the hawks had won on this issue as 
Wahid backtracked and stated that independence for Aceh was not possible 
32 In understanding these roots further, in Javanese culture, power is accorded rather than earned, it 
descends on a ruler who must have all power in the zero-sum game and power must seem to be effortless. 
As Anderson infers, for the Javanese 'ýpower is neither legitimate or illegitimate. Power is. " (Anderson 
cited in Schwarz, 1999: 45). 
33 During the annexation of East Timor in 1975,200,000 people or nearly half the provincial population 
was killed (Schwarz, 1999: 16). 
34 Although the position of the TNI was safe for most of the Suharto era, threats to its national standing 
emerged in the early 1990s when Suharto shifted his power base from the armed forces to Islamic 
movements. Kooistra writes that consequently, the army "became less sure of its position and needed the 
conflict [in Aceh] to secure its role as the sole guarantor of the New Order's interests" (Kooistra, 
2001: 14 and 17). 
35 There are many examples of the military using covert action to ignite or maintain conflict to make the 
government look weak or paralysed, from the murder of the rebel leader, Theys Eluay, in Papua in 2002 
to the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2000 (ICG, 2001 a: 16-17). 
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(O'Rourke, 2002: 333-334). 36 
Second, the power of the TNI not only stemmed from reactive, deterrence operations 
but from 1966 it was grounded in a parallel system of government, which consisted of a 
proactive territorial command system known as the dual function (dwifungsi) doctrine 
(Schwarz, 1999: 14). Accordingly, each civilian official, from provincial governors 
down to district supervisors, had a military counterpart with comparatively more power 
and was in a strong position to maintain unity from the local level. Therefore, the TNI 
adopted a middle way, seeing itself as an indirect force as opposed to the dictatorial 
approach of the Generals of Latin America (Schwarz, 1999: 16). The military 
consolidated its command and dwifungsi became permanent after the Communist 
purges and under President Suharto. Huge foreign investment in partnership with the 
military `financial Generals' provided large resources for their "patronage machine" 
(Schwarz, 1999: 33-34). Dwifungsi should have been dismantled during Reformasi but 
evidence suggests that it was strengthened instead, which made the military the most 
solid institution in the RI. This was exemplified by the creation of new regional 
commands in Aceh and Maluku (USAID-OTI, 2002). 
Dwifungsi also needed to be protected and augmented by the continuation of the 
violence because it was the means to the military's funding. Approximately, 70-80 per 
cent of the TNI's national budget comes from private businesses. In this sense, 
dwifungsi was its private business formation since the RI was unable "to adequately 
provide for" its "welfare and running costs" (McCulloch, 2002c: 9). 37 Furthermore, the 
military operations in Aceh, Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Papua were not funded by 
the state budget (McCulloch, 2002c: 9). This made it imperative to generate funds by 
other means (ICG, 2001 a: 13; Kooistra, 2001: 17; and Barakat et al, 2002b: 7). For 
36 In 2000, the National Resilience Institute (under Ministry of Defence) argues that Indonesia was facing 
imminent collapse with a "breakdown of the country occurring within a matter of time". Among reasons 
listed were a protracted economic crisis, disharmony among the politicians and the nation, the 
demoralisation of soldiers and the international intervention in East Timor (Xinhua, 2000). 
37 The TNI's official budget was Rp 9.3 trillion (US$ 840 million) per year or I per cent of GDP, but this 
was meant to cover only 30 per cent of its needs, thereby making its actual annual budget Rp 35 trillion. 
Accordingly, the military had interests in 250 businesses worth US $3 billion (Time Asia, 2002). 
Nationally, the military's economic interests included "natural resource extraction, and the service sector 
including finance, real estate, manufacturing, and construction". Profits were used for communal good, 
slush funds and off-salary income (mid-high ranking officers) (McCulloch, 2002c: 9). The TNI's Kartika 
Eka Paksi Foundation was the main money maker, covering businesses in timber, plantations, property, 
insurance, steel, construction companies, a hotel, a shoe factory and a bank, estimated at Rp 50 billion per 
year (Ernst & Young financial report cited in Wijaksana & Musthofid, 2002). 
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example, the military derived extra revenue from ExxonMobil in Aceh by providing 
protection. ß The introduction of the destabilising NAD autonomy became a "giant 
slush fund for provincial officials from oil and gas revenues. " (Jones, 2002a; and 
2002b). The military operated other predatory and profiteering practices. This ranged 
from opportunistic soldiers earning extra field-operational money through pillaging and 
extortion to the more institutionalised and collective forms of racketeering, for example, 
forcing local and international businesses to pay for protection services and illegal trade 
from natural resources (Interview 1,9 March 2001)39 To complete the understanding 
of the military's opposition, it is essential to examine the similar role and impact of 
GAM within the joint dialogue process. 
5.3.2 GAM opposition and manipulation 
GAM opposed and manipulated the joint dialogue, from the start of the Humanitarian 
Pause, to self-aggrandise (Interview 33,25 March 2001; and Interview 5,11 March 
2001). 40 Militarily, GAM continuously violated its security guarantees and by January 
2001 it was launching more audacious attacks, "taking over villages and towns, for 
example, Idi Rayeuk" (Interview 1,9 March 2001). In addition to capturing territory, 
GAM used the Pause to launch information campaigns and raise its visibility. 
Politically, the rebels divided Aceh into 17 regencies and "each had an operative 
parallel system of `protection' of citizens, tax collection and the issuing of birth and 
marriage certificates" at the expense of traditional societal structures (Barakat et al, 
38 McCulloch states that ExxonMobil paid the 1300 armed forces to guard the facilities a daily allowance 
of Rp 40,000 each. Kontras notes ExxonMobil paid Rp 5 billion per month. In February 2002 the troops 
increased to 5000, thereby raising the costs (McCulloch, 2002c: 9). From the start, the army was linked 
to the petroleum industry with an ex-army colonel becoming head of the state oil monopoly, P. T. 
Pertarnina. In 1966, Suharto excised the domains of the state oil company, Permina, from the Mining 
Ministry and placed them under his son's responsibility, thereby providing access to funds to pay for 
troops (HDC, 2000: 4-5). 
39 Bus drivers and commercial lorries were all used to paying illegal tolls at the numerous checkpoints on 
the main Medan-Banda Aceh road (McCulloch, 2002a). GAM also collected 'illegal taxes' using this 
method. The knock-on effects resulted in several strike actions by truck drivers from 2001-2002 (The 
Jakarta Post, 2001d). In addition, Aceh was the second biggest producer (mostly for export) of 
marijuana in South East Asia and both sides were accused of involvement in this trade (ICG, 2000: 2; 
Buiza & Risser, 2003: 26; and O'Rourke, 2002: 332). Temptation for extortion was large. Soldiers' 
wages were low and often inadequate, receiving daily from Rp 10,000-17,500 for meals allowance and 
Rp 4000 pocket money, which doubled if they joined an operation (Unidjaja & Siboro, 2002). ABrimob 
recruit was paid less, Rp 7000 per day. To give some idea of its actual worth, a pack of cigarettes cost 
ýpproximately Rp 5000 (ICG, 2001b: 19). 
' Several sources also concur, for example, ICG, 2000; Reid, 2000; and Kooistra, 2001: 17). 
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2002b: 23). Financially, thousands of villages paid GAM 20 per cent of development 
funds received from central government (Barakat et al, 2002b: 9). The rebels once again 
tried to consolidate using the more lenient conditions created by the CoHA after the 
more stringent military operations during the latter half of 2001 and through 2002 
(Jesuit Refugee Service, 2003a). 
At the elite level, GAM also frequently stalled the joint dialogue despite the 
accommodation of many of their original demands. This included increased 
international intervention and monitors, a reduction in the TNI offensive, the real 
possibility of alternatives to future governance and international awareness of the 
human rights violations by the state. During the last chance offered by the CoHA, 
GAM once again broke its promise and refused to store its weapons at secret designated 
sites. 41 It also tried to stall and attack the peace process at crucial points. For example, 
during the CoHA, GAM accused the Filipino peace monitors of lacking impartiality 
(Tjandra, Bakri & Suud, 2003: 4243). 42 In 2003, it was reported that the Co-ordinating 
Minister for People's Welfare, Yusuf Kalla, tried to negotiate with GAM, offering them 
a share of economic compensation but this negotiating track collapsed because the 
rebel's Stockholm leadership was reluctant (ICG, 2003b: 4). Furthermore, after three 
years of acting as a loyal confidant, the HDC admitted that GAM had never disclosed 
reliable details of its troop and rebel locations, nor the amount and type of weaponry 
they held (Gorman, 2004: 2). 
Overall, the action of the rebels was itself a form of opposition as it proved they could 
not keep promises on security. Clearly, the self-aggrandisement was opportunistic by 
taking advantage of the changes on the ground created by the HDC intervention and the 
humanitarian assistance. In explaining this outcome, it is reasonable to assume that 
factions within GAM were ultimately pro-peace but used the joint dialogue to 
strengthen their position in case a peaceful settlement was reached. Alternatively and 
similar to the motivations of the TNI, spoilers also consisted of those that benefited 
financially from the conflict and thus did not want the status quo to change, in 
41 In the build-up to the CoHA, the civil society leader, Imam Suja, who met GAM in Geneva, said GAM 
stalled because they were reluctant to hand over arms and wanted more time to discuss with members 
(Farida, 2002). 
42 They took this stance because President Arroyo once made an anti-GAM comment. 
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particular, through international scrutiny in their strongholds. 43 Nevertheless, the rebels 
acted as a unified group during the joint dialogue; therefore, they could not deny 
responsibility for the actions of its members, especially over the long period of time. 
Regardless of understanding its motivations and assigning responsibility, the action by 
GAM threatened the neutrality of the responses. This immediately gave the military 
leverage to question the intentions of the responses. For example, a military 
representative from the RI was clearly annoyed at the violation of the 2001 peace zone 
and accused GAM of opening fire first on a TNI convoy and injuring two soldiers. The 
RI representative adds, "GAM promised not to carry out attacks, they promised the 
monitoring teams, the HDC and Mr. Griffiths [Director of the HDC], yet they have 
failed. " (Interview 32,25 March 2001). 
5.3.3 Intensification of political violence 
The increase in political violence and its effects during the joint dialogue demonstrated 
the predominate role of spoilers from both armed sides. Informants during field 
research in 2001 supported this development, for example, the director of the 
indigenous NGO, Flower Aceh, concludes, "basically, since the process of dialogue and 
the Pause, the violence has increased" (Interview 8,12 March 2001). The first secretary 
of the American Consulate in Medan recalls that, "most Acehnese say there has been 
more indiscriminate violence after the DOM period than before" (Interview 1,9 March 
2001). 45 First, Table 2 compares the number of fatalities before, during and after the 
Pause. Although the first phase resulted in a dramatic decrease in conflict-related 
deaths, there was nearly a return to pre-Pause levels by the end of 2000. In particular, 
43 Jones refers to GAM's recruitment of criminal thugs, reflecting its non-ideological and pure financial 
aims (Jones, 2002a). In recognising the business interests of the rebels, McCulloch reminds that the 
conflict did not trigger the collapse of local economic and political system, rather "a system of profit, 
power and protection that benefits certain groups has emerged, and it is this that explains the violent 
conflict" (McCulloch, 2002c: 2-3). Large concludes that GAM wanted lawlessness or to be the de facto 
local power since "parts of GAM have degenerated into banditry costing it some support in Aceh" and 
widespread "disillusionment and despair" (Large, 2001: 13). 
44 Some days later, the GoRI accused the insurgents of 12 ambushes, 3 attacks on the military command 
headquarters and several other acts of violence, including shooting, killing, bombing and burning 
(OCHA, 2001c). 
45 The Economist states "since the first truce in May 2000, the violence has got worse" (The Economist, 
2002). 
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there were more killed in December 2000 alone compared to the total for September- 
November. 
Table 2 Comparison of Total Fatalities, Before and During 
the Humanitarian Pause 
Time Period Number of 
Fatalities 
January-February 2000 340 
3 Months Prior to Pause (March-May 2000) 189 
1St Phase of Pause (June-August 2000) 63 
F° Phase of Pause (Se tember-November 2000) 166 
ecember 2000 202 
(GoRI figures cited in Associated Press, 2001). 
2001 was the worst year for deaths (1700) and 70 per cent were civilians. The killing 
rate was twice that for 2000 and five times higher than from 1989-1998 (Barakat et al, 
2002b: 5). Between January and August 2002,937 persons were killed (OCHA, 
2002y). 
Second, Table 3 demonstrates that there was also a rise in each of the human rights 
abuses below from 1999-2002. 
Table 3 Human Rights Abuses (1999-2002) 
Human Rights 
Abuse 
1999 2000 2001 2002 (Jan. - 
Nov. ) 
Extra judicial or 
summary 
killings 
421 524 1014 1307 
Torture 802 549 768 1860 
Arrest/detention 293 419 578 1186 
Disappearances 101 140 110 337 
(Kontras-Aceh, 2002). 
In pinpointing a crucial reason for the intensification of the political violence, this 
section examined the role and impact of spoilers that had more to gain from the 
46 Between January 2000 and December 2000, Aceh experienced the most human rights abuses in 
Indonesia. During DOM, from 1990-1998, there were 7727 cases of human rights violations (Daorueng, 
2002). 
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continuation of the conflict. Although the military used Aceh to reassert their power 
and influence at the national level, GAM's opportunism made this imperative. 
Furthermore, the neutrality of the responses became contested because of the violation 
of security guarantees. Although the responses operated with good intentions, it is now 
important to consider a significant weakness in the political intervention strategy, which 
allowed spoilers to oppose and manipulate. 
5.4 Practical Flaw in Humanitarian Mediation 
Humanitarian mediation, as a strategy for political intervention, was unsuitable for 
addressing and resolving the underlying reasons for the conflict in Aceh, which also 
explains how the political violence was able to continue and intensify. 
Humanitarianism was designed to be proactive, to prevent the conflict from 
deteriorating, thereby acting as an appropriate lever or space for conflict transformation. 
However, from the start, the Humanitarian Pause was based on "an inherent 
contradiction", that is, it was a face-saving agreement for combatants and also aimed to 
respond to humanitarian needs (Barakat et al, 2002b: 17). 
First, Aceh demonstrated that humanitarian access tactics may be used for confidence- 
building or interim measures but "conflict resolution strategy must ultimately 
encompass multiple interests and the need for fundamental changes in relationships and 
structures. " While third party, non-official, political mediation "relies on opening 
discussions, enabling processes, seeking trust and long-term transition in messages, 
positions, actions", humanitarian access negotiations require agreement and action on 
very specific targets, times and routes, "with obligations and understandings undertaken 
between intervening/outside agency and conflicting parties. " (Barakat et al, 2002b: 13). 
In compounding this flaw, the HDC did not have the capacity to implement a 
humanitarian agenda. Field research confirmed that the GoRI imposed limits on 
international personnel because, until the CoHA it did not want a highly visible 
presence of international mediators in the field (Interview 8,12 March 2001). With the 
ending of the Pause in January 2001 a number of other important changes occurred, for 
example, the joint monitoring teams were halved (Interview 2,10 March 2001). As 
purely facilitators, HDC only needed a few experienced international staff to manage 
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the negotiations in the Kuala Tripa Hotel in Banda Aceh but they were pushed beyond 
this original capacity to help monitor the humanitarian and security situation across the 
province. The pressure to maintain momentum within the joint dialogue and to achieve 
results stemmed from high expectations amongst the Acehnese and the international 
community. Counteracting the GoRI's restrictions, GAM constantly pushed for a more 
international presence in the province since their ultimate goal was UN intervention. 
The flaw was further significant since the strategy made the HDC fundamentally 
powerless as it was unable to sanction and reward and thus prevent the continuation of 
the political violence. As a local NGO director pinpoints, "as facilitators, they have no 
power" (Interview 8,12 March 2001). GAM could violate agreements because they 
had nothing to forfeit and in response the military perpetuated and reacted to the 
violence to demonstrate their own defiance. The HDC project assistant states, "GAM 
have everything to win from the process and the GoRI have everything to lose - these 
are still based on two irreconcilable differences in opinion on the future of Aceh. It is 
still in the interests of both sides to continue to use violence" (Interview 33,25 March 
2001). 
Despite the concerted efforts and the innovative, sovereignty-sensitive strategy, the 
crucial mechanics of the CoHA framework were nebulous and overall implementation 
remained precarious until it collapsed in May 2003. Powerlessness prevailed 
throughout. Overall, sanctions under the CoHA proved intractable despite a clear and 
detailed procedure. This was demonstrated by the international monitoring teams that 
needed permission from headquarters/Kuala Tripa Hotel before going into the field 
(Tjandra et al, 2003: 42-43). Similarly, the intricate process of weapon 
decommissioning failed because it could not prevent the disruptive role of spoilers 
(Gorman, 2004: 3). Other unresolved differences included the relocation of the military 
and GAM's wavering acceptance of NAD as a basis for future dialogue (ICG, 2003a: 
3). Consequently, the political violence continued and in April 2003, the GoRI 
unilaterally withdrew from the joint talks and launched the major military offensive a 
month later. 
Last, although the humanitarian mediation strategy was adopted because of the limited 
space for political intervention, field research also reflected that the aims were unclear 
and there was confusion surrounding the selection of the strategy before intervention. 
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As Professor Barakat recalls, "I am sure there was no plan, they had no expertise in 
conflict management or negotiation. " However, at this time "we were driven that it was 
going to be a successful example of preventive work - preventing violence. " (Interview 
76,16 July 2004). 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the problematic implementation of the political response for 
IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra. It was important first to focus on the achievements, 
which consisted of the limited ability of joint dialogue to maintain and extend the 
negotiations between the two sides for three years. This process culminated with the 
CoHA, which in theory could have acted as a practical mechanism for addressing and 
resolving the underlying reasons for the conflict. This was particularly significant for 
IDPs, as sustainable development required permanent return and resettlement, which 
ultimately demanded sustainable peace and security. To further the understanding of 
the RI's acceptance of international intervention, this chapter pointed to the confluence 
of significant strains upon state sovereignty, which strengthened the need for outside 
assistance. 
Nevertheless, the pacific approach to the conflict was gradually eroded by the 
continuation of political violence and it was eventually superseded by martial law in 
May 2003. The GoRI and GAM conceded on peace because each believed they were 
making too many concessions and fundamental differences remained intact. From the 
start, spoilers were committed to pursuing vested economic, political and military 
interests, thereby threatening the basis of the joint dialogue. Last, in allocating 
responsibility, it was essential to consider the pragmatic weaknesses of the humanitarian 
mediation strategy in accommodating and controlling the conflicting motivations of the 
combatants. In particular, the strategy and the HDC was unsuitable as it lacked 
sufficient power to enforce its mandate, allowing spoilers to oppose and manipulate the 
joint dialogue and thereby erode the neutrality of the responses. However, this 
damaging outcome also stemmed from other significant weaknesses in the practical 
application of the joint responses. Therefore, it is appropriate to move to Chapter Six, 
which focuses on how the responses failed to understand the real nature of forced 
internal displacement. 
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6. A Composite Approach to Understanding 
Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement 
This chapter employs a typology of push and pull factors to analyse and understand the 
causal process of conflict-induced displacement. ' The findings are grounded in a 
comparison of the two case study groups: the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Aceh and the Sei Lepan IDPs in North Sumatra. The 
author concentrates on four classifications of each factor based on its direct or indirect 
impact and proximate and gradual effects on displacement. As examined in Sections 
6.2 and 6.3, the predominating influence of the political violence push factors stemmed 
from the root cause of displacement, the low-intensity secessionist armed conflict in 
Aceh between the Republic of Indonesia (RI) and insurgents, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM). Section 6.4 demonstrates that economic push factors played an important role 
but were dependent on the political violence. Similarly, the pull factors were less 
significant but demand consideration in the fifth section. 
Although the classifications of both sets of factors provide insight into displacement, 
Section 6.6 proffers a composite or flexible approach to the typology to reflect the 
complex and protean process of displacement. That is, it is concluded that the 
classifications were blurred since the factors inter-played and overlapped within each 
case study to produce multi-layered reasons for flight. In particular, the displacement of 
both case study groups, while triggered by the direct impact and proximate effects of the 
political violence, was grounded in the indirect impact and gradual effects. 
Furthermore, the typology and the composite approach demonstrate that the political 
and humanitarian responses to IDPs in the two provinces misunderstood the processes 
of displacement, which became a fundamental weakness in the application of the joint 
responses. This damaging mistake stemmed directly from the ingrained politicisation of 
IDPs by the RI, which divided IDP groups using the reductive labels of real and false. 
Regrettably, the responses upheld and perpetuated this damaging dichotomy. As a 
consequence of this significant misconception, the protection and assistance of IDPs 
were fundamentally flawed at conceptual and operational levels. 
1 This is also referred to as forced displacement, forced movement and internal displacement. 
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Before the typology is presented, it is important to demonstrate how the case studies 
were representative of their respective province. Accordingly, the first section identifies 
the main pattern and characteristics of displacement, which also elucidates the fluidity 
and variation in forced movement within a contained geographical area. 
6.1 Patterns and Characteristics of Displacement 
This section introduces the two case study groups of IDPs, which were selected after a 
general review of displacement in North Sumatra and Aceh caused by the political 
violence. 2 The case studies are fundamentally important as each was representative of 
the main and distinctive type of displacement within their respective province. To 
prove this assertion, this section identifies the main pattern and characteristics of 
displacement in each province and the personal profiles of IDPs. 
6.1.1 Fluidity of forced displacement in Aceh 
Internal displacement was extremely fluid in Aceh from 1999 to 2003. Oxfam's 
programme manager succinctly describes how, "the numbers have fluctuated [ ... ] as 
they move back and forward" (Interview 14,13 March 2001). Displacement first 
occurred in the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh but then diffused, forcing 
between 200,000 and 560,000 persons to seek refuge during 1999, with the latter figure 
representing 18 per cent of the provincial population. By May 2000, the numbers fell to 
a few hundred, however, towards the end of the year the increase in fighting and the 
collapse of civilian authority in certain districts again sparked displacement (Bakornas 
PBP & OCHA, 2002). In 2001, total numbers remained at 20,000 until August when 
there was a drop to 12,000. In September, there was a further peak at 18,600 and by 
February 2002, totals declined to 9000 (Oxfam data cited in OCHA, 2001f; Indonesian 
Red Cross (PMI) data cited in OCHA, 200 1 g; OCHA, 200 1 h; OCHA, 200 1 k; 200 1 m; 
2 There were also natural causes in the two provinces, in particular, floods and earthquakes. In 2002, 
floods destroyed 1100 homes in Langsa and Birem Bayeun sub-district of East Aceh and in Dewantara 
and Nisam sub-districts of North Aceh (Waspadä and Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), 2002a). In North Sumatra, 1966 people were displaced briefly by floods in November 
2002 (OCHA, 2002vi). 
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and 2002e). 3 By May 2002, it was estimated that 550,700 had either returned to their 
villages or were staying with relatives, leaving 13,200 still displaced in camps or 
temporary shelters (Bakornas PBP & OCHA, 2002). By April 2003, there was an 
increase to 20,200.5 
The overview of total numbers is useful as it demonstrates that displacement fluctuated 
deeply. However, this merely provides a cursory and simplistic understanding of the 
fluidity. Quantitative analysis is limited because of the nature and politics of 
displacement. For the latter and as explained further below, the RI frequently prevented 
indigenous and international humanitarian actors from maintaining consistent access to 
IDPs. Consequently, it proved impossible to attain a reliable grasp of total numbers. 
As the project director for Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) verifies, "because of our 
situation, it is difficult to get an accurate picture" [author's emphasis] (Interview 10,12 
March 2001). Second, such statistical information was inherently difficult to attain 
because of the fluid nature of displacement. Therefore, a qualitative analysis is 
necessary. 
The main pattern of displacement in Aceh consisted of interlinked characteristics; that 
is, it was short-term, localised, fragmented and seemingly spontaneous though 
repetitive. First, the push factors from political violence tended to create short-term 
displacement, with sudden increases in areas when clashes occurred matched by swift 
decreases when the fighting subsided. OCHA's area co-ordinator estimates the shortest 
as, "three days, five days to one week. " (Interview 59,24 February 2003). Similarly, 
the field co-ordinator for the Consortium for the Assistance to Refugees and Displaced 
in Indonesia (CARDI) adds, "internal displacement was sporadic, between one week 
and one month" (Interview 60,24 February 2003). 6 Consequently, displacement tended 
to be localised. For example, the project manager for the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue (HDC) describes how, "the recent violence in [in the town of] Idi produced 
3 Across Indonesia from January 2000 to July 2002, the total numbers of IDPS doubled from 600,000 to 
1.3 million (World Food Programme (WFP), 2002). 
4 At the district level, in 1999, Pidie had the most IDPs, followed by West and South Aceh. In 2001, East 
Aceh had the most. North Aceh (1999-2000) and Central Aceh (1999-2001) also experienced significant 
numbers of displaced persons (OCHA, 2001g; 2002n; and 2002t). 
5 Although it goes beyond the timeframe of the research, it is important to note that the IDPs increased 
significantly after the start of the major military operation in May 2003 (International Organisation for 
Migration data cited in OCHA, 2004a). 
6 Human Rights Watch (HRW) and OCHA concurred that IDPs would typically stay for days or months 
until they felt it was safe to return (HRW, 2000b; and OCHA, 2003a). 
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IDPs that are now sheltered in the mosque nearby. " (Interview 5,11 March 2001). 
Temporary IDPs also stayed with or beside friends and relatives nearby and OCHA 
admitted this lack of visibility in particular made its 2003-2004 statistics limited 
(OCHA, 2004c). 
Third, rather than the prevalence of large camps, displacement tended to be scattered, 
fragmented and restricted to small groups of, from hundreds or a few thousand at the 
most down to a collection of families. An indigenous NGO representative notes, at the 
start of 2003 there were, "IDPs in the Polytechnic, at the animal slaughterhouse and in 
villages in North Aceh" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). Another international NGO 
senior staff member states there were, "two internal displacements in East Aceh, Bagok 
(700 persons)", with "about 100 IDPs in Lhok Nibong" (Interview 58,23 February 
2003). Similarly, OCHA's Internal Displacement (ID) Unit notes that only 30 per cent 
lived in camps or shelters supported by the GoRI or other organisations (OCHA ID 
Unit, 2002). 8 
Fourth, displacement seemed to be reactive and spontaneous overall, a former civilian 
representative of the MTHA confirms that, "the IDPs often left their homes the next 
day, deciding the night before to flee" (Interview 66,25 February 2003). However, this 
characteristic in particular demanded close case study evidence. Last, displacement was 
repetitive, which pinpoints the most damaging fallacy of the statistics. For example, 
RPuK's regional co-ordinator explains how the IDPs, "go on foot and if it is safe then 
they go back. If houses are burnt then they do not return until the houses are rebuilt. 
However, once the village is unsafe then they leave again" (Interview 72,8 March 
2003). Therefore, it was common for IDPs to move locally though frequently within 
short spaces of time, for example, shifting between village of origin and a host 
community. 
7 It was the same in 2003, the former RI representative on the Monitoring Team for Humanitarian Action 
(MTHA) explains, "some live in local mosques, field tents, schools, state institutions and buildings" 
(Interview 68,28 February 2003). The regional co-ordinator from the indigenous non-govemmental 
organisation (NGO), Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity (RPuK), concurs, listing, "local mosques, 
tents, emergency houses, nearby villages and boarding schools" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). OCHA 
also describes how "local people have in general been temporarily displaced in mosques or community 
halls. " (OCHA. 2003a). 
8 As exceptions, the former RI representative for the MTHA recalls, "one of the highest was in Jambu 
Dalern in South Aceh with 12,000 IDPs. The second biggest was in Kreung Saby in West Aceh with 
6000 people. " (Interview 68,28 February 2003). 
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There were also two other variables, which caused sudden decreases in IDPs between 
1999-2003. Annually, the short period prior to the start of Ramadan marked a time 
when I1DPs returned to their homes (Interview 5,11 March 2001; and Peace Brigades 
International, 2003). At this time, return was either voluntary or it was carried out 
forcibly by the national armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)). RPuK's 
secretary-general states, "before Ramadan there were a lower number of IDPs but this 
was because the government forced them to leave the camps and said they would not 
protect them so they had to return without security from the government" (Interview 15, 
13 March 2001). 9 When Ramadan ended, it was common for displacement to recur. 
Consequently, totals taken during the'Muslim holiday typically gave a false impression. 
Another variable was the short period directly following the signing of joint agreements 
between the two-armed sides within the process of dialogue as facilitated by the HDC, 
which typically allowed the return of 1DPs. However, when the short-term cease-fires 
began, either return was not guaranteed or it was difficult to sustain because the cease- 
fires remained precarious. 
Based on this qualitative analysis, the case study was fundamentally important because 
it was representative of the general pattern and characteristics. The findings are 
especially insightful considering the frequent restrictions on third party access to IDPs 
in Aceh. The group consisted of Acelinese IDPs, seeking refuge at the central hall of a 
polytechnic in the industrial town of Lhokseumawe (see Figure 4 Lhokseumawe 
Polytechnic, North Aceh). They were short-term or temporary, with the majority of the 
respondents or sample displaced together for three months. Third, the group was 
localised with the sample drawn mainly from three villages in Simpang Keramat, North 
Aceh, located approximately two hours (by bus) from the Polytechnic. 10 The group was 
also small; exemplifying fragmented displacement with no more than 100 households 
(500 persons) approximately, based on the calculation of one household or family to a 
mat and daily observations. They left their village as one family or together with 50 
people on average. Fourth, on the surface, the displacement of the group was 
spontaneous. For example, all claimed to have brought none of their belongings and 
goods and this was confirmed by the researcher's observations. Last, the group 
9 Only the FP HAM chairman thought it was inaccurate that all of the IDPs were returned before 
Ramadan "as it depends on the area. " (Interview 9,12 March 2001). 
10 Most made half the journey on foot and the rest by public bus. 
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consisted of repetitive IDPs and for many it was their third time to be displaced in as 
manyyears. 11 The rest of the sample was displaced twice before. 
Lhokseumwe Polytechnic 
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Figure 4 Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, North Aceh 
United Nations (UN), 2005) 
6.1.2 Fluid forced displacement to North Sumatra 
Although displacement to North Sumatra was not as fluid as within Aceh, total numbers 
fluctuated with IDPs moving to and between host locations in North Sumatra or using it 
11 They were displaced three times: 1999 to the village of Simpang Jamu, Batuda Lapan sub-district; in 
2000 to the mosque in Simpang Keramat sub-district; and in December 2002 to the Lhokseumawe 
Polytechnic (Interview 73,8 March 2003). 
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as a mid-way point before travelling to provinces further south in search of organised or 
unplanned employment. Between 1998/99 and the end of 2002, it was believed the 
conflict in Aceh forced 179,000 persons to flee, with nearly 70 per cent staying in North 
Sumatra. 12 The majority consisted of non-Acehnese (mainly of Javanese ethnicity) that 
were no longer welcome in their original communities in Java or were born in Aceh 
after their parents transmigrated and had never been to Java (OCHA, 2001 d). Figure 5 
(Variation in Number of IDPs to North Sumatra) illustrates the fluctuating totals 
between 2000 and 2002, which suggests a peak in April 2002 followed by another a few 
months later in August. 
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Figure 5 Variation in Number of IDPs to North Sumatra (February 2000- 
October 2002) (Global IDP Project/Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002: 120). 
The totals provide a useful overview but were unreliable because of the politics of 
displacement. For example, in March 2002, the head of the North Sumatra Social 
Welfare Department estimated there were 59,800 IDPs but this figure then jumped to 
94,600 IDPs a few weeks later (OCHA, 2002h). By December 2002, the GoRl and the 
main humanitarian actors agreed on the approximate total of 122,000 IDPs (OCHA, 20 
December 2002). The total doubled within six months because the GoRl was persuaded 
by OCHA to admit to the more realistic total and to begin to accept the full extent of its 
responsibilities. The revised figures thus stemmed from the adoption of more accurate 
12 By July 2002, WFP estimated that 34,000 fled to Central Java, 12,000 to West Java, 8000 to Riau, 2000 
to Jambi and 1300 to South Sumatra (WFP-Vulnerability Analysis Mapping Unit, 2002). 
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methods of registration (OCHA, 2003f). Consequently, the totals between February 
2000 and mid-2002 in Figure 5 are misleading and field findings assert that the peak in 
displacement actually occurred between 1999-2000 (Interview 54,8 February 2003; and 
Interview 52,4 February 2003). 
The statistics above were also limited by the fluid nature of displacement, as 
demonstrated by qualitative analysis. The main pattern of displacement to North 
Sumatra consisted of interlinked characteristics, that is, small groups of non-Acehnese 
(mainly Javanese) from across Aceh, unaccustomed to displacement, spontaneous and 
organised, for long periods of time and collectively in large host locations far from their 
villages of origin. First, the non-Acehnese tended to flee in pockets spanning disparate 
villages of origin from 11 districts/87 sub-districts within Aceh (OCHA, 2002j). An 
academic from North Sumatra University states they, "have come from all over". 
Second, as the same informant notes, they began to flee, "in groups, some spontaneous 
and fled because their neighbours were gone" (Interview 51,4 February 2003). 
Similarly, a GoRI representative confirms how they, "come in small numbers at night 
and during the day" (Interview 49,3 February 2003). This was qualified by the co- 
ordinator for Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), asserting that some of the displacement was, 
"planned and organised" to varying degrees: "they tend to leave in the morning and it 
involves discussions" (Interview 54,8 February 2003). Compared with IDPs in Aceh, 
once in North Sumatra, displacement tended to be more collective and fixed ("camps", 
"military bar-racks" and " government buildings"), with return less common because 
villages of origin were inhospitable and farther from host locations. By March 2002, 
there were 65 known IDP sites or host communities. However, "rented houses" and the 
"houses of relatives" were also used (Interview 54,8 February 2003; and OCHA, 
2002j). The majority were displaced in the district of Langkat (68,600 persons), with 
26,000 in six other districts including Medan, Sedang and Diari (OCHA, 2002j). 
The case study is fundamentally important because it was representative of the general 
pattern and its characteristics, while the findings are especially valuable considering the 
lack of in-depth understanding of the IDPs in North Sumatra. The case study group 
consisted of mainly Javanese IDPs, that planned and then fled in small groups far from 
several villages of origin in East Aceh during 1999-2000 to seek safety and a new life in 
North Sumatra. The group consisted of approximately 1300 IDPs (300 households or 
families), living in two neighbouring settlements, Barak Induk Major and Barak Sei 
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Minyak, situated in the Leusser National Park in the sub-district of Sei Lepan, Langkat 
District, (see Figure 6 Barak Induk Major and Barak Sei Minyak). 13 Among the sample, 
the length of displacement varied from one and a half years to three and a half years 
with an average of three years. For the vast majority, it was their first time to be 
displaced. 14 
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Figure 6 Barak Induk Major and Barak Sei Minyak, Langkat District (Sei 
Lepan Sub-District), North Sumatra 
(North Sumatra Provincial Government, 2005) 
13 Officially, the IDPs were split into the two small settlements, which the research treats as one case 
study or group. Significant differences between the two settlements are noted where relevant. The 
researcher inserted 'Major' into the name of one of the settlements to avoid confusion. The IDPs referred 
to the first main settlement (as a whole) as Barak Induk. However, Barak Induk was also the name of a 
neighbourhood within the main settlement. 
14 There were some minor exceptions, for example, some were forcibly displaced for a few months in 
1990 because of armed clashes after the post- 1989 resurgence in the conflict. Interestingly, going back 
further, an elderly respondent was displaced for three years during the Indonesian war of independence 
against the Dutch ( 1945 -49). 
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6.1.3 Personal profile of the IDPs 
The personal profile of the Polytechnic 1DPs and the Sei Lepan group also matched 
trends within their respective province. For both groups, the family unit or household 
consisted mostly of a husband and wife together with 2-3 children at school age . 
15 
Some widows and widowers were also interviewed to reflect one of the most damaging 
and widespread deficits of the conflict. Although most of the respondents were aged 
between their early 20s and mid-40s, there was also some representation from the 
elderly (70s>). 16 The sample at the Polytechnic was completely Acehnese. In Sei 
Lepan, 80-90 per cent were Javanese with some Batak, Gayonese and Sundanese. Half 
the respondents were either born in Aceh or moved there during the 1970s and early 
1980s and some had married Acehnese. They or their parents moved to the province in 
search of the cheap and fertile land. However, only a few were part of the state 
transmigration (transmigrasi) programme. 
Prior to displacement, all were subsistence farmers of a variety of crops, including rice, 
chilli, peanuts and bananas apart from some traders or shop owners. For the IDPs in Sei 
Lepan, previous crops also included cocoa, coffee, rubber and palm oil. In both groups, 
approximately three-quarters of each sample claimed to own their former land. Most in 
Sei Lepan had a letter of ownership while other respondents used to work on private 
plantations. At the Polytechnic, the monthly household income was between Rupiah 
(Rp) 250,000-2 million per month, with an average of Rp 500,000 before flight. 17 The 
monthly household income for their non-Acehnese counterparts was between Rp 
150,000 to 1.6 million per month, with an average of Rp 600,000. RPuK's regional co- 
ordinator verifies that the Acehnese l1DPs in general are, "mostly from villages, have 
little education, are in a bad economic situation and are farmers" (Interview 72,8 March 
2003). 18 
15 Some interviews involved only one partner in order to create balanced findings. 16 A senior official from North Sumatra's Social Welfare Department indicated the IDPs typically 
consisted of a mixture of ages (Interview 49,3 February 2003). 
17 The average household in Aceh earned Rp 600,000-700,000 per month and nationally it was Rp 
500,000 per month (Interview 63,25 February 2003). At the time of field research, Rp 10,000 
(approximately) equalled US$ 1. 
18 The former RI representative on the MTHA, CARDI's field co-ordinator and OCHA's area co- 
ordinator agreed (Interview 68,28 February 2003; Interview 60,24 February 2003; and Interview 59,24 
February 2003). 
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The initial comparative analysis of the two case studies and the juxtaposition with each 
province indicate two main patterns of displacement. In Aceh, the Acehnese were 
localised, fragmented, seemingly spontaneous, short-term though repetitively displaced. 
This contrasted with the mainly Javanese IDPs: displaced for the first time, fleeing 
spontaneously and organised, with a tendency to stay in large groups in fixed camps for 
longer periods in North Sumatra. These interlinked characteristics suggest the two 
types of displacement were dissimilar, however, the l1DPs in both case studies also had 
much in common. They were of lower class and rural origin, farmers by trade and fled 
in small groups (from single families to sections of a village community). In 
understanding the reasons for these minor commonalities and to explore the differences 
further, it is necessary to examine the most significant source of sin-fflitude, the political 
violence as the root cause of displacement. 
6.2 Political Violence Push Factors in Aceh 
Five factors of political violence pushed displacement in Aceh, which varied with direct 
and indirect impact and gradual and proximate effects. They consisted of armed 
clashes, military posts, sweepings, fear of political violence and deliberate displacement 
by both armed sides. The latter was sometimes assisted by the acquiescence of IDPs 
that would thus feign the impact and effects of political violence. Before this, Figure 7 
(Cycle of Conflict-Induced Displacement) depicts a simple three-stage cycle, starting 
with a violent incident of political violence, which pushes an individual, family or group 
to a host location. Accordingly, perceived safety and the possibility of humanitarian 
assistance are typical pull factors. The cycle is completed with return, which is pulled 
by improved security at the place of origin. 
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1. Violent Incident (Push) 
/i 3. Return (Pull) 
(security re-established) 
2. Safe Host Location (Pull) 
(and possible humanitarian assistance) 
Figure 7 Cycle of Conflict-Induced Displacement 
Although the diagram provides a preliminary analysis, as reflected by its one- 
dimensional properties, it is too simplistic to assume that displacement is caused solely 
and directly by single acts of political violence. Therefore, it is important to examine 
the nature of `incidents' by exploring their impact and effects. 
6.2.1 Armed clashes, military posts and sweepings 
Half of the respondents at the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic claimed to have experienced 
the political violence directly or indirectly from armed clashes, the local military post 
and sweepings. For victims directly affected by these factors, the vast majority said 
they fled because the violence was gradually intimidating, that is, they did not leave 
solely because of recent violence or a single incident. Indirect victims fled because the 
violence occurred near to them and was gradual also, for example, hearing gunfire and 
following neighbours as they ran away. However, there was one exception: 
On 9t' of February this year the military came to my village, they caught two 
people and shot one in the foot. Because of the violence I left with my family. 
The military thought GAM was there but they could not find them so they 
became violent. Before this, the people were also unhappy as the military put a 
television in the mosque and called people to come to them when they were not 
wearing clothes. Also, if people wanted to go into the mountains, they had to 
report to the military first (Lhokseumawe Polytechnic respondent, 9 March 
2003). 
Although the respondent connects witnessing the shooting and the decision to flee, there 
is clearly more emphasis on the progressive intimidation from the military post, that is, 
the indirect impact and gradual effect of the political violence. These findings are 
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validated further since Simpang Keramat, as the sub-district of origin for the 
Polytechnic sample, was identified as a frequent site of the political violence (HRW, 
2000a). 
Across Aceh, an-ned clashes occurred with guerrilla hit-and-run attacks by GAM on the 
TNI and when the latter attacked rebel bases. These incidents were common, especially 
in GAM strongholds and civilians in proximity would leave traumatised because they 
were caught in the crossfire. As a representative from the indigenous NGO, People's 
Crisis Centre (PCQ clearly states, "people have to flee if there is an actual gun battle 
between both sides in the village. " (Interview 13,13 March 2001). 19 Military posts and 
installations were also common. For example, during the first joint agreement, the 
Humanitarian Pause, a Mobile Police Brigade post (combined with violent incidents) 
triggered a group of villages (5450 persons/1340 households) in South Aceh to seek 
shelter in a single site between July and August 2000 (Barakat, Connolly, Aitken & 
Strand, 2001: 55-56). 
Proceeding an armed clash or attack, it was common for the military to retaliate 
indiscriminately with a sweeping operation (Interview 2,10 March 2001; and Interview 
13,13 March 2001). Sweepings typically resulted in the physical intimidation of 
civilians through direct impact with proximate and gradual effects (Support Committee 
for Human Rights in Aceh, 2000). The main motive of this counter-insurgency measure 
was to flush out the armed insurgents and identify sympathisers (Interview 8,12 March 
2001). A PCC representative clarifies that, "if they could not find those responsible 
they would simply torture the people" (Interview 13,13 March 2001). Sweepings were 
also unprovoked and conducted by the military and GAM for tactical reasons, for 
example, to gain control of territory and to loot. Beyond the warfare, they were also 
seemingly gratuitous and random. However, the resultant human rights violations were 
part of a systematic and perennial campaign of terror and realpolitick by both armed 
sides to inflict collective punishment and coerce 'support' through instilling an 
environment of fear. The sweeping of villages was routine during the Military 
Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM)), 1989-1998 and the PCC 
representative explains how, "the Kopassus [special forces] units would enter the 
villages between 4 am and 6 am when the people were asleep. They were then searched 
19 Trauma would result from physical injury or witnessing friends and family members killed or hurt. 
Armed clashes caused 10,000 to flee from East Aceh by mid-April 2001 (The Jakarta Post, 2001c). 
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by the military and their identities checked one by one" (Interview 13,13 March 
2001) 20 Whether unprovoked or retaliatory, "burning" was a prevalent technique of 
sweepings, especially in Central and North Aceh (Interview 59,24 February 2003 and 
Interview 72,8 March 2003). 21 
Sweeping operations became more severe during the process of joint dialogue with "the 
military attacking specific communities to destroy livelihoods, whereas during DOM 
whole villages were not emptied with only a few families fleeing at a time. " (Barakat, 
Lume & Salvetti, 2000: 40). For example, in September 2002, after the arrest of 
Scottish academic, McCulloch, and American nurse, Sadler, ten villages in Kluet 
Selatan and YJuet Utara sub-districts (which the two women were meant to have 
visited) were targeted by 400 TNI. It was reported that the army forced villagers to flee 
their homes to the safety of several local villages. As a form of collective punishment, 
the TNI later closed the villages and cut off supplies, resulting in a shortage of food and 
the closure of schools (JRS, 2002). 22 
6.2.2 Fear 
The fear that political violence was imminent was the fourth push factor and its impact 
was inherently indirect though with both proximate and gradual effects. At least on the 
surface, all respondents at the Polytechnic blamed the climate of fear for their 
displacement, in particular, the intimidation from the military post in their village. The 
director of the indigenous NGO, Flower Aceh, states that fear was the factor that 
"happens most often. " (Interview 8,12 March 2001). RPuK's regional co-ordinator 
verifies that it was common, based on the trauma of DOM, "for IDPs to be afraid even 
when the military set up posts or simply enter a village" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). 23 
20 In September 2001, three IDPs were found dead with gun shot wounds in Matangkuli. North Aceh the 
day after they were 'arrested' during a sweeping by GAM (Agence France-Presse, 200 1). 
21 During but not limited to 2001, PMI reported that 2000 houses and buildings were burnt with the 
largest (1,100) in Central Aceh followed by250 in Pidie (OCHA, 2001g). Public buildings were also 
greatly affected with the burning of 550 schools across 20 districts between 1998 and 2002. 
22 The stringency of sweeping operations increased further under martial law after April 2003. In an 
effort to identify GAM members, the TNI used camps to physically separate civilians from suspected. 
armed separatists (HRW, 2003). By 2004, another source believed that many men had avoided official 
camps seeking refuge in forests and mountains, afraid they would become targets for the military (Eye on 
Aceh, 2004). 
23 The representatives from PCC and Flower Aceh agreed (Interview 13,13 March 2001; and Interview 8, 
12 March 2001). 
183 
Anxiety also extended to the possibility of sweepings and armed clashes. Civilians 
were afraid instinctively based on direct personal experiences and/or hearing stories 
from friends and relatives as armed clashes were widespread and contributed to the 
episodic though protracted political violence. 24 Furthermore, the PCC representative 
adds that "fear is also created by rumours and bad information from both sides, which 
make the people flee" (Interview 13,13 March 2001). 
6.2.3 Manipulated displacement 
As the fifth push factor, civilians were also displaced deliberately as a form of 
manipulation, thus becoming an effect and means to the conflict. Such groups were 
then deemed politicised by the opposing side. The author asserts that GAM was 
deliberately instrumental in the displacement of the Polytechnic ]DPs while not 
excluding the influence of the push factors above. The insurgents' actions on the group 
varied with direct and indirect impact and proximate and gradual effects. 
First, the Polytechnic IDPs were politicised, that is, perceived overwhelmingly by the 
state and indigenous and international NGOs as attempts by the insurgents to destabilise 
the political process. The group was displaced symbolically in December 2002 shortly 
after GAM's reluctant signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) and its 
unwilling acceptance of autonomy as a basis for furtherjoint dialogue. RPuK's 
regional co-ordinator confirms, "in the [Lhokseumawe] Polytechnic, the IDPs are 
influenced by politics. They say 'it is because the military has come to our village'. 
We say it is because of politics and the IDPs are being used" (Interview 72,8 March 
2003). The PCC and JRS representatives concur, "the other politicised group is at the 
Polytechnic" and "the IDPs are politicised" (Interview 62,25 February 2003; and 
Interview 58,23 February 2003, respectively). Second, the Joint Committee for 
Security Matters (JCSM) identified the sub-district of origin, Simpang Keramat, as the 
location of an important GAM base (JCSM, undated (b)). 
24 To exemplify the significant impact of fear, The Jakarta Post reported that many young Acehnese men 
fled to North Sumatra after speculation about the imposition of a state of emergency in Aceh since most 
were afraid of being accused of sympathising with GAM (cited in OCHA, 2002u). Field research by JRS 
in Aceh found that 61 per cent of their IDP sample fled because they were frightened. 14 per cent driven 
away by unidentified perpetrators (orang tak dikenal (OTK)), 13 per cent driven away by soldiers/militia, 
6 per cent house arson, 4 per cent by GAM and 2 per cent others (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 37). 
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Third, it was unusual that the Polytechnic group was displaced after the signing of the 
CoHA since the agreement allowed, "many other IDPs to return at this time" in other 
areas and a general drop in violent acts. This was part of a pattern, with the initial post- 
signing period of other agreements enabling the return of IDPs as an intended 
confidence-building measure between both sides (Interview 58,23 February 2003). 25 
Furthermore, it was strange that the Polytechnic group was displaced during Ramadan, 
which also represented a time of return and less violence. Fifth, the Polytechnic was 
renowned as a host location for manipulated or politicised displacement. OCHA's area 
co-ordinator recalls, "in the Polytechnic, in 1998/99 it was very common for people to 
be told to go there [author's emphasis] (Interview 59,24 February 2003). Last, the 
deliberate displacement of the case study group and the Polytechnic's tradition as a 
politicised host location exemplified a province-wide practice. RPuK's regional co- 
ordinator compares, "in Lhoksukon, it is very similar" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). 26 
GAM had two interconnected motives in deliberately displacing the Acehnese. At a 
minimum, it caused social disruption within the villages and towns of Aceh and thereby 
contributed to the other destabilising effects of the conflict. A former civilian member 
of the MTHA confirms that at minimum, "GAM wanted the unsafe scenario factor of 
the civilians staying away from home" (Interview 69,28 February 2003). Moreover, 
the troops and resources of the TNI would be stretched and strategically altered, for 
example, pulled out of some areas and transferred elsewhere in reaction to the 
displaced, which then could create an offensive opportunity for the rebels. 27 
This form of repetitive disruption and its humanitarian knock-on effects highlighted 
structural weaknesses in the state and exacerbated the rupture between the RI and the 
Acehnese. In particular, instigating or accentuating humanitarian needs through 
displacement encouraged international attention and assistance, thereby confirming the 
deterioration in state/citizen relations, the vulnerability of authority from Jakarta and the 
fragility of sovereignty. The mediation advisor for HDC acknowledges, "GAM will ask 
them to move into camps to try and attract international assistance and make the GoRI 
25 The post-signing periods were also synonymous with a reduction in armed clashes and increased 
humanitarian access to victims. 26 In late 2003, it was reported that the "humanitarian community was also concerned that displacement 
was used as a strategy of war by the parties to the conflict. " (International Council of Voluntary 
Agencies, 2003) 
27 The RI representative on the JCSM concludes that the rebels were responsible for intimidating civilians 
to flee on 15 June 2000 so troops and military posts would be pulled from certain areas (JCSM, undated 
(b)). 
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look bad" (Interview 6,11 March 200 1). 28 This provocative strategy was employed at 
other crucial stages during the joint dialogue process. In May 2002, the Head of Aceh 
Regional Command, Brigadier General Djali Yusuf, said the presence of 130 IDPs in 
Banda Aceh was, "engineered to attract international attention to the conflict" (Noor, 
2002). The local government similarly described them as "propaganda fodder" 
(McCulloch, 2002b). Accordingly, GAM could also profit financially from its position 
of control at both ends: from humanitarian assistance at the host location and the vacant 
property and possessions at the village of origin. Based on other functional equivalents, 
deliberate displacement was also part of a wider strategy, for example, GAM knew the 
attacks on the liquid natural gas industries would attract international attention and fuel 
the conflict (Robinson, 1998: 138). 
There was also evidence of deliberate displacement by the TNI for strategic reasons, 
which revolved around the need to gain or reassert control and authority over an area 
and its residents. State forces would physically force a group to return by escort when 
GAM was deemed responsible in the first instance. Alternatively, the delivery of aid 
would be prevented, as the project director for MSF notes: "a couple of weeks ago, the 
Indonesian Health Department visited an IDP camp close to Idi Rayeuk. A few hours 
later the TNI came and threatened them and they were prevented from carrying out their 
work in the IDP camp. " (Interview 10,12 March 200 1). 29 Conversely, in some 
situations the RI preferred to have IDPs as a justification to "bring more troops into 
Aceh" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). A GoRI representative candidly agrees, "it is 
believed that some TNI and Polri are committing criminal acts, for example, burning 
houses in North Aceh to displace civilians. " (Interview 68,28 February 2003). Overall, 
based on the prevalence of politicised displacement, the MSF representative asserts that 
there is "no such thing as a neutral IDP camp since it must have relations with one side 
or the other. " (Interview 10,12 March 2001). 
Compared to the military's dependence on force to deliberately displace civilians, GAM 
could employ more subtle means. The most common method was to control the 
28 Tiwon similarly describes 27-31 IDP camps along the main road between Pidie and North and East 
Aceh holding 100,000-200,000 persons and that "at least a few of these camps were set up to display to 
the world the plight of the Acehnese, in a bid to rally international support behind the independence 
movement' ', with the GAM flag raised over some (Tiwon, 2000: 99- 100). 
29 The military traditionally used civilians as a tool within the conflict. As detailed in Chapter Four, 
during DOM, civilians were used to flush out the rebels using the "fence of legs" technique (Robinson, 
1998: 143). 
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leadership of each displaced group by appointing loyal supporters or volunteers, before 
or during displacement. The Aceh co-ordinator from JRS explains, "in the 
[Lhokseumawe] Polytechnic, the IDP committee said there would be no return even 
though the IDPs wanted to return" (Interview 58,23 February 2003). Therefore, while 
the IDPs were eager to go home, their leaders were not in a rush. The regional co- 
ordinator for RPuK agrees, "for the people there is no choice" (Interview 72,8 March 
30 2003). Similarly, of another group, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 
(TAPOL) describes that "although they wanted to return to their villages, they were 
being prevented from doing so by members of the camp committees" (TAPOL, 2000: 
13). More generally, the HDC's mediation advisor asserts that, "members of the IDP 
committees are clearly political. " (Interview 6,11 March 2001). Another way to guide 
the displacement of a group was to spread rumours among the village of an attack or 
sweeping. As a less sophisticated example, the PCC representative recalls that in Gayo, 
Central Aceh, "Acehnese villagers simply heard from loudspeakers to flee" (Interview 
62,25 February 2003). Regardless of the method, GAM capitalised on an ingrained 
layer of fear among the populace. 
Moving outside the classifications of the typology, deliberate displacement by GAM 
was also sometimes assisted by IDPs that feigned the impact and effects of the push 
factors. For example, the former RI representative on the MTHA recalls the responses 
of one group: 
Some [IDPs] said the TNI came and the people got scared but after more 
discussion they said there was no violence, not even a house was burned. All of 
the TNI and Polri were going around the village but they took no actions.. . In 
reality there was no violence (Interview 68,28 February 2003). 
First, there was a pattern of varying degrees of acquiescence among civilians in their 
uprootedness that used their displacement evocatively to protest against the state. The 
Aceh co-ordinator for IRS states, "Kamara zaman [a high-profile member] from GAM 
told me that displacement was used by the villagers to express dissatisfaction with the 
government and military posts in the villages. " (Interview 58,23 February 2003). With 
entrenched anti-RI, or at least anti-TNI, sentiments concentrated in strongholds across 
the province, GAM could rely on civilian sympathisers to be convinced or simply 
instructed that their sudden and temporary flight would further the path to secession or 
30 As examined below with reference to the province overall, the case study demonstrates a degree of 
acquiescence in the displacement, at least among the leaders within the group. 
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at least assist in the removal of military oppression. 31 Therefore, deliberate 
displacement was more common in the sub-districts where GAM predominated as the 
de facto polity. 
Second, proof stems from the main characteristics of displacement. Since it would be 
easier to mobilise and gain the support of smaller numbers of IDPs, this contributed to 
the predominance of fragmented and repetitive displacement. Furthermore, such IDPs 
would be less willing to move far away and for long-periods of time, which therefore 
matches the typical short-term and localised characteristics. RPuK's secretary-general 
describes how these groups are, "usually displaced for less than one month" (Interview 
70,28 February and 4 March 2003). Fourth, as the Aceh co-ordinator for JRS confirms, 
it was common for the short-term IDPs to know in advance the exact day of their return, 
for example, "at the Polytechnic and the IDPs in Bagok said they will return on 
Tuesday. However, in Lhok Nibong, the 1DPs have been there for two years. " 
(Interview 58,23 February 2003). This type of certainty further suggests a degree of 
acquiescence in the process and seems far removed from the actual impact and effects 
of political violence, the debilitating impact of deteriorating livelihoods, never mind the 
chaos associated with a humanitarian emergency. 
On the surface, it may seem nonsensical that civilians would accept and support 
deliberate displacement by GAM since they would incur significant hardship during 
displacement and the loss of possessions and property upon return. 32 However, three 
scenarios explain this apparent paradox. First, civilians may have consented in the first 
instance based on the belief that the displacement would be brief and the personal cost 
would be negligible. Alternatively, the lIDPs may have predicted significant loss based 
on experience but believed they would be compensated through humanitarian assistance 
after they fled and upon return. Therefore, it is not asserted that civilians willingly and 
unconditionally surrendered their homes and livelihoods. Rather and as an important 
qualification, it is probable that civilians, when desperate for change, may have 
consented to a brief period of displacement, similar to participating in a demonstration. 
31 It is important to remember that civilians in Aceh were the victims of sustained campaigns of terror and 
human rights abuses, in particular, between 1989 and 1998. International humanitarian organisations, for 
example, the World Health Organisation and HRW uncovered high levels of trauma, especially among 
those residing in North and East Aceh. 
32 Since these types of displacement were organised and deliberate by GAM it is presumed that the rebels 
were also responsible for using and looting the unoccupied property. Among IDP respondents and 
informants, the identity of the thieves and looters was also unknown because there were no witnesses or 
respondents were afraid to answer. 
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However, it is unlikely this agreement would have extended to long periods. 
Nevertheless, the consent of IDPs would have become irrelevant once displaced and 
vulnerable. Instead, their fate would be decided by the agendas of the group's leaders 
and both armed sides. Last, civilians may have fled simply because they saw fellow 
villagers leaving and understandably wanted to stay with the group. 33 Therefore, some 
may have been motivated by, and as a result contributed to, a snowballing of 
displacement although there was no perceived threat or fear. 
6.2.4 Real and false IDPs 
Primarily and at a basic level, the RI (government and military) labelled displaced 
groups false when it held GAM's deliberate actions to be responsible, whether the IDPs 
acquiesced or not. The Polytechnic group was labelled false as it was politicised. 
Conversely, real or genuine IDPs were perceived to have directly experienced the 
effects of an armed clash. The dichotomy proved significantly damaging for the 
Polytechnic IDPs and other similar groups. Since the aim of deliberate displacement 
was to attract international aid and attention, the RI actively discouraged and prevented 
indigenous and international NGOs from assisting those perceived to be false and 
preferred the IDPs to return with the possibility of receiving assistance within their 
communities of origin. Consequently, the humanitarian actors were forced to adopt this 
discriminating division in practice as reflected by their operational lingo. For example, 
a representative of the PCC recalls, "to thefalse ones I have asked them why they flee? 
They answer 'because someone asked them and we were not asked to return'. The real 
IDPs have accurate explanations [author's emphasis]. " (Interview 62,25 February 
34 2003). Moreover, field research proved that the stigmatising 'false' label became 
more inclusive even when used by civil society representatives. An imam and fonner 
member of the MTHA identifies three different types of false IDPs: 
... those who had nothing happened to them, maybe GAM 
has made them, 
maybe not; those convinced a clash might happen soon, for example, if there 
was an operation the day before and so it may happen again; and people scared 
of past and future clashes, these are genuine but not 100 per cent genuine 
(Interview 66,25 February 2003). 
33 This point is also examined as a direct and proximate pull factor below. 
34 Similarly, areas of origin and host locations were also divided into real and false. 
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The author challenges both the reference to and practical usage of the real/false division 
for two reasons. First, deliberate or politicised displacement was only the instrumental 
push factor as demonstrated by the case study findings and as examined further below 
in the composite approach. Therefore, even IDPs perceived as false by the RI and 
humanitarian actors typically experienced at least one form of the impact and effects of 
the political violence. 35 Furthermore, it was argued by the humanitarian actors that false 
IDPs were easy to identify because they were displaced for short periods but real IDPs 
were also displaced for the short-term, for example, if the political violence intensified 
and cooled within a brief period of time. Similarly, it was argued by some that false 
IDPs occurred in areas where GAM enjoyed significant authority but these areas were 
also intense conflict zones because the government was trying to regain control. 
Consequently, the simplistic division of real and false was not accurate since push 
factors varied among and within groups of IDPs. 
Second, the dichotomy also created confusion and jeopardised basic humanitarian 
principles for the joint responses to IDPs. For example, the PCC representative explains 
that his NGO followed B)Ps displaced from "Bagok, East Aceh and Julok" but "the 
government became very angry and the people did not want to return. " The confusion 
occurred because the government thought, "GAM deliberately displaced the people but 
there was an armed clash and when the military waited for GAM to return, the people 
got frightened and left. " Therefore, the PCC was caught in the middle since, "the 
government asked us to lobby the people but we did not as we had no right to. " 
(Interview 62,25 February 2003) 
This section has argued that the impact and effects of the push factors on the Acehnese 
varied considerably. This was demonstrated by the detailed analysis of the narratives 
from IDPs at the Polytechnic and the insight from representatives of the joint responses. 
Overall, the typology reflected the episodic though protracted nature of the political 
violence. In particular, the underlying level of fear, manipulated displacement and 
evidence of civilian acquiescence made l1DPs both an effect and means to furthering the 
conflict. Consequently, the process of displacement was multi-layered and complex. 
However, the joint responses exacerbated the initial problems by adopting and 
perpetuating a simplistic grasp of displacement. This was exemplified by the 
35 Based on this argument, IDPs deemed false by international and indigenous NGOs still qualified as 
IDPs according to the UN's definition. 
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continuation of forced movement and the intensification of the push factors despite and 
in some cases as a reaction to the process of joint dialogue. To further the 
understanding, it is necessary to examine the role of the main push factor for the IDPs in 
North Sumatra. 
6.3 Ethnic Evictions to North Sumatra 
Ethnic evictions formed the main political violence push factor in the displacement of 
the non-Acehnese to North Sumatra. The evictions were direct in impact and proximate 
in effect for the Sei Lepan case study group. However, the same respondents also 
recalled the indirect impact of a gradual deterioration in basic security. In order to 
mobilise the deliberate and targeted displacement of the non-Acehnese; GAM ignited 
ingrained ethnic tension in Aceh, which prompted the state forces to reply in a similar 
fashion. 
6.3.1 More direct impact of political violence 
Although some non-Acehnese fled their homes because of the indiscriminate 
consequences of the political violence, the main pattern was deliberate displacement by 
ethnic evictions. In Sei Lepan, the majority of the sample fled because they were 
targeted by GAM and Acehnese civilians using physical (guns and swords) and 
psychological (face-to-face threats) intimidation. Therefore, these respondents were 
displaced principally because of the direct impact of the violence. OCHA's area co- 
ordinator and an academic from North Sumatra University confirmed this practice 
elsewhere, for example, "the Javanese were burnt out by GAM" and "most of the IDPs 
fled because of their ethnicity and attacks by GAM. " (Interview 59,24 February 2003; 
and Interview 51,4 February 2003, respectivel Y) . 
36 
The most common recollection was that the respondent or their partner received a 
written (mostly letters to the house or pamphlets distributed in the village) or verbal 
36 OCHA noted in 2003 that, "decades long conflict among various factions caused insecurity problems 
for many Javanese transmigrants as well as local residents [ ... I (GAM) threats, intimidation, destruction 
of properties and lives led many non Acehnese residents to flee their homes" (OCHA, 2003f). 
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warning to empty and leave their home. They were given a deadline to comply, ranging 
from 12 hours to four days and were told they would be killed or at least their security 
was not guaranteed. The sampled IDPs evidently took this threat seriously since most 
said they left as soon as they were able. As a respondent narrates: 
GAM came to the house and told us to empty the house, I asked for more time 
but they refused. They were masked and armed. The door was knocked in the 
middle of the night and we left the next morning without goods. Even the 
children's clothes were left; we only had the clothes on their bodies (Sei Lepan 
respondent, 11 February 2003). 37 
Although the effects of the evictions were proximate or abrupt by nature, the same 
respondents referred to the indirect impact of the gradual deterioration in basic 
security. 38 This included, seeing and hearing about clashes between the TNI and GAM, 
the burning of their neighbours' houses and other people fleeing. In addition, the Sei 
Lepan committee recall that in, "1998 and 1999, GAM would do a sweep on the buses 
and ask if there were any 'goods' [slang term for Javanese] onboard" (Interview 55,12 
February 2003). Over time, these few respondents decided to leave because they 
became afraid that 'they were next'. 39 
Sometimes respondents recognised and even knew those making the threat, that is, 
Acelmese 'friends' and neighbours or the perpetrators were judged with certainty to be 
GAM. Alternatively, identification was not possible (OTK) since they were masked 
and probably not from the village/area of origin. A respondent explains this below 
while making a direct link between GAM and OTK: 
We ran away because there was no protection and no security. I was once 
surrounded by OTK. I was the imam and because of that GAM suspected me 
and told me to leave the village and we were forced to empty the house (Sei 
Lepan respondent, 10 February 2003). 40 
37 Another similarly describes how, I was evicted by Acehnese from my village, two people came at 8 
p. m. and told me to empty the house and gave me three days to leave. " (Sei Lepan respondent, 12 
February 2003). 
38 Conversely, one respondent describes, "at noon we [Acehnese neighbours] were friends but that night 
they tried to kill us" (Sei Lepan respondent, 9 February 2003). 39 Within a JRS study, fear formed the main motivator, stemming from a "rumour or news of killings, 
disappearances, or arson in neighbouring villages" (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 40). As an example, at the 
start of June 2001 it was reported that in West Aceh, 3150 transmigrant settlers in Alue Panjang village in 
Kawai district left their houses and took refuge in government buildings from fear of attacks (The Jakarta 
Post, 2001e). 
40 The respondent's story also reflects the politicisation of the ulania and imams. As traditional religious 
and community leaders, it was common for them to be forced to choose sides. When they refused to do 
so, each armed side suspected them as a sympathiser of the other. 
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It was also presumed that sometimes the displaced knew the perpetrators but were too 
afraid to admit (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 4' 
The fact they were mainly Javanese (even though half were bom in Aceh and the rest 
had lived there for at least 15 years) was the main reason given for their forcible 
eviction. The majority of respondents left their villages with, between 6 and 70 
families. However, a few claimed to have left with their immediate family only or with 
most of the community. When the latter occurred, it signified that the perpetrators 
knew or perceived the village to be Javanese. An IDP respondent describes, "when a 
village was purely Javanese, usually everyone fled with some families remaining either 
because they were too poor and could not borrow money" (Sei Lepan respondent, 12 
February 2003). There were also respondents of Gayonese, Sundanese and Batak 
ethnicity that claimed they were caught in a sandwich position because of their 
ethnicity. That is, the armed forces perceived them, unlike the Javanese, as GAM 
sympathisers but the rebels treated them as spies for the military. Conversely, it was 
also reported that Bataks were allowed to stay in some villages. The same respondent 
clarifies that, "when the village was mixed, those that had Acehnese partners or could 
speak Acehnese or were thought to be co-operating with GAM were allowed to stay and 
the Javanese forced ouf ' (Sei Lepan respondent, 12 February 2003). 42 
The location of the village of origin was an important influence in the process of 
displacement. The Sei Lepan II)Ps originated from East Aceh, which was one of the 
first areas to experience the ethnic evictions. Similar to other non-Acelmese there, they 
were also easier to displace because they were taken by surprise, tended to live among 
the Acehnese and were less established, having transmigrated in the 1970s-80s. 
Conversely, the non-Acehnese in Central Aceh were attacked and displaced after the 
coastal areas, which gave the communities and the military more time to limit the 
effects by preparing a defence using armed militias. In addition, the non-Acehnese in 
Central Aceh had lived there since the 1920s and were more concentrated, living 
separately from the Acehnese (Interview 68,28 February 2003). 
41 JRS found 45 per cent were driven away by GAM, 34 per cent by OTK, 17 per cent were frightened, 3 
p! r cent for other reasons and I per cent because of arson (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 40). 
The subtleties of these variations are beyond the scope of this thesis and clearly demand further 
research. 
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6.3.2 Manipulated displacement 
From 1998, the steady though fragmented outward flow of non-Acehnese transmigrants 
to North Sumatra and other provinces to the south marked a significant shift in the Aceh 
conflict. Nevertheless, the joint dialogue process never addressed this deficit. The 
tradition of state controlled ethnic harmony quickly collapsed in several districts when 
GAM made strategic gains and became the defacto polity at some village and sub- 
district levels. In further explaining the timing, the IlDP committee in Sei Lepan 
describes how, "in 1990, GAM did not have many weapons and were afraid of the 
Indonesian soldiers and the Acehnese were afraid of the Javanese transmigrants because 
they were perceived to be close to the TNI. " However, by 1999 the situation was 
reversed as GAM had acquired more weapons and the TNI were withdrawn under 
President Habibie (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
GAM's chief spokesperson, Sofyan Daud, admitted candidly that the rebels were 
actively and systematically driving Javanese out for two reasons. First, they did not 
want the Javanese transmigrants to become indiscriminate victims of the conflict and 
they did not want the TNI to recruit the Javanese as militia (Tempo Magazine, 2001). 
While Daud's first compassionate concern was contradicted by the rebels' more 
infamous practices, the latter concern was well founded. 43 Despite GAM's proactive 
efforts, it was reported that Javanese migrants had formed militia groups and had 
participated in attacks against the rebels (Amnesty International, 2001). The non- 
Acehnese also had a reputation of collusion with the security forces, formed anti- 
independence support and formed another tangible reminder of rule from Java. As an 
attempt to counteract the gradual ethnic displacement by the insurgents, the TNI later 
forced out Acehnese coffee planters in Central Aceh and replaced them with Javanese 
(Cochrane & Janssen, 2002). Overall, as JRS concludes, "the warring parties heavily 
politicized the ethnic issue to support their respective causes and to fan the flames of 
war" (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 34). 
43 As examined in Chapter Five, the military fought conflicts by proxy, training militia to fight insurgents 
both in Aceh and in other internal conflicts. Perhaps the most well documented case occurred in East 
Timor before, during and after the referendum for independence. 
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This section has focused on the more direct impact of political violence for the non- 
Acehnese through the main push factor of ethnic evictions. For the majority of 
respondents in Sei Lepan, the evictions were proximate or abrupt. However, this was 
preceded by the indirect impact of a gradual deterioration in basic security. Last, there 
was a layer of underlying ethnic tension in Aceh but GAM clearly organised and 
manipulated the displacement of the non-Acehnese while the state forces used similar 
counteracting methods. Although political violence created the predominant push 
factors for the Polytechnic and Sei Lepan groups, it is also important to consider the 
role of economic factors in the two processes of displacement. 
6.4 Economic Push Factors 
This section examines the role of economic push factors in the process of displacement, 
which were dependent on the political violence. The factors consisted of the mainly 
direct impact of extortion and financial losses from the destruction or confiscation of 
private property. Indirect impact stemmed from the rise in prices caused by the 
disruption of the conflict. Overall, the factors had a gradual effect on displacement. 
6.4.1 Implicit economic factors for IDPs in Aceh 
At the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, the IDPs did not refer directly to the role of 
economic push factors. On the surface, this finding was surprising as elsewhere in 
Aceh combatants invariably had economic motivations for causing the political violence 
push factors. This dual impact naturally imposed an extra layer of pressure on civilians. 
As the first economic factor, extortion was ingrained and widespread in Aceh, 
encompassed several practices and had a direct impact on displacement. For example, 
50 people/16 families in 2001 sought refuge for over five months in Purwosari village, 
Bandadr sub-district, Central Aceh, after facing extortion and threats by OTK 
(Aglionby, 2001b). As a general trend, extortion in rural areas contributed to the 
movement of people to the perceived safety of Banda Aceh. These two examples could 
have been proximate in effect, for example, being unable to pay a one-off illegal tax or 
more gradual and prolonged through the attrition of income and savings. An Acelinese 
businessman estimated that from 1999, GAM was forcing civilians in certain areas to 
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pay Rp 3000 per month per household and Rp 100 million for businesses (Interview 53, 
6 February 2003). Extortion was so severe that during the joint dialogue process, a 
local radio station broadcast cases each evening to raise public awareness as deterrence 
(Interview 66,25 February 2003 and Interview 74,11 March 2003). However, the 
efforts proved ineffective and improvement demanded the co-operation of both armed 
sides. For example, Barakat et al noted that in 2000, the Humanitarian Pause in South 
Aceh encouraged GAM to pull back to their bases but ironically this allowed the TNI a 
freer role to demand more money from villagers (Barakat et al, 2001: 56). 
Second, financial losses from the confiscation or destruction of private property and 
land resulted directly in displacement with varying effects. Proximate effects would 
involve severe financial losses from a single incident, causing displacement because the 
civilian lost almost everything. Alternatively, the gradual and repetitive pillaging of 
private property, goods and land caused displacement (Interview 53,6 February 2003). 
For instance, 1DPs from East Aceh in April 2002 blamed human rights violations, 
combined with difficulties in maintaining their livelihood because the TNI monitored 
their workplaces and used their land for military installations (Afrida & Noor, 2002). 
Although the Polytechnic IDDPs did not refer explicitly to economic push factors, based 
on previous experience they were in no doubt that after three months it was likely that 
their property, land and possessions would be damaged, destroyed or stolen. In this 
sense, the economic push factors would not have been apparent until they returned. 
While these acts could have been a knock-on effect of deserted property and land, they 
often represented one of the original motives for perpetrators of displacement. RPuK's 
regional co-ordinator confirms that this premeditated practice was common as "most of 
them are farmers and they are forced to leave before the harvest is collected so when 
they come back the harvest is gone" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). Both armed sides 
deliberately displaced civilians to suit self-serving needs, that is, by stealing the 
property and goods from villages of origin. Therefore, since the Polytechnic IDPs knew 
their property would probably be stolen but did not blame the TNI, it can be inferred 
that GAM would have been the beneficiaries. On reflection, since the rebels played an 
instrumental role in triggering the displacement, while still retaining the support of the 
IlDPs, it explains why respondents did not refer explicitly to the role of economics in 
their flight. This culture of silence also elucidates why local informants were unaware 
in this respect. The main assertion is given further validity considering the planned 
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choice of the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic and the possibility of humanitarian assistance 
as `compensation'. 
Economic factors when combined with political violence also had an indirect impact 
with a gradual effect. The disruption caused by the conflict on social and economic 
infrastructures frequently affected the supply and availability of basic food items and 
would cause a steep rise in prices. JRS reported in early February 2002,45 families 
from Panuci village, Central Aceh, were displaced to Geumpang sub-district, Pidie, 
because of the triple increase in the prices of cooking oil, sugar and salt after several 
months (OCHA, 2002k). Violence on the Bireuen to Central Aceh route caused a 
shortage of food and prices to soar in 2001 (The Jakarta Post, 2001g). 44 
6.4.2 Significant economic factors for IDPs in North Sumatra 
For the Sei Lepan group, economic factors when combined with actual threats and 
intimidation directly impacted on the group's displacement mainly with a gradual 
effect. For some, the sudden extortion of property and goods contributed to some 
immediate displacement. However, findings from the focus group interview confirmed 
the link between the acts of physical intimidation prior to eviction and pressure from 
protracted or gradual extortion in the form of money or being forced to give valuable 
goods, for example, motorcycles to GAM (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
Respondents fled because they were unable to continue giving money or goods or knew 
they could not afford to remain victims in the future. 45 
Economic status was a determinant of how respondents fled their homes. When a large 
number of families fled as a group, trucks were hired to transport them and limited 
possessions out of Aceh. Therefore, flight in this case was organised up to a few days 
in advance (based on background to the evictions) and demanded sufficient capital. 
44 To note briefly an alternative dimension to economic factors; civilians typically needed sufficient 
income to become an IDP, for example, to pay for transport and food during displacement. Therefore, the 
research appreciates the possible existence of civilians that suffered the political violence but were unable 
to flee from their locale. This consideration is also relevant to those unable to flee because of poor health 
or other disabilities. Regrettably, this sub-group of conflict-affected victims is beyond the focus of the 
thesis and by definition would be difficult to access and research. 
45 Respondents within the second case study did not refer to the indirect impact of economics on their 
displacement, for example, problems in gaining access to food and supplies, the steep rise in prices or not 
being able to sell their own produce. 
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Conversely, the public bus was used to leave the village when a family left alone or as 
part of a small group. Similarly, JRS described how the II)Ps "managed to rent trucks or 
simply get on a truck when it arrived, or walk to reach safety" (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 
35-36). 
After the forcible evictions, respondents and informants confirmed that the houses of 
the Sei Lepan IDPs were most typically looted and confiscated with the good houses 
reoccupied by local Acehnese and the more dilapidated shelters destroyed. Some IDP 
respondents recalled that some months after flight they heard that security had improved 
and returned to their former homes. These respondents either left immediately because 
their houses had been looted and destroyed or they stayed for up to three months and 
then left again because the political violence re-ignited. For some, members of their 
family had been killed upon return and some claimed to have been attacked by GAM. 
For instance, an IDP said he was beaten on the steps of a mosque (Sei Lepan 
respondent, 10 February 2003). 
Socio-economic jealousy was central to the evictions of the non-Acehnese. As GAM 
increased their control from 1999, the envy that was subdued for decades came to the 
fore and split along ethnic lines, that is, "it started from local disputes as the Javanese 
had a better life. " (Interview 59,24 February 2003). An imam, and former civilian 
member of the MTHA concurs, "the root was there, the Javanese were seen to have all 
the big and good functions" (Interview 66,25 February 2003). Tensions in particular 
stemmed from the Acehnese perception that the Javanese had unfairly benefited from 
transmigration, both from the state's transmigrasi programme and unofficial movement 
(WFP, 2002). Accordingly, sometimes the acts of political violence were deliberate to 
enable GAM and the Acelinese to gain economic benefits from abandoned property, 
land and other possessions. As a criticism of the popular perceptions, the JRS North 
Sumatra co-ordinator argues that, "the ethnic labels were used too easily by GAM, the 
media and academics in Aceh when it came to social and economic jealousy" (Interview 
54,8 February 2003). 
For both case studies, economic push factors played a significant role in the processes 
of displacement and were inherently connected to the political violence. The factors 
tended to have direct impact though gradual in effect. To complete the understanding of 
displacement, it is necessary to examine the role of the pull factors. 
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6.5 Direct Impact of Pull Factors 
For each case study group and their respective province, the pull factors inter-played to 
form an important role in the process of displacement. However, their influence was 
limited because of the predominance of the political violence push factors. The first 
direct pull factor, the possibility of improved safety or escaping the political violence, 
was subdivided into the type of shelter, the host environment and the desire to stay with 
orjoin the group. The second was seeking organised and/or informal sources of 
protection and humanitarian assistance. These two factors varied with proximate and 
gradual effects. The third stemmed from the IDPs' limited options (direct and 
proximate). The last pull factor, seeking an improved livelihood, was not relevant to the 
Polytechnic IDPs but had a direct impact and gradual effect on the displacement of the 
Sei Lepan group. 
6.5.1 Seeking safety and protest in Aceh 
Within the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, the IDPs lived within the central hall, which 
provided enough space to accommodate many families but was also meant to be used 
by the students (see sketches of the Polytechnic, Figures 8,9 and 10). First, the host 
location provided protective shelter with enough space outside to cook, existing wells 
for washing and space for the children to play and adults to exercise. All respondents 
claimed that everyone left their villages around the same time, which demonstrated the 
proximate effects of wanting to remain with the group. As detailed in sub-section 6.1.1, 
mosques, schools and other public buildings were frequently used and typically on a 
short-term basis across the province. These types of buildings demonstrated the desire 
of the IDPs to stay as a small group and were considered unofficial safe havens from the 
political violence. However, shelter was also sometimes private, for example, staying 
with a relative, close friend or in "rented houses" (Interview 59,24 February 2003). 
Those that chose this latter type of shelter and location prioritised joining family 
members or friends rather than remaining with the group from the village of origin. 
Socio-economic status played an important factor in choosing the host location. 
CARDI's field co-ordinator states, "the higher class IDPs move to the city and start life 
again even though they are farmers. " (Interview 60,24 February 2003). 
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The second pull factor, seeking protection and humanitarian assistance, had direct 
impact. Indigenous sources had a gradual effect since all respondents at the Polytechnic 
claimed to know their host location before flight, referring to it as a traditional place of 
refuge with a reputation for providing a safe environment. In particular, the presence of 
the students was a trusted source of protection, assistance, solidarity and at least 
sympathy. OCHA's area co-ordinator and the Aceh co-ordinator for JRS concur there 
was, "safety and [unarmed] security provided by the students" and "the Polytechnic is a 
good choice, it is near the hospital and they can receive support from the students - they 
are always with them" (Interview 59,24 February 2003; and Interview 58,23 February 
2003, respectivel Y). 46 It was common for IDPs in Aceh to find indigenous and informal 
sources of protection and assistance, which proved to be both resilient and vital in 
helping the prevention of a humanitarian emergency. The importance of protecting the 
family unit, provision of education, giving alms and help in general to those in need was 
instilled by a socio-cultural tradition of altruism grounded in a common Islamic identity 
46 Although the respondents were displaced several times in the past, this was the first time they had used 
the Polytechnic. 
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and religious ethos and a collective sense of resolve after years of conflict. 
The gradual effects of the pull factors stem from the premeditated selection of the 
Polytechnic, which also confirms the high degree of organisation and planning by the 
group's leaders. In addition to support from the students, the Polytechnic was also 
chosen because it could accommodate the large group and its central location, which in 
theory was easier for NGOs to channel aid to such a central location. Therefore, the 
location was a strategic choice for GAM as it maximised the visibility of the IDPs. This 
intention was clearly proven by the spokesperson of the IDPs who conducted daily 
interviews with local and international press to highlight the plight of the group during 
the sensitive political period after the signing of the CoHA. Their presence was also 
symbolic since Lhokseumawe was the most industrialised sector in Aceh and the 
Polytechnic was close to the luxurious residential complexes of ExxonMobil's foreign 
staff. This strengthens the argument that the displacement was a manipulated and a 
visible form of anti-state protest. Similarly, in 2000, a local newspaper reported that 
500 families fled from their homes in East Aceh to the Polytechnic (100 km) even 
though there were many other closer, suitable host locations, for example, the major 
town of Langsa. Furthermore, at this time it was well known that the Polytechnic was 
full with other IDPs from Kuta Makmur. Nevertheless, the 500 families were 
deliberately sent to the Polytechnic as they were taken there in a number of vehicles 
(Serambi-Lhokseumawe, 2000). 
The vast majority of Polytechnic respondents claimed they had no other options except 
going directly to the host location (direct impact and proximate effects). Only some 
respondents stayed with families during the journey for one night before going to the 
Polytechnic. The last pull factor, seeking an improved livelihood (direct and gradual), 
was not completely relevant since none of the sample were employed while staying at 
the Polytechnic. In explaining this, it is important to appreciate the low morale among 
the group, their perception that displacement was short-term while employment would 
not have aided their image as a group in plight. 47 
47 For example, every day it was common to hear the IDPs talk about 'definite' dates of return. These 
dates would vary and were moved back from one day to the next. Although their livelihood suffered 
during displacement, it is important to note that the IDPs relied on the busy main road (Medan-Banda 
Aceh) at the front of the campus to solicit money from passing motorists. 
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6.5.2 Seeking new opportunities in North Sumatra 
For the Sei Lepan group, the most important direct pull factor was seeking improved 
safety by escaping the political violence. Sin-dlar to the Polytechnic IDPs, respondents 
preferTed the host location because it seemed safer than their village of origin. This was 
emphasised by the remoteness of the two small settlements (see Figure 11 Barak Induk 
48 Major and Figure 12 Barak Sei Minyak). The type of shelter, in particular, the 
availability of the material resources and the host location environment had proximate 
and gradual effects. Although the quality of shelter varied, the plentiful supply of 
wood, leaves and corrugated tin sheets meant that at least a basic quality was 
guaranteed. 
The incentive of staying as a group had a direct impact and gradual effect. Half the 
respondents knew their destination either before leaving or shortly after flight because 
they had heard from friends and neighbours that other IDPs were at the host location 
and frequently claimed they wanted to 'share the same destiny'. In some cases, the 
husbands scouted and then returned briefly to help the rest of the family move there. 
Seeking protection and humanitarian assistance was not a direct and gradual pull factor 
before flight since only a few international and indigenous NGOs worked in the host 
location and their engagement was recent. However, basic assistance and small 
development projects from the international NGO, JRS, influenced some IDPs to stay 
and therefore had a direct impact with gradual effect during displacement. 
The third pull factor of limited options had direct impact and proximate effect. During 
flight, the non-Acehnese had a more transient experience and differed from the IDPs at 
the Polytechnic. Among respondents, half came directly and the rest spent short periods 
of time typically in other parts of North Sumatra to stay with relatives. A few families 
went to the more southern province of Riau to work in the state plantations. A minority 
spent one or two days in nearby towns living in public buildings or mosques. In 
explaining the reasons for these trends, most said they had no options or that their 
48 A river and a thirty-minute walk divided the two settlements; both situated at approximately 1000 m 
(above sea level) within the Leusser National Park. The settlements were 2-3 hours (bus then motorbike 
or four-wheel drive) from the Medan side of Langkat district and approximately 30 krn south of the Aceh 
border or 6-8 days walk through jungle (Field notes, February 2003). 
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options were limited to staying with a relative for a short period . 
4" The main reasons 
given for the limited options were money, the determination to be self-sufficient and 
independent and the fact that relatives were also poor and living in small houses. In 
sum, they pointed to the fact that they had nowhere else to go and were attracted by the 
abundance of free land in Sei Lepan which they hoped to cultivate. 
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49 Many of the non-Acehnese IDPs moved into makeshift houses in several long-term camps in North 
Sumatra, unlike the Acehnese IDPs that tended to be short-term, localised and able to stay with extended 
family members close-by or in public buildings. 
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Seeking an improved livelihood (direct and gradual) may have been a ma . for pull 
factor 
for the Set Lepan group, while not detracting from the root cause ofpolitical violence 
and the other economic factors. In 1998/99 the IDPs realised their livelihood as farmers 
was under threat because of the conflict and the effects of the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis. Thus, it was significant that they chose a location Surrounded by an abundaricc of' 
land. Moreover, many IDPs admitted to visiting and selecting the host location in 
advance and recalled the initial incentive that the land was free and available to 
cultivate. Combined with the secluded nature ofthe national park, tile location 
presented a perfect opportunity for the transmigrants to inake a new start after tile 
trauma of Aceh. Furthermore, they could depend on the plentiful supply of wood to 
build and cook, which formed significant short and long-term incentivcs. Last, the 
nearby presence of a lucrative timber trade, rubber and palm oil plantations presented 
the IDPs with possible alternative livelihoods to subsistence farming. Overall, the Sel 
Lepan evinced their immense loss combined with the commitment to re-estahlish their 
relatively comfortable standard of living as transmigrants in Aceh. Therefore, as 
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transmigrant farmers, the role of economics was central to understanding the process of 
displacement since it was relevant to both pre-flight and choice of host location. 
Reaching improved safety, which was subdivided into shelter, the host location and 
staying as a group, and seeking protection and assistance had direct impact with 
variable proximate and gradual effects. Limited options were direct and proximate. 
The last pull factor, the prospects of an improved livelihood, was not relevant to the 
Polytechnic but it was inferred that it had a direct impact and gradual effect on the Sei 
Lepan IDPs. Nevertheless, the significance of the pull factors was still peripheral 
because of the salience of the political violence push factors. 
6.6 A Composite Approach 
The four-part typology of the push and pull factors was useful in analysing and 
comparing the two processes of displacement. Both case study groups shared the same 
root cause of political violence although neither fled after or simply because of a single 
act of violence but were grounded in a gradual deterioration in security through 
protracted intimidation, armed clashes and human tights violations. GAM, OTK and 
Acehnese civilians intimidated the Sei Lepan IDPs. The Polytechnic IDPs claimed 
particular harassment from the military post in their home village. Moreover, both 
groups were deliberately targeted and manipulatively displaced by GAM. 
Consequently, the Sei Lepan and Polytechnic IDPs exposed weaknesses in the RI and 
thus represented two attacks on state sovereignty. Nevertheless, flight was triggered by 
GAM for different reasons and motivations. The Sei Lepan group witnessed and 
experienced the direct impact and proximate effect of forcible evictions whereas a more 
subtle form of intimidation and coercion sparked the move to the Polytechnic. 
Overall, the comparative case study research highlighted the extremely protean impact 
and effects of the political violence within each group. Even at the level of the 
individual, there were several push and pull factors modulating in impact and effect. 
The individual experience affected the group, which in turn influenced the individual's 
decision of when to leave their village of origin and the choice of host location. 
Therefore, it is argued that neither groups nor IDPs can be confined to single 
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classification within the typology. In particular, by demonstrating the complicated 
causal process of displacement, the division of IDPs into real and false by the joint 
responses in Aceh and North Sumatra was clearly misleading and unethical. For 
example, it is impossible to gauge the level of acquiescence among IDPs perceived as 
false, considering the volatile and politicised backdrop to their lives and their 
vulnerability within the conflict. 
Instead, a composite approach to displacement is proposed, based on a flexible 
interpretation of the typology (see Figure 13 A Composite Approach). It moves beyond 
the one-dimensional Figure 7 to display the complexities of the process between 
incident and host location and compensates for the elasticity of the displacement 
process. Accordingly, the author stresses that in Aceh and North Sumatra, an IDP was 
typically the product of several push and pull factors which inter-played and overlapped 
with varying degrees of influence in terms of their impact and effect. While an IDP 
may fall under one of the main classifications, it is recognised that this status would 
change. For example, although an IDP may directly witness or experience political 
violence in the past, their eventual flight may be triggered some time later after fearing 
further clashes or hearing rumours that an attack was imminent. In this instance, direct 
and indirect impact co-exists with the gradual and proximate effects of political 
violence, which can all play a causal role in the process of displacement. 
Direct and Gradual 
Indirect and Gradual 
As an Unintentional Consequence 
Direct and Proximate 
f Push and Pull Factors 
Indirect and Proximate 
4 Push and Pull Factors 
Deliberate with Acquiescence 
Figure 13 A Composite Approach 
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The composite approach includes a third dimension based on a variable geometry, 
which allows for the influence of deliberate displacement by GAM with the 
acquiescence of the 1DPs as opposed to displacement as an unintentional consequence 
of push factors. Therefore, it is argued that this approach provides a more robust 
understanding of displacement by treating it as a layered concept and reflecting the 
actual contextual circumstances behind the process. If the composite approach was to 
influence the perceptions of those in the field, it is proposed that the simplistic and 
damaging labels of real and false would appear less relevant to understanding 
displacement. 
Conclusion 
Since the composite approach summarises and concludes on the analytical usefulness of 
the typology, it is appropriate to concentrate on the commonalities and differences of 
the two case studies. The Sei Lepan and Polytechnic groups were selected since they 
represented two of the main patterns of displacement from the low-intensity secessionist 
armed conflict in Aceh. They demonstrated that displacement was a variable 
phenomenon within a contained geographical area, consisting of interlinked 
characteristics. In Aceh, the IDPs were typically short-term, fragmented, localised 
though repetitive. In the neighbouring province, displacement tended to be more long- 
term and collective, consisting of non-Acehnese (mainly Javanese) that were 
unaccustomed to displacement and fled from across Aceh. 
For the Sei Lepan group, the impact of the political violence was more direct and 
economic factors when combined with the violence, contributed directly to 
displacement through extortion and financial losses from the destruction and 
confiscation of property. Although the Acelmese IDPs did not refer directly to 
economic factors they admitted that based on experience, their property and goods 
would either be damaged or destroyed. In the two provinces, the total numbers of IDPs 
fluctuated, though this was evidently more fluid and sporadic in Aceh due to the 
proximity of the political violence. From 1999, total numbers ranged from 7000- 
200,000 persons at its peak. In North Sumatra, total numbers ranged from 59,000- 
122,000, with some returning to Aceh or attempting to resettle in provinces further 
south. 
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Nevertheless, the analysis shows that two seemingly different groups shared significant 
similarities. This proved that internal displacement, when caused by low-intensity 
political violence, also produced common trends. Both groups fled mainly in small 
groups, in a spontaneous and organised fashion and suffered random and systematic 
human rights abuses, in particular, physical intimidation and threats. While triggered by 
the direct impact and proximate effects of the political violence, the displacement of the 
two groups was grounded in the indirect impact and gradual effects of the push factors. 
The similar trends make sense considering the protracted though episodic nature of the 
conflict: low in intensity, widespread though contained in pockets of violent incidents, 
based on campaigns of terror and fear and involving an oscillating battle for allegiance 
between both armed sides. Appropriately, the Sei Lepan and Polytechnic IDPs were 
pulled from their villages of origin to seek improved safety, which was conditioned by 
limited options. 
Moreover, both groups were deliberately displaced by GAM and targeted because of 
their ethnicity to fulfil vested interests in the conflict and the political process of joint 
dialogue. Consequently, the Polytechnic group symbolised a collective expression of 
social and political protest at the military post in their village and the RI's military 
approach. As an end product, the Sei Upan group was part of a systematic and 
widespread process of forced ethnic evictions. The latter represented an attack on the 
socio-econon-iic status quo of the province and reflected the powerlessness of a 
weakened state. In addition, the role of the state forces in causing and contributing to 
forced displacement demonstrated that some state actors were willing to exploit civilian 
vulnerability to further their own agendas. Based on these case study conclusions, the 
two groups of IDPs stemmed from and added further to the fractures in state 
sovereignty. 
Last, based on the case study findings, displacement affected the complete range of 
society: males, females, children, the elderly and the sick. Similarly, both groups 
depended on land as their livelihood. Unlike the IDPs in Aceh that were fundamentally 
linked to the political process of joint dialogue, the displaced in North Sumatra were not 
given a stake in the peace process. However, the long-term future of both groups was 
dependent on sustainable peace through the joint agreements on security between the RI 
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and GAM. Accordingly, it is pertinent to move to Chapter Seven to understand the full 
significance of these humanitarian and political needs. 
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7. Unsettled Existences through Protracted Neglect 
This chapter argues that the protracted neglect of the long-term needs of each case study 
group, the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic in Aceh and Sei Lepan in North Sumatra, resulted 
in significant instability for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Therefore, it is 
concluded that the joint political and humanitarian responses to the displaced failed to 
tackle the cyclical and interdependent nature of short and long-term humanitarian and 
political needs. Consequently, sustainable development was prevented. 
The first section examines the short-term or relief-based needs of the Lhokseumawe 
Polytechnic IDPs. Security threats from the nearby military base and basic health 
concerns from poor sanitation were the most important. An absence of nutritious food 
in their diet formed an additional concern. Positive aspects included the quality of 
shelter and the basic fulfilment of survival needs (medicine, food and water) through 
indigenous sources of protection and assistance and the coping mechanisms of the 
displaced. 
Section 7.2 demonstrates that the IDPs in Sei Lepan similarly had access to basic needs, 
including adequate amounts of food and water. Other strengths included access to a 
health clinic on site and most IDPs had built adequate shelter. However, the group 
faced potential threats to physical security, had insufficient clothing and the access to 
basic needs in general was unpredictable due to the remoteness of the host location. 
Although internal displacement in Aceh was commonly perceived as short-term and 
thus limited in impact, the Polytechnic group proved that the repetitive nature of their 
short-term displacement impacted significantly on long-term development needs. In 
this sense, the third section examines the loss of livelihoods and property upon return. 
Furthermore, it is asserted that return was unlikely to remain permanent based on the 
pattern of repetition, the volatility of the conflict and the vulnerability of the displaced. 
Other important long-term needs included trauma from the political violence and the 
perpetual uprootedness, the erosion of social structures and gaps in the provision of 
education. Alternatively, if their stay at the Polytechnic became more protracted, all of 
the needs above would have deteriorated in tandem with strains upon the host 
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community of students and further intimidation from soldiers at the nearby military 
base. 
Section 7.4 identifies the illegality of the Sei Lepan group's settlements as the main 
reason for their development needs. With an uncertain future, livelihoods remained 
fractured and education debilitated. Other concerns included high levels of trauma, 
tensions within the group concerning resources and the government's national 
termination policy, and their strained relationship with the host community. 
Nevertheless, the Sei Lepan IDPs overall compensated with a developed social structure 
to manage all group-decisions. 
The author uses a selection of the provisions for basic human rights, as converged in the 
United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, as the framework 
for investigating and analysing the needs-' Accordingly, this chapter concludes that the 
Principles were largely applicable to the two case study groups, which were 
representative of the similar and more predominating trends in displacement in their 
respective province. However, it is important to identify where the Principles 
sometimes failed to grasp the contextual complexities of displacement. 2 
7.1 Precarious Short-Term Needs in Aceh 
For the Polytechnic IDPs, the main short-term concerns were improved security at their 
host location and basic health problems from poor sanitation, which were political and 
humanitarian needs, respectively. An additional latter need was the absence of 
nutritious food in their diet. At the provincial level, the short-term needs for IDPs and 
other conflict-affected populations in 2001 were similar. Although, unlike the 
Polytechnic group, there were instances of unreliable access to food and children in 
particular were adversely affected. By 2002, the World Food Programme (WFP) 
asserted that the displaced in Aceh were worst off nationally for all the aforementioned 
needs (WFP, 2002). For the case study group and other IIDPs, shelter was deemed 
adequate. 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. 
2 See Appendix A for complete text of the Guiding Principles. 
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community of students and further intimidation from soldiers at the nearby military 
base. 
Section 7.4 identifies the illegality of the Sei Lepan group's settlements as the main 
reason for their development needs. With an uncertain future, livelihoods remained 
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United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, as the framework 
for investigating and analysing the needs-' Accordingly, this chapter concludes that the 
Principles were largely applicable to the two case study groups, which were 
representative of the similar and more predominating trends in displacement in their 
respective province. However, it is important to identify where the Principles 
sometimes failed to grasp the contextual complexities of displacement. 2 
7.1 Precarious Short-Term Needs in Aceh 
For the Polytechnic IDPs, the main short-term concerns were improved security at their 
host location and basic health problems from poor sanitation, which were political and 
humanitarian needs, respectively. An additional latter need was the absence of 
nutritious food in their diet. At the provincial level, the short-term needs for IDPs and 
other conflict-affected populations in 2001 were similar. Although, unlike the 
Polytechnic group, there were instances of unreliable access to food and children in 
particular were adversely affected. By 2002, the World Food Programme (WFP) 
asserted that the displaced in Aceh were worst off nationally for all the aforementioned 
needs (VVTP, 2002). For the case study group and other IDPs, shelter was deemed 
adequate. 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. 
2 See Appendix A for complete text of the Guiding Principles. 
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7.1.1 Threatening physical security 
The Polytechnic group initially was not protected against arbitrary displacement 
(Principle 6, No. 1). Their flight was relevant specifically to the broad context of 
"situations of armed conflict" (Principle 6, No. 2b). Most respondents indicated that 
they did not feel safe at the Polytechnic because of the nearby military base. This 
resulted in daily patrols and searches by soldiers looking for the insurgents, Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM), unofficial non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists 
and researchers. Although the military occasionally entered the Polytechnic, the IDPs 
claimed thorough searches were made only when they first arrived. 3 Nevertheless, the 
student organisation on-site, Badan Executive Mahas (BEM), concurred that the IDPs, 
in particular the children, became very nervous and afraid when the military arrived 
(Interview 74,11 March 2003). This seemed plausible considering the IDPs' perennial 
experience of intimidation and fear of the political violence. Consequently, Principle 10 
(No. 2a. and d. ) was not violated but there were threats of these acts. Therefore, 
Principle 10 (No. lb. -d. ) was not upheld. Most of the respondents (both women and 
men) had some form of official identification (Guiding Principle 20, Nos. 1-3). For 
those without, they were unaware, though unconcerned, that the state should replace lost 
identification. 
Principle 15 (Parts a. -d. ), relating to the right to the freedom of movement, was also 
used to assess the respondents' perception of security during displacement. All IDP 
respondents stated that they were never prevented from seeking safety in another part of 
the country, nor leaving or seeking safety in another country, nor returned to their 
village of origin, nor resettled against their will. Therefore, this Principle was irrelevant 
to the context because the IDPs neither had the desire or the required funds to move. 
Alternatively, some respondents thought their personal safety was jeopardised because 
of insufficient funds but this concern was not directly included by the Guiding 
Principles. Moreover, Principle 15 did not allow for their deliberate displacement by 
GAM, which forced the IDPs to remain uprooted. The principle also did not allow for 
the group's preference to remain together, which formed a crucial protection coping 
mechanism. 
3 The airforce base overlooked one side of the central hall, the fields in front and some of the water wells. 
Since the researcher never visited the airforce base, the last observation is based on an informed 
assumption. 
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Across Aceh between 2000 and 2003, security during displacement became gradually 
more difficult to maintain, with some II)Ps becoming further victims of the conflict. As 
an example of physical protection concerns, the rural development manager for the 
international NGO, International Rescue Committee (IRC), describes how, "people 
want to move to the local mosque but it is often difficult to provide shelter and 
transportation as the state forces and the [joint] committees cannot guarantee security. " 
(Interview 12,13 March 2001). Similarly, it was reported a general deterioration in 
security for IDPs in March 2001, noting that traditional places of refuge were becoming 
increasingly unsafe. 4A human rights representative for the Republic of Indonesia (RI) 
also noticed the same pattern, reporting some movement of men to the jungles and the 
sea. Cases of famine were recorded as assistance to the traditional camps became 
tenuous and it was impossible to reach those deliberately hiding (Interview 25,19 
March 2001). 
Even basic monitoring became more restricted. The chairman of a local human rights 
organisation, Care Human Rights Forum, asserts that from the end of November 2000 to 
March 2001, "we cannot access real needs; even the [Indonesian Red Cross] PMI 
cannot even gain access" (Interview 9,12 March 2001). The WFP eventually 
conducted a survey in 2002 and aptly found that 95 per cent of the IDPs surveyed in 
North Aceh (the district of the Polytechnic) and approximately half of those asked in 
Great and Central Aceh did not feel safe at their host location (WFP, 2002). 
7.1.2 Inadequate basic health and sanitation 
As an element of an "adequate standard of living" , the Polytechnic lDPs believed they 
had access to essential medical services (Principle 18, No. 2d.; and Principle 19 No. 1). 
The local hospital was used for emergencies since it was in proximity to the 
Polytechnic. A state nurse visited at least weekly although BEM clarified that the 
frequency of the visits varied and had decreased gradually (Interview 74,11 March 
2003). The committee also had access to some medicine provided by NGOs. Despite 
these provisions, the spokesperson for the Polytechnic committee repeatedly stated there 
4 In 2000, the Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) terrorised a camp of 
20,000 IDPs (gunfire, physical harassment of women and stealing food) at the Agricultural Senior High 
School, Kota Fajar, South Aceh (Joint Committee for Security Modalities, undated (c): 11). 
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were minor health problems, in particular, half the group had scabies (penyakit Wit or 
gatal-gatah). The researcher observed quite a few people, including infants, with either 
an infection or irritation of the skin. In addition, a female IDP and a child had a fever 
and the latter was believed to have measles or chicken pox. The child's condition 
deteriorated during the course of the research, however, the IDP family acted as if they 
were helpless (Field notes, 10-11 March 2003). Some of the I1DPs were pregnant with a 
significant number of infants (1-3 months) present, suggesting many were born during 
displacement. Principle 19 (No. 2), health needs of women, was not part of the research 
focus but basic observations confirmed these were not provided for (Field notes, 9-10 
March 2003). 5 
Sanitation was a significant concern as all respondents highlighted the lack of hygiene 
and sanitation (Principle 18, No. 2d. ), which threatened the outbreak of basic infections 
(Principle 19 No. 3). The problem of sanitation was protracted and the regional co- 
ordinator for the indigenous NGO, Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity (RPuK), 
who had assisted the group before, confirms the history of "bad sanitation and dirty 
conditions" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). Although the IDPs had developed a roster 
for cleaning, it was confirmed that the schedule had been abandoned several weeks 
before, perhaps due to low group morale and the constant expectation that their stay 
would be short. There were eight wells for washing and eight toilets, which existed 
prior to the arrival of the group in December 2002. These facilities were situated a short 
walking distance from outside the central hall and access was gained only by passing 
within view of the airforce base. However, the water in the wells was dirty, as 
experienced by the researcher. Also outside the Polytechnic, there was a considerable 
amount of rubbish and flying latrines (in addition to the toilets), which contributed to a 
foul stench outside the student cafeteria (Field notes, 9-13 March 2003). 
Fruit or nutritious food was not consumed at the Polytechnic. Perhaps as a result of 
this, and in addition to an absence of livelihood, it was common for the IDPs to sleep a 
lot during the day. However, the men exercised at least once a week playing football. 
According to Principle 18 (No. 2c. ), respondents asserted that the state, indigenous or 
international NGOs had not provided new clothing for the adults, however, some of 
NGOs had donated some for the children. At the time of the displacement, respondents 
5 Principle 19 (No. 1) is examined in the subsection below on trauma. 
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indicated they were able to take some basic possessions but it was evident that for the 
adults at least their clothes were severely limited. 
Deficiencies in health and sanitation were widespread in Aceh. Although the provincial 
health structure overall remained strong, the chairman of the inidigenous NGO, Care 
Human Rights Forum, clarifies that, "since the conflict has been at this level for ten 
years now, the information from the health structure tells us there could now be serious 
long term effects" (Interview 9,12 March 2001). In 2001, Oxfam reported new cases of 
diseases, consisting of 21,200 of suspected malaria, 43,336 diar-rhoea and 1179 
tuberculosis (Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2001k). In 
2002, WHO reported that scabies skin infections were endemic through poor sanitation 
while "medicine to treat the problem was also not readily available" (Buiza & Risser, 
2003: 54). Even in 2001, the rural development manager for International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) warned that, "sanitation in the camps is usually poor and toilets 
always need to be built" (Interview 12,13 March 2001). In 2003, the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children-United States found that 62 per cent 
of the people in Pidie district were infected with scabies. Accordingly, OCHA advised 
that the health department needed assistance to complete minimum services and to 
strengthen human resources, district level management, drug supplies, psychosocial 
training and the establishment of referral systems (OCHA, 2003a). 
7.1.3 Variation in access to basic food and potable water 
All respondents at the Polytechnic stated they had access to essential food and potable 
water (Principle 18, No. 2a) since they were well established at the host location. The 
main ingredients of the group's diet consisted of salted fish, lice and basic vegetables. 6 
Cooking took place at the back of the Polytechnic on wood fires. Generally, the IDPs 
used a roster and took turns to prepare and cook for the group. However, some families 
chose to cook for themselves within the central hall and next to their mats using 
6 This consisted mainly of obi, which has less nutritional value than the potato. Consequently, it was very 
cheap to buy and grow, with I torme of ob! equivalent to 30 kg of rice. The IDPs used obi as the main 
filler in their diet as they could never afford to eat meat. An agricultural specialist confirmed that 
Indonesians survived on this type of diet despite the lack of nutrition. In comparison to the non- 
displaced, obi was widely consumed in Aceh but usually as a small part of a main meal. In addition, 
approximately 80 per cent of Acelinese ate meat once a week. Those from the lower classes would eat 
meat three times a year in line with the main Islamic holidays (Interview 63.25 February 2003). 
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portable gas cookers. They also took turns to go and buy the food in and around 
Lhokseumawe (Interview 75,13 March 2003). The IDPs did not possess livestock 
either for consumption or for profit. The PMI provided several water tanks, pots and 
utensils. 
Beyond the communal arrangements, the IDPs could pay for extra food and coffee at 
the student cafeteria (within the central hall). Adjacent to this, the group also ran a 
small shop selling bottled water, cigarettes and sweets. 7 There were also three to four 
small stalls owned and run by households inside the central hall, that were shop owners 
prior to displacement. More supplies could be purchased at the nearest village, local 
shop and market, approximately I krn from the Polytechnic (Interview 74,11 March 
2003). 
Money was the main overall concern for the IDPs at the individual and group level 
rather than food and potable water. For instance, RPuK's regional co-ordinator notes 
that the IDP committee would frequently sell surplus noodles (originally donated as aid) 
to people outside the Polytechnic in order to profit (Interview 72,8 March 2003). 8 As 
detailed below, since there was no great will or success in finding employment, begging 
on the main road outside the Polytechnic (organised by the students and the IDP 
committee and operated on a roster) appeared to be the main source of income and 
coping mechanism. This was not considered to be a problem since they had been 
displaced for a short period of time. The money collected went towards purchasing 
food and other necessary supplies for the group. 
Conversely, elsewhere in Aceh malnourished children gathered international attention. 
Guiding Principle 4 (No. 2) grants this basic need special attention. At the start of 2002, 
the Provincial Health Department announced that 200,179 children under the age of five 
years had suffered from malnutrition since 2000.63,410 children were suffering from 
under-nourishment and 227 were in a critical condition. The causes were insufficient 
food in remote areas, a weak health service and poor nutrition for pregnant women 
7 The shop prices were the same as in the centre of Lhokseumawe. For example, bottled water cost 
Rupiah (Rp) 3000, cigarettes Rp 6000. At the time of field research, Rp 10,000 (approximately) equalled 
United States (US)$ 1. 
8A representative of the IDP committee confirms that, "we get rice, oil, sugar; we just really need more 
money as we are in a crisis" (Interview 75,13 March 2003). During the research, the IDPs were 
preoccupied with money and despite the arrangement with the committee, the researcher was asked 
constantly to give money even though it was made clear on several occasions that this was not possible. 
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(OCHA, 2002d). In 2002, it was reported that imposition of emergency status would 
starve IDPs across the province by blocking lines of transport and access to aid and food 
(The Jakarta Post, 2002b). As a second cause, in some cases the local government 
decided to discontinue the supply of basic assistance, for example, thousands of 
Javanese transmigrants in camps in East Aceh were reportedly suffering from starvation 
in 2001 (Down to Earth, 2001 a). 
7.1.4 Adequate shelter 
The Polytechnic IDPs enjoyed adequate basic shelter at the Polytechnic (Principle 18, 
No. 2b), based on the respondents' answers and the researcher's observations. The 
central hall in the Polytechnic was a 45 x 15 meter, two-storied building with two main 
living spaces (spacious and open-planned), each with an adjoining small room (see 
Figure 14 Some IDPs Outside the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic). 9 Connected to the lower 
level, there was an additional room used as a canteen during term. The smaller room on 
the second floor was reserved as a sleeping space for the young men without families 
and used as a prayer room during the day. Outside, at the back of the central hall, there 
was a space for cooking on fires and to each side at the front there were two dormitories 
occupied by students. Located at the back of the Polytechnic campus, the central hall 
was separated from a main road by a brick wall. Within the hall, each IDP family took 
a defined space as their temporary home. Conditions were not cramped since they lived 
on both floors. Each family had a plastic mat laid on top of the floor and at night they 
hung sheets and other material (with sticks and line) as dividers to create temporary 
privacy (see Figure 15 Inside the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic). Compared to other 
groups in Aceh, the Polytechnic IDPs had more protective shelter, however, the use of 
mosques and other public buildings ensured shelter was sufficient overall. 
9 For a floor plan of the Polytechnic see Figures 9 and 10, pp. 200-201. 
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Figure 14 Some lDPs Outside the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic 
Figure 15 Inside the Lhokseumawe Polytechniclo 
For short-terin livelihoods, Principle 22 (No. I b. ) was difficult to apply to the case study 
group. As noted above, the IDPs collected money from the main road and (lid not 
secure employment. This occurred for three reasons. First, they were mainly farmers 
by trade, therefore, their skills limited theirjob options. Second, they had tile constant 
expectation that their displacement would remain short-term. Last, considering the 
politics of their displacement, the adoption of short-ten-n livelihoods would not have 
'0 The picture shows the researcher with a young and elderly IDP. The background displays some oftheir 
basic possessions and the space allocated for each household. 
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been conducive to their displacement as a form of manipulated political and social 
protest against the state. 
Overall, security and basic health problems caused by poor sanitation were the two most 
significant short-term needs for the Polytechnic group. This reflected the wider 
provincial context except for instances of an unreliable access to food between 2001- 
2002. The Guiding Principles were a useful framework of analysis, in particular 
Principle 10 (Nos. lb. -d; and 2a. and d. ), Principle 18 (No. 2a. -d. ), Principle 19 (No. I- 
3), Principle 20 (Nos. 1-3) and Principle 22 (No. lb. ). However, some failed to capture 
the subtleties of the context (Principle 6, No. 2b.; and Principle 15, Parts a. -d. ) and the 
latter was also irrelevant to needs. 
7.2 Challenges to Meeting Short-Term Needs in North 
Sumatra 
For the Sei Lepan case study group, the main short-term concerns centered on security, 
an unreliable access to potable water, the general absence of nutritious food in the diet, 
instances of inadequate shelter and insufficient clothing for adults. Nevertheless, short- 
term needs overall were fulfilled, since the majority had regular access to basic supplies, 
health facilities on-site and adequate shelter. It is asserted that this reflected needs at 
the wider provincial level. Compared with Aceh however, there was a paucity of 
analysis. " Therefore, the empirical case study findings were especially pioneering. 
11 This can be explained by several reasons. IDPs may not have been visible because they stayed fixed in 
remote settlements while others integrated with relatives and friends in several locations, establishing 
small makeshift camps within neighbourhoods in Medan in addition to those who moved temporarily 
between these options. Second, some of the IDPs fled Aceh and moved directly to the south of the 
province and further south to work on state plantations or remained fluid there, with families moving 
frequently in search of a steady livelihood. Other IDPs attempted to return to Aceh. Third, gaining 
access to IDPs living in government buildings (Medan) or in army barracks (Alur Dua) was also difficult 
for third party humanitarian actors and journalists. Within each of these patterns, keeping track of 
families and even larger groups proved difficult. Therefore, often the analysis for displacement in North 
Sumatra was confined to estimates of total numbers with the occasional identification of host locations 
and rudimentary evaluations. Conversely, the fixed settlement of the IDPs in Sei Lepan and their relative 
accessibility facilitated closer analysis. 
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7.2.1 Potential threats to physical security 
Similar to most of the conflict-induced IDPs in North Sumatra from Aceh, the Sei 
Lepan group, by definition, was not protected against arbitrary displacement (Principle 
6, No. 1). Moreover, their displacement was systematically driven by "ethnic cleansing 
[ 
... 
] aimed at or resulting in altering the ethnic [ ... 
] composition of the affected 
population" (Principle 6, No. 2a). For Principle 10 (No. la. -d., No. 2a. -e. ), concerning 
personal safety during displacement, only a few said they were directly threatened to 
leave their land and some recalled physical attacks in the past. Although this is 
furthered below, it is important to note some short-term security threats and their 
background. The IDPs lived in the Leusser National Park, a 2.6 million-hectare 
ecosystem, which was also home to the timber company, Perusahaan Terbatas Raja 
Garuda Mas (PT RGM). This allowed some of the IDPs to adopt logging as their 
livelihood (Down to Earth, 2003). Findings from the field confirmed that this was also 
an illegal trade dominated by PT RGM, the military and the host community. 12 
Consequently, the IDPs were locked in a difficult situation. They claimed they took 
enough timber for personal use but the RI and PT RGM opposed the settlements 
because they were not sanctioned by the state and blamed the IDPs for the illegal 
logging. This led to incidents of physical intimidation by the forest management 
guards, for example, a significant number of IDPs heard of others being threatened in 
2000. Shortly after the IDPs settled in Sei Lepan, the government sent the military to 
try and persuade them to leave (Interview 57,14 February 2003). On the surface, 
respondents proudly claimed they were not afraid but subsequently admitted the forest 
guards were armed and believed the threat would persist as long as the 1DPs continued 
to live there illegally. The IDP committee in Barak Induk Major, Pentani Indonesia 
Peng Aceh (PIPA), did not receive a reply to a letter sent to thirty-one institutions, 
including the President of Indonesia, the district head and the police, with information 
and proposals for cultivating the land. Therefore, the IDPs were confused by the 
indecisiveness of the authorities (Interview 55,12 February 2003). Respondents also 
claimed they worried regularly that GAM would come to the settlement due to its 
proximity to the Aceh border. This underlying fear stemmed from trauma inflicted by 
12 The military in particular was accused of profiting, an institutional trait that was commonly ascribed 
across the resource-rich provinces of Indonesia. Looking beyond the crossfire of accusations and on a 
wider note, the Leuser Park continued to lose many chunks of its forests even though the European Union 
was funding a re-forestation programme. 
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the conflict. Additional fears stemmed from the nearby operations of marijuana traders 
in the forest, the presence of military involved in the timber trade and non-uniformed 
intelligence officers that visited the settlement every two months (Interview 55,12 
February 2003). 13 
For Principle 15 (a. -d. ), all of the respondents claimed they had not been prevented from 
seeking safety in another part of the country or seeking safety in another country. 
However, this principle was irrelevant to the context because insufficient funds and the 
desire to remain with the group prevented such movement. The majority of respondents 
had one or more forms of identification while a few had their official documents burned 
in their houses in Aceh (Principle 20, Nos. 1-3). 
In North Sumatra, the VVTP found that 90 per cent of IDPs surveyed in Langkat (host 
district for the Sei Lepan group) felt safe at their location. 82 per cent in Deli Serdang, 
88 per cent in Dairi, 96 per cent in Kampar and 71 per cent in Indragiri districts always 
felt safe (WFP, 2002). However, in 2003 The Jakarta Post uncovered a serious gap in 
protection needs for women with "at least 1000 female Acehnese" IDPs "forced to 
become sex workers" with no protection from the police. The women were allegedly 
trafficked as prostitutes to Riau, Medan, Langkat and Asahan districts and a local 
activist blamed economic factors, which made the IDPs particularly vulnerable to 
commercial sex syndicates (Gunawan, 2003). 
7.2.2 Adequate basic health and sanitation 
Based on Guiding Principle 18 (No. 2c. -d. ), which enshrines the right to appropriate 
clothing, essential medical services and sanitation as a minimum standard, all 
respondents said they had access but cmphasised that it was basic. The IDPs did not 
suffer from sanitation-linkcd diseases or infections but improvement in sanitation was 
13 The IDP committee recalled that an Acehnese man arrived and the IDPs attacked him as they feared he 
was GAM. The injured man was then handed to the authorities and eventually sent to the police 
headquarters. Although the Acehnese man was interrogated, the reasons for his visit to Sei Lepan 
remained unknown. Nevertheless, the man returned but this time the people gave him money and tried to 
send him to the public bus station. However, he ran away. Afterwards, they thought that perhaps he was 
one of the many marijuana traders who had ventured out of the jungle, There were four locations nearby 
where the marijuana traders worked. The IDPs said they were afraid as the traders often carried guns 
(Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
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required. The IDPs had constructed their own wells and had access to springs nearby 
but some families constructed primitive toilets in the ground outside their homes and 
flying latrines were also commonly used. Most had not bought or received new clothes 
since their eviction. The latter was a significant need, especially considering the 
extreme and varying weather conditions of their host location. 
Although the Sei Lepan group lived in a remote and isolated host location, the sick 
could receive medical assistance from health volunteers in the neighbouring village and 
paramedics in the nearest town (Principle 18 No. 2d.; and Principle 19, No. 1). 
Emergency cases could go to the primary health centre 9 krn away or paramedics could 
come to the camp by motorbike. In addition, a team of mobile doctors made visits once 
a week. An on-site health clinic was opened within Barak Induk Major at the time of 
research but there was no permanent trained staff. Alternatively, in Barak Sei Minyak, 
it was 35 minutes walk to the nearest health centre. Principle 19 (No. 2), health needs 
of women, was not part of the research focus but basic observations confirmed these 
were not systematically provided for (Field notes, 9-14 February 2003). 14 However, in 
demonstrating one of their coping mechanisms as a group, PIPA arranged for a pregnant 
woman to travel to the nearest hospital to have a caesarean section and collected 
donations from everyone to cover the costs (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
Across North Sumatra, common problems were waterborne diseases, coughing, rashes 
and stomach worms during 2002. OCHA noted that although some IDPs had relocated 
to Riau and South Sumatra Provinces, the remainder continued to live with poor access 
to essential health care and basic water and sanitation facilities, which lead to high 
morbidity (OCHA, 2004b). For example, the IDPs in Panti Insyaf, Pancing suburb of 
Medan city, had electricity, running water and access to free medical services but 
sanitation was described as very poor (OCHA, 2002j). 
7.2.3 Unreliable access to basic food and potable water 
In Sei Lepan, the supply of drinking water was adequate because the IDPs and the Jesuit 
Refugee Service (JRS) constructed wells nearby. However, the supply of water 
14 Principle 19 (No. 1) is also examined in the subsection below on trauma. 
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naturally decreased at the peak of the dry season. The quality was basic, as the IDPs 
had to boil the water before consumption (Principle 18, No. 2a, "essential food and 
potable water"). In 2002, OCHA asserted that clean water was the main source of 
problems and that a rig well was needed (OCHA, 2002j). The National Park 
Management Unit discouraged the building of more wells and sanitation facilities since 
the IDPs were technically encroaching on government land (Buiza, 2003). 
For daily meals, the IDPs judged the supply of rice as adequate but vegetables were 
limited to home grown obi and long bean and the group commonly referred to their diet 
as "war food". The committee provided each family with land to grow enough food, in 
theory, to survive. Traders also brought in a supply of salted fish a few times per week. 
Most of the IDPs raised chickens, which they sold at the weekly market to buy more 
salted fish, rice and vegetables. Based on the sample of respondents, families ate meat 
once a year if not less. 15 The other main food item was punquan, which has no 
nutritional value and tastes like a sour apple (Interview 63,25 February 2003). There 
were eight shops in Barak Induk Major owned and run by the IDPs that had transplanted 
their skills and occupation from their village of origin. Respondents concurred that 
generally goods were 25 per cent higher, in order to pay for delivery and transport to the 
remote settlement. Moreover, access to supplies was not always reliable. 
Elsewhere in Langkat district, it was reported that 13,700 IDPs/3000 families were 
starving and malnourished by December 2002 because of insufficient provisions 
(Indonesian Observer, 2002). Conversely, the IDPs in Panti Insyaf, Medan, received 
food and financial assistance regularly by the state (OCHA, 2002j). lDPs in the sub- 
districts of Gebang, Tanjung Pura and Stabat also received funds and basic commodities 
from the developers of Karang Safi but as a temporary arTangement. 16 
15 To repeat the comparative indicator above, people in the lower classes would eat meat three times a 
year in line with the main Islamic holidays (Interview 63,25 February 2003). Furthermore, the 
interpreter and guide said their families in North Sumatra ate meat once a week or at least once a month. 
Their economic status was low to middle class, one was a schoolteacher and the other worked as a 
carpenter and as a volunteer for the community-based organisation, Candhika. 
16 Consequently, it was reported that parents did not have enough food for their children, IDP 
representatives met officers from the Social Welfare Department and asked for jobs, funds for education 
and to be relocated to Java. The officers said they would try to prevent them from starving and to provide 
more nutritious food for children under five (Indonesian Observer, 2002). 
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7.2.4 Variation in the standard of shelter 
Apart from a main street in Barak Induk Major, the houses and basic shelters were 
sprinkled across small valleys, stretching back to the edges of the forest (see Figure 16 
Centre of Barak Induk, Sei Lepan and Figure 17 Back of Barak Induk). 17 For Principle 
18 (No. 2b. ), the quality of housing varied considerably. Although there were only a 
few instances, the most disadvantaged used black plastic bags for walls with an 
incomplete grass or tin roof, covering two cramped and dank rooms (see Figure 18 
Inadequate Shelter in Barak Induk Major, Sei Lepan). More common, and at a slighter 
higher standard, there were self-made huts, with walls and a roof made of a mixture of 
grass, palm leaf and wood. These shelters included a cooking space, living area and 
two bedrooms (Figure 19 Adequate Shelter in Barak Sei Minyak, Sei Lepan). At the 
other end of the scale, only a few families had built large houses with three-four 
bedrooms, a living room, plastic sheet flooring and glass windows. 18 Mostofthe 
shelter was at least adequate because the IDPs worked hard at construction and 
maintenance for at least 11/2 years (see Figure 20 Example of Early Houses, Barak Induk 
Major, Sei Lepan). 19 Symbolically, the inadequate shelters belonged to the l1DPs in 
Barak Sei Minyak that wanted to return to Aceh or resettle or the old and sick in both 
settlements. Last, Barak Induk Major had its own electricity generator and paid a 
private company for limited usage. 
17 See Figures II and 12, pp. 204-205. 
" According to the agreement among the IDPs, each family could take land for housing and for farming. 
Respondents noted that it took them one month to build a house and the wood was taken from trees 
leftover from the neighbouring timber industry. 
19 A local lecturer and representatives of Candikha noted that the quality of houses had improved over the 
course of time. At the beginning, they were makeshift and in a primitive camp but, "now the IDPs live in 
permanent houses" (Interview 51,4 February 2003). 
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Figure 16 Centre of Barak Induk, Sei Lepan 20 
Figure 17 
; 
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Back of Barak Induk, Sei Lepan2l 
20 Barak Sei Minyak is situated towards the horizon, 
21 Barak Sei Minyak is in the far distance while the foreground exemplifies how the IDP houses were 
scattered. 
226 
Figure 18 Inadequate Shelter in Barak Induk Major, Sei Lepan 
Figure 19 Adequate Shelter in Barak Sei Minyak, SO Lepan 22 
Figure 20 Example of Early Houses, Barak Incluk Major, Sei Lepan 
22 The picture shows a widow with her son, accompanied by her parents. tier husband was killed by 
GAM in Aceh. 
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The standard of shelter also varied across North Sumatra. OCHA reported that although 
some IIDPs had relocated to Riau and South Sumatra provinces, the remainder continued 
to live in poorly constructed, overcrowded housing (OCHA, 2004b). An exception was 
the camp for 370 IIDPs/100 families in Panti Insyaf, Medan, which consisted of two 
buildings (one of them two-storey) with large rooms accommodating between 5-10 
families (OCHA, 2002j). 
For short-term livelihoods (Principle 22, No. lb. ), since the IDPs in Sei Lepan were 
displaced in the host location for 2-3 years, the analysis of their livelihoods is examined 
below as a long-term need. For 14,000 other IDPs in the district of Lankgat, it was 
difficult to gain even menial jobs like building houses, driving cycle taxis (becaks) and 
fanning, since locals did not appreciate the influx of competition (Indonesian Observer, 
2002). 
Overall, security, access to potable water, a general absence of nutritious food in the 
diet and insufficient clothing for adults formed the main concerns. In addition, the 
quality of shelter varied considerably, from the small, dark and dirty to the spacious, 
clean and solid wooden structures. Nevertheless, short-term needs overall were 
fulfilled, especially the provision of basic health services. In general, these findings 
reflected needs at the wider provincial level. The Guiding Principles helped provide 
insight, in particular Principle 6 (No. 2a), Principle 10 (Nos. 1b. -d; and 2a. and d. ), 
Principle 18 (No. 2a. -d. ), Principle 19 (Nos. 1-3) and Principle 20 (Nos. 1-3). However, 
Principle 15, (Parts a. -d. ) failed to capture the contextual subtleties. It was upheld but 
more because of insufficient funds and the preference to remain with the group. 
7.3 Chronic Long-Term Needs in Aceh 
Security and livelihoods upon return were the two main long-term problems for the 
Polytechnic IDPs. Other significant concerns were trauma from the conflict and the 
erosion of traditional social structures, which were open to further manipulation by the 
two-armed sides. If return was delayed considerably, their stay at the Polytechnic could 
have placed strains on the host community. For other displaced groups and conflict- 
affected populations in Aceh, in 2001 long-term needs similarly included economic 
reconstruction and infrastructure, education and resettlement (OCHA, 2001k). In 2002, 
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the VvTT found that IDPs in Aceh were worst off nationally for trauma, employment 
and education (WFP, 2002). 
7.3.1 Fractured livelihoods 
It is important to concentrate on the impact of displacement on the livelihoods of the 
Polytechnic group upon return since their flight was short-term. 23 Crucially, the 
repetitive nature of their uprootedness would have impacted significantly on long-term 
development needs. Return and securing sustainable livelihoods were dependent 
primarily on the security of their villages of origin, in particular, protection from 
intimidation by the military post and deliberate displacement by GAM. Even if the 
Polytechnic IDPs did return to improved security, their history of displacement reflected 
the volatile nature of the conflict. 24 Therefore, the case study demonstrated the need for 
durable solutions to the political violence push factors. 
It was significant for the Polytechnic group that Principle 9 was not upheld, which 
reminds states of their "particular obligation to protect against the displacement of 
groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands. " Although the 
group was displaced for three months, it was probable their land and property were 
damaged or destroyed by combatants or other civilians. Crops abandoned for this 
period would also spoil naturally. The IDP committee asserts, based on their 
experience, that, "our crops and houses will have been destroyed after three months. " 
(Interview 75,13 March 2003). Apart from the immediate loss, the impact would have 
severe long-term consequences on their dependence on agriculture as a livelihood. For 
example, it took one year to re-plant and grow banana, three years for coconut, six 
months for chilli and the rice cycle was three to six months (Interview 61,24 February 
2003). 
Furthermore, the Polytechnic group, even though three-quarters of respondents claimed 
to own their land, did not expect to receive compensation from the state upon return for 
their loss. This assumption was based on the constraints imposed by the ongoing 
23 The Polytechnic group was not seeking employment at the host location and the RI dissuaded 
humanitarian actors from delivering assistance. If the group's displacement had become long-term, it 
would have proved difficult to sustain organised begging as the main source of income. 
24 Security was also the priority need for all conflict-affected victims in Aceh. 
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conflict, their status as false IDPs and the absence of compensation after previous 
displacements. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that Principle 29 (No. 2), the "duty 
and responsibility" of "competent authorities" to recover the "property and possessions" 
where possible or to assist 1DPs "in obtaining "appropriate compensation" upon return 
or resettlement, was not upheld. Similarly, it is argued that Principle 21 (Nos. 1-3), 
protection of property and possessions left behind during displacement, was not 
respected. The IDP committee adds that when the Polytechnic group was displaced 
before, "all the families helped together" (Interview 75,13 March 2003). However, it 
stands to reason that this coping mechanism had limits and may not have been able to 
withstand endless displacement. 
The fracturing of livelihoods in this way was common in the villages of origin since 
agriculture formed the main source of employment in the province. For example, the 
Aceh co-ordinator for JRS recalls a group that retumed to West Aceh and found, "the 
land was useless, livestock was gone and property destroyed" (Interview 58,23 
February 2003). The nature of the protracted guerrilla warfare and the prevalence of 
repetitive displacement meant, "farmers were typically prevented from attending to their 
crops for significant periods of time" despite the signing of joint security agreements 
through dialogue (Interview 58,23 February 2003; and HZC, 2000: 4). UNICEF's 
regional director for Europe, who also had extensive experience in Indonesia and Aceh, 
emphasised that, "this going back and forth is extremely damaging and destructive" 
even when localised and short-term. He added that, "if you are living at that level you 
need to have some continuity to be able to plan things and plant crops. " (Interview 36,2 
December 2002). The UNHCR's senior desk officer for Asia and the Pacific concurs 
and adds that, "it is made worse since short-term and localised displacement is not high 
profile for intemational NGOs but this type can be just as damaging as others" 
(Interview 37,3 December 2002). A local academic notes that consequently, "the 
retumees are all communities in poverty" (Interview 63,25 February 2003). 
25 
Fractured livelihoods had a profound knock-on effect on food production. Aceh's 
tradition of staggered rice planting was a sign of a well-developed agricultural system. 
However, between 1998 and 2000, it was no longer self-sufficient in rice production 
and had to import (IRC, 2000: 4). A US diplomat in Medan asserts that, "agriculture 
25 All four districts surveyed by the WFP in 2002 had unemployment rates of 85 per cent or higher (WFP, 
2002. 
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had declined 15 per cent" (Interview 52,4 February 2003). Government representatives 
from the Provincial Department of Agriculture clarified this, noting that, "East Aceh 
was the worst affected [in 2003] and in 2001 North Aceh [the Polytechnic group's 
district of origin] was the worst affected by the conflict" (Interview 64,25 February 
2003). 26 Crucially, starvation and other aspects of humanitarian emergencies occur 
after sustained neglect. 
7.3.2 Debilitating gaps in education 
On the surface, the Polytechnic IDPs were fortunate since at least there was a primary 
school ten minutes walking distance away, and half the respondents sent their children 
for all or at least some of the time (Principle 23, No. 2). However, half of the 
households said their children did not have regular access to primary schooling during 
displacement because the teacher was there infrequently, the classes were full or they 
could not meet the costs (Interview 74,11 March 2003). No. 3 of Principle 23, efforts 
to ensure full and equal participation of women and girls in educational programmes, 
was not respected and there was no evidence for No. 4, education and training facilities 
for adults "as soon as conditions permit". However, efforts that encouraged Nos. 3 and 
4 were applied to other groups of IDPs inside Aceh, based on interviews with key 
informants. 27 
Most of the respondents that had children above the age of junior high school were able 
to send them to Islamic boarding schools in Aceh. They were either able to meet some 
of the costs or the school educated their children for free because the parents were 
recognised as poor. Prior to displacement, the vast majority said their children went to 
school with some claiming the conflict prevented this. As detailed below, on return it 
was probable that schools were damaged or destroyed during their three-month absence. 
Thus, both the conflict and the displacement created significant suspensions in 
education. 
26 According to government figures, the targets for the production of rice in 2002 fell from 1.7 tonnes to 
1.4 tonnes in 2003, leaving them "unable to reach the optimal production of rice" (Interview 64,25 
February 2003). 
27 As examined in Chapter Eight, this made some notable progress despite resistance from GAM and 
socio-cultural gender relations. 
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At the provincial level, the need for the restoration of the education system was evident. 
The provincial government stated that 130,500 pupils had stopped going to school 
(WFP, 2002). The Commission on Victims of Violence and Missing Persons (Kontras) 
reported that 600 schools were destroyed affecting the education of 40,000 children, 
between the start of martial law in May 2003 and October 2003. The indigenous human 
rights organisation reflected that this "had a strong effect on the progress of the younger 
generation, and Acelinese society will be held back several decades as a result. " 
(Kontras, 2003). The International Crisis Group (ICG) believed GAM members were 
responsible for some of the burning, "to prevent the schools from being used as billets 
for troops" or "from housing the displaced so that the humanitarian problem would 
receive more international attention, or to ensure that they were not used to turn 
Acehnese children into Indonesians [through the state-run syllabi]. " However, ICG was 
also sceptical that so many schools could have been burned so quickly without some 
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compliance from the military (ICG, 2003c: 1-2). Another and more sinister reason for 
the deficiencies in education stemmed from the murder and torture of 39 teachers in 
North Aceh from 1998 (OCHA, 2002d). 
7.3.3 High-levels of trauma and the erosion of social structures 
The indiscriminate results of the conflict and systematic campaigns of terror by the TNI 
and GAM caused devastating effects on the psyche of civilians. Echoing the majority 
of respondents at the Polytechnic, the committee emphasises that, "the actions of the 
military have resulted in trauma", therefore, "we really need the military to leave our 
villages" (Interview 75,13 March 2003). However, there was no provision for 
44 psychological and social services" (Principle 19, No. 1). Half of the respondents 
claimed to have relatives either missing or killed, if not both. However, the respondents 
were not aware that they had the right to know the fate and whereabouts of those 
missing (Principle 16, Nos. 1-2). 
Displacement typically created an extra layer of vulnerability for women through 
gender-specific trauma. The director of the indigenous NGO, Flower Aceh, asserts that 
women, "have no power and are also used as political tools by both sides". As an 
28 For further details see Aceh Child Rights Alliance, 2002. 
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example, "many times, GAM have claimed female villagers have been raped by the 
military. Whether this is true or not, the women arc then stigmatised by the rest of the 
village. " (Interview 8,12 March 200 1). 29 Other basic needs were ignored since the, 
"leaders within the camps are always men". For example, "if a group is displaced to a 
mosque, menstruating women are not allowed by the men to enter". Instead, they are 
forced, "to sit and sleep in makeshift shelters outside", making the women more 
"vulnerable to the military" and a more uncomfortable experience in general (Interview 
8,12 March 200 1). 30 
For Principle 22 (No. 1), Parts (a. ), freedom of thought and belief and (c. ), freedom of 
participation in community affairs, were not upheld because of the politics of the 
Polytechnic group's displacement. Several respondents expressed distrust and a lack of 
faith in the committee and its self-appointed leaders. Overall, respondents were reticent 
on this issue and it was clear they were too afraid to express their dissatisfaction and 
differences in opinion. Although most said the committee solved the problems affecting 
the group, no one could provide details or examples. Furthermore, it was unusual that 
the traditional leaders from the village (often the imams) did not hold positions on the 
committee although were present at the Polytechnic. The actual leadership of the 
committee was also nebulous. At the start, one IDP repeatedly claimed to be the 
committee leader but it soon transpired that actually he was the spokesperson and had 
been in the Polytechnic for only one month. During the focus group interview, the 
committee claimed to hold a group meeting every two weeks on average or whenever 
there was a problem but respondents did not concur. 
There was also definite confusion concerning the election of the committee. The 
leaders asserted that the group (one male adult, one vote) elected it within one week of 
arriving but the 1DPs denied this took place. The committee subsequently admitted that 
"we do not want to be leaders but it is the emergency condition, that is why we are 
leaders. The people know us from the community in the past" (Interview 75,13 March 
2003). This reply seemed strange since in emergency situations people are more likely 
to rely on and trust established leaders. RPuK's regional co-ordinator concurs: "the 
29 OCHA states that, "almost 23 per cent of all households in Aceh were headed by womerf'. Most were 
particularly vulnerable as women were unable to provide resources for their families and "were frequently 
forced to depend on unsustainable international food aid, or much worse, sexual and/or political alliances 
against their will. " (OCHA, 2003a). 
30 Kooistra concurs that women faced the double burden of the brutality of state while "repressed by 
patriarchal social practices. Men make all the decisions in the camps. " (Kooistra, 2001: 17). 
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committees are usually not I1DPs but people from the local village. Now [in the 
Polytechnic] they have a committee but the management is not good" (Interview 72,8 
March 2003). More positively, all respondents agreed they could "communicate in a 
language they understand" (Principle 22, Part (e. )). Part (d. ) was not upheld because of 
the brevity of their displacement. 
The erosion of traditional social structures was widespread and instilled new divisions. 
For example, the programme manager for Oxfam describes how: 
... the ulama in the community acted as informal leaders and had influence but 
authority has degenerated because they have been perceived to have gone to the 
other side and this applies to other village leaders [author's emphasis] (Interview 
67,26 February 2003). 
As one consequence, such changes would have made it easier for the TNI and GAM to 
manipulate and exploit civilians to fulfil military and economic interests. At the 
Polytechnic, females did not participate in the planning and distribution of supplies 
(Principle 18 (No. 3)). There were no women representatives on the committee and as 
noted above they were not included in the supposed election. Overall, the females 
appeared subservient, were sometimes afraid to talk and rarely entered the cafeteria at 
the central hall. Therefore, the lack of participation was rooted in traditional socio- 
cultural gender relations and was typical of IDP committees. The regional co-ordinator 
for RPuK confides, "the committee is always a group of men" (Interview 72,8 March 
2003). This pragmatic point is significant since when couples were interviewed 
together and alone, most of the females were voluble and identified specific ways to 
improve communal needs. 
7.3.4 Becorning a burden upon the host conununity 
It is instructive to split the host community at the Polytechnic into two: the students and 
the nearby airforce base. The latter had the potential to become more intrusive in the 
lives of the 1DPs if they were perceived to have overstayed at the Polytechnic or were 
seen to be attracting too much international attention. In this sense there were potential 
threats to personal security and more generally security was always a risk, considering 
the backdrop of the volatile political violence. 
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Second, although the students were willing to assist and organise the Polytechnic group, 
this role would have been difficult to maintain long-term. At a minimum, protracted 
displacement in the Polytechnic would have placed significant strains on the students, as 
exemplified by the pressure on the local primary school. RPuK's regional co-ordinator, 
who had assisted the group, argued that, "there is a damaging effect on their [students'] 
study environment as it is disturbed by the IDPs. " (Interview 72,8 March 2003). In 
2000, it was reported that the director of Polytechnic had urged the North Aceh 
administration to take responsibility for another group of IDPs so the Polytechnic could 
resume educational activities (Serambi-Lhokseumawe, 2000). 
It was common for informants to point to the strengths of the Acehnese in coping with 
the needs of IDPs and in preventing deterioration, "using extended families and local 
support" (Interview 14,13 March 200 1). 31 Nevertheless, host communities were 
typically poor and conflict-weary with commendable but limited resilience. A senior 
representative from UNICEF asserted that strong family structures were advantageous 
in the short-term but could easily lead to a drain on resources during more protracted 
displacement (Interview 36,2 December 2002). The secretary-general of RPuK 
recalled instances of disturbed religious and education activities, the blaming of IDPs 
for petty crime and envy when a group received aid and the host village was poor 
(Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). In 2002, OCHA also recognised the 
potential for such inter-communal tensions (OCHA Internal Displacement Unit, 2002). 
7.3.5 Anxious to return 
At the Polytechnic, only a few respondents said they did not want to return and all 
agreed this was conditional on the military leaving their villages. If the latter was not 
possible, they said they would reluctantly remain displaced. It was not surprising that 
the respondents did not mention the influence of politics in their return, in particular, the 
role of the committee and GAM. The group finally returned just before the start of 
martial law in May 2003 (BEM, 2004). 
31 RPuK's regional co-ordinator and the programme manager for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
(HDC) concurred (Interview 72,8 March 2003; and Interview 5,11 March 2001). The strength of 
indigenous coping mechanisms is perhaps epitomised best by the Acehnese reference to each host 
location as the sharing village (Field notes, March 2003). 
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The future of the Polytechnic IDPs upon return centered on their ability to reconstruct 
their agricultural livelihoods, which primarily demanded sustainable peace at the village 
level. The provision of education required development assistance but this would have 
proved difficult considering the trauma and the attrition of traditional forms of 
authority. Alternatively, the prolonging of their stay at the Polytechnic would also have 
been problematic. Overall, these long-term concerns were representative of wider 
trends. The Guiding Principles were extremely useful as the framework for the 
investigation. In particular, Principles 9,21 (Nos. 1-3) and 29 (No. 2) contained 
important provisions for civilians with a dependency on land and the protection of 
property during displacement and compensation upon return. Similarly, Principle 23 
(Nos. 24), rights to education for all, and Principle 16 (Nos. 1-2), fate and whereabouts 
of missing and dead relatives, proved applicable to the context. Principle 19 (No. 1), 
the provision for psychological and social services, Principle 18 (No. 3), participation of 
women, and Principle 22 (No. Ia., c. -e. ) raised equally crucial concerns. 
7.4 Debilitating Long-Term Needs in North Sumatra 
Long-term needs among the Sei Lepan IDPs centred on the illegality of their 
settlements. Although they lived in Sei Lcpan from 1999, many were preoccupied on a 
daily basis with if and when they would be evicted again: the first time by GAM, the 
next time by the state and the host community. Consequently, the group was reluctant 
to invest in the land, causing uncertain short and long-term futures. Other concerns 
included high-levels of individual trauma, no on-site education facility beyond junior 
high school and the loss of property after displacement. Furthermore, there was a 
definite split, concerning financial compensation from the government's national 
termination policy and internal tensions with the host community regarding resources. 
Nevertheless, the IDPs proved resilient with a developed social structure to manage all 
group decisions. As noted above, there were few secondary sources that surveyed the 
long-term needs of IDPs in North Sumatra, which make the case study findings 
particularly insightful. 
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7.4.1 Unsustainable livelihoods 
The displacement of the Sei Lepan IDPs proved that Principle 9 was not upheld since 
they predominately consisted of farmers and thus had "a special dependency on and 
attachment to their lands. " Furthermore, respondents believed their crops were 
probably robbed while the good houses were pillaged and the bad ones burned 
(Principle 21, Nos. 1-3). Most of the sample owned their former land in Aceh and 
possessed the letter of ownership. However, they did not expect to receive accurate 
compensation for their loss of property or for it to be recovered (Principle 29, No. 2). 
Appropriately, OCHA specifically recommended the provincial governments in Aceh 
and North Sumatra to co-operate to ensure the protection of property, repossession 
rights and/or compensation for all the IDPs in the province (OCHA, 2003f). 
The chief obstacle to long-term livelihoods in Sei Lepan was the illegality of their 
settlements and the resultant intricate dispute. The RI's opposition discouraged proper 
development and their future was uncertain since eviction was likely (Interview 57,14 
February 2003). PIPA concludes that, "it is essential for us to have permanent 
residences and to build proper roads within and between the two settlements" (Interview 
55,12 February 2003). In compounding this problem, many of the experienced IDP 
farmers raised the futility of investing in expensive seeds because the logging industry 
was decimating the surrounding forests, thereby robbing the land of its chief source of 
nutrients (see Figure 21 The Fallen Jungle and Figure 22 Close-up of the Deforestation). 
In sum, the IDPs faced a predicament. In Aceh they, "had more money but were not 
independent and always pressured even threatened". However, in Sei Lepan they were 
"poor but still able to exisC. They preferred to stay and thus resolved their quandary 
based on the, "hope that our children will be better off in the future" (Interview 55,12 
February 2003). 
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Figure 21 The Fallen Jungle, Sei Lepan 
Figure 22 Close-up of the Deforestation, Barak Incluk Major, Sei Lepan 
Long-term livelihoods were based on the assumption that the IDPs continued to live 
indefinitely in Sci Lepan. 32 As the first main income-generating opportunity, IDPs 
farmed and then sold or exchanged basic vegetables (obi, green bean and rice) and 
chickens. A second was finding and selling amber. 33 Third, sonic worked as 
34 traders/shop keepers, teachers and nurses . Last, some IDPs participated in the local 
logging industry. 35 Respondents indicated they were forced to adopt several of these 
opportunities in order to survive. Therefore, Principle 22 (No. I b. ), freedom to seek 
3' This was still the case by October 2004. 
33 Amber is a yellowish, translucent fossil resin, which can be used as material for glass and glue. The 
IDPs sold it to manufacturers outside the settlements. They had to walk for two hours to find the arnber 
and were very lucky to get 50 kg per day. I kg was sold for Rp 600. It was an insufficient and extremely 
challenging livelihood, becoming increasingly difficult to find and was illegal (Field notes, 9-14 February 
2003). 
34 As examples of kinship and exchange networks, sometimes a nurse would use her training and skills in 
exchange for rice. Also where necessary, children appeared to care for their parents based on the socio- 
cultural importance placed on the family unit and the influence of Islamic traditions (Field notes, 9-14 
February 2003). 
3' By October 2003, the needs were still the same in Sei Lepan, except the IDPs were involved more in 
the illegal logging trade in order to survive (Sitepu, October 2003). 
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employment, was restricted because the RI did not sanction their settlements. For North 
Sumatra overall, OCHA found that the male IDPs usually found temporary work as 
construction workers. Nevertheless, it was reported that the IDPs needed income- 
generating projects through international assistance, as the government could not cope 
with the scope of the problems (OCHA, 2002j). 
7.4.2 Struggling to preserve education 
The children received education from primary to junior high school level in Sei Lepan 
(Principle 23, No. 2). This was provided on-site in Barak Induk Major. In Barak Sei 
Minyak, children were educated in villages nearby or sent to boarding schools. 
However, at the time of field research, school fees were expected to rise to Rp 1500 per 
month and JRS also planned to stop financial assistance, which both jeopardised the 
provision in the future (Interview 56,13 February 2003). In both settlements, after 
junior high school, children were sent to boarding schools or stopped education and 
helped their family maintain an income. 36 All respondents claimed their children had 
schooling in Aceh prior to displacement. No. 3 of Principle 23, efforts to include 
participation of females, was not respected and there was no evidence for No. 4, 
education and training facilities for adults "as soon as conditions permit". 
For the province, Waspada reports in 2002 that 30,000 children, mainly in Langkat and 
Deli Serdang districts, were out of school for two years (cited in OCHA, 2002o). The 
WFP survey also found that none of the children surveyed were attending school (Vv'FP, 
2002). As an exception, in Panti Insyaf, Medan, all IDP children received education, 
with some attending private schools where an anonymous donor paid the tuition fees 
(OCHA, 2002j). 
7.4.3 High-levels of trauma and repairing social structures 
Trauma from the conflict and the forced evictions existed at the individual and group 
levels. Overall, there was an inadequate provision of social and psychological services 
36 OCHA concurred (OCHA, 2002j). 
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(Principle 19, No 1). For the individual, PIPA describes how, "many people get 
stressed easily and feel isolated and do not want to have contact with others. " These 
feelings were caused because the "people here have lost the trust of the government and 
because they have lost their homes" while the "conflict and internal displacement" 
made them, "very suspicious towards strangers as if they want to kill them. " 
Consequently, "we have to stick together or else they will have nothing to depend on. " 
(Interview 55,12 February 2003). The Barak Sei Nfinyak committee agree that the 
conflict and the displacement, "has changed some people's actions and minds [ ... ] they 
are fearful, for example, once a gun was fired from a deer hunter and nearly all the 
people tried to hide. " Conversely, "because of the fear", the committee describe how 
the l1DPs sometimes act, "too brave and too hot tempered", for example and as noted 
above, "when the government came to evict the people, they reacted in a crazy way. " 
The committee elaborates that: 
Because of the suffering, we do not have any courage, determination or money. 
Before we came here, this land had been poorly cultivated, then we came here 
and tried to improve the land. But neighbouring villagers say the land is theirs. 
This makes us confused and stressed as we can still remember all the good 
things we left behind in Aceh (Interview 57,14 February 2003). 
In the description above, it is important to emphasise that the committee makes a 
definite link between the trauma of the forced evictions and the ongoing threat of 
eviction in the future. The IDP committee admitted that sometimes there are children 
that are unusually difficult to motivate as they are "haunted by the conflict". Some 
were traurnatised or "disturbed emotionally, for example, a child will harTn his friend 
with no provocation while playing. " (Interview 57,14 February 2003). Most 
respondents had no missing or killed relatives but for some, they had seen proof of 
death. A few had relatives missing presumed dead but were not able to find out their 
precise fate and whereabouts (Principle 16, Nos. 1-2). 
Based on Principle 22 (No. Ia., c., and e. ), all respondents claimed they had never been 
prevented from exercising the freedoms of belief, thought, participation in community 
affairs and using their preferred language. However, Part (d. ), the right to vote in 
governmental and public affairs, was not adhered to because the state refused to 
recognise their resettlement. Principle 22 was fulfilled overall because each settlement 
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had established a committee, which thus formed an important coping mechanism. 37 
Barak Induk Major's committee, PIPA, was the most developed and far-reaching in 
making group decisions. It was formed in 1999 and positions were decided by a vote 
(see Figure 23 Structure of PIPA). 38 From its inception, it recycled leadership structures 
and utilised some leaders from the villages of origin. 39 The overall structure was 
checked by a Board of Control and Finance and co-ordinated through the small lorong 
within each barak. In Indonesian, the name, PIPA, reflected the focus on education and 
development through agricultural institutions. 
Head 
Deputy Head 
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Pubk Rektims N pirlig kdm 
secretary Treaswer 
II 
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Develop= 
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Figure 23 Structure of PIPA 
Hdý Yod and ýo 
Security 
PIPA gained the trust of the people by "using democratic ways to manage their 
business, by placing public interests above personal interests and by deciding 
37 Barak Induk Major consisted of Barak Induk, Barak Seng, Barak Itir and Barak GaJah. The term barak 
was one constructed by the IDPs and thus was not an official boundary marking. In addition, there were 
some IDPs in Barak Sei Minyak that recognised PIPA as their committee. The barak subdivisions were 
made in 2002 but PIPA was in the process of renaming these boundaries as loreng. This change was 
based on the hope that Barak Induk Major would become an official village based on ten loreng 
(Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
38 The head and deputy were elected and the others were appointed during the first meeting when all the 
IDPs were invited to the mosque to vote based on one man/one vote (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
39 One member was an ex-viflage head and another was an ex-deputy village leader from Aceh (Field 
notes, 10 February 2003). 
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everything through the meeting". Another committee representative emphasised that 
they kept to their principles, worked transparently and gained respect by focusing on the 
development of agriculture and education (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
Islam was a cohesive coping mechanism and this also helps explain how social 
structures were repaired. The Aceh co-ordinator for JRS emphasised the importance of 
the group's habitual consolidation through the mosque and the children's access to basic 
education by reading the Koran each afternoon (Interview 58,23 February 2003). As 
an offshoot, strength stemmed from the emphasis placed on "the family unit", which 
meant that, "the people do not feel so easily defeated", according to CARDI's field co- 
ordinator (Interview 60,24 February 2003). In Barak Induk Major, this was 
exemplified by the policy of helping each family to collect wood and make the roof of 
their house upon arrival. The community's sense of "togetherness and brother-ship" 
was Janus-faced. It was rooted in the past by sharing the same district of origin while 
they confronted "the same destiny and problems", in particular, the "determination to 
develop the land so it would be as rich as the land we owned in Aceh" (Interview 55,12 
February 2003). 40 
Nevertheless, PIPA displayed some ingrained flaws. First, the female IDPs did not 
have official positions on the committees and appeared to be neglected from the 
decision-making process. Based on the sample, women from both settlements wanted 
an increased role in the community and had an abundance of practical ideas on possible 
improvements. This exclusionary element within the group decision-making process 
was a minor problem but in theory upholding Principle 18 (No. 3), participation of 
women, would have enhanced PIPA's role. 
Moreover, the Sei Lepan II)Ps were deeply divided by their position on the 
government's national IDP policy. PIPA refused to accept the meagre compensation 
from the state because they feared the government could then legally evict them and 
terminate their status as displaced persons. Alternatively, the Barak Sei Minyak 
committee wanted the compensation and believed it would not affect the possibility of 
40 PIPA advises other IDP groups to: "have strong determination to succeed, be independent, stick 
together, be patient, don't remember the past, just think about the future and learn to adopt to their new 
environmene' (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
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land ownership (Interview 57,14 February 2003). While the overall needs of each 
settlement were the same, the Sei Minyak II)Ps endured a comparatively lower standard 
of living and were less optimistic about their future in Sei Lepan. Appropriately, the Sei 
Minyak committee was in stark contrast to PIPA, with only a leader, secretary, and 
three heads of the lorong. In addition, the committee met only when the committee 
decided (Interview 55,12 February 2003; and Interview 57,14 February 2003). 
Furthermore, Sei Minyak had less access to resources, including schooling, health 
services and assistance from NGOs, which created simmering discontent. In describing 
their relationship with their counterparts, the Barak Sei Minyak committee said they 
wanted to let things pass but the leader indicated that people from Induk Major had 
"tried to break the unity of the people. " The latter involved PIPA claiming that families 
from Sei Minyak lived in their settlement to justify more assistance from NGOs. The 
committee in Barak Sei Minyak also recalled that Induk Major had on occasion 
prevented supplies from reaching theM. 41 
Evidently, there was the potential for conflict and it was unlikely that the inter- 
settlement tensions would be resolved since they did not occur organically. As noted 
above, state and non-state actors were actively opposed to the Sei Lepan group. There 
was no direct physical intimidation since 2000 but the national IDP policy was used as a 
subtler means to split the group. In particular, there was evidence that the leader of the 
Sei Nfinyak committee, that favoured the policy, was working as a proxy for the Leusser 
National Park and the RI to persuade the Sci Minyak IDPs to resettle in the district of 
South Tapanuli, North Sumatra. 42 
41 The committee received assistance from the government and although the amount was insignificant, the 
IDPs from Barak Induk Major tried to prevent it, which nearly caused a fight. The Sei Minyak committee 
said they instructed the people to work on as normal during the confrontation and physical violence was 
avoided. There was a precedent, with conflict between two other settlements nearby concerning 
assistance from the government (Interview 57,14 February 2003). 
42 The leader of Candhika had a letter from the district head that stated this. It was also strange that the 
committee leader was not part of the original group but came to Sei Minyak in the 1980s and lived in the 
neighbouring village. To maintain his leadership, he asked some friends (non-IDPs) to live in the 
settlement (Interview 56,13 February 2003). The latter was confirmed during the interviews as a non- 
IDP occupied one of the houses (Field notes, 13 February 2003). 
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7.4.4 Protracted tensions with the host community 
The Sei Lepan IDPs also faced opposition from local villagers, who perceived them as 
transmigrant opportunists and an economic threat. From 2001, locals blamed them for 
the illegal de-forestation and for taking official jobs with the timber company, PT RGM, 
while receiving extra attention and assistance from NGOs. This irritated the villagers 
since they had "the same level of income and economic status" as the displaced 
(Interview 54,8 February 2003). Some respondents also claimed that the host 
community had prevented assistance from reaching the settlements. Therefore, these 
tensions exacerbated the opposition from the RI (government and the military) and PT 
RGM. 
7.4.5 Impossible return and uncertain resettlement 
Most of the Sei Lepan respondents had conceded on returning to their former homes in 
Aceh and only a few wanted to resettle. Those that wanted to remain were willing to 
pay for the land. Those that wanted to resettle or return to Aceh, needed money, 
transport and new housing, in order of importance. Conversely, the Provincial Co- 
ordinating Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees stated that 66,400 
IDPs/13,700 families in eight districts in North Sumatra were ready to return in 2001 if 
their safety was guaranteed and their houses rebuilt in Aceh (OCHA, 2001m). 
However, this collective desire and same obstacles were reiterated in 2003 and OCHA 
confirmed there was no official communication between the two relevant provincial 
authorities regarding a mutual solution to the problem (OCHA, 2003f). 
The long-term needs of the Sei Lcpan group were ingrained and debilitating. Clearly, 
the main source of the problems was the uncertainty stemming from the illegitimacy of 
the resettlement. As farmcrs, the relationship with the land was paramount and created 
several knock-on effects. The most significant problem was the multifaceted opposition 
from the host location and the inter-settlement tensions, which inflamed the trauma 
caused by the conflict and evictions in Aceh. Other concerns included the loss of 
property from displacement and the tenuous provision of education. Nevertheless, the 
II)Ps overall proved resilient with a developed social structure and their collective 
resolve. In gauging these needs, the Guiding Principles proved insightful. Principle 9, 
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Principle 21 (Nos. 1-3) and Principle 29 (No. 2) proved relevant, considering the 
group's dependency on land, loss of property and absence of compensation. Similarly, 
Principle 23 (Nos. 2-4), rights to education for all, and Principle 16 (Nos. 1-2), fate and 
whereabouts of missing and dead relatives, reflected the nature of needs. Principle 19 
(No. 1), provision for psychological and social services, and Principle 18 (No. 3), 
participation of women, and Principle 22 (No. la., c. -e. ) raised equally crucial concerns. 
Conclusion 
The investigation and analysis demonstrated that the short-term needs of the 
Lhokseurnawe Polytechnic and Sei Lepan IDPs were largely fulfilled. Therefore, in 
these ways and at least on the surface, the state became more responsible. The joint 
responses enabled this alleviation in tandem with the socio-religious coping 
mechanisms of the family unit and Islam. However, the intimidation from the nearby 
military base and poor sanitation at the Polytechnic threatened more serious basic health 
problems. Coping mechanisms and assistance were not sustainable, while the 
uncertainty over return and ingrained suspicion from the state, created distress. 
Similarly, the Sei Lepan group fulfilled most basic needs but there was insufficient 
clothing, an absence of nutritious food and an unpredictable supply of potable water. 
The quality of shelter and access to medicine varied but was more crucial, compared to 
the Polytechnic, because of the remoteness of their settlements. 
Moreover, the protracted neglect of long-term needs created significant instability for 
each case study group. Therefore, it is concluded that sustainable development was 
prevented because the cyclical nature of needs was ignored. The findings proved that 
the unresolved long-term concerns in turn threatened the future fulfilment of short-term 
needs. For both groups, there were high-levels of trauma, simmering tensions with the 
host community, livelihoods remained fractured, no compensation for losses and there 
were important deficiencies in education. Traditional social structures were eroded in 
Aceh and challenged by deep divisions in North Sumatra. In sum, the Polytechnic 
group required security in order to make a permanent return while the Sei Lepan group 
needed their settlements to be sanctioned by the state. Based on secondary sources and 
interviews with key informants, it was argued that the case study findings were 
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representative of the similar and predominating trends in displacement in their 
respective province. 
Second, the Guiding Principles acted as an insightful framework for analysis. They 
were applicable overall to the needs of each case study group, especially for 
investigating the long-term needs. 43 However, some significant contextual complexities 
proved elusive. For example, adequate shelter (Principle 18, No. lb. ) was created by 
the coping mechanisms of the displaced and/or the host community, as opposed to 
efforts by the joint responses. Principle 15 (Parts a. -d. ), freedom of movement, was 
upheld overall but because of insufficient funds and the preference to remain with the 
group. As a category of causes, "situations of armed conflict" (Principle 6, No. 2b. ), is 
intentionally inclusive but it glossed over the politics of displacement of the Polytechnic 
group. 
Last, the findings within this chapter demonstrated the fundamental policy mistake of 
overly focusing on short-term needs and rapid assistance. This was instigated by the RI 
trying to improve superficially its international image as a responsible state. It was then 
perpetuated by the HDC through the aims of its misguided humanitarian mediation 
strategy for political intervention. However, as Chapter Eight details, the humanitarian 
response attempted to address long-term needs and strengthen the responsibility of the 
RI. Therefore, it is now important to examine the facets of this strategy and the 
inadequacy of protection as the key to its shortcomings. 
43 This included Principle 4 (No. 2); Principle 6 (Nos. I and 2a); Principle 9; Principle 10 (Nos. I b. -d.; 
and 2a. and d. ); Principle 16 (Nos. 1-2); Principle 18 (Nos. 2-3); Principle 19 (Nos. 1-3); Principle 20 
(Nos. 1-3); Principle 21 (Nos. 1-3); Principle 22 (No. I a. -e. ); Principle 23 (Nos. 2-4); and Principle 29 
(No. 2). 
246 
Opportunities for Responsibility 
This chapter examines the opportunities for the Republic of Indonesia (RI) to take 
greater responsibility for the needs of its Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Aceh 
and North Sumatra. These opportunities were created by the joint political and 
humanitarian responses and in particular, the author focuses on the efforts of the latter 
to deliver relief and implement development programmes. Despite some notable 
progress in assistance, it is argued that long-standing deficiencies in protection by the 
RI prevailed and thus constrained sustainable development. Therefore, it is concluded 
that the RI did not use the potential developed by the joint responses to assume greater 
responsibility for its IDPs. Evidence for these assertions is grounded in a comparative 
analysis of the Polytechnic and Sci Lepan case study groups, with reference to the wider 
efforts of the joint responses in each respective province. Furthermore, this chapter is 
particularly significant since it refers directly to relevant empirical findings in previous 
chapters. 
Before the relief and development programmes are examined, Section 8.1 reviews the 
potentials and limitations of the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement in improving the pragmatic provisions of protection and assistance in the 
two provinces. ' This is important as the Principles were used directly to strengthen the 
approach and policies of the RI, which reflected their main purpose. In addition, the 
Principles frame the inquiry into protection and help elucidate the specific deficiencies. 
Section 8.2 critiques the attempts by the strategy of the humanitarian response to 
provide and advance relief. Despite the concerted efforts and funding, this section 
pinpoints gaps in access to basic health services, food and potable water. Although the 
strategy played an important role, it is also concluded that the coping mechanisms of the 
displaced and host communities were crucial. However, this meant that sustainability 
was a recurring problem. 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. See Appendix A for complete text of the 
Principles. 
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Accordingly, Section 8.3 examines the second part of the humanitarian response 
strategy, which sought to move assistance and protection to a more long-term mindset 
through sustainable development programmes. This involved a focus on livelihoods, 
primary education, trauma and local capacity building. In addition, protection centered 
on return and resettlement, which received the input of the political response of joint 
dialogue between the two-anned sides. Nevertheless, sustainable development proved 
elusive and Sections 8.2 and 8.3 juxtapose Chapter Seven's conclusions on the needs of 
the IDPs to demonstrate this outcome. 
i 
1 
To explain the shortfall in sustainable development, the last section analyses the 
ingrained absence of protection for IDPs under the RI. This consisted of three gaps: the 
politicisation of protection and assistance, the corruption of aid and opposition to return 
and resettlement. As the final manipulative constraint from within state sovereignty, it 
also jeopardised the neutrality of the responses. 
8.1 Principles versus Practice 
Field research identified the potentials of the Guiding Principles in improving the 
pragmatic provisions of protection and assistance in the two provinces. Nevertheless, 
representatives of the joint responses raised significant concerns regarding 
implementation and accessibility. 
1.1 Potentials 
The Guiding Principles aim to provide guidance to "states" and "all other authorities, 
groups, and persons in their relations with internally displaced persons; and 
intergovemmental and non-governmental organisations when addressing internal 
displacement" (Introduction: Scope and Purpose, No. 3b., c. and d. ). To this end, the 
Principles instruct that they "should be disseminated and applied as widely as possible" 
(Introduction: Scope and Purpose, No. 4). Although there were no explicit references to 
the Principles in Indonesian national legislation, they were reflected in the three options 
of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia's (GoRI) national termination policy 
for EDPs: return, resettlement and empowerment (Office for the Co-ordination of 
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Humanitarian Affairs Internal Displacement (OCHA ID) Unit, 2002). The GoRI was 
also involved in a planning process to create "greater space for advocating better 
practice in public service provision, increasing social service expenditure, and 
incorporating rights-based approaches into public PoliCy.,, 2 Furthermore, there were 
efforts in the field to instil a better understanding of the Principles through the training 
of humanitarian actors in collaborative workshops, as demonstrated in 2002 by the 
Consortium for the Assistance to Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) and 
3 the Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). During 2003, the 
Principles and the Manual on Field Practices in Internal Displacement were translated 
into Bahasa Indonesia and circulated among government officials (OCHA, 2004b). 
The Principles gained some ground in reaching the senior representatives of the main 
humanitarian actors in Aceh and North Sumatra by 2002.4 The Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS), which worked in Sei Lepan, had started to incorporate them into their operations, 
in addition to the indigenous NGO, the Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity 
(RPuK) and CARDI in Aceh (Interview 72,8 March 2003). More tangibly, by March 
2003 the humanitarian organisations were planning to distribute the Principles widely to 
IDPs in a comic book fonnat, called 77iose who are displaced (Mereka yang 
mengungsi) (OCHA, 2004b). 5 
There was significant optimism among the humanitarian actors about the role of the 
Principles in clarifying and even in directly ameliorating forced displacement. With 
reference to the main pattern of displacement in Aceh, Francis Deng's assistant 
2 This was exemplified by "the unanimous endorsement of the Principles by provincial governments 
affected by conflict. " (OCHA, 2003a). 
3 This process started in at least 2001, when the Brookings Project, in collaboration with the Centre for 
Research on Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Resolution, the National Commission on Human Rights, 
OCHA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) held a seminar in Jakarta to raise awareness of forced internal 
displacement and improve the humanitarian response. Participants expressed support for the 
establishment of a National Commission for IDPs and Community Recovery, the creation of an effective 
information system on displacement, recommended programs to rebuild trust and solidarity among 
different ethnic and religious groups, called for the wide dissemination and application of the Principles 
and urged international humanitarian organizations to expand their presence in affected areas (Brookings, 
2001). 
4 However, respondents from the case study groups and the provincial government were unaware of the 
Principles. Other informants concurred that the dissemination did not reach beyond international NGOs 
and a limited number of local organisations. 
5 RPuK (Banda Aceh/Headquarters Office) confirms that, "we have exchanged views on the comic 
through a focus group discussion with Satkorlak PBP [Provincial Co-ordinating Unit for the Management 
of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees; Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksanal" (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 
2003). 
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proposes that the, "Principles do respond to the short-term, localised internal 
displacement" while "providing a good basis to advocate with the government. " 
(Interview 48,6 December 2002). OCHA believes the Principles are, "useful in 
determining responsibilities" (Interview 59,24 February 2003). Oxfarn was optimistic 
about their application because they, "are broad and basic principles that should be 
easily adaptable, encouraging local partners to use them as a tool" (Interview 67,26 
February 2003). JRS proposes that if, "the IDP committees speak in the language of the 
Guiding Principles, then their campaign would be more appropriate" (Interview 58,23 
February 2003). 
8.1.2 Limitations 
Nevertheless, the informants also raised significant caveats regarding implementation. 
The North Sumatra co-ordinator for JRS pinpoints the fundamental absurdity: "the 
Principles tell us that the government is responsible, however, the government reacts 
slowly or is useless, for example, in protecting the property of IDPs or providing 
accurate compensation" (Interview 54,8 February 2003). The People's Crisis Centre 
(PCC) Aceh co-ordinator agrees that, "the government or police do not care and since 
the IDPs are the government's responsibility then the Principles are difficult to 
implement" (Interview 62,25 February 2003). Oxfam concurs that, "the major problem 
is implementation, if the reception was positive then I would introduce a local workshop 
on the Guiding Principles" (Interview 67,26 February 2003). Perhaps more crucially, 
RPuK pointed to the pragmatic obstacle of security and emphasises that, "the more 
important issue is the peace agreement, the CoHA [Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement]" (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
In addition, informants referred to the abstract nature of the Principles as an obstacle to 
implementation. CARDI would have preferred them to be, "like a constitution, they 
should be more specific as they are very vague" (Interview 60,24 February 2003). In 
North Sumatra, JRS states that the, "Sphere Project is more helpful as it shows us 
exactly what we can do when we have to react spontaneously in the field. " (Interview 
54,8 February 2003). The Aceh co-ordinator for JRS states that, "some of the 
Principles, for example, increasing the role of women, are naturally restricted because 
of socio-cultural discrimination by the IDP committees" (Interview 58,23 February 
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2003). The Principles were intended to improve monitoring and evaluation in general 
(Cohen, 1998a: 3). However, CARDI's field co-ordinator states that, "monitoring and 
evaluation is difficult in Aceh because displacement has been sporadic and repetitive. " 
(Interview 60,24 February 2003). 
Therefore, progress in dissemination and implementation was slow. Oxfarn recalls its, 
"protection workshop with the local NGOs [non-governmental organisations] on the 
Guiding Principles" but clarifies, "at this point, the Principles are not very well 
understood by our partners and there should be a more structured approach. " (Interview 
67,26 February 2003). Similarly, RPuK (Lhokseumawe/Regional Office) believes the 
Principles, "are not socialised throughout Aceh but we hope that in a short time they 
will be. We want to introduce them to the IDPs, NGOs, GAM [Free Aceh Movement; 
Gerakan Aceh Merdekaj and military" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). The comic, 
Those who are displaced, had not been distributed by March 2003, with the 
humanitarian actors, "waiting for the proper person to do it " (Interview 70,28 February 
and 4 March 2003). 
Humanitarian actors pointed to similar problems with the comic's accessibility and 
applicability to the context. The secretary-general of RPuK asserts that the comic, "is 
not well appreciated because the information and guidelines are not specific to Aceh". 
The informant notes that, "it was made by my friends in Jakarta with no understanding 
of the conflict" (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). Oxfam agrees that, 
"there was little effort to make the comic specific" (Interview 67,26 February 2003). In 
this sense, RPuK identified two particular problems: the generalising comic failed to 
include deliberate or politicised displacement and it was not written in Acehnese. The 
latter mistake could have allowed GAM to dismiss it as another Jakaiiia-centric poliCy. 6 
The Principles had the potential to guide and improve assistance and protection and 
made some progress in this respect. However, their impact and dissemination proved 
superficial. To explain these barriers to implementation, the humanitarian actors 
overwhelmingly pointed to the Principles' unrealistic assumption that national 
authorities want to accept responsibility, their inapplicability to the context and 
6 The secretary-general for RPuK elaborates that, "in Maluku [Province], they use the same comic and 
guidelines but there are no false IDPs. Since this pattern is well known in Aceh, the comic needs to 
include if' (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
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inaccessibility for humanitarian actors. To understand the practice of protection and 
assistance, it is necessary to examine the strategy of the humanitarian response. 
8.2 Attempts to Advance Relief 
The humanitarian response strategy first focused on assistance by meeting and 
improving the provision of relief through funds for emergency assistance and 
addressing the areas of health, food and water, and shelter. As reviewed in Section 4.4, 
the response consisted of an extensive range of actors. In order to gauge the strategy's 
effectiveness, this section also juxtaposes Chapter Seven's findings on the short-term 
needs of the IDPs. 
8.2.1 Funds for emergency assistance 
The RI channelled emergency financial assistance to IDPs through the provision of 
side-dish money and the relief operations of state agencies in the two provinces. It was 
reported that the provincial authorities in Aceh spent Rupiah (Rp) 1.4 billion on food 
and water in eleven districts by 2002 (OCHA, 2001k; and the National Disaster 
7 Management Co-ordination Board (Bakomas PBP) & OCHA, 2002). As examined in 
subsection 4.5.1, the international community also funded a broad array of international 
and indigenous humanitarian organisations, though more so in Aceh. Although, these 
injections of funding partially explain Chapter Seven's conclusion that short-term needs 
were fulfilled overall, it is important to examine the strengths of each aspect and the 
significant gaps in relief. 
7 For example, President Wahid promised the central government would disburse United States (US) $ 
10.47 million between December 2000 and February 2001 for all victims of the conflict (International 
Crisis Group (ICG), 2000: 1). After the start of the CoHA, the GoRI announced that its newly 
strengthened humanitarian team would start in January 2003 and work for seven months to co-ordinate 
and distribute domestic and foreign aid (Farida & Moestasfa, 2002b). At the time of field research, Rp 
10,000 (approximately) equalled US$ 1. 
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8.2.2 Basic health services 
Between 2002 and 2003, there were several UN inter-agency missions by the United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO), OCHA, 
World Food Program (WFP), UNDP and the International Organisation of Migration 
(IOM), focusing on immunisation against tuberculosis, scabies and measles (OCHA, 
2002x; 2002i; 2002iii; 2002vi; and 2003e). JRS was active in distributing medicine and 
health kits to several IDP camps (Interview 58,23 February 2003; OCHA, 2002m; and 
OCHA, 2002p). To advance relief, CARDI focused on improving sdnitation across the 
province through its Resettlement Intervention Project and Rehabilitation of Water and 
Sanitation Facilities Programme (OCHA, 2002j; 20021; 2002m; 2002q; 2003a; 2003b; 
and 2003c). Similarly, Save the Children-United States (SC-US) included health 
services within its Coming Home Programme (OCHA, 2002p). WHO and SC-US also 
conducted separate training programmes for local health workers on medical ethics, 
international humanitarian law and conflict management skills (OCHA, 2002t; 2002w; 
2002iii; 2003b; and 2003d). Contrary to these concerted efforts, subsection 7.1.2 
concluded that poor sanitation caused basic health problems at the Lhokseumawe 
Polytechnic and there was an unreliable access to basic health services for IDPs across 
the province. 
In 2001, OCHA reported that health services in North Sumatra were "in critical 
condition and needed urgent attention, government assistance was limited and there 
were no international NGOs" (OCHA, 2001m). After this, JRS, three indigenous NGOs 
(Melati, Parpari and Consercio) and the International Medic Corps (IMC) assisted in Sei 
Lepan and other host locations. By 2003, OCHA's area co-ordinator asserts that the 
North Sumatra Provincial Government, "was very open to humanitarian assistance, in 
particular, health" and cited the example of IMC, which had co-ordinated with the 
government health department (Interview 59,24 February 2003). In Langkat, OCHA 
reported a Sustainable and Integrated Health, Environmental Health and Livelihood 
Programme, with the district's health department and indigenous NGOs as 
implementing partners. The programme aimed to increase access to and improve the 
quality of primary health care services and environmental health facilities for IDPs and 
host communities (OCHA, 2004b). Subsection 7.2.2 found that access to basic health 
services for IDPs in Sei Lepan and across North Sumatra remained adequate by 2003. 
However, sustainability was the primary concern. For example, the North Sumatra co- 
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ordinator for JRS pinpoints, "we need the government, it is their responsibility. We 
always find problems, we built a health clinic but we need the government health 
department to provide a regular nurse" (Interview 54,8 February 2003). 
8.2.3 Access to food and potable water 
It was reported that the central government funded the distribution of 2800 MT of rice 
and Rp 16.9 billion for side-dish money from 2001-2002. However, the main problem 
was the variation in amounts. In 2000, each IDP was to receive Rp 75,000 in cash and 5 
kg of rice to last 13 months (OCHA, 2001k; and Bakomas PBP & OCHA, 2002). 
Conversely, the project manager for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) 
recalls that the government provided other IDPs with, "meat and chicken, two cups of 
rice and Rp 10,000 per day" (Interview 5,11 March 2001 ). 8 To redress the imbalance, 
in 2002, the WFP aimed to provide food assistance to the most vulnerable groups, 
returnees and others most affected by the conflict (OCHA, 2002vii; 2003c; and 2003d). 
JRS was also active, focusing on the delivery of rice (OCHA, 2002k; 2002r; and 
2002v). In addition, the GoRI claimed to prioritise food production, however, this 
seemed self-defeating considering the ongoing conflict. The head of the Department of 
Agriculture, Aceh Provincial Office, states that the GoRI has, "tried to introduce pilot 
projects to increase production of rice" but "the government budget was restricted, 
farmers have no money and in some areas the government is still afraid to go there" 
(Interview 65,25 February 2003). Although subsection 7.1.3 found an adequate 
provision of basic food and water at the Polytechnic, this mainly stemmed from coping 
mechanisms of the IDPs and the host community. Furthermore, the future of this 
provision was uncertain and similarly there was an unreliable access to basic food and 
water across Aceh. 
For IDPs in North Sumatra, the provincial government spent Rp 8.8 billion in total on 
daily meals and 2.34 tons of rice was distributed between September 1999 and June 
2001 (Gunawan, 2001a). In 2002, the provincial government was to provide and 
distribute emergency food and side-dish money (Rp 1500 and 400 grams of rice, per 
person, per day) on a three-month basis (OCHA, 2002j). However, amounts varied 
8 Buiza and Risser confirmed that the "precise amounts IDPs received varied from site to site" (Buiza & 
Risser, 2003: 46 and 56). 
254 
considerably among groups. The IDP committee in Barak Induk Major, Pentani 
Indonesia Peng Aceh (PIPA), indicated that they received such assistance (money and 
rice) once in 2002, involving Rp 82,000 and 7 kg of rice per person (Interview 55,12 
February 2003). Individual respondents said they received salted fish, some vegetables, 
rice (varying between 5,7,10,35 and 40 kg), noodles, sugar, milk, some baby food and 
varying amounts of money. 9 An OCHA mission confirmed this general unreliability, 
for example, 1DPs in the city of Medan received 12 kg of rice and Rp 164,000 per 
person whereas IDPs in remote areas received 9 kg of rice and Rp 94,000 per person 
(OCHA, 2002j). Subsection 7.2.3 concluded that food and potable water proved 
adequate overall but access was unreliable and survival in Sei Lepan depended on 
coping mechanisms. 
8.2.4 Shelter 
Last, at the Polytechnic and across Aceh, the provision of shelter proved adequate but 
this stemmed mainly from the altruism of host communities, rather than the proactive or 
even reactive efforts of the humanitarian response. While shelter proved suitable for the 
short-term, the widespread practice of burning public and private buildings raised the 
definite need for more development and reconstruction, as detailed in subsection 7.1.4. 
At Sei Lepan and across North Sumatra, subsection 7.2.4 found that the standard of 
shelter varied. Similarly, positive instances stemmed mainly from strong coping 
mechanisms, although JRS helped construct a school, mosque and health centre in 
Barak Induk Major. 
In sum, there were significant gaps in the provision of assistance, involving unreliable 
access to basic health services, food and potable water. This was strange considering 
the pre-existing level of needs and the concerted efforts by the humanitarian response to 
provide and advance relief. Although the humanitarian response strategy clearly played 
an important role in the overall fulfilment of short-term needs, the coping mechanisms 
of the displaced and their host communities were crucial. However, this meant that 
sustainability was a recurring challenge, as detailed in subsections 7.3.4 and 7.4.4. 
9 Variations included Rp 550,000, Rp 92,000, Rp 80,000 and Rp 35,000. 
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8.3 Towards Sustainable Development 
The strategy of the humanitarian response tried to improve and make sustainable the 
funds for development, livelihoods, primary education, trauma and the capacities of 
indigenous NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs). In addition, protection 
centered on return and resettlement, which received the direct involvement of the 
political response, based on joint dialogue between the RI and GAM. Inorderto 
demonstrate the strategy's effectiveness, this section also juxtaposes Chapter Seven's 
conclusions on the long-term needs of the IDPs. 
8.3.1 Reasons for development 
Between 2001 and 2002, international organisations attempted to move the mindset of 
the humanitarian response by focusing on sustainable development programmes. 
Although the RI was traditionally opposed, limited development was appealing because 
it encouraged return and resettlement and could thus improve the image of the state in 
the new context of increased international attention to the conflict and its humanitarian 
deficit. Oxfam's programme manager recalls that his international NGO used to, "focus 
on water, sanitation and food security. " After March 2002, "there was a re-think on 
strategy and we came back with the idea of a project to respond to humanitarian needs 
but with a longer view and to include advocacy, protection and closer partnerships with 
local NGOs" (Interview 67,26 February 2003). The International Catholic Migration 
Commission (ICMC) confirms this with its, "change in focus to vulnerable households" 
(Interview 71,4 March 2003). CARDI adds that this also involved efforts to improve 
co-ordination since, "we were all doing the same thing at the same time in 2001/2002. " 
(Interview 60,24 February 2003). Nevertheless, as detailed below, changing the state's 
mindset proved difficult, development programmes remained patchy and sustainability 
proved elusive. 10 
10 In 2003, Bakomas PBP & OCHA belatedly concluded that humanitarian assistance should be 
development oriented and the central government policy should have a greater strategic focus by tackling 
the root causes of the conflict, seeking integrated solutions and co-operating closely with local 
government. To this end, it was recommended that the rights of IDPs had to be protected and the Guiding 
Principles should be implemented as much as possible in all programmes and projects (Bakomas PBP & 
OCHA, 2003). 
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8.3.2 Development funds 
There were several sources of funding for sustainable development, which were 
designed to have a direct and trickle-down impact on IDPs in Aceh. For the latter, the 
RI introduced special autonomy Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) in 2001 to defuse 
demands for separatism and to channel long-term funding. " As examined in subsection 
4.5.1, the international community funded the development operations of humanitarian 
organisations and the political response of the joint dialogue process. In 2003, a 
mission of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP started a review of 
public expenditure regarding NAD, financial management, human development, 
infrastructure, justice and security, and the business environment to determine future 
programmes and international donor interest for assistance (OCHA, 2003b). Therefore, 
in theory, there was the potential for funding and third party scrutiny to assist durable 
development. 
Funds for development in North Sumatra came from the GoRI's national termination 
policy. As detailed in subsection 4.4.1, the policy was inspired by the Guiding 
Principles and offered compensation to the displaced after choosing return, 
empowerment or resettlement. The central government regarded the policy "as a 
framework to find durable solutions for IDPs". Funds were first issued mid-July 2002 
and allocated Rp 8.75 million for each family. OCHA praised the GoRl for accepting 
its responsibility in addressing the IDP problem and acknowledged that the authorities 
provided a major portion of support for protection and assistance (OCHA ID Unit, 
2002). " A senior official at the North Sumatra Social Welfare Department believed the 
policy provided the IDPs with necessary food and money (Interview 49,3 February 
2003). 13 
" Serambi reported Rp 1.5 trillion for NAD in 2002, and in 2003, Aceh expected to receive Rp 2.3 trillion 
with the rise to help improve the CoHA (cited in OCHA, 2003c). 
12 Chief of OCHA Indonesia, Mr. Elmquist, considered the "de-linking of humanitarian assistance from 
the status of IDPs" as the most important recommendation (Bakornas PBP & OCHA, 2002). 13 In November 2002, the provincial government announced that 908 families would receive Rp 8.75 
million each and thus renounce their IDP status (OCHA, 2002iii). JRS found that IDPs in the Piturah and 
Sei Dendang camps resettled after receiving compensation (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 16). 
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8.3.3 Recovery of livelihoods 
The attempt to make livelihoods sustainable through the economic recovery of conflict- 
affected communities was the important second feature of the long-term strategy in 
Aceh. In 2001, the RI announced Rp 1.43 trillion in bank loans throughout the province 
to empower farmers and fishermen (OCHA, 2001m). The UNDP operated a 
Community Recovery Programme, which focused activities on poverty reduction and 
economic recovery by providing US$ 1.2 million in grants to indigenous NGOs and 
CBOs in Central, Great and West Aceh (OCHA, 2003a). CARDI's resettlement project 
aimed, "to cover loss of assets, for example, hand tractors and livestock" in East and 
South Aceh, Pidie and Bireuen from February to May 2002 (Interview 60,24 February 
2003; OCHA, 2002y; and 2002o). This was followed by a Community Development 
Micro-Grants Programme in June 2002 for 1000 potential beneficiaries, which focused 
on the capacity building of indigenous NGOs in Pidie, Bireuen and North Aceh districts 
(OCHA, 2002t; 2002w; 2003a; and 2003c). 14 
A significant component of the livelihood programmes involved the targeting of female- 
headed households by ICMC using indigenous NGOs as implementing partners 
(OCHA, 2002c; and 2002r). 15 RPuK also conducted an empowerment and income 
generating programme to address the prevalence of female discrimination and unequal 
access to resources in North, East and South Aceh (Interview 70,28 February and 4 
March 2003; and OCHA, 2002t). All economic recovery was dependent on safe and 
permanent return and thus excluded the Polytechnic IDPs, as detailed in subsection 
7.3.1. 
There was less attention given to restoring the livelihoods of IDPs in North Sumatra. ' 6 
As an exception, a province-based, agrarian reform co-operative, the North Sumatra 
Peasants Union (NSPU), provided a long-term micro-development initiative for IDPs in 
the south of North Sumatra. In 2001, the NSPU was given 40 hectares of traditionally 
14 Oxfam also started a pilot community-income project in early 2003, "with small grants to six 
communities using participatory strategies [ ... ] to gain access to the fields and build an economic 
structure" (Interview 67,26 February 2003). 
15 ICMC tries to, "give them better negotiating skills, or marketing skills to tweak the system. There 
are plenty of women's groups but women are missing out on profit. " (Interview 71,4 March 2003). 16 Buiza states that the, "NGOs based in Aceh could only provide anecdotal concerns about the 'other' 
IDPs due to the ethnopolitical backdrop". In addition, "[mlany of the Javanese IDPs eventually mixed 
into the informal job sector, working as irregular plantation hands, or in the more cut-throat environment 
of modem Medan"(Buiza, 2003). 
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owned land in South Tapanuli for the relocation of 84 families/416 IDPs (Down to 
Earth, 2001b). Considering the paucity of such efforts overall, it was appropriate that 
subsection 7.4.1 found that the livelihoods of II)Ps in Sei Lepan and across the province 
remained tenuously dependent on coping skills. 
8.3.4 Re-building primary education 
UNICEF provided and expanded its Peace Education Programme across Aceh, working 
closely with local authorities, including the police and the national armed forces 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) (OCHA, 2002x; 2002iii; 2003d; and 2003e). These 
efforts built on increased emergency assistance (the School-in-a-Box and School Tents 
Programme) and were to be supplemented by participatory child lights workshops and 
teacher training (OCHA, 2003a). JRS and Nonviolence International also provided 
basic equipment in Pidie, Central Aceh and Bireuen (Interview 58,23 February 2003; 
OCHA, 2002z; and 2002iii). RPuK operated an Alternative Education Programme 
(AEP) in five locations focusing on children both during and after displacement. The 
curriculum included religion, mathematics, history and art and classes were held in 
"mosques, river banks and fields". The AEP also prioritised the training of people 
within the communities on participatory learning and was context-specifC. 17 Re- 
building primary education was similarly dependent upon security and return. 
Therefore, subsection 7.3.2 found that this provision at the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic 
was inadequate, with the H)Ps relying on an overloaded school within the host 
community and struggling to meet associated costs. 
Although the provision of primary education for displaced children in North Sumatra 
was weak, there was little evidence of systematic input from the humanitarian response. 
OCHA and UNICEF conducted a joint assessment mission in November 2002 and met 
with representatives of the provincial government (OCHA, 2002iii). As an exception, 
indigenous and international NGOs had gradually constructed a school and provided 
limited financial support for teachers' salaries in Barak Induk Major, Sei Lepan. 
Children in the Barak Sei Minyak settlement were sent to a school in a nearby village 
17 The secretary-general for RPuK describes how in, "Central Aceh we use an art-based approach as 
people who joined liked art. In North, South Aceh and Pidie, we take the Islamic approach as most of 
GAM suspect a nationalist agenda" (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
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(Interview 56,13 February 2003). Therefore, as examined in subsection 7.4.2, the 
children in the case study received adequate primary education but the future funding of 
this provision was in doubt. 
8.3.5 Trauma 
There was some provision for assessing and assisting those with trauma in Aceh. WHO 
initially focused on developing projects in Community Based Mental Health Services 
and sent team leaders to Bireuen, Central, North, East and South Aceh to conduct focus 
group discussions (OCHA, 2002iii). SC-US included psychosocial counselling for 
women and children in its Coming Home Programme, which aimed to strengthen the 
capacity of communities to cope with trauma and stress with the help of nine indigenous 
organisations (Interview 61,24 February 2003; and OCHA, 2002p). RPuK also 
provided trauma counselling for 72 displaced children in Bintang Meusara, Bandar sub- 
district, Central Aceh (OCHA, 2002s). However, the ongoing impact and effects of the 
conflict made trauma intractable across the province. The politicised displacement of 
the Polytechnic group prevented such long-ten-n assistance and this remained a 
significant need, as found in subsection 7.3.3. 
There was no evidence of psychosocial programmes for other displaced groups in North 
Sumatra. This was especially important since subsection 7.4.3 detailed how the 
protracted displacement of the Sei Lepan group and the violent nature of their evictions 
resulted in high-levels of trauma. However, through the resilience of the group, the 
committee conducted a programme for the traumatised children, which was managed by 
psychology students from Bandung University, West Java. The students came to the 
carnp every three months and trained the men to be "psychological advisers" by 
suggesting basic methods to assist the children (Interview 54,12 February 2003). 
8.3.6 Return and resettlement 
Sustainable development programmes were contingent on permanent return and 
resettlement, as examined above and as reinforced by the Guiding Principles. For IDPs 
in Aceh, there were limited achievements in return, which formed the most desirable 
260 
option for the displaced and the humanitarian response. Durable return required the 
consent of the RI, physical protection guarantees and co-ordination from the joint 
dialogue process, with development assistance from indigenous and international 
NGOs. In particular, the political response was actively involved in fast return, using it 
frequently as a confidence-building measure within the joint dialogue process. In 2001, 
the HDC mediation advisor, noting the foundations for the link between IDPs and joint 
dialogue, describes how, "in the joint committees, GAM are all local and can get the 
IDPs to return. In this sense they have been more effective than the RI representatives" 
(Interview 6,11 March 2001). For example, during the Humanitarian Pause, 
representatives from the joint committees, monitoring teams and the HDC intervened 
and facilitated the return of 23,000 IDPs in South Aceh (HDC, 2000b). In January 
2003, members of the tripartite Joint Security Committee QSQ escorted and returned 
more than 2500 IDPs from Lhoksukon to eight villages in North Aceh, demonstrating 
the unusual usefulness of the CoHA's security mechanisms (Agence France-Presse, 
2003a). 18 
The JRS and SC-US were the other main international humanitarian actors providing 
protection during return. JRS escorted 401 IDPs in Lhok Nibong sub-district, East 
Aceh, in March 2003 (OCHA, 2003d). In 2002, the local authority gave security 
guarantees for JRS to return 250 people to Bukit sub-district, Central Aceh and another 
120 families were waiting to return (OCHA, 2002d; 2002f; and 2002g). Reflecting 
Guiding Principle 28 (No. 2) and appreciating the need for prevention, the JRS Aceh 
co-ordinator confirmed that after the CoHA, "we will get the communities to assess 
their own situation, prepare the involvement of the women and empower others to speak 
or help them to stop internal displacement in the first place. " (Interview 58,23 February 
2003). Despite these examples, subsections 6.1.1,7.1.1 and 7.3.5 found that the main 
pattern of repetitive displacement meant permanent return was not possible across the 
province, as demonstrated by the Polytechnic group. 
The majority of non-Acehnese IDPs in North Sumatra tried to resettle there or further 
south although there were some cases of return to places of origin or other locations in 
18 A month later, the JSC escorted 200 IDPs from Bireuen district to their homes in Takengon, Central 
Aceh. It was also reported that the JSC was working with CARDI's resettlement intervention programme 
on the planned return of another group on 4 March 2003 to Indramakmur and Pante Bidari, East Aceh 
district (OCHA, 2003b). CARDI's resettlement and sanitation programmes aimed to help make return 
and resettlement permanent using implementing partnerships with indigenous organisations, for example, 
Pemberdayaan Haerkat Inong Aceh and Muhammadiyah. 
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Aceh. The GoRl managed relocation, with some assistance from JRS. The senior 
official at the Social Welfare Department, North Sumatra Provincial Office, was not 
aware of any problems resettling IDPs and was content with the government's efforts 
(Interview 49,3 February 2003). In 2002,360 households were relocated in two 
districts in North Sumatra and 54 households to two other provinces in Sumatra and 
were given certificates of land ownership, housing and a living allowance for one year 
(Bakornas PBP & OCHA, 2002). In August 2001, the Minister for Social Affairs 
confirmed plans to relocate 53,000 IDPs. Each family head was to be given one hectare 
of land provided by the state-owned palm oil plantation in North Sumatra, with 20 per 
cent of the land going to local people to avoid jealousy and ill-feeling (77ze Jakarta 
Post, 2001i). 19 Despite these efforts, subsections 6.1.2,7.2.1 and 7.4.5 found that the 
main pattern of prolonged and unsettled IDPs suggests that permanent resettlement 
proved elusive across North Sumatra, as demonstrated by the illegality of the Sei Lepan 
settlements. 20 
8.3.7 Building capacities 
As noted throughout Sections 8.2-8.3, several international NGOs and UN agencies 
attempted to build the capacities of, and between, local government and indigenous 
NGOs through partnerships and co-ordination in the areas of health, livelihoods and 
trauma. 21 This last sustainable development component had a dual function since it also 
circumvented the Rl's restrictions on international field personnel. 
By 2003, RPuK believed that working alongside international actors is, "very essential" 
and operated with, "Oxfarn in North Aceh and with ICMC in Bireucn. " RPuK's 
regional co-ordinator adds that, "sometimes we network with other indigenous 
organisations, usually with PCC and others in Central Aceh" (Interview 72,8 March 
2003). The secretary-general of RPuK notes that they co-operate, "as a source of 
funding, aid, technical assistance and training and helping to raise the campaign for 
19 In June 2002, the chief of North Sumatra's Social Affairs Agency said that the central government had 
allocated Rp 10 million for each IDP family (Gunawan, 2002a). 
20 Although JRS had relocated 29 families to South Tapanuli, the majority of respondents wanted to stay 
based on their previous experiences of flight despite the government's opposition, an antagonistic intra- 
oup split and a hostile host community (Interview 54,8 February 2003). 
Across Aceh, OCHA became more involved in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance from 2001- 
2003. 
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IDPs in the international arena". The same informant concludes that, "if we work 
together, the mandate is more valuable and efficient since it can increase the amount of 
aid and improve training and communication with the local government" (Interview 70, 
28 February and 4 March 2003). 
The political response by HDC also encouraged capacity building and improved co- 
ordination in humanitarian assistance through the UNDP fund, which was a built-in 
component of the Humanitarian Pause. In 2001 the director of Flower Aceh applauds, 
64 our involvement with the HDC and the UNDP funding programme" since it improved 
access, assessments and protection from GAM, which was no longer able to "take their 
usual 8 per cent" of the aid (Interview 8,12 March 2001). The International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) and Oxfam also received funds and thus praised the =P 
programme. 22 
Nevertheless, field research also uncovered significant obstacles to capacity building, 
which centered on the ongoing conflict. As Oxfam's programme manager concludes in 
2003, the, "natural limitations from the conflict" means that "local NGOs are still stuck 
in a short-term mindset; there is community participation but there is no depth" 
(Interview 67,26 February 2003). ICMC's Aceh programme manager explains the 
shallowness of capacities, noting that in the areas where the government had authority it 
was unwilling to co-operate while local NGOs, especially women's groups, "could not 
leave their office" in lawless areas such as "South Aceh where the government was 
paralysed. " Consequently, indigenous NGOs also had a, "huge lack of faith in the 
government" (Interview 71,4 March 2003). SC-US's programme director agrees that, 
"capacity is low [ ... ] the conflict should have created more opportunities but it 
didn't". 23 Despite CARDI's progress in this area, its field co-ordinator believes that 
overall, "working with local partners has involved more problems than benefits". 24 
22 Oxfam was given US$ 72,000 from the UNDP for programmes with their five partner NGOs (Interview 
14,13 March 2001). IRC's rural development manager discloses they had, "received Rp 300 million for 
three different programmes" aimed at victim rehabilitation (Interview 12,13 March 2001). 
23 The same senior representative states that it, "took us nine months to assess and finalise nine proposals 
and then the programmes needed to be evaluated in the field" (Interview 61,24 February 2003). 
2*4 For example, "if the local partners are not based in Banda Acch then there is no co-ordination and it is 
very problematic and we might not know the communities where they work. We have tried to work with 
NGOs based in the districts". One difficulty with local partners was, "they try to please us. I wonder 
why the concept papers submitted involved water, sanitation and income-generating with nothing else 
needed", which suggested, "the people [beneficiaries] are not being asked so CARDI is now sending 
people to assess the concept papers. " (Interview 60,24 February 2003). 
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Conversely, RPuK criticised their international counterparts for the, "lack of co- 
operation". In particular, its secretary-general was critical of the UNDP fund, which 
prioritised international NGOs even though, "their programmes were restricted to Banda 
Aceh because of security" (Interview 15,13 March 2001). The special status awarded 
to IDPs also became a source of disagreement. RPuK focused on IDPs, and returnees 
but international NGOs shifted to assisting conflict-affected communities because of 
pressure from the authorities. When the two collided within a group of beneficiaries, it 
resulted in competing programmes and confusion (Interview 70,28 February and 4 
March 2003). Politically and between indigenous organisations, RPuK, claims they 
wanted to assist victims, "regardless of their ethnicity" but "some local organisations 
only want to help Acelinese", which resulted in the termination of a partnership. By 
2003, RPuK's regional co-ordinator concludes that, "it is very difficult to work 
together. " (Interview 72,8 March 2003). 
The building of capacities was not possible at the Polytechnic because the authorities 
discouraged the continuation of the displacement. For example, the student 
organisation at Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, Badan Executive Mahas (BEM), claimed 
that, except for PCC, they "never talk to other indigenous or international NGOs 
although we tried to talk to them, for example, HDC, JSC, PMI [Indonesian Red Cross] 
and CARDI". The PCC states that they never approached the government or district 
head, "because the local government and Satkorlak PBP do not care. " Although the 
PCC had a limited presence and in general believed that the most important step for 
their organisation was, "the integration and interaction with the people"; their efforts 
were limited because of volunteers and funding (Interview 73,8 March 2003). 
Capacity building did not thrive in North Sumatra although Sections 8.2-8.3 uncovered 
some examples in the areas of health and education. As detailed below, partnerships 
between international and indigenous NGOs discontinued overall after allegations of 
corruption. Sei Lepan exemplified the deficit, with the main CBO, Candhika, using 
their members' money and conducting small fund-raising activities to finance and 
operate basic programmes. The CBO leader adds that, "we do not want to work alone 
but we have to" (Interview 56,13 February 2003). The case study group was equally 
zealous to secure help, for example, to find a marketing place for their crops (Interview 
57,14 February 2003). 
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Overall, the successful implementation of sustainable development programmes proved 
elusive. On the surface, this outcome in Aceh was unusual considering the concerted 
efforts towards assistance by the humanitarian response and the RI's original 
welcoming of intervention outlined in Section 5.2. Although there was less attention 
paid to the IDPs in North Sumatra, this finding was also strange since humanitarian 
actors were not operating in proximity to the armed conflict. In pinpointing the crux of 
this paradox, this section concurred with the Guiding Principles that permanent return 
and resettlement were crucial prerequisites in Aceh and North Sumatra, respectively. 
Therefore, to understand why these two tasks remained unattainable, it is essential to 
examine the resistance to improved protection from within state sovereignty. 
8.4 Ingrained Absence of Protection 
This section examines three gaps in protection for ]IDPs, which existed before the 
impact of the joint responses. The gaps consisted of the RI's politicisation of protection 
and assistance, the corruption of aid and opposition specifically to return and 
resettlement. The three reflected deficiencies in the authority and responsibility of the 
state but also were deliberately created by spoilers from both armed sides to prolong the 
conflict and together form the final manipulative constraint from state sovereignty. 
Therefore, this adds to the other constraints: the history of manipulation by both armed 
sides (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), the use of the responses to suit ulterior agendas (subsection 
4.5.2) and the politicisation of IDPs (Chapter Six). The Guiding Principles provide an 
extra layer of protection for IDPs by preserving the role of humanitarian actors. 
However, in the two provinces, this safeguard was consistently ignored. 
8.4.1 Politicisation of protection and assistance 
Fundamentally, Principle 3 (No. 1) reminds that "[n]ational authorities have the primary 
duty and responsibility" to provide protection and assistance to IDPs. This is echoed in 
Principle 25 (No. 1) and No. 2 of the same Principle reminds national authorities that 
international humanitarian organisations and other relevant actors enjoy the "right to 
offer their services in support of'H)Ps. Accordingly, No. 3 instructs that "[a]ll 
authorities shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and 
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grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and unimpeded access" 
to IDPs. 
The provisions of protection and assistance for I1DPs were manipulatively politicised in 
Aceh by the RI. First, the state consistently discouraged the humanitarian response 
from "assisting IDPs in camps", especially those deemed false and instead preferred the 
targeting of conflict-affected communities. 25 This attempted to limit and conceal the 
visibility of IDPs and the response to their needs. As an offshoot, districts, where state 
authority was either absent or debilitated because of strategic military losses, were also 
politicised and deemed no-go areas for humanitarians. 26 Furthermore, as examined in 
subsection 8.3.1, it traditionally discouraged development projects and human rights 
advocacy, thereby restricting assistance to relief until 2001-2002.27 After this time, 
some development was possible but humanitarian organisations still faced opposition 
and turbulence from the volatile political violence. The RI also proactively limited the 
capacity of international organisations by restricting the number of foreign staff, 
perceiving increased intervention as an unacceptable weakening of sovereignty and 
unwelcome scrutiny. 28 CARDI points out the recurring crucial flaw: "having a hasty 
solution to the IDPs is against the whole principle of IDPs as they have no other 
choices" (Interview 60,24 February 2003). This manipulative constraint, whether 
intentional or unintentional, prevented the provision of adequate protection and allowed 
the cycle of displacement to continue, as demonstrated by the repetitively displaced 
I1DPs at the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic. 
25 OCHA's area co-ordinator similarly states, "the government at the national level does not want to 
acknowledge there are IDPs. They want fast return" (Interview 59,24 February 2003). The Aceh co- 
ordinator for JRS and the programme manager for ICMC agreed (Interview 5 8,23 February 2003; and 
Interview 71,4 March 2001, respectively). 
26 In these power vacuums, either GAM or other non-state groups dominated. The Aceh co-ordinator for 
JRS asserts that, "on local government policy, for example, Pidie, the government does not take an active 
role. " (Interview 58,23 February 2003). CARDI concurs that, "with the government, it is limited 
government offices are not operating in South Aceh and Pidie" (Interview 60,24 February 2003). 
27 Human rights and development mandates were perceived to threaten sovereignty through long-term 
intervention and scrutiny of military practices and state policies. Oxfam's programme manager confirms 
that, "the government doesn't like our organisations, especially local NGOs as they are afraid of them 
uncovering what happened during the DOM [Military Operation Area; Daerah Operasi Milder]" 
(Interview 14,13 March 2001). Alternatively, relief was acceptable because on the surface it 
strengthened the RI's image as a responsible state among the international community. 
2's Field research in 2001 uncovered that all the international NGO staff in Aceh were operating in Aceh 
using 60-day tourist visas (Interview 11,13 March 2001; and Interview 34,27 March 2001). 
Consequently, staff worked illegally in Aceh, which resulted in a high turnover in field personnel and 
operations remained unstable. Even in 2003, SC-US notes that the main restriction on recruitment was, 
G'visas since each staff member has to wait for four months. " (Interview 61,24 February 2003). 
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The RI also politicised protection and assistance for I1DPs in North Sumatra by first 
discouraging and limiting the operations of international NGOs. This was to avoid 
external interference in general and there was particular sensitivity regarding the 
contribution of the state's transmigration programme to instability and the armed 
conflict in Aceh. 29 Consequently, the UN was confined to basic and infrequent 
assessment missions, leaving JRS and IMC as the only international NGOs with 
permanent operations. The SC-US programme director states that, "the key problem 
with assistance in Medan is the government's obstruction, which involves long 
negotiations" (Interview 61,24 February 2003). 30 When the real extent of the 
humanitarian problems became apparent in late 2002, logistical planning was extremely 
difficult since the humanitarian actors were unsure how many IDPs needed protection 
and assistance and the RI was still uncooperative (Buiza, 2003). It was therefore not 
surprising that there were few international NGOs and UN agencies operating in Sei 
Lepan, with informants overwhelmingly pointing to restrictions from the state as the 
cause of their inability to provide protection and assistance. 
Instead, the state preferTed to use its national termination policy but this proved to be a 
cursory approach to the myriad needs and problems raised by displacement. 31 That is, 
once an IIDP selected return, resettlement or empowerment and received the meagre 
compensation, the GoRI was quickly absolved of its long-term responsibility and was 
no longer required to provide assistance. 32 Problems existed from the start since the 
GoRl was reluctant to respond and the termination policy was the product of 
international pressure. 33 Moreover, the policy suffered from poor planning and 
insufficient institutional capacity by recklessly transferring responsibility to a stretched 
provincial government (OCHA ID Unit, 2002). This made the implementation of the 
29 The representative of the American Consulate in Medan raised the latter point and referred to Maluku, 
where the people also blamed transmigration as a cause of the conflict (Interview 52,4 February 2003). 
30 JRS North Sumatra stated that it was comparatively easier for their international NGO branch to work 
in Aceh. The co-ordinator recalls that, "in Alu Dua [IDP camp in North Sumatra], we were questioned by 
the military and they stopped the UN representatives from entering the camp in October 2002. " 
(Interview 54,8 February 2003). 
31 At the start of 2002, OCHA described the policy as the GoRI's simplistic instruction for the IDPs to go 
back home (OCHA ID Unit, 2002). When the termination policy was announced, the GoRl assured the 
international community that it solve the IDP problem in six months as security conditions improved 
(Unidjaja, 2002). However, representatives of the provincial government emphasised the GoRl's 
timeframe was unrealistic and "emphasised the need to place solutions in the context of the specific 
conditions of the provincetregion concerned" (OCHA ID Unit, 2002). 
32 Even in principle, the allocation of Rp 8.75 million was significantly below the estimations of the 
Acehnese Refugees in North Sumatra (ARSINS), which claimed each family suffered between Rp 30 
million and Rp 40 rnillion through loss of property and belongings (Gunawan, 2002d). 
33 CARDI's Aceh field co-ordinator confirms there, "were international pressures for a hasty solution" 
(Interview 60,24 February 2003). 
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compensation funds problematic and there was systematic corruption, as detailed below. 
By the end of 2003, it was not surprising that the provincial government was still 
struggling to implement the policy. OCHA concluded that the, "sluggish 
implementation rate at the provincial level does not meet the Central Government 
policy requirements" and urged funds to "be utilized effectively to minimize IDPs 
sufferings" (OCHA, 2003f). These problems were exemplified in Sei Lepan, with the 
group in protracted disagreement with the RI regarding compensation. 
8.4.2 Corruption of aid 
Across Aceh, there was systemic financial corruption of aid by state actors (the central 
and provincial government and the military) and GAM to fulfil vested economic 
interests, as introduced in subsection 5.3. L This gap in protection for IDPs was thus 
deliberate and manipulative and exacerbated the mistrust between Acelinese and the 
state. In 2001, the IRC rural development manager describes that, "usually the 
government gives aid on return but in some cases the government worker is corrupt and 
they take a percentage of the aid. " (Interview 12,13 March 2001). Even a former senior 
policeman and government representative on the HDC monitoring teams explains how, 
"I told the government that if there is funding, local NGOs should deliver the aid with 
the government to prevent corruption. " (Interview 68,28 February 2003). Problems of 
financial corruption within the state were epitomised and further complicated by the 
decentralisation or NAD autonomy legislation in Aceh (Interview 47,6 December 
34 2002). Many NGOs believed the only hope was for the central governmental to step 
in for the provincial government. 35 
As examined in subsection 5.3.2, aid was also manipulated and then appropriated by 
GAM and other predatory groups. CARDI's field co-ordinator states that, "since 2002, 
GAM demanded 20 per cent of the budget from local partners in some cases" (Interview 
34 During seminars among humanitarians and key stakeholders in Aceh, the GoRl was criticised for 
corruption and was asked to immediately install a local law (qanun) on anti-corruption (OCHA, 2001m). 35 JRS reported that the Aceh provincial administration disbursed a third batch of humanitarian aid 
totalling Rp 25.7 billion (US$ 3 million) for those widowed or disabled by recent violence. However, 12 
out of 14 regencies had yet to submit their accountability reports on the use of funds disbursed in the first 
two phases. NGOs feared that money would be lost to corruption and never reach those in need (JRS, 
2003c). In its strategic plan, CARDI recognised "entrenched and sometimes corrupt bureaucracies" as a 
"significant constraint" for future operations (CARDI, 2002). 
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60,24 February 2003). RPuK clarifies that extortion through illegal taxes varied 
depending on the area. For example, "sometimes GAM ask for 10 per cent of the aid as 
tax but in Pidie, GAM ask for 30 per cent and think this is reasonable since they are in 
control of the area" (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). Similarly, OCHA's 
area co-ordinator recalls that on one occasion, "those that collected the food were not 
the targeted groups so the WFP uses the government to distribute. " (Interview 59,24 
February 2003). There was no evidence of extortion and the corruption of assistance at 
the Polytechnic because of its limited scope and amount and the sensitive nature of such 
an inquiry. However, at a minimum, the committee's lack of accountability and the 
erosion of traditional social structures raise significant concerns, as detailed in 
subsection 7.3.3. 
IDPs in North Sumatra suffered from the widespread corruption of the termination fund 
by representatives of the provincial government at least. The central government 
argued it disbursed the fund in 2002 but in November, the police charged two 
government employees and the district chief of Binjai with siphoning off Rp 165.5 
million set aside for 277 families (Gunawan, 2002d). The promised funds were 
postponed in December 2002 and again in February 2003 after allegations of further 
corruption and the inability to register accurately the IDPs. 36 The JRS North Sumatra 
co-ordinator notes how, "Satkorlak PBP first said there were 13,000 IDPs but after the 
policy said there were 22,000 because the officials were looking for more money. " The 
same informant states that at the time the, "JRS national director went and complained 
to Bakarnos PBP but nothing happened. " (Interview 54,8 February 2003). Even those 
who received the funds were allegedly forced to pay from Rp 750,000-Rp 1 million to 
local officials. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence, 12 UN officials inspected the 
camps in North Sumatra and praised the GoRI's handling of the IDPs, which 
presumably demonstrated the international community's tentative approach to 
sovereignty (OCHA, 2002vii). Although the Sei Lepan group had not received the 
termination fund, PIPA noted corruption of emergency assistance in 2000 when they 
each received Rp 700,00 out of an intended Rp 1.1 million (Interview 55,12 February 
36 The delays and the corruption caused several protests by IDPs during 2002-2003 in Medan, involving 
hunger strikes, clashes with the police and arrests. By 2002, only 3000 of 23,000 families had received 
their resettlement funds (Gunawan, 2002d; and Buiza, 2003). 
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2003). 37 ARSINS was also accused of corruption and was consequently disbanded 
(Interview 55,12 February 2003). 38 
8.4.3 OPposition to return and resettlement 
Return specifically remained volatile in Aceh because, as argued in subsections 5.3.1 
and 5.3.2, there were enough spoilers from the TNI and GAM that benefited from the 
continuation of the armed conflict. Indiscriminate and deliberate displacement was an 
important element of these campaigns, as detailed throughout Section 6.2. Therefore, 
both sides manipulatively opposed the permanent return of IDPs and this represented a 
crucial absence of protection. Accordingly, the relevant Principles were not upheld. 
Principle 28 (No. 1) ambitiously asks "competent authorities" to accept their "primary 
duty and responsibility to establish conditions and means to allow IDPs to return 
voluntarily, in safety and with dignity or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the 
country". Principle 30 reminds national authorities to "grant and facilitate [ ... ] rapid 
and unimpeded access" to international humanitarian organisations and other 
st appropriate actors" to assist with return and resettlement. 39 
OCHA wrote that across Indonesia, despite the desire of "many of the II)Ps", the 
ongoing conflicts prevented return and there was no "strategy for dealing with situations 
of extended insecurity. " (OCHA ID Unit, 2002). In Aceh, even when there were 50,000 
IDPs in 2000, it was warned that "[b]oth sides are eager to return them but are less able 
and perhaps willing to deal with the larger structural issues that have led to this 
situation. " (HDC, 2000b). For example, it was reported that 350 IDPs from Getol sub- 
district, Central Aceh, had to stay in Gampong Gajah village, Mutiara sub-district, 
Pidic, as their return was postponed because of the increase in "militia activities in the 
area" (OCHA, 2002o). OCHA adds that, "700 Acehnese families displaced from 
Central Aceh to Bireuen and Pidie, want to return but cannot because of the Javanese 
37 The leader of PIPA was meant to appear as a witness in court against the indigenous NGO appointed to 
distribute the money but the case never went to trial because the father of the head of the CBO was a 
policeman (Interview 55,12 February 2003). 
38 The latter was confirmed by JRS and Candhika (Interview 54,8 February 2003; and Interview 56,13 
February). 
39 Therefore, Principle 28 (No. 2) was not upheld by the RI, which asks for special efforts to ensure IDPs 
fully participate in the planning and management of their return. Similarly, Principal 29 (No. 1), the right 
to fully participate in public affairs and have full and equal access to public services upon return, was not 
respected. 
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militias" (Interview 59,24 February 2003). 40 GAM also shared responsibility since it 
was able to return some groups when it suited their interests. For example, the 
secretary-general for RPuK recalls that, "in Lhok Nibong there are false IDPs returning 
because GAM said so. " (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
The Polytechnic group, were waiting anxiously for the IDP committee to signal return. 
It can only be presumed that the committee allowed return when the situation at their 
villages of origin became more stable or when needs could no longer be met at the 
Polytechnic. For the former, stability at home would have been decided by either or 
both armed sides, that is, GAM allowing return and/or promises of restraint from the 
military. For the second scenario, the B)Ps could have decided to take their chances, 
preferring to return despite the risks. All these possibilities centred on protection and 
therefore emphasise its crucial importance. 
Resettlement was also volatile and extremely inconsistent across North Sumatra, with 
efforts by the state proving haphazard and provoking opposition. Return to places of 
origin in Aceh was consistently prevented because of the deterioration in security, as 
concluded in Section 6.3. For example, the East Aceh regency administration prepared 
a safe transit area for IDPs in Kejiran Muda, Kuala Simpang district but it was later 
cancelled due to bad security and moved to the transit village to Pulau Tiga village in 
Tarniang Hula district, East Aceh. In October 2001, East Aceh Regent, Azman 
Usmanuddin, promised to move the IDPs to a safe zone stretching from West Kangsa to 
Kuala Simpang but this plan was also cancelled because of poor security. The IDPs 
were desperate to move out of the camps because they were forced to steal to earn 
money (Gunawan, 2001b). For all groups, the options were then reduced further 
because the other provinces perceived the 1DPs as "outsiders" and were unwilling to 
accept them (Gunawan, 2001a). For example, in July 2002, the head of South Tapanuli 
district rejected 41 displaced families from Aceh, sending them back to Medan as soon 
as they arrived in the district (Gunawan, 2002b) . 
41 For the Sei Lepan group, the best 
40 Another group that had returned to Timang Gajah sub-district, Central Aceh, moved back to their 
previous IDP camps in Bireuen and Pidie districts because the local government promised, though failed, 
to re-build their houses (Waspada cited in OCHA, 2002o). 41 A joint GoRI & OCHA ID Unit workshop recommended that protection and security (for example, 
strengthening the rule of law) could be strengthened through the introduction of confidence building and 
reconciliation projects and schemes to facilitate dialogue between communities (OCIIA ID Unit, 2002; 
and OCHA, 2004b). OCHA recognises the GoRl's "every effort to assist the IDPs" but emphasises that 
"the capacity of Satkorlak PBP and particularly Satlak PBP staff is limited and requires strengthening. " 
(OCHA, April 2004). 
271 
option was the validation of their resettlement by the GoRI, empowerment and proper 
integration with the host community. 
This section examined how the constraint from state sovereignty contributed to 
inadequate protection during and after displacement. Guiding Principle 3 (No. 1), 
Principle 25 (Nos. 1-3), Principle 28 (Nos. 1-2), Principle 29 (No. 1) and Principle 30 
elucidated how the RI was negligent and failed to maximise the potential for sustainable 
development by deliberately restricting thejoint responses. In Aceh as exemplified by 
the Polytechnic group, IDPs were vulnerable and open to manipulation. Permanent 
return was thwarted by spoilers, which meant displacement was short though repetitive 
and consequently assistance was stymied. In North Sumatra as demonstrated by the Sei 
Lepan IDPs, the GoRI's termination policy was inadequate in addressing the complex 
problems and there were insufficient capacities at the provincial and national levels of 
government. This encouraged corTuption and the paucity of humanitarian actors 
prevented adequate co-ordination and scrutiny. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined how the provisions of protection and assistance by international 
and indigenous organisations presented the RI with valuable opportunities to strengthen 
its responsibility for IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra. It was concluded that the 
Guiding Principles displayed the potential to advise the practice of all relevant actors 
and were applicable in determining protection concerns. However, representatives of 
the humanitarian response overwhelmingly highlighted that successful implementation 
required improved security and for the Principles to be more context-specific. 
In the field, the delivery of protection and assistance was based on an extensive 
framework of organisations and agencies, especially in Aceh. In both provinces, 
indigenous and international organisations made tangible advances in alleviating the 
relief and development-based needs of II)Ps. More generally, the state's consent to and 
participation within the joint responses demonstrated significant progress. 
Nevertheless, within each provincial context, inadequate protection was the 
fundamental and recurring problem, which explained gaps in the provision of relief and 
the thwarting of sustainable development. The two case study groups exemplified these 
outcomes. As prerequisites for fulfilling long-term needs, the Polytechnic IDPs needed 
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improved security upon return to avoid further uprootedness and the Sei Lepan group 
required the RI to validate their resettlement. 
To explain the obstacles to the provision of protection, it was argued that the RI was 
perennially negligent through the politicisation of protection and assistance, the 
corruption of aid and opposition to return and resettlement. Moreover, these gaps in 
protection were created deliberately by spoilers from the RI and GAM to fulfill vested 
interests. This was demonstrated by the RI's politicised view of the Polytechnic and Sei 
Lepan IIDPs, which thus became a means to the political violence. Consequently, 
attempts by the joint responses to protect and assist meant risking their privileged 
neutrality. However, this constraint from state sovereignty only partially explains the 
overall deficiencies in protection. To complete the understanding, it is essential to 
examine the final weaknesses in the application of the joint responses. 
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Inadequate Provision of Protection 
This chapter examines how two weaknesses in the application of the joint political and 
humanitarian responses contributed to the inadequate provision of protection for the 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Aceh and North Sumatra. This inability to fill 
the protection gaps was crucial in the prevention of sustainable development and peace. 
Ultimately, the operations of the responses became consumed by the politics of the 
conflict and the joint dialogue until the provisions of protection and assistance no longer 
appeared neutral. To understand this central point, it is necessary to include though 
look beyond the Polytechnic and Sei Lepan case study groups to the systemic 
weaknesses of the responses. It is also pertinent to refer directly to connecting findings 
from previous chapters. 
As the first weakness in the application of the joint responses, Section 9.1 addresses the 
insufficient preparation by indigenous and international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) in meeting protection needs. 
This is demonstrated by a review of their mandates, their overly reactive efforts in the 
field and the evidence that they misjudged the level and type of protection concerns. 
Against the instruction of the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, the responses were too slow to integrate the provisions of protection with 
assistance. ' 
The second section focuses on the main designated mechanism for protection in Aceh, 
the joint dialogue structure of the political response, which proved too vulnerable to 
spoilers. This was demonstrated by the continuation of forced displacement in spite of 
the joint security agreements, which formed a facet of the intensification of political 
violence overall. The vulnerability is explained by the powerlessness of the joint 
committees and the monitoring teams and the restriction of civil society from the 
negotiations between the Republic of Indonesia (RI) and the Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)). 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. See Appendix A for complete text of the 
Principles. 
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As the final weakness, Section 9.3 argues that the joint responses integrated 
inappropriately, as demonstrated by the exclusionary pursuit of peace dividends. 
This crucial flaw exacerbated the politicisation of protection and assistance in Aceh and 
North Sumatra, which was an original constraint from state sovereignty. Consequently, 
security for IDPs and the staff of the responses could no longer be guaranteed in Aceh. 
The introduction of martial law in May 2003 signalled that neutrality had been 
discredited. 
9.1 Insufficient Preparation 
The first part of this section examines three forms of protection in Aceh and one in 
North Sumatra. Although some represented innovative ideas in difficult contexts, the 
analysis clearly uncovers the lack of a firm, consistent plan or procedure by the 
responses in each province. To help explain this insufficient preparation, the second 
part of this section pinpoints how the responses misjudged protection needs by making 
two basic mistakes. 
9.1.1 Attempts to protect 
The Guiding Principles emphasise the prioritisation of protection before (Principles 5- 
9), during (Principles 10-27), and after (Principles 28-30) internal displacement. To all 
humanitarian actors, Principle 27 (No. 1) encourages taking "appropriate measures" in 
giving "due regard to the protection needs and human rights" of IDPs, with respect to 
"relevant international standards and codes of conduct". Nevertheless, as highlighted 
by the World Food Programme (WFP), the "protection of civilians is difficult in 
guerrilla-styled war, where entire villages may be suspected of tacitly supporting a rebel 
movement or authorities" (WFP, 2002). 
In Aceh, IDPs needed protection from the political violence during displacement and 
upon return, for example, from crossfire, physical intimidation, extortion, manipulation 
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.2 and other violations of basic human rights The first form of protection, the political 
response by the HDC, aimed to persuade the armed sides to stop the violence through 
joint dialogue and the signing of cessation of hostility agreements from 2000, which 
were detailed in Section 5.1. In the field, the agreements were encouraged and 
monitored by a fixed and small number of the third party's international personnel and 
two tripartite (RI, GAM and neutrals) teams focusing on security and humanitarian 
action. The latter also depended on the support of the state, UN agencies and 
indigenous and international NGOs. To implement the agreements, from 2000, the 
HDC could provide incentives though ultimately relied on the good faith of each side 
and in 2003 attempted to use limited sanctions to punish and prevent violations. At the 
start or the humanitarian intervention phase, there were several examples of successful 
return and general protection through the first short-term ccasefire, the Humanitarian 
Pause (the Pause). Consequently, expectations were raised but sustainable protection 
and return proved impossible. 
Gaps in the provision of protection prevailed because the implementation of the joint 
agreements between 2000 and 2001 depended upon the tripartite teams and the HDC to 
persuade regional and battalion commanders to respect the security guarantees made by 
their superiors in Banda Aceh and Geneva. 3A retired senior police officer and former 
member of the Monitoring Team for Humanitarian Action (MTHA) confirmed this 
amorphous approach by recalling personal attempts to persuade GAM to stop the 
deliberate displacement of civilians in 2001: 
I used my relationship with a regional commander of GAM and I told him that 
the I1DP agenda would bring no benefits except suffering to the people. I went 
with GAM and the neutrals [civil society representatives on the monitoring 
teams] to an IDP site. They were in a poor state and all suffering (Interview 68, 
28 February 2003). 
At the camp, the informant then, "gave a speech and because the IDPs knew me they 
listened and agreed to return". Although the, "government and police didn't want to 
hear", after some negotiation, "the local government assisted with some food, 
transportation and money to return" (Interview 68,28 February 2003). Despite the 
2 For example, 275 IDPs from six villages in Syiah Utama, Central Aceh, had to walk for 20 days to seek 
shelter in North Aceh. During this time, they were threatened by an armed gang and the village head was 
kidnapped (OCHA, 2002c). Of course, protection from the political violence push factors needed to be 
extended to all civilians to prevent displacement. 
3 The agreements consisted of the Pause, the Moratorium on Violence, the ten-day pact and Peace 
Through Dialogue. 
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successful outcome, there was no established procedure for providing consistent 
protection, as proven by the prevalence of repetitive displacement. 
Joint dialogue, from Banda Aceh to Geneva, culminated in the joint signing of the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (the CoHA) in December 2002. The latter 
agreement, inter alia, introduced more and larger unarmed teams of international HDC 
personnel to monitor and report violations in selected peace zones. It also increased 
international support and reinforced the incentive of substantial financial assistance if 
the cease-fire was maintained. However, in the field, protection was still contingent on 
personal efforts and persuasive personalities to ensure the implementation of security 
guarantees. Overall, achievements in protection remained short-term, as the joint 
agreements lacked teeth and a clear strategy to resolve the main and instrumental 
security concerns. In sum, both armed sides were able to further the manipulation of 
IDPs and the humanitarian situation to suit their political and military objectives. 4 
The second form of protection involved the ad hoc physical presence of an unarmed, 
humanitarian organisation, which communicated with either armed side to ensure the 
safe passage of IDPs, the delivery of aid or more generally and indirectly, to increase 
awareness of needs. For example, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) was obliged to provide protection to 150 IDPs that suddenly occupied 
its office in May 2002. The UN agency prevented the government authorities from 
entering the building and secured guarantees for the safe return and assistance for the 
group a few days later. Nevertheless, neither OCHA nor the Regional Representative 
Assembly could resolve the IDPs' main concern: the removal of an Indonesian National 
Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) post from their host village in North 
5 Aceh . Consequently, the group was split with some returning to their districts of origin 
while others sought refuge at the Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh (OCHA, 2002p; 
and 2002q). Furthermore, the UN area co-ordinator significantly adds that, "student 
groups were behind them as they wanted peacekeepers introduced to the province" 
(Interview 59,24 February 2003). Apart from raising the phenomenon of politicised 
displacement, the example reflected the complicated mixture of probable security fears 
4 The HDC process also sometimes involved civil society groups in protection. A co-ordinator for the 
People's Crisis Centre (PCC) notes that, "for the past two years, the Acelinese Civilian Security Task 
Force has facilitated certain local groups and is involved in co-ordination and consultation. The I IDC 
have also consulted us before and after agreements" (Interview 62,25 February 2003). 
5 That is, the group, from several districts of origin, had been displaced at least twice, first to North Aceh 
and then to OCHA's office in Banda Aceh. 
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for IDPs and outside efforts to manipulate international humanitarian actors. It may be 
argued that the UN office provided a well-needed sanctuary with staff keen and able to 
protect their basic rights. However, overall the example reflected the absence of a 
strategy to prevent and even react to layered protection needs and thus proved the 
insufficient preparation. 
Indigenous NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) also provided unofficial 
protection simply by their presence while communicating and co-ordinating with 
international organisations. The co-ordinator for PCC states, "we accompany the IDPs 
and then call the international NGOs to tell them about the needs and find out about the 
possibility of return. " (Interview 62,25 February 2003). A representative of the student 
organisation at the Polytechnic states how, "we protect the IDPs from the military and 
the government by providing the group with reliable information from the outside, by 
helping them improve their environment and reassuring them not to be afraid" 
(Interview 74,11 March 2003). Although indigenous NGOs and CBOs provided basic 
though important protection, their links with international NGOs, UN agencies and the 
HDC were tenuous. Consequently, protection efforts incurTed formidable risks, 
considering the dynamics of the conflict and the military's ingrained suspicion and 
opposition to indigenous humanitarian organisations. For example, the OCHA area co- 
ordinator recalls that, "the PCC usually live with the IDPs but one time the police 
arrested one of their staff and they were prevented from reaching the camp. " (Interview 
59,24 February 2003). 6 
The third form of protection involved overdue programmes to strengthen the links 
between protection and assistance by initiating constructive dialogue with the RI and 
between the state and beneficiaries. 7 Oxfam's programme manager describes how, "we 
are trying to encourage direct dialogue between local authorities and communities, to 
make them aware of each other's needs and to improve access for us" (Interview 67,26 
February 2003). The Jesuit Refugee Service QRS) Aceh also "did not link relief and 
protection" but was planning to focus on "food production in a safe environment" 
(Interview 58,23 February 2003). The programme manager for the International 
Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) agrees that, "protection was being considered 
6 The protection of indigenous humanitarian personnel through physical and unarmed accompaniment 
was provided solely by the skeletal presence of Peace Brigades International. 
7 The ultimate type of protection, an armed guarding or shielding by a third party, was not used in Aceh. 
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more so but efforts were still limited to preserving ongoing assistance" (Interview 71,4 
March 2003). The regional co-ordinator for the Women's Volunteer Team for 
Humanity (RPuK) pinpoints the operational dilemma: "aid is needed but without 
protection it is meaningless". The informant explains that, "when the IDPs return and 
aid is provided, if they have no protection or security from GAM and the TNI, the 
people will flee so the aid will have no meaning" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). 
Despite the efforts, the crucial link between assistance and protection was not attempted 
until two to three years after the start of the joint responses. 8 
In North Sumatra, there was not the same need for protection from the political violence 
because the conflict was not in proximity. However, there were still important safety 
concerns and the operations of the humanitarian response were restricted by the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GoRI), as detailed in subsection 8.4. L The 
co-ordinator for JRS North Sumatra, with regular access to the Sei Lepan IDPs, states 
that, "we just support the group, facilitate their needs, help them become organised and 
advise them to be united but to avoid violence against the government" (Interview 54,8 
February 2003). However, as demonstrated by the Sei Lepan group, the most pertinent 
need was advocacy by humanitarian organisations to resolve the illegality of their 
settlements and to promote the right to empowerment and compensation. Protection 
from corruption by state and non-state actors was also necessary and equally there was 
evidence that the IDPs needed protection from one another based on an emerging and 
visible divide. 
9.1.2 Misjudging protection needs 
First, protection was not deemed a priority in both provinces because the international 
donor community perceived the total numbers of IDPs in the province to be low, 
compared to, for example, the Horn of Africa and the former Yugoslavia. The former 
a It was only in 2002 that the Global IDP Project together with the Consortium for the Assistance to 
Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) discussed protection and the Guiding Principles in a 
structured though basic workshop, which addressed questions such as what is protection? and explored 
different approaches to improving protection concerns within relief programmes (Global IDP Project, 
2002: 189). In February 2003, some months before martial law and the resultant exiting of international 
NGOs, the International Organisation of Migration started a partnership with the Indonesian Department 
of Justice and Human Rights (Depkeh & HAM) on training in the Principles, protection assessment and 
monitoring and the development of reconciliation strategies (OCHA, 2003a). For more details, see 
OCHA, 2003a; and 2004b. 
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MrHA representative promotes the need for a more context-specific interpretation, 
noting that, "I think 12,000 is high. Here each village is around 300 people and the area 
is 30 km between the village and displacement area so they cannot bring clothes or 
enough food" (Interview 68,28 February 2003). Linked to this, international 
organisations did not realisc that IDPs were repetitively displaced nor did they allow for 
the recurring, disruptive impact on those displaced and the host communities in Aceh. 
Even by 2003, OCHA was still promoting ill-founded optimism when it assumed that 
such IDPs "usually returned to their villages within a few weeks and started 
reconstructing their houses and livelihoods" (OCHA, 2003a). Consequently, the 
responses were not prepared to monitor and thus protect the main type of displacement. 
Protection in Aceh was also undertstimated because the responses followed the 
perception that short-term, localised JIDPs were false, as introduced in Chapter Six. 
Irrespective of actual needs, false IDPs received less or were denied protection and 
assistance compared to those deemed genuine. The secretary-general for RPuK 
explains that, "aid is given at the start of displacement for the real IDPs whose houses 
have been burnt, therefore, when they have nothing". Conversely, "for the false IDPs, 
because they were forced, they usually bring some stuff with them" and were not 
considered important beneficiaries (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
However, the simplistic dichotomy established a worrying trend, that is, the perceived 
status of a group both discouraged assessment in general and as a result it was likely 
that the level of assistance did not correspond with actual needs. For indigenous and 
international humanitarian actors, it was argued that the dichotomy was justified 
because of constraints upon resources and personnel. In addition, it was argued that 
there were greater risks for humanitarians in protecting and assisting false IDPs. That 
is, when a group was politicised by either armed side, those that tried to protect and 
assist the group were in turn tarnished. Operational dilemmas aside, the responses 
exacerbated the politicisation of groups through this selection process, which prioritised 
IDPs perceived to be real. However, as demonstrated by the Polytechnic group, 
repetitive displacement created both basic relief and development needs and thus fell in 
between this dichotomy. Therefore, the case study findings again challenge this 
damaging division. 
Protection needs varied between the two case studies and provinces. Nevertheless, 
close analysis demonstrated that the responses were not prepared in adequately meeting 
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protection needs. While taking into consideration the complexities arising from low- 
intensity conflict, fundamental mistakes were made initially and subsequent efforts to 
formulate and integrate protection in substantive ways arrived too late. Therefore, the 
two case studies reflected the lack of 'due regard' to protection needs in operational 
mandates and verified that 'aid without protection is meaningless'. To further the 
understanding of inadequate protection, it is important to examine the more pragmatic 
reasons for weaknesses in the field. 
9.2 Vulnerable Joint Structure 
Protection for IDPs was weak in the field because the main mechanism in Aceh, the 
structure of joint dialogue, was too vulnerable to spoilers. Vulnerability stemmed from 
the powerlessness of the joint committees and monitoring teams and the prevention of 
civil society from gaining a substantive stake in the dialogue process. It is appropriate 
to focus on the continuation of internal displacement to exemplify this weakness. 
9.2.1 Continuation of internal displacement 
Following from the assertion that the political violence intensified, as detailed in 
subsection 5.3.3, it is necessary to demonstrate how internal displacement continued in 
Aceh. This proves the vulnerability of the joint structure, its inability to implement the 
joint security agreements and the direct impact on civilians. Based on approximate 
totals, before the political response, OCHA estimated between 200,000 and 560,000 
persons were forced to seek refuge during 1999. In May 2000, when the Pause was 
signed and one month prior to implementation, the numbers fell to a few hundred. 
However, when the Pause began in June 2000, symbolically 8000 were displaced by 
sweeping operations before the end of the month (The Jakarta Post, 2000). The 
increase in fighting and the collapse of civilian authority in certain districts again 
sparked displacement towards the end of the year despite phase II of the Pause (OCHA, 
2001b; National Co-ordinating Board for the Management of Disasters and 
IDPs/Refugees (Bakornas PBP) & OCHA, 2002; and Daorueng, 2002). 2001 was the 
Year with the highest killing rate and total numbers of IDPs remained around 20,000 
until August where there was a drop to 12,000. Therefore, the Peace Through Dialogue 
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phase (implemented in Mar-ch-April) was not effective in this respect. There was a peak 
again to 18,600 in September and by February 2002 the numbers declined to 9000 
despite the absence of a new agreement (Oxfam, data cited in OCHA, 27 July 2001; 
Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) figures cited in OCHA, 2001g; OCHA, 2001h; Oxfam data 
cited in OCHA, 2001i; OCHA, 2001k; 2001m; and 2002e). 
I 
The signing of the CoHA in December 2002 did create instances of successful return. 
However, the Polytechnic IDPs were a significant exception and the group exemplified 
the type of displacement (pushed by violence and politics), that the political response 
was originally meant to assist, protect and prevent by facilitating joint agreements on 
security and escorting specific groups back to their villages of origin. Although it was 
never admitted, perhaps those manipulating the Polytechnic group were waiting for this 
international safeguard. That is, the group was symbolically displaced after the CoHA 
and correspondingly such international attention on their return would have suited GAM 
and perplexed the GoRl. 
Politics aside, it was clear that protection, permanent return and sustainable 
development required a more effective mechanism. A representative from the 
indigenous NGO, Women's Crisis Centre, describes that, "the IDPs return to their 
villages because they hear it is peaceful and calm but as soon as the news changes they 
flee again" (Interview 28,21 March 2001). The Aceh co-ordinator for JRS argues that, 
"cases of return are difficult and need strong third parties between GAM and the 
military" (Interview 58,23 February 2003). Similarly, CARDI's field co-ordinator 
emphasises that their resettlement programme requires, "active support from the JSC 
[Joint Security Committee] to avoid future displacement. " (Interview 60,24 February 
2003). ICMC's programme manager agrees: "development is dependent on security, 
that is, the outcome of the peace process. " (Interview 71,4 March 2003). 
9.2.2 Powerlessness of the joint committees and monitoring teams 
Fundamentally, the joint structure could not implement the security promises because 
the representatives from the armed sides on the committees and monitoring teams did 
not possess sufficient authority and power. For example, the secretary-general of RPuK 
believes that, "we cannot work freely because the JSC cannot handle security. For 
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example, GAM threatened the teachers in our Alternative Education Programme in 
Julok, East Aceh because we could not pay the illegal tax". RPuK asked the JSC for 
help but it refused, "since the case was not between GAM and the RI and it was only a 
threat, it could not be considered to be breaking the joint agreements" (Interview 70,28 
February and 4 March 2003). Similarly, during the Pause in South Aceh, the Joint 
Committec for Security Matters said they did not have the authority to remove a Mobile 
Police Brigade (Brigade Mobil Polis; Brimob) post and therefore could not guarantee a 
displaced group's safety after return (Barakat, Connolly, Aitken & Strand, 2001: 55-56). 
Furthermore, the JSC were supposed to assist IDPs in Lhok Nibong return but this plan 
was cancelled after JSC members were physically attacked by spoilers in Central Aceh 
(Buiza & Risser, 2003: 84). 
Second, the monitoring teams found it difficult to function because they could not 
identify the perpetrators of violence. The former RI representative on the MTHA states 
that, "I could not make any decision at that time because there were many versions of 
the violations from GAM, neutruls and the TNI". The informant recalls an occasion 
when, "some D)Ps said GAM had asked them to flee, others in the same group said the 
TNI were violent in the village while the military denied they were there". 
Consequently, the MTHA member, "could not complete a thorough investigation 
because of the contradictory channels of information" (Interview 68,28 February 2003). 
The executive director of the Aceh NGOs' Coalition for Human Rights concurs that the, 
"monitoring teams were not neutral in their reporting" (Interview 2,10 March 2001). 
This was echoed by the executive director of the indigenous NGO, Care Human Rights 
Forum, who blamed the sending of the, "monitoring reports first to the joint committees 
in Banda Aceh rather than directly to the Joint Council in Geneva" (Interview 21,18 
March 2001). Interestingly, a GAM representative on thejoint committees agrees that, 
"the findings of the monitoring teams were weak" but blames "pressure from the Rr', 
thereby illustrating the persistent obstacle of partisanship (Interview 30,23 March 
2001). 
The powerlessness also stemmed from the stretched capacity of the third party 
facilitators. As stated in subsection 4.5.2, the RI restricted the number of international 
HDC staff in Aceh (2-3 persons) since it believed an increase would transform their role 
to mediation (Interview 5,10 March 2001). However, this was compounded by the 
HDC, which created a high turnover in international staff between 2000 and 2003. This 
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naturally produced a crisis management-styled approach to tasks of the political 
response. For instance, the HDC project manager was concerned that, "I am always 
under pressure to get things done, everything concentrates on an immediate impact and 
there is no provision for the short or long term. " (Interview 5,11 March 2001). 9 The 
mediation advisor to the HDC adds that, "I have had to cover for others while doing my 
own job. On the humanitarian side, I did not receive any information when I arrived in 
August and when the new project manager arrived he had no information on security" 
(Interview 6,11 March 2001). This directly affected the negotiations. The project 
manager recalls how, "during one workshop, the committee members asked me what I 
was doing because I was repeating something that they had done before. There was no 
hand-over. "10 Consequently, the same informant concludes that by 2001 they had, 
"essentially felt their way along" as negotiators (Interview 5,11 March 2001). It was 
thus not surprising that the provincial project director for MSF identifies, "an absence of 
authority among the HDC staff' (Interview 10,12 March 2001). 
9.2.3 Restriction of civil society 
The restriction of civil society from the dialogue process also made the joint structure 
vulnerable to spoilers. Civil society was not traditionally strong at the elite level of 
provincial politics because of the repressive New Order regime and in particular the 
Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM)). As an ironic consequence, 
GAM was able to increase its support during the 1990s until it created a "two-man 
game" with the RI (Interview 52,4 February 2003). However, as detailed in 
subsections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4, democratisation permitted a mushrooming of civil society 
activity and a new period of openness after 1999. At this time, representatives consisted 
of ulama, imams, student groups, NGOs and CBOs, in addition to local politicians but 
they were neither utilised nor protected by the HDC process. " Indigenous NGOs and 
academics in Aceh and foreign commentators repeatedly voiced this criticism 
9 Professor Barakat recognises that even at the start of the intervention, "the main problem was there were 
lots of people coming in and out, Larry [Hollingsworth], me etc. " (Interview 76,16 July 2004). 10 The RI representative confirmed this incident (Interview 32,25 March 200 1). 11 One source described that the Council of Ulama "exerts large influence on society" (Smith, 2002). The 
Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah, had a strong presence in addition to the main students' 
organisations of the Islamic Boarding Schools and the Aceh Daya Ulaina Association. These bodies and 
the local political parties, the United Development Party, the National Awakening Party, the Reform 
Factions (National Mandate Party and Justice Party) and the Regional Representative's faction, were also 
considered moderates and pro-dialogue (Indonesian Observer, 2000; and Moestafa & Farida, 2002). 
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throughout the intervention. For example, in 2002, the Acehnese Civil Society Task 
Force asked for greater recognition and inclusion (Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 
(TAPOL), 2002). 
The RI and GAM were always needed at the negotiating table to secure a ceasefire as 
the basis for sustainable peace. As the director of Flower Aceh appreciates, "it is better 
to get assurances for security from both sides first in order to allow civil society to 
grow" (Interview 8,12 March 2001). However, the efforts by official and unofficial 
representatives of civil society in Aceh to create a peaceful resolution to the conflict 
were marginalised by the RI, GAM and the HDC until it was too late (TAPOL, 2000: 
16). From the start, joint dialogue allowed di Tiro's GAM to manipulate and limit the 
composition of the dialogue partners and thus become the defacto, sole representatives 
of the Acelinese. First, the rebels were allowed to intimidate and bring down the 
People's Congress in April/May 2000, which was the first concerted attempt by the 
HDC to harness civil society. The first secretary of the American Consulate in Medan 
confirms that, "at the beginning of the negotiations in Banda Aceh, there were no 
neutral parties due to intimidation by the GAM" (Interview 1,9 March 2001). The 
director of Flower Aceh agrees that, "GAM objected to the civil society idea at the 
beginning" (Interview 8,12 March 2001). Moreover, this aggressiveness was then 
validated by the Geneva-based agency, which accepted di Tiro's GAM and allowed the 
exclusion of the Free Aceh Movement Government Council (Majelis Pemerintahall 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (MP GAM)) faction. 12 
Civil society was eventually included but was never given a proper stake in the dialogue 
and thus remained unprotected as detailed further below. For example, each armed side 
was allowed to nominate a neutral for the monitoring teams under the Pause, thereby 
"branding them as either pro-GAM or pro-government" (ICG, 2003a: 6). As another 
attempt, the Peace Through Dialogue stage of March 2001 aimed to create Democratic 
Consultations but the design of the mandate was unclear. In theory, the consultations 
were to become equal in standing to the two joint committees but the HDC programme 
12 As detailed in subsection 4.1.2, MP GAM wanted another state to be the intervening third party and for 
Acehnese civil society to be represented during negotiations. Di Tiro's GAM preferred the UN or an 
international NGO and wanted to act as the sole representatives. Perhaps it was a coincidence but MP 
GAM's leader, Don Zulfahri, was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur after publicly condemning the Pause 
shortly before its inception (Gerry van Klinken, cited in International Crisis Group (ICG), 2001 a: 6). 
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manager correctly predicted that they probably would not materialise because, "GAM 
do not want the domesticisation of the conflict" (Interview 5,11 March 200 1). 13 
From the restriction, the potential for harnessing popular support for resolving contested 
sovereignty was crucially ignored. The Acelinese rallied for independence in 
1999/2000 because of frustration with Jakarta, anger at the military's repression and the 
evocative precedent of East Timor. However, civilians and civil society representatives 
were not unified in their support for secession, as explained in subsection 4.2.1. 
Regardless, the negotiations did not address the alternative of increased autonomy, 
which remained constricted by the polarising debate between secession and inclusion 
within the RI. 14 This projected the false image that the Acehnese only supported 
GAM's violent campaign for independence. Moreover, GAM gained considerably from 
the dialogue, which granted them more control of territory, natural resources and 
humanitarian aid. Although the HDC was given evidence of GAM's increasing 
authority, the self-aggrandisement remained unchecked (Large, 2001: 13). The fear that 
the insurgents would make irrevocable gains and the resultant impasse in negotiations 
caused the GoRI to impose the flawed special autonomy law (Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam (NAD)) and unilaterally made it a precondition for the CoHA and all 
further dialogue. GAM accepted reluctantly but the two sides remained diametrically 
opposed, as demonstrated by the collapse of the CoHA. 
The restriction also had a direct impact on protection in the field. Since the main 
indigenous source of neutrality or at least pacifism was marginalised, the parlay became 
preoccupied with, and frozen by, the military aspects. Accordingly, spoilers could 
freely obstruct and manipulate thejoint committees and monitoring teams. As the 
director of Flower Aceh states, "the two sides fight against each other and civilians are 
used as the bargaining chips. GAM claim to protect the people but so do the GoRl" 
(Interview 8,12 March 2001). Consequently, the Acehnese remained alienated from 
the peace process. A representative of the Commission on Victims of Violence and 
Missing Persons (Kontras) describes how, "the people in the fields have never been 
involved in the process and there is great resentment towards the elite" (Interview 16, 
13 Furthermore, there was a civil society presence in Geneva before the joint agreements were signed but 
its role was erratic and the impact was superficial. For example, six prominent representatives attended 
talks in Geneva to provide input to both parties regarding the latest situation and to encourage them to end 
hostilities and restore peace (Serambi cited in OCHA, 2002ii). 
14 ICG concurs that the negotiations limited the dialogue to independence versus rule from Jakarta, 
thereby "excluding wider social and humanitarian concerns" (ICG, 2002: 11). 
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14 March 2001). Similarly, Large pinpoints a significant loss of trust by the Acehnese 
when the HDC recklessly cancelled an important civil society meeting in late 1999 to 
focus instead on high level meetings (Large, 2001: 11-12). In sum, the restriction 
further explains the crippling effects on the provision of protection for I1DPs by the 
political response. 
This section argued that the joint structure was vulnerable to spoilers because of the 
powerlessness of the two joint committees and their monitoring teams and the stretched 
capacity of the HDC. Furthermore, the restriction of civil society from the negotiations 
allowed the dialogue agenda to remain militarised and alienated the Acehnese. 
Consequently, the joint agreements could not alleviate internal displacement and the 
absence of protection prevented sustainable development. To understand how the 
prospects for IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra deteriorated further, it is now essential to 
consider the integration of the joint responses. 
9.3 Inappropriate Integration of the joint Responses 
This last section examines the integration of the joint responses through the 
exclusionary pursuit of peace dividends, from the Pause to the CoHA. The integration 
proved to be inappropriate as it further politicised humanitarian protection and 
assistance in both provinces. The resultant significant deterioration first became 
apparent in 2001 with deliberate intimidation and attacks on the joint responses in Aceh 
by spoilers from both armed sides. Apart from the respite created by the CoHA 
between December 2002 and April 2003, the subsequent introduction of martial law 
represented the nadir of neutrality and humanitarian access. 
9.3.1 Exclusionary pursuit of peace dividends 
The joint responses became integrated through the exclusionary pursuit of peace 
dividends. This form of integration occurred primarily because the HDC used the 
humanitarian mediation strategy for political intervention. As detailed in Section 4.3, 
the RI and GAM were persuaded to address humanitarian needs proactively as a 
common concern, with special focus on IDPs in Aceh. This initial humanitarian 
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intervention phase then became the platform forjoint dialogue on the substantive 
political differences. As the latter phase developed and came to the fore, tangible 
improvements in relief and development became more crucial as justification for the 
dialogue and in maintaining the momentum among the elites in Banda Aceh and 
Geneva. Moreover, as the HDC was limited in capacity, it became more reliant on the 
humanitarian response and this in turn became dependent on advances in joint dialogue, 
in particular, the security guarantees. 
However, the marriage between the political and humanitarian responses was built on 
weak foundations. As argued in Section 5.4, the strategy of humanitarian mediation for 
political intervention was fundamentally flawed because it was unsuitable to addressing 
the underlying reasons for the conflict. The relationship between the responses was not 
helped by the HDC's narrow focus on quick impact and gains from relief and the 
prioritisation of IDPs, as stated in subsection 4.5.3. The inability to implement the joint 
security agreements echoed these weaknesses in design. As explained below, the 
humanitarian response became a pawn for the RI and GAM in the stuttering dialogue 
process and was thus further politicised. 
As introduced in subsection 5.1.1, all humanitarian assistance was to be channelled 
through a donor-appointed institution with co-ordination from the Joint Committee for 
Humanitarian Action QCHA) and each humanitarian actor was "encouraged to 
accelerate their activities during the Pause and to inform the JCHA" QCHA, undated: 
Ch. IV). However, informants from the humanitarian response overwhelmingly 
criticised this arrangement because it forced them to adopt a bureaucratic procedure to 
deliver aid. Indigenous and international NGOs were required to apply forjoint 
authorisation letters, from the two joint committees, to gain permission for access. 
While this was proposed as a safeguard, it conversely politicised the humanitarian 
organisations in the field. The TNI would see GAM's signature on the letter and then 
perceive the organisation to be acting on behalf of the rebels and vice versa. 15 The 
procedure and its impact was furthered by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) programme, "which requires the approval of GAM and the RI through the 
15 For example, the provincial project director for MSF states that, "our international NGO has been 
trying to walk a fine line by avoiding the requirement of letters so we don't have to get involved in this 
way" (Interview 10,12 March 200 1). Before the joint letter procedure, organisations needed written 
permission from the police to travel (suratjalan), which, "lasts for six weeks and must include the names 
of all staff and car details. " (Interview 71,4 March 2003). 
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HDC". The provincial project director for MSF asserts that it, "made the RI resentful as 
they see the UNDP as a fundraiser for GAM. " The same informant also felt that in 
principle, "NGOs should not think that they need the permission of the GAM to do their 
work. " (Interview 10,12 March 2001). 
During the CoHA, it was evident that the humanitarian response had become formally 
integrated with the joint dialogue agenda. The exclusionary pursuit of peace dividends 
was demonstrated clearly by the 2003 peace zones, which encouraged all humanitarian 
actors to focus on the selected areas of peace and successfully gained the support of the 
main international donors. The ICMC programme manager states that, "the JSC wants 
peace dividends so they want us to go into the peace zones" (Interview 71,4 March 
2003). CARDI's field co-ordinator concurs that, "we are encouraged to work within the 
peace zones" and concludes more broadly that, "assistance and development are tied to 
the political situation [ ... ] there is a fine line between the humanitarian and political" 
(Interview 60,24 February 2003). 
While the integrated push for peace in 2003 was laudable, the concentration of funds 
and programmes into the peace zones meant neglecting needs outside the zones by 
restricting or cancelling programmes. Apart from jeopardising the trust of beneficiaries, 
it threatened to undermine basic humanitarian principles. For example, the first peace 
zone, Indrapuri, was assessed by CARDI's field co-ordinator as experiencing, "a limited 
impact from the conflict, with no internal displacement. " The same informant states 
simply that as a, "humanitarian international NGO, there is a need to prove that 
humanitarian needs are there". CARDI did, "not want to be too much involved with the 
CoHA [peace zones] and preferred to open an office in South Aceh where the impact of 
the conflict is greater. " (Interview 60,24 February 2003). 16 Accordingly, it is surmised 
that Indrapuri was selected deliberately to launch the CoHA because security there was 
less problematic, which made it a potentially easier peace dividend to achieve. 
The peace zones dilemma was particularly serious for humanitarians as it carried the 
risk of political fallout. In keeping with the majority of the decisions made by thejoint 
16 Buiza & Risser were similarly concerned that, "[flt will remain to be seen also whether funding and 
therefore protection and assistance will be concentrated on the peace zones to the neglect of other 
critically affected areas. " (Buiza & Risser, 2003: 75). 
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dialogue, the zones divided the RI and GAM, with the state opposed to the increase in 
international interference. The programme manager for ICMC clarifies that, "the vice- 
governor [of Aceh] told us he does not want new donors and programmes in the peace 
zones because he does not want GAM strengthened, therefore, he does not want things 
changed. " (Interview 71,4 March 2003). Therefore, either way, the neutrality and 
independence of organisations was disputable again. Furthermore, there was little 
insurance for the indigenous and international humanitarian organisations. The long- 
term funding from the donor community, as agreed in Japan shortly before the CoHA, 
was conditional on a permanent ceasefire (Interview 52,4 February 2003). 
Appropriately, the Aceh co-ordinator of PCC concludes that, "the humanitarian and the 
political should be separate. GAM wants to internationalise the humanitarian issues and 
politicisation is a common trend" (Interview 62,25 February 2003). 
The pursuit of peace dividends in Aceh also excluded the non-Acehnese IDPs in North 
Sumatra. First, the joint dialogue agenda did not attempt to address their long-term 
plight. This was a significant omission since GAM perpetrated the ethnic evictions, 
which represented a significant deficit of the conflict and directly undermined the 
Javanese-dominant, state doctrine of Pancasila. Despite responsibility, the rebels 
showed no remorse and went on to gain international respect through their participation 
in the negotiations. Therefore, from the start, joint dialogue appeared to tolerate certain 
types of displacement and this stark lack of symmetry compounded an already 
politicised phenomenon and tainted the attempts to create sustainable peace. 17 As the 
former civilian representative on the MTHA and advisor to the HDC appreciates: "now 
there is no choice, we must find a way to bring back the Javanese IDPs and it must be 
done seriously" (Interview 66,25 February 2003). 
Second, the humanitarian needs of the IDPs in North Sumatra, although similar to their 
Acehnese counterparts, received less attention from the humanitarian response because 
organisations and donors were encouraged to channel efforts and funds into Acch. 
Although the RI discouraged interference, as it did in Aceh, the exclusionary pursuit of 
peace dividends meant the capacity of organisations was reduced in pushing for 
17 Although it may be argued that the IDPs expelled from Aceh were not within the remit of the IIDC, 
their exclusion reflected the limitations of the third party and the challenges of remaining neutral within a 
highly politicised environment. Perhaps in the interest of balance and symmetry, since the non-Acehnese 
IDPs were not addressed then it was a mistake to act solely on behalf of their Acehnese counterparts. 
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improved access to the IDPs in North Sumatra. The programme director for Save the 
Children-United States (SC-US) succinctly states that, "international NGOs are not 
encouraged to operate in North Sumatra because of the peace process in Aceh" 
(Interview 61,24 February 2003). The second secretary at the American Consulate in 
Medan concurs: "the IDPs in North Sumatra have not received attention because the 
conflict in Aceh has been drawn out" (Interview 52,4 February 2003). 
9.3.2 Loss of neutrality and humanitarian access 
The joint responses gradually lost their privileged neutrality and humanitarian access to 
IDPs and conflict-affected communities in Aceh between late 2000 and May 2003. 
This unfolded as the political and the humanitarian became increasingly and 
inappropriately integrated. Humanitarian actors and IDPs became pejoratively linked to 
perceived violations of the tenuous joint agreements when the dialogue became 
turbulent. The outcome represented the inability of the RI to uphold Guiding Principle 
26, which asks for the "transport, and supplies" of humanitarians to be "respected and 
protected" and not "the object of attack or other acts of violence". 
First, the politicising joint authorisation letters and the UNDP programme under the 
Pause, as introduced above, gave the two-armed sides the authority to make access 
uncertain if desired, which previously had not been a significant problem. For example, 
by the first period of the Pause in 2000, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
describes that, "[ilntemational NGOs operating in Aceh are not a direct target for either 
side involved in the conflict. " (IRC, 2000: 7). By comparison, in March 2001, the rural 
development manager for the IRC states that their work, "was made worse under the 
Pause and getting access to villages is now a bureaucratic mess, in particular, the letters 
that we need to get from the joint committees". Consequently, the Pause prevented a 
rapid response to humanitarian needs because, "even if we have a letter from the joint 
committees in the field it doesn't always mean you can have access" (Interview 12,13 
March 200 1). 18 
18 ICMC also asserts that, "the joint letters for access were unwieldy. " (Interview 71,4 March 2003) 
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Second, suspicion from the RI and GAM graduated to the intimidation of humanitarian 
actors from the second phase of the Pause, with each side accusing indigenous and 
international NGOs of betrayal. For the director of Flower Aceh the conditions for 
humanitarians in 2001 were similar to the DOM since, "everything is based on rumours 
and suspicions and there is no allowance for a neutral or middle ground. If you don't 
chose a side, it is chosen for you" (Interview 8,12 March 2001). At a minimum, the 
intimidation entailed threats and often arrests. The secretary-general of RPuK describes 
how the military frequently accuses their, "NGO of talking too much" and "had 
intimidated" their staff (Interview 15,13 March 2001). 19 The Lhokseumawe area 
manager for the PMI notes that, "there are some pressures, telephone calls which 
threaten and tell me not to go into the field. This is probably from the TNI and 
sometimes OTK [unidentified perpetrators of violence; orang tak dikena] come to the 
outside of my house. " (Interview 29,23 March 2001). Alternatively, PCC made the 
mistake of not getting GAM's permission before entering a village in North Acch. As a 
result, the representative and his colleague were, "arrested and interrogated but released 
once they discovered we were from the PCC. We cannot return to the village though. " 
(Interview 13,13 March 2001). Civil society representatives with no links to 
humanitarian assistance were also intimidated. 20 
Third, the targeting and prevalence of physical attacks on humanitarian response staff 
became an unfortunate, though natural, progression. This involved kidnappings, 
beatings and murders. A representative of PCC notes that, "Brimob and the TNI have 
arrested and tortured some of our workers in Bireuen" (Interview 13,13 March 2001). 
The deputy director of the Institute for Civil Society Empowerment (Cordova) details 
that, "one of our staff had to flee to the US and another was kidnapped on the 19 
October 2000. We have concrete proof that it [the kidnapping] was done by Brimob in 
Langsa. He was released after being tortured for 24 hours; his T-shirt was covered in 
19 The executive director of Koalisi-HAM noted the tendency for the military to question and prevent 
humanitarian workers, often intimidating them and accusing them of being GAM sympathisers (Interview 
2,10 March 2001). In July 2001, two human rights defenders from Kontras and one from JRS were 
arrested by police in Southeast Aceh (TAPOL, 2001b). 
20 In November 2000, the leader of Aceh Referendum Information Centre (Sentral Informasi Referendum 
Aceh (SIRA)) in Acch was found guilty of "spreading hatred" after a public rally and the ten-month 
prison sentence was widely interpreted as politically motivated (Human Rights Watch (IIRW) 2000c). In 
March 2001, non-uniformed security forces raided the office of SIRA in Banda Aceh, ransacked the 
office and detained eight activists. The local newspaper, Serambi, was closed down in June 2001 by 
GAM (International Federation of Journalists, 2001). This caused Kooistra to write, " the moderate and 
democratic voices - are quickly disappearing from Acehnese society. " (Kooistra, 2001: 17). 
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blood and his lips were broken open after he had been hit with a chair. " (Interview 19, 
15 March 200 1). 21 The killing of three workers from the indigenous NGO, the 
Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims, in Aceh also marked a watershed (HRW, 
2000d). Politically, the apex of this trend occurred in March 2001 when the HDC 
process was directly attacked, with the killing of two members of a monitoring team and 
the brutal harassment of another team consisting of international staff (HRW, 2001). 
Local politicians and other non-NGO representatives of civil society at the village, 
district and provincial levels across the province were also systematically murdered 
during 2001.22 
The intimidation and attacks also marked three other changes in the political violence, 
which were equally redolent of the DOM's campaign of terror. First, civilians became 
targeted more, both randomly and with specific motives. 23 Second, it became more 
common for the identity of perpetrators to remain unknown (OTK), as demonstrated by 
the investigations into the attacks on the HDC and the vice-chancellor of Syiah Kuala 
University. Last, the tortured bodies of victims were frequently displaced in public 
places, in particular, by roads, bridges and rivers (Interview 11,13 March 200 1). 24 
These changes in addition to the clear significant increase in intimidation and attacks on 
the humanitarian response and civil society help explain the intensification of the 
political violence, as demonstrated statistically in subsection 5.3.3. 
Evidently, the neutrality of the humanitarian and political responses had become 
severely damaged by mid-2001. Consequently, humanitarian access and the delivery of 
aid became greatly restricted, which was ironic considering the fundamental intention of 
the Pause. As the safety of staff could not be guaranteed outside Banda Aceh, 
21 Towards the end of 2001, a human rights worker, Yusuf Usman, was kidnapped by OTK and later 
found shot dead (Hara, 2001). In October, the head of the Juli sub-branch of the Red Cross was found 
dead from gun shot wounds (Noor, 2001 a). See Hara, 2001 for similar cases. 22 In September 2001, a key representative of the middle ground, the vice-chancellor of Syiah Kuala 
University, was shot dead (The Jakarta Post, 2001j). It was the ninth murder of a prominent Acehnese 
from January, which included a member of the People's Consultative Assembly, several village chiefs 
and a Muslim cleric (The Jakarta Post, 2001h; Noor, 2001b; Noor, 2001c; and Soekanto, 2001). 23 For the former, the media reported a series of brutal and motiveless attacks on civilians, especially 
during March-April 2001 (OCHA, 2001a; and 2001e). To demonstrate the latter, there was an increase in 
the killing of teachers and the burning of schools, as detailed in previous chapters (Serambi cited in 
OCHA, 2002b). 
24 There was a myriad of examples from across the province reported during 2001 (British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), 2001a; The Jakarta Post, 2001b; and 2001c). 
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international humanitarian operations across the province were halted between late 2000 
and mid-2001. The MSF provincial project director for MSF explains: 
... because of the security situation recently, NGOs are now part of the conflict 
as they have become politicised. As an international NGO, all NGO activists 
have been linked together and it is now hard to operate outside Banda Aceh. 
Ideally, we would like to be travelling around Aceh but not only would our 
safety be jeopardised, we would be targets (Interview 10,12 March 200 1). 
The programme manager for the HDC confirms that, "international NGOs have been 
here but they cannot do much" (Interview 5,11 March 200 1). 2' Accordingly, protection 
for IDPs and other victims of the conflict was prevented (Interview 28,21 March 2001). 
A humanitarian affairs officer at OCHA agrees that as the joint dialogue continued, the 
needs deteriorated, including those of IDPs (Interview 47,6 December 2002). 26 
Similarly, civil society was reluctant to speak out (Interview 5,11 March 200 1; and 
Interview 16,14 March 2001). Consequently, the secretary-general of RPuK and 
Amnesty criticised the HDC and the JSC for showing insufficient concem for civilian 
protection (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003; and The Jakarta Post, 2001 f). 
The overall regression even had notable ramifications at the international level. A 
senior representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 
Geneva admitted that the HDC changed its name from the Henri Dunnant Centre to the 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue because there was a "fear" that its work in Aceh 
would affect the credibility of the ICRC globally (Interview 38,3 December 2002). 
Access improved and the humanitarian response became more operable in the field 
from late 2001 when the joint dialogue had become frozen on the issue of the NAD 
autonomy law. Nevertheless, there were still some intimidation, physical attacks and 
attempts to terTorise civilians. Even in 2003, RPuK confirms that it still, "could not 
protect 11DPs or risk speaking out" (Interview 72,8 March 2003). 27 The CoHA brought 
some respite but major protection concerns persisted and the joint dialogue continued to 
risk the neutrality of humanitarian actors. For example, the secretary-general of RPuK 
25 ICMC, IRC and WFP concurred (Interview 71,4 March 2003; Interview 12,13 March 200 1; and WFP. 
2002). 
26 Barakat et al describe how the "IDPs were attacked in the very camps where they had sought shelter. " 
(Barakat. Connolly & Large, 2002b: 9). 
27 RPuK's secretary-general concurs, adding that they were still refused access in certain places by 2003, 
for example: "in Manggamat, South Aceh, there are so many IDPs and we are restricted to enter by both 
sides and in the north, Bagee, it is very hard because it is considered freed [liberated by GAMI territory. " 
For NGOs to enter there, "they have to get special permission and have strong contacts with GAM. " 
(Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
294 
I 
argued that the CoHA's procedure for reporting intimidation and problems with access 
was not secure. The indigenous NGO describes that, "most of the reporting is just done 
in front of the door at Kuala Tripa and not in private or confidence, which is a security 
risk". In addition, GAM challenged the usefulness of the reporting procedure after 
RPuK complained to the JSC about a threat made by the rebels against a local aid 
worker (Interview 70,28 February and 4 March 2003). 
The nadir of neutrality and humanitarian access was reached in May 2003 with the 
introduction of martial law, causing severe restrictions in travel within the province for 
the international humanitarian community and thus making the independent assessment 
of needs impossible. Presidential Decree 43/2003 and subsequent regulations issued by 
the Martial Law Authority of the Aceh Military Command required all assistance to be 
directed through the government ministries, restricted international organisations from 
working with local NGOs, and prohibited their direct interaction with affected 
communities (HRW, 2003). 
This section examined how the integration of the joint responses further politicised the 
provisions of protection and assistance in Aceh, with focus on the joint authorisation 
letters, the UNDP fund, the peace zones in 2003 and the mediation strategy overall. 
Consequently, basic humanitarian principles were challenged, the neutrality of the 
responses became compromised and humanitarian access was lost in Aceh. The most 
serious development was the deliberate attacks on humanitarian actors and civil society 
representatives in 2001, which had become pawns between the combatants. This 
violated Guiding Principle 26 and paved the way for martial law. Although North 
Sumatra escaped the wave of violence, the pursuit of peace dividends in Aceh created 
serious gaps in the provisions of protection and assistance and further tarnished the aims 
of the joint dialogue. 
Conclusion 
Repetitive displacement and illegitimate resettlement, as exemplified by the Polytechnic 
and Sei Lepan case study groups, formed two intractable problems in Aceh and North 
Sumatra because the provision of protection remained inadequate. In Aceh, it was 
difficult to create the return of IDPs but even more challenging to make sure they 
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stayed. In North Sumatra, the humanitarian response failed similarly to establish an 
effective procedure for permanent resettlement and empowerment. To explain the 
inadequacy, it was argued first that the joint responses were insufficiently prepared and 
protection was based on overly reactive efforts rather than a firm, consistent strategy. 
Against the instruction of the Guiding Principles, protection concerns were not 
integrated properly with the provision of assistance. Before intervention, the responses 
also made the mistake of using a generalised understanding of protection needs. 
Moreover, the designated mechanism, the joint structure, proved too vulnerable to 
spoilers, as demonstrated by the continuation of forced displacement and the 
intensification of political violence overall. Vulnerability stemmed from the 
powerlessness of the joint committees and monitoring teams and from civil society not 
gaining a proportional stake in the dialogue process. 
In principle, there may not be ethical problems in marrying humanitarian needs to a 
political process of conflict management. However, field research emphasised the risks 
of politicising protection and assistance when the humanitarian and the political are 
inappropriately integrated in the field. Although the immediate period following joint 
agreements typically enabled return, the Polytechnic group was symbolically displaced 
shortly after the signing of the CoHA, illustrating that humanitarian needs had become 
pejoratively linked and reactive to political disagreements between both armed sides. 
Similarly, the Sei Lepan group was politicised from the start of the displacement, first 
by GAM and then by the peace process that arbitrarily excluded their needs. The first 
peace zone in 2003, Indrapuri, made sense for the political process in terms of making 
progress but it created dilemmas for humanitarians because there were comparatively 
less humanitarian needs. Conversely, trying to make the first peace zone out of a more 
volatile district with a greater humanitarian deficit would have satisfied the 
humanitarian response but not the HDC in terms of maintaining momentum in dialogue. 
Therefore, making humanitarian needs a basis for political intervention was a shotgun 
wedding, which impeded the provision of adequate protection. This flaw in addition to 
the other identified weaknesses in the joint responses linked with the manipulative 
constraints from state sovereignty and neutrality was discredited. 
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Conclusions 
The conclusions start by revisiting the research question, argument and main conclusion 
of the thesis. Second, it is instructive to identify the wider significance of the findings 
by relating back to the seven main interconnecting themes addressed by the literature 
review. This is followed by some'ideas for further research. 
The thesis examined the effectiveness of using joint political and humanitarian 
responses in ensuring the adequate protection and assistance of the two main types of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Aceh and North Sumatra: repetitive 
displacement and illegitimate resettlement, respectively. To this end, the main findings 
were drawn primarily from a qualitative, comparative study of a displaced group from 
each province: the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic IDPs in Aceh and the Sei Upan IDPs in 
North Sumatra. In Sections 3.4 and 6.1, it was detailed how each case study was 
representative of the main type of displacement in their respective province. 
The inquiry was in response to the following central research question: 
Can the application ofjoint responses to IDPs, to address their political and 
humanitarian needs, significantly improve the provision ofprolection and 
assistance and thereby make the state more responsiblefor its IDPs, during low- 
intensity secessionist armed conflict? 
The impact of the joint responses was gauged by exploring the short (relief) and long- 
term (development) needs of the two IDP groups. These needs were evaluated based on 
the standards of basic human rights included within the United Nations (UN) Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, which represented the formal response to internal 
displacement globally. ' The thesis also drew upon other groups and modes of 
displacement in the two provinces to supplement the empirical findings and to make 
wider, though tentative, conclusions. 
1 Hereupon referred to as the Guiding Principles or Principles. 
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Following the central research question, a preliminary hypothesis was reached: 
Men low-intensity secessionist armed conflict is the root cause offorced 
internal displacement, the protection and assistance of IDPs are more effective 
and sustainable when the state adopts and supports a joint approach, consisting 
of indigenous and international actors, which addresses the political and 
humanitarian needs of IDPs. 
The research question and hypothesis were grounded in the international community's 
doctrine of responsible sovereignty, that is, the assumption that the democratic state can 
and should choose from several approaches to protect and assist its IDPs. The 
Introduction to this thesis outlined two reasons for a home state's inaction and three 
reactive approaches towards greater responsibility. Accordingly, the joint responses in 
Aceh and North Sumatra were significant for the study of forced migration and the 
application of responsible sovereignty because they promised to address the 
humanitarian and political needs of the IDPs. Therefore, in theory there was the 
potential to create sustainable solutions to displacement. 
The research question and hypothesis were based on four main assumptions. First, in 
low-intensity internal conflict, joint responses require intervention by an international, 
neutral third party and indigenous mechanisms in order to best protect and assist IDPs. 
Second, effective international responses for IDPs must remain neutral and impartial 
both in practice and in image. Based on the first two, the third assumption was the 
willingness of the state to consent to the responses, in particular the operations of 
international actors. The last assumption was that IDPs have both political and 
humanitarian needs, which must be addressed to improve protection and assistance and 
to create sustainable solutions. 
In concluding, the joint responses made some achievements in strengthening the 
responsibility of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) but ultimately did not fulfil their 
combined potential and could not build on opportunities from within the state and the 
international community. This significant assertion was based on the representative 
findings from the comparative case study approach and the extensive interviews with 
senior representatives from the joint responses and other key inforinants. In particular, 
the thesis focused on the predominating manipulative constraints from the internal and 
international dimensions to state sovereignty and weaknesses in the application of the 
joint responses, which linked together to discredit their neutrality. Since neutrality is 
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the basis of an effective response, it pinpointed the eventual obstruction of protection 
and assistance and the prevention of sustainable development and peace. This 
conclusion therefore exemplified the limitations of responsible sovereignty in ensuring 
the adequate protection and assistance of IDPs. 
The conclusion was based on a twofold argument. First, the thesis identified the 
important achievements of the joint responses. The primary achievement was gaining 
dual acceptance of the RI and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM)). From this, the political response had the potential to resolve the root cause of 
displacement and bring sustainable peace. It also made sustainable development 
possible by initially strengthening access for an extensive structure of indigenous and 
international humanitarian actors, which worked alongside the RL This achievement 
occurred because the responses were initially respected for their neutral, international 
status and from opportunities created by the state and the international community. 
Accordingly, the joint responses made some progress in advancing the protection and 
assistance of 1DPs and thus the responsibility of the state. That is, the short-term needs 
of IDPs were mainly fulfilled. For long-term needs, there were concerted attempts by 
the international organisations to move the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(GoRI) and indigenous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to a more long-term 
mindset by improving local capacities and through some positive instances of return and 
resettlement. 
Nevertheless, sustainable development and peace were prevented because the responses 
became inoperative when their neutrality was discredited by the combination of the two 
multifaceted challenges: manipulative constraints from state sovereignty and 
weaknesses in the practical application of the joint responses. The thesis focused on the 
following manipulative constraints from state sovereignty: 
> the historical dynamics of the secessionist conflict; 
> the hijacking of the responses by foreign states to fulfil vested political and 
economic interests; 
the superficial use of the responses by the RI to improve its international image; 
the ingrained politicisation of IDPs; and 
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> the traditional gaps in protection for IDPs, as demonstrated by the politicisation 
of protection and assistance, the corruption of aid and the specific opposition to 
return and resettlement. 
Furthermore, the following weaknesses in the practical application of the joint 
responses also put their neutrality at risk: 
> the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's (HDC) narrow restriction of 
beneficiaries to IDPs and its misrepresentation of humanitarian needs; 
> humanitarian mediation was unsuitable as a conflict resolution strategy, as 
proven by the ability of spoilers on both armed sides to oppose and manipulate 
the responses; 
> both responses misunderstood the nature of internal displacement; 
> the inadequate provision of protection, as demonstrated by insufficient 
preparation by both responses and the vulnerable structure of the joint dialogue 
process; and 
> humanitarian protection and assistance were politicised directly by the 
inappropriate integration of the joint responses. 
The neutrality of the responses ultimately became discredited and they became 
inoperative when the above weaknesses and constraints linked. Accordingly: 
> the HDC added to the manipulative dynamics of the context by misrepresenting 
the nature of humanitarian needs as leverage for political intervention; 
> the GoRl preferTed assistance to development so it could lin-tit intervention 
while superficially improving its international image as a responsible state. 
Similarly, the humanitarian mediation strategy demanded the fulfilincrit of short- 
term needs to help maintain momentum in joint dialogue; 
> the ingrained politicisation of B)Ps became more entrenched because the JJDC 
made them special beneficiaries and the joint responses misunderstood the 
nature of displacement; and 
the politicisation of protection and assistance became more extreme and resulted 
in the complete restriction of humanitarian access to IIDPs. This outcome 
stemmed from the wider unsuitability of humanitarian mediation as a strategy 
for addressing and resolving the reasons for the conflict, the particular inability 
of the responses to fill the original gaps in protection for IIDPs and their 
inappropriate integration. 
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Consequently, the joint responses unintentionally fuelled the conflict by 2003. Some 
short-term needs for IDPs were still threatened but it was more significant that long- 
term needs remained unresolved, in particular, livelihoods, education, trauma, social 
structures and tensions with host communities. The main predicament of each case 
study group, repetitive displacement in Aceh and illegitimate resettlement in North 
Sumatra, overwhelmingly demonstrated this impact. 
It is essential to expand on the above research findings by pinpointing their wider 
significance for the seven interconnecting themes reviewed in Chapters One and Two. 
The themes were: understanding conflict-induced internal displacement; low-intensity 
secessionist armed conflict; the interdependency of needs; the Guiding Principles; 
justification for international intervention; international humanitarian intervention; and 
political intervention through humanitarian mediation. 
Understanding conflict-induced internal displacement 
Section 1.1 examined two main approaches to understanding conflict-induced internal 
displacement. The universal approach centred on the broad-based, codified definition 
of an IDP as a distinct category of persons with vulnerable needs and as a basis for a 
legal framework (Cohen & Deng, 1998). Although this approach gained the support 
and acceptance of the international community through the Guiding Principles, it 
revealed ethical and logistical problems. In opposition, the situational or needs-based 
approach preferred to address the situations of conflict rather than reductive categories 
(Bennett, 1998; Helle, 1998; Barutciski, 1998; Sorenson, 1998; ICRC (general policy); 
Interview 38,3 December 2002; Interview 40,3 December 2002; and Interview 48,6 
December 2002). While the two main approaches greatly improved the understanding 
of this phenomenon, the division reflected the international community's uncertainty in 
understanding internal displacement. 
Interestingly, the RI employed both approaches to displacement. In North Sumatra, the 
national termination policy, as introduced in subsection 4.4.1, reflected the universal 
approach as it was an IDP-specific policy shaped by the Guiding Principles. In Aceh, 
Section 4.4 demonstrated that the state adopted a more context-spccif"ic, nced-based 
approach which sought to include IDPs within conflict-affected communities. In 
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explaining the fundamental inadequacy of both approaches in practice, Chapter Six 
argued that the joint responses misunderstood the nature of displacement in both 
provinces. Instead, the author developed the typology of displacement in Section 6.6 
based on classifications of push and pull factors. It was concluded that there was 
considerable variation within and between groups with direct and indirect impact, 
proximate and gradual effects. Therefore, the composite approach to the typology was 
proposed to emphasise the danger of using reductive labels and categories to understand 
the complex process of displacement. This was particularly relevant to the prevalence 
of the real and false dichotomy used by the joint responses, as detailed first in 
subsection 6.2.4. The composite approach to the typology was more critical of the 
universal although it was also argued that uprootedness increased vulnerability. 
Therefore, it was important to establish an accurate understanding of displacement, 
which was possible through the flexible approach to the classifications. 
Low-intensity secessionist anned conflict 
The selected root cause of displacement was political violence through low-intensity 
secessionist armed conflict, as analysed in Section 1.3. Although it was important to 
identify the root cause, it was also important to allow for multiple, overlapping causes 
(Deng, 1998a; and Birkland, 2001). Accordingly, common complex underlying 
(political, economic, and cultural and perceptual) and proximate factors were examined 
(Brown, 1997; Cohen & Deng, 1998; Helle, 1998; and Kom, 1999). 2 A weak state 
structure was also noted as a prevalent factor, which was prone to intensification of the 
security dilemma through greed and scarce resources and unable to control its military. 
Nevertheless, the low-intensity stage was deemed significant because it was widespread 
and represented opportunities for conflict-management through third party intervention 
(Brown, 1997; Synder & Jervis, 1999; and Interview 44,5 December 2002). 
2 There were four political factors: discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideology; 
dynamics of domestic inter-group politics; and elite politics during political and economic turmoil to fend 
off domestic challenges. The economic factors involved: a move from a centrally planned to market- 
based tradition; destabilising financial reforms; a discriminatory economic system; unequal opportunities; 
and economic development and modernisation. The four proximate factors consisted of: Mass 
triggered/Bad domestic problems; Mass-triggcred/Bad neighbours; Externally-driven/Elite decisions by 
governments to trigger conflict; and Internally-driven/Elite power struggles. 
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The 'new wars' thesis, that modem internal conflicts represent significant deviations 
from previous variants, was considered in Section 1.4. This included changes in the 
motivations of combatants (less concerned with the boundaries and goals of the state); 
the dynamics of violence (fragmented and decentralised, informal armies, less decisive 
outcomes and a war economy as an effect and means); and its input (support by a 
Diaspora and international actors). Furthermore, it was proposed that internal 
displacement had increased and diversified, as a means to destabilisation, marked by a 
decrease in government assistance and as an example of peripheral actions (rape and 
human shields) coming to the fore in modem conflicts (Kaldor, 1997; and Munck, 
2000). 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 examined the dynamics of political violence in the low-intensity 
secessionist armed conflict in Aceh as the root cause of displacement. Perennial 
dissatisfaction of the Acelinese with local governance was the underlying factor of the 
political violence. This was first indicated during the RI by the Darul Islam rebellion 
(1953-62) for more autonomy (Robinson, 1998; and Smith, 2002). Suharto's co-opting 
of the technocrats and the ulama allowed the manipulation of local governance to 
benefit the centre, which further alienated the Acelinese from the state (Kell, 1995; and 
Kooistra, 2001). GAM transformed this modem tradition of rebellion and the limited 
independence enjoyed pre-17th Century into primordial separatism (1976-82,89-90, 
1998-). Economic grievances from the exploitation of natural resources (liquid natural 
gas (LNG) and timber), in extraction and distribution, also formed an underlying factor, 
which had roots in Dutch and Portuguese colonial intrusion (Kell, 1995; and Robinson, 
1998). During the 1980s, there was little grassroots' support for independence but it 
grew gradually with the increase in economic resentment and vacuums of authority in 
some districts. These weaknesses in the state permitted the intensification of the 
security dilemma through GAM's guerrilla warfare and the military's reckless counter- 
insurgency operations to maintain national unity. The ensuing campaign of terror and 
systematic human rights violations, from the Military Operation Area (1989-99) to 
martial law in 2003, cemented the polarisation. Despite this cycle of violence, the 
stalemate in 1999 produced enough reformers on both armed sides to try a non-military 
approach to resolving the conflict. 
The new wars thesis was extremely pertinent to understanding the conflict in Aceh. 
Primarily, the assertion that modem combatants were motivated less by the goals and 
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boundaries of the state proved untrue. Conversely, the prevalence of splinter factions 
(within the RI and GAM), the phenomenon of blurred divisions (the third force, militia 
and unknown perpetrators) and the ambiguous direction of the violence confirmed the 
relevance of the thesis. Furthermore, the role and linkage between profiteering 
(extortion and pillaging) and spoilers were crucial dynamics. It was also significant that 
the di Tiro Diaspora in Sweden directed GAM while the insurgents also had strong 
support bases in Malaysia and Thailand. 
Last, the conflict resulted in a significant increase in internal displacement by 1999. 
While some was indiscriminate, the thesis proved that the military and rebels heavily 
manipulated displacement. In sum, it exemplified how civilians had become political 
pawns in the cycle of violence and the joint dialogue while the RI proved 
unsympathetic. In particular, GAM displaced civilians in Aceh and to North Sumatra to 
cause disruption, accentuate weaknesses in the authority of the RI and to profit from 
vacant properties and resources. As argued in subsections 6.2.3 and 6.3.2, this formed 
part of the overarching strategy that a humanitarian emergency and greater awareness of 
the RI's fragility would bring UN intervention, a referendum and independence, 
following in the wake of East Timor's secession. It was also concluded that in some 
cases, there was a degree of civilian acquiescence. 
The interdependency of needs 
It was argued in Section 2.1 that the needs of lDPs were multi-layered and 
interdependent, when political violence through secessionist armed conflict is the root 
cause of displacement. First, political needs reflected the underlying and proximate 
reasons for political violence (weaknesses in the rule of law, system of governmcnt and 
political identity), were long-term in nature and their resolution or accommodation was 
the prerequisite to sustainable peace (Deng, 1994; and 1998b). Second, humanitarian 
needs were also complex, reflected the effects of the political violence and were divided 
into short (relief) and long-term (development) (Deng, 1994; 1998b; and Interview 48,6 
December 2002). They were cyclical in nature so when the long-term was not 
addressed then the relief-based became threatened (Bennett, 1998a; and Interview 39,3 
December 2002). Cohen & Deng (1998) and Kom (1999) raised prolonged 
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displacement as especially damaging and worrying because there was no accepted 
return process. 
Third, it was proposed that assistance needed to be linked to protection in order to 
improve security, prevent displacement and help create sustainable development 
(Cohen, 1998b; and Helle, 1998). This last linkage was considered by the international 
community to be the more accepted approach but protection was problematic (Cohen, 
1998a; Kom, 1999; and Interview 44,5 December 2002). In particular, Helle advised 
that when neutrality and impartiality was questioned by the authorities then protection 
should be secondary (Helle, 1998). The universal and situational approaches to 
addressing needs were then compared. The former wanted IDP-specific policies and 
mechanisms, for example, the Guiding Principles and the Office for the Co-ordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs Internal Displacement Unit (OCHA ID Unit) (Deng, 2000). 
Alternatively, the situational preferred inclusive programmes and mechanisms but 
emphasised more the need to tailor the understanding of needs based on the context of 
each humanitarian impact (Helle, 1998; and Bennett, 1998a). Section 1.1 stated that 
such exponents argued that it was futile for states to re-codify since they were already 
bound by international law. In addition, the IDP concept was seen as too political and 
this could reinforce sovereignty and make intervention more difficult. 
As explored in Chapter Seven, the political needs of the Polytechnic and Sei Lepan 
groups were long-term and first demanded durable security at their villages of origin 
and the validation of their resettlements, respectively. Second, as the effects of the 
violence, the humanitarian needs were also complex and it was concluded that the 
protracted neglect of the long-term needs of each case study group resulted in 
significant instability for the IIDPs. Since the joint responses failed to tackle the cyclical 
and interdependent nature of short and long-term humanitarian needs, sustainable 
development was prevented. Moreover, the future fulfilment of short-term needs 
became threatened. While prolonged uprootedness had a far-reaching impact on the Sei 
Lepan IDPs, it was concluded that the Polytechnic group's short-term and localised 
displacement was more damaging because it was repetitive. 
Third, the joint responses were delayed in linking assistance and protection. Section 8.4 
explained that the latter was inadequate because the state's negligence was long- 
standing, as demonstrated by the politicisation of protection and assistance, the 
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corruption of aid and the opposition to return and resettlement by spoilers. Section 9.1 
added that the joint responses overall failed to prepare for protection needs, which 
meant there was no firm, consistent procedure. Protection was problematic for IDPs in 
both provinces because they were politicised as a category of victims. However, the 
failure by the joint responses to provide adequate protection perpetuated this 
manipulation, made their neutrality disputable and removed the blanket of security for 
personnel. 
The Guiding Principles 
As the first critique of the international response to displacement, Section 2.2 examined 
the Guiding Principles. They represented the cornerstone of the doctrine of responsible 
sovereignty and were designed to act as leverage in encouraging states to respect the 
rights of civilians during and after displacement and as a preventative measure (Cohen 
& Deng, 1998). The literature and key informants praised the Principles' conciseness 
and their potential to create awareness among and guide all relevant actors, clarify 
rights, harness greater authority by shaping customary law, improve monitoring and 
identify IDPs in the field (Cohen & Deng, 1998; Interview 40,3 December 2002; 
Interview 44,5 December 2002; and Interview 48,6 December 2002). 
Nevertheless, the application and implementation of the Principles provoked criticism. 
Legally, it was contested that they did not really fill any gaps, were non-binding and the 
creation of a distinct category would only undercut existing standards (Barutciski, 1998; 
and Interview 44,5 December 2002). Instead, a tailored-to-IDP approach and specific 
legal framework was proposed because protection was inadequate and internal 
displacement typically occurred in states that failed to ratify treaties (Helle, 1998; and 
Interview 41,4 December 2002). Furthermore, it was asserted that the Principles were 
perceived as unwelcome interference by states, with military and insurgents typically 
opposed (Interview 43,4 December 2002; and Interview 44,5 December 2002). 
Therefore, politics was identified as the key variable in implementation (Interview 38,3 
December 2002). 
As the sub-question addressed by the thesis, the Principles were found applicable 
overall to the two main types of displacement in Aceh and North Sumatra and were a 
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useful framework of analysis in evaluating needs, and the impact of the responses. 
First, Sections 7.1 and 7.2 found that in particular Principle 10 (Nos. lb. -d; and 2a. and 
d. ), the right to life and security; Principle 18 (No. 2a. -d. ), access to basic food, water, 
shelter, clothing, medical services and sanitation; Principle 19 (No. 3), prevention of 
infectious diseases; Principle 20 (Nos. 1-3), documents to ensure legal recognition; and 
Principle 4 (No. 2), extra protection of the more vulnerable, provided insight into short- 
term needs. Principle 6 (No. 2a) pinpointed the ethnic evictions to North Sumatra, as a 
manifestation of the root cause. 
Moreover, Sections 7.3 and 7.4 concluded that the Principles were more discerning for 
long-term needs. Fundamentally, it was appropriate that the Principles prioritised 
protection, return and resettlement. More specifically, Principle 9, Principle 21 (Nos. I- 
3) and Principle 29 (No. 2) contained important provisions for civilians with a 
dependency on land and the protection of property during displacement and 
compensation upon return. Similarly, Principle 23 (Nos. 24), the right to education for 
all, and Principle 16 (Nos. 1-2), fate and whereabouts of missing and dead relatives, 
proved applicable to the context. Principle 19 (Nos. 1-2), the provision for 
psychological and social services and health needs for women; Principle 18 (No. 3), 
participation of women; and Principle 22 (No. la-e. ), freedom of thought, to seek 
employment and social and political participation, reflected the true nature of concerns. 
However, some of the Principles were also simplistic in understanding the contextual 
complexities, as detailed in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. Principle 18, (No. lb. ), adequate 
shelter, was upheld but through the coping mechanisms of the displaced and/or the host 
community, as opposed to efforts by the joint responses. Principle 15 (Parts a. -d. ), 
freedom of movement, was also upheld overall but because of insufficient funds and the 
preference to remain with the group. As a category of causes, "situations of armed 
conflict" (Principle 6, No. 2b. ), was intentionally inclusive but it glossed over the 
politics of displacement of the Polytechnic group. 
Second, Section 8.1 examined the potentials of the Principles to improve the pragmatic 
provisions of protection and assistance. By 2003, the Principles had shaped the GoRl's 
national termination policy, been disseminated among the senior representatives of the 
joint responses and reformatted as a comic for the 1DPs. Informants in Geneva, Acch 
and North Sumatra praised the ability of the Principles to guide the aims of programmes 
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and determine protection concerns. The Principles also proved prescient. As argued in 
Chapter Nine, the failure of the joint responses to take "appropriate measures" in giving 
"due regard to the protection needs and human lights" of IDPs became one of their 
crucial weaknesses (Principle 27, No. 1). Similarly, the inability of the RI to uphold 
Principle 26, the respect and protection of humanitarian personnel, transport and 
supplies, signalled the gradual collapse of the responses. Contrary to concerted efforts, 
the impact and dissemination in Indonesia proved superficial. Representatives of the 
humanitarian response overwhelmingly raised the Principles' unrealistic assumption 
that national authorities wanted genuinely to accept responsibility, as the main barrier to 
implementation. Other recurring limitations consisted of their inapplicability to the 
context and inaccessibility for humanitarian actors. More crucially, improved security 
in Aceh was the key prerequisite to realising the potentials. 
Justification for international intervention 
The thesis asserted that international humanitarian and political responses are required 
to address both sets of needs of IDPs to create sustainable development and peace. 
Therefore, Section 2.3 explored three justifications for such intervention. Focusing on 
the internal dimension of the state, the doctrine of responsible sovereignty, as advocated 
by the Guiding Principles, argued that the state has primary legal responsibility for 
protection and life-saving assistance (Cohen & Deng, 1998). In addition, it was 
proposed that individual responsibility was enhanced by the renewed consciousness of 
individual rights (Weiss & Chopra, 1995). Furthermore, since IDPs represented a 
vacuum of responsibility, states ought to request or accept international co-operation to 
safeguard sovereignty (Cohen & Deng, 1998; and Kom, 1999). 
Second and with focus on the external dimension, intervention was justified when an 
internal conflict threatened regional stability. As B)Ps were warning signs of internal 
humanitarian crisis, human rights violations and the ineffectiveness of containment; it 
was acknowledged that prevention through international intervention had become a de 
facto norm (Dowty & Loescher, 1997). Accordingly, IDPs were opportunities for the 
international community to participate in resolving a wider humanitarian plight. 
Similarly, it was stated that IDPs needed appropriate mechanisms and operational 
responses as guarantees of protection and assistance, in particular, to compensate for 
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weaknesses in the implementation of the Guiding Principles. In transcending both 
dimensions, intervention was assisted by the redefinition or relaxation of sovereignty 
through the expanding global humanitarian space created by human rights treaties and 
trade. 
Third, international intervention was justified because the resolution or management of 
the complex dynamics and reasons for armed secessionism demanded a third party. 
In particular, an international third party could overcome the security dilemma in the 
short-term and had the capacity in the long-term to bridge the divide between state and 
citizen by introducing the viability of other modes of governance. At a minimum, 
intervention could move armed sides away from the constricting mindset of winning 
and losing. Therefore, it ought to be in the interests of the state and its contestants to 
discuss pacific alternatives and the low-intensity variant represented a breathing space. 
Subsections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 found that the RI eventually acknowledged its primary legal 
responsibility for its IDPs with encouragement from the international community. 
However, the RI was not fully committed to the aims of the joint responses and used 
them superficially to improve its international image as a responsible state during a 
period of human rights scrutiny and to protect trade. Accordingly, the responses 
strengthened the RI's image but there were restrictions placed on international 
personnel (numbers and permits) and the scope of programmes. Therefore, 
international intervention overall did not strengthen the responsibility of the home state 
and this application also represented a weakness in the doctrine of responsible 
sovereignty, as demonstrated by repetitive displacement and illegal resettlement. 
Nevertheless, Section 5.2 argued that intervention was possible because of the popular 
support for human rights and political change among the Acehnese in 1999 and the 
stretching of the RI by the simultaneous effects of other internal conflicts, its faltering 
economy and changes to the state's institutions through democratic reforms. 
Furthermore, intervention occurred because of the international community's realisation 
that the conflict and humanitarian deficit in Aceh would deteriorate, which could affect 
state sovereignty, regional stability and trade. As subsection 4.5.1 stated, political and 
financial support followed, both armed sides were encouraged to keep talking and the 
HDC was opportunistic by focusing on the propitious concern of H)Ps. Although the 
conflict resumed fully in 2003, the joint dialogue process offered respite from the 
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security dilemma, allowed the Acehnese to trust Jakarta and indirectly introduced the 
possibility of greater autonomy as a political compromise. 
International humanitarian intervention 
Intemational humanitarian intervention for IDPs relied on five main mechanisms for 
protection and assistance, as outlined in Section 2.4. Multilateral intervention by UN 
agencies was often essential, bringing vast resources and experience in monitoring and 
alleviating short and long-term needs. However, the UN had not settled on a preferred 
approach, struggled to co-ordinate its relevant agencies and suffered from a politicised 
image (McNamara, 1998; Interview 37,3 December 2002; and Interview 39,3 
December 2002). The emergency relief co-ordinator and the OCHA ID Unit were 
designed to improve co-ordination among agencies but were not financially autonomous 
and thus lacked power (Cohen, 1998a; Interview 37,3 December 2002; Interview 39,3 
December 2002; Interview 40,3 December 2002; and Interview 44,5 December 2002). 
Within and between agencies, recurring weaknesses involved limited capacity building 
to meet needs, especially for the protection of human rights (Cohen, 2000). The main 
paradox was that agencies did not want full responsibility for IDPs but were equally 
jealous of others assuming this role (Interview 48,6 December 2002). Consequently, 
the preferred co-ordinated, collaborative option was inadequate and ineffective (Davies, 
1998; Deng, 1998b; and Kom, 1999). The UN Secretary-General's Representative for 
IDPs was important though sometimes stymied by sovereignty while the ICRC had a 
clear mandate but did not focus on IDPs and relied on alliances (McNamara, 1998). 
The proliferation of international and indigenous NGOs acted as far-reaching, neutral 
and impartial mechanisms, strengthened protection links and created opportunities for 
empowerment. Nevertheless, conflicting mandates sometimes caused tensions and 
NGOs were often forced to rely on the home government and the UN for co-ordination 
and to secure access, which often restricted protection (Cohen & Deng, 1998; and Kom, 
1999). The coping mechanisms of IDPs (through committees, community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and host communities) were vital with their roots and authority 
grounded in the local culture, could provide protection and were thus essential in 
creating sustainable development, as stressed by the situational approach. However, 
this mechanism tended to be unpredictable, politicised and constrained by the effects of 
310 
conflict and overly prudent international NGOs (Bennett, 1998a; Sorenson, 1998; and 
Kom, 1999). 
Section 4.4 detailed the humanitarian response's extensive range of mechanisms, which 
also received input from the HDC, with the structure of joint dialogue acting as the 
main designated mechanism for protection and initial co-ordinator of aid. In theory, the 
responses had the combined capacity to make the RI more responsible for its IDPs in 
Aceh and North Sumatra by significantly improving protection and assistance and thus 
created the potential for sustainable development. As argued in Sections 8.2 and 8.3, 
there were concerted efforts to advance relief and to move protection and assistance to a 
more long-term mindset. It was important that the home state participated in the 
humanitarian response but as noted above improvement was insubstantial. Despite the 
efforts led by the UN Representative for IDPs and the GoRI's subsequent promise of 
compensation upon return, resettlement or empowerment in North Sumatra, the policy 
ultimately suffered from a hasty timeframe and weak implementation. In Acch, the RI 
traditionally preferred relief and was too slow to accept that development could 
strengthen sovereignty. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was 
not active but several agencies were operational and added crucial layers of support and 
expertise with specialised programmes for IDPs and conflict-affected communities. In 
particular, OCHA gradually increased its role in co-ordination. 
There were several important international NGOs in Aceh, with a few in North Sumatra, 
with varied programmes and a focus on capacity building. Accordingly, indigenous 
NGOs were a crucial mechanism that mushroomed after 1999. Similarly, indigenous 
coping mechanisms (IDPs, host communities and CBOs) prevented the deterioration of 
needs in both case studies, as explained in Chapter Seven. However, this over reliance 
meant that the sustainability of protection and assistance was prevented. 
Political intervention through humanitarian mediation 
It was argued in Section 2.5 that, within the doctrine of responsible sovereignty, 
political intervention was more difficult because it implied greater interference and the 
international community had not established a viable response. Therefore, it was 
appropriate to examine the viability of humanitarian mediation as a strategy for political 
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intervention in resolving internal conflict as the root cause of displacement. 
Considering the evolving tasks of humanitarian assistance, Conflict Transformation 
Agencies (CTAs) were introduced as emerging, innovative and deemed suitable in 
theory as independent, unarmed and low-key mechanisms (Roberts, 1996; Rigby, 2001; 
Ludlum-Taylor, 1998; and Interview 48,6 December 2002). The primary appeal of the 
CTA and humanitarian mediation was their combined ability to break from international 
apathy because their neutrality could transcend the negative image of intervention and 
uphold the sovereignty of the state (Interview 46,6 December 2002). In addition, a 
CTA could possess sufficient capacity to transform the pivotal breathing opportunities 
within low-intensity conflict into guided dialogue, act in confidence and be flexible in 
coping with contextual turbulence while operating alongside humanitarian actors 
(Interview 46,6 December 2002; and Interview 48,6 December 2002). Positive lessons 
were drawn from the more modest immunisation campaigns during the 1980s in El 
Salvador, Sudan and Lebanon, which acted as turning points for building trust and 
strengthened moderates (Hay & Sanger, 1992; and Ebersole, 2000). 
However, significant concerns involved establishing a ceasefire, overcoming opposition 
from spoilers, maintaining momentum to move to the substantive issues, allowing space 
for civil society and preventing the politicisation of humanitarian needs (Posen, 1997; 
Brown, 1997; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998; 
Barakat, Connolly & Large, 2002b; Kaldor, 1997; Interview 38,3 December 2002; 
Interview 40,3 December 2002; Interview 46,6 December 2002). Possible 
ramifications included the unintentional fuelling of conflict by allowing combatants to 
rearm and use civilians as pawns (Ebersole, 2000; Egeland, 1999; Hay & Sanger, 1992: 
Interview 40,3 December 2002; and Interview 44,5 December 2002). Last, a weak 
third party capacity also risked being compromised by the ulterior agendas of foreign 
states (Interview 44,5 December 2002). 
The joint dialogue process in Aceh proved that it was possible to gain consent for 
political intervention even when the state was zealously protective of its sovereignty. 
As analysed in Chapter Four, the sovereignty-friendly aspects included the adoption of 
facilitation rather than mediation and the humanitarian mediation strategy, which sought 
to address humanitarian needs proactivcly. The HDC's organisational profile and 
background also instilled trust and built confidence by reassuring the RI that it would 
remain neutral, impartial and independent. The primary achievement was completed 
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with gaining the acceptance and co-operation of GAM, which gradually had its 
demands fulfilled for greater international involvement. The international community 
also warmed to the low-key and economical strategy, which could work in tandem with 
other humanitarian actors and promised sustainable development as opposed to 
perpetual relief. This support then allowed the HDC to pursue a long-term strategy. 
Section 5.1 focused on the unprecedented process, which encouraged the two-armed 
sides to identify common humanitarian and political concerns, co-operate in the field, 
sustain negotiations for three years and create several joint agreements on security, from 
the Humanitarian Pause to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement as the promising 
framework for negotiating peace. At a minimum, it created a breathing space by 
delaying a complete offensive and humanitarian emergency in 2000. The first phase of 
the Pause also allowed the successful return of IDPs and opened the space and access 
for humanitarian assistance. 
Nevertheless, the cease-fires could not be implemented in the field. Overall, the HDC 
failed to appreciate the dynamics of the conflict. First, the humanitarian mediation 
strategy was unsuitable in addressing the underlying reasons for the conflict, as stated in 
Section 5.4. Second, the role of facilitation and the joint dialogue structure were 
powerless and too vulnerable to spoilers, which were then able to intensify the political 
violence and jeopardise the neutrality of the joint responses, as detailed in Sections 5.3 
and 9.2. In addition, civil society and the Acelmese never gained a proportional stake in 
the joint dialogue, which remained too focused on the military aspects. In sum, the 
HDC could not maintain the momentum to move to the substantive issues and the 
dialogue continued to be based on the two political extremes, resulting in the unpopular 
and flawed implementation of the special autonomy law. 
The intervention strategy further politicised humanitarian needs and the provisions of 
protection and assistance. As argued in Section 9.3, the humanitarian response was 
made dependent on the political response for improved security but joint dialogue also 
relied on advances in relief and development. Subsection 4.5.3 asserted that the HDC 
primarily misrepresented the nature of humanitarian needs by focusing on relief and 
IDPs as leverage to gain the consent of the RL However, needs were actually more 
long-term and development in nature, which brought the neutrality of responses into 
question. The politicisation of the humanitarian was sealed by the inappropriate 
integration of the joint responses. This created dangerous operational dilemmas for the 
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humanitarian response and both sides targeted civil society. Ultimately, the security for 
civilians and personnel of the responses could no longer be guaranteed and access was 
lost with martial law. In sum, the joint responses unintentionally fuelled the conflict. 
Furthermore, GAM displaced the non-Acelmese to North Sumatra but was allowed to 
rearm and gain international respect through the joint dialogue while showing no 
remorse. Consequently, the dialogue process lacked symmetry, which compounded an 
already politicised displacement and tainted the attempts to create sustainable peace. In 
addition, donors channelled funds into Aceh at the expense of needs in North Sumatra. 
Finally, the HDC intervention was compromised and constrained by the ulterior 
agendas of foreign states, as argued in subsection 4.5.2. The United States (US) and the 
United Mngdom supported the responses but this was constrained by the inviolability of 
sovereignty and global terrorism concerns post-2001. In particular, the capacity of the 
HDC was notably weak and its neutrality was compromised when the US hijacked the 
peace zones in 2001 to protect ExxonMobil and the LNG facilities. 
Further research 
> To evaluate the specific impact of the December 2004 tsunami on the processes 
of displacement, the dynamics of the conflict and the prospects for sustainable 
peace and development in Aceh. 
To test the author's composite approach to the typology of displacement with 
other groups of IDPs in Aceh and North Sumatra in addition to those displaced 
by Indonesia's other internal conflicts, for example, in Papua, Central 
Kalimantan and North Maluku. 
To gauge the impact of the RI's national termination policy in other provinces 
with IDPs in order to identify similarities in implementation and to exan-dne 
reasons for differences. 
> To assess and modify the hypothesis of the thesis with a study of other contexts 
where IDPs have been protected and assisted by a similar application of joint 
political and humanitarian responses, for example, in Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines. A feasibility study could also be conducted in internal low-intensity 
conflicts where joint responses might be appropriate, for example, Nepal. 
> To examine further the ethics and wider implications of integrating political and 
humanitarian interventions for B)Ps to establish lessons for practitioners. 
> To evaluate the applicability of the Guiding Principles to needs and the role of 
protection and assistance in other low-intensity armed conflicts. 
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Appendix A: The United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement' 
Introduction: Scope and Purpose 
1. These Guiding Principles address the specific needs of internally displaced persons 
worldwide. They identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons 
from forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement as 
well as during return or resettlement and reintegration. 
2. For the purposes of these Principles, internally displaced persons are persons or 
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural 
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state 
border. 
3. These Principles reflect and are consistent with international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. They provide guidance to: 
(a) The Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons 
in carrying out his mandate; 
(b) States when faced with the phenomenon of internal displacement; 
(c) All other authorities, groups and persons in their relations with internally 
displaced persons; and 
(d) Intergovernmental and non-govemmental organizations when addressing 
internal displacement. 
4. These Guiding Piinciples should be disseminated and applied as widely as possible. 
Section I General PrinciPles 
Principle 1 
1. Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms 
under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall 
not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground 
that they are internally displaced. 
2. These Principles are without prejudice to individual criminal responsibility under 
international law, in particular relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. 
1 (Brookings Institution, 1998) 
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Principle 2 
1. These Principles shall be observed by all authorities, groups and persons irrespective 
of their legal status and applied without any adverse distinction. The observance of 
these Principles shall not affect the legal status of any authorities, groups or persons 
involved. 
2. These Principles shall not be interpreted as restricting, modifying or impairing the 
provisions of any international human rights or intemational humanitarian law 
instrument or rights granted to persons under domestic law. In particular, these 
Principles are without prejudice to the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries. 
Principle 3 
1. National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection 
and humanitarian assistance to intemally displaced persons within their j uri sdiction. 
2. Intemally displaced persons have the right to request and to receive protection and 
humanitarian assistance from these authorities. They shall not be persecuted or 
punished for making such a request. 
Principle 4 
1. These Principles shall be applied without discrimination of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, legal or social status, age, disability, property, birth, or on any other 
similar criteria. 
2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied 
n-tinors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, 
persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and 
assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their 
special needs. 
Section 11 Principles Relating To Protection From Displacement 
Principle 5 
All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their 
obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all 
CIrCumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of 
persons. 
Principle 6 
1. Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily 
displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence. 
2. The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement: 
(a) When it is based on policies of apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" or similar 
practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial 
composition of the affected population; 
(b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or 
imperative military reasons so demand; 
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(c) In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by 
compelling and overriding public interests; 
(d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires 
their evacuation; and 
(e) When it is used as a collective punishment. 
3. Displacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances. 
Principle 7 
I. Prior to any decision requiring the displacement of persons, the authorities concerned 
shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement 
altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be taken to minimise 
displacement and its adverse effects. 
2. The authorities undertaking such displacement shall ensure, to the greatest practicable 
extent, that proper accommodation is provided to the displaced persons, that such 
displacements are effected in satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and 
hygiene, and that members of the same family are not separated. 
3. If displacement occurs in situations other than during the emergency stages of armed 
conflicts and disasters, the following guarantees shall be complied with: 
(a) A specific decision shall be taken by a State authority empowered by law to 
order such measures; 
(b) Adequate measures shall be taken to guarantee to those to be displaced full 
information on the reasons and procedures for their displacement and, where 
applicable, on compensation and relocation; 
(c) The free and informed consent of those to be displaced shall be sought; 
(d) The authorities concerned shall endeavor to involve those affected, 
particularly women, in the planning and management of their relocation; 
(e) Law enforcement measures, where required, shall be carried out by 
competent legal authorities; and 
(f) The right to an effective remedy, including the review of such decisions by 
appropriate judicial authorities, shall be respected. 
Principle 8 
Displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the rights to life, dignity, 
liberty and security of those affected. 
Principle 9 
States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous 
peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency 
on and attachment to their lands. 
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Section III Principles Relating To Protection During Displacement 
i 
Principle 10 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life which shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. Internally displaced persons shall be 
protected in particular against: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Murder; 
(c) Summary or arbitrary executions; and 
(d) Enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, 
threatening or resulting in death. 
Threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts shall be prohibited. 
2. Attacks or other acts of violence against internally displaced persons who do not or 
no longer participate in hostilities are prohibited in all circumstances. Internally 
displaced persons shall be protected, in particular, against: 
(a) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence, including the 
creation of areas wherein attacks on civilians are permitted; 
(b) Starvation as a method of combat; 
(c) Their use to shield military objectives from attack or to shield, favor or 
impede military operations; 
(d) Attacks against their camps or settlements; and 
(e) The use of anti-personnel landmines. 
Principle 11 
1. Every human being has the right to dignity and physical, mental and moral integrity. 
2. Internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall be 
protected in particular against: 
(a) Rape, mutilation, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and other outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender- 
specific violence, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(b) Slavery or any contemporary form of slavery, such as sale into marriage, 
sexual exploitation, or forced labor of children; and 
(c) Acts of violence intended to spread terror among internally displaced 
persons. 
Threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts shall be prohibited. 
Principle 12 
1. Every human being has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
2. To give effect to this tight for internally displaced persons, they shall not be interned 
in or confined to a camp. If in exceptional circumstances such internment or 
confinement is absolutely necessary, it shall not last longer than required by the 
circumstances. 
3. Internally displaced persons shall be protected from discriminatory arrest and 
detention as a result of their displacement. 
4. In no case shall internally displaced persons be taken hostage. 
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Principle 13 
1. In no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited nor be required or permitted 
to take part in hostilities. 
2. Internally displaced persons shall be protected against discriminatory practices of 
recruitment into any armed forces or groups as a result of their displacement. In 
particular any cruel, inhuman or degrading practices that compel compliance or punish 
non-compliance with recruitment are prohibited in all circumstances. 
Principle 14 
1. Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his or her residence. 
2. In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of 
camps or other settlements. 
Principle 15 
Internally displaced persons have: 
(a) The right to seek safety in another part of the country; 
(b) The right to leave their country; 
(c) The right to seek asylum in another country; and 
(d) The right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any 
place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk. 
Principle 16 
1. All internally displaced persons have the right to know the fate and whereabouts of 
missing relatives. 
2. The authorities concerned shall endeavour to establish the fate and whereabouts of 
intemally displaced persons reported missing, and co-operate with relevant international 
organizations engaged in this task. They shall inform the next of kin on the progress of 
the investigation and notify them of any result. 
3. The authorities concerned shall endeavour to collect and identify the mortal remains 
of those deceased, prevent their despoliation or mutilation, and facilitate the return of 
those remains to the next of kin or dispose of them respectfully. 
4. Grave sites of internally displaced persons should be protected and respected in all 
circumstances. Internally displaced persons should have the light of access to the grave 
sites of their deceased relatives. 
Principle 17 
1. Every human being has the right to respect of his or her family life. 
2. To give effect to this right for intemally displaced persons, family members who wish 
to remain together shall be allowed to do so. 
3. Families which arc separated by displacement should be reunited as quickly as 
possible. 
All appropriate steps shall be taken to expedite the reunion of such families, particularly 
when children are involved. The responsible authorities shall facilitate inquiries made 
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by family members and encourage and co-operate with the work of humanitarian 
organizations engaged in the task of family reunification. 
4. Members of internally displaced families whose personal liberty has been restricted 
by internment or confinement in camps shall have the right to remain together. 
Principle 18 
I. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living. 
2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, 
competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe 
accessto: 
(a) Essential food and potable water; 
(b) Basic shelter and housing; 
(c) Appropriate clothing; and 
(d) Essential medical services and sanitation. 
3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of women in the 
planning and distribution of these basic supplies. 
Principle 19 
1. All wounded and sick internally displaced persons as well as those with disabilities 
shall receive to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the 
medical care and attention they require, without distinction on any grounds other than 
medical ones. When necessary, internally displaced persons shall have access to 
psychological and social services. 
2. Special attention should be paid to the health needs of women, including access to 
female health care providers and services, such as reproductive health care, as well as 
appropriate counselling for victims of sexual and other abuses. 
3. Special attention should also be given to the prevention of contagious and infectious 
diseases, including AIDS, among internally displaced persons. 
Principle 20 
1. Every human being has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law. 
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, the authorities concerned 
shall issue to them all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal 
rights, such as passports, personal identification documents, birth certificates and 
marriage certificates. In particular, the authorities shall facilitate the issuance of new 
documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement, without 
imposing unreasonable conditions, such as requiring the return to one's area of habitual 
residence in order to obtain these or other required documents. 
3. Women and men shall have equal rights to obtain such necessary documents and 
shall have the right to have such documentation issued in their own names. 
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Principle 21 
1. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of property and possessions. 
2. The property and possessions of internally displaced persons shall in all 
circumstances be protected, in particular, against the following acts: 
(a) Pillage; 
(b) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence; 
(c) Being used to shield military operations or objectives; 
(d) Being made the object of reprisal; and 
(e) Being destroyed or appropriated as a form of collective punishment. 
3. Property and possessions left behind by internally displaced persons should be 
protected against destruction and arbitrary and illegal appropriation, occupation or use. 
Principle 22 
1. Internally displaced persons, whether or not they are living in camps, shall not be 
discriminated against as a result of their displacement in the enjoyment of the following 
rights: 
(a) The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, opinion and 
expression; 
(b) The right to seek freely opportunities for employment and to participate in 
economic activities; 
(c) The right to associate freely and participate equally in community affairs; 
(d) The right to vote and to participate in governmental and public affairs, 
including the right to have access to the means necessary to exercise this right; 
and 
(e) The right to communicate in a language they understand. 
Principle 23 
1. Every human being has the right to education. 
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, the authorities concerned 
shall ensure that such persons, in particular displaced children, receive education which 
shall be free and compulsory at the primary level. Education should respect their 
cultural identity, language and religion. 
3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full and equal participation of women 
and girls in educational programmes. 
4. Education and training facilities shall be made available to internally displaced 
persons, in particular adolescents and women, whether or not living in camps, as soon 
as conditions permit. 
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Section IV Principles Relating To Humanitarian Assistance 
Principle 24 
1. All humanitarian assistance shall be carried out in accordance with the principles of 
humanity and impartiality and without discrimination. 
2. Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons shall not be diverted, in 
particular for political or military reasons. 
Principle 25 
1. The primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to 
internally displaced persons lies with national authorities. 
2. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right 
to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not be 
regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State's internal affairs and shall be 
considered in good faith. Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly 
when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the required 
humanitarian assistance. 
3. All authorities concemed shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian 
assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and 
unimpeded access to the intemally displaced. 
Principle 26 
Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transport, and supplies shall be 
respected and protected. They shall not be the object of attack or other acts of violence. 
Principle 27 
1. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors when providing 
assistance should give due regard to the protection needs and human rights of internally 
displaced persons and take appropriate measures in this regard. In so doing, these 
organizations and actors should respect relevant international standards and codes of 
conduct. 
2. The preceding paragraph is without prejudice to the protection responsibilities of 
international organizations mandated for this purpose, whose services may be offered or 
requested by States. 
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Section V Principles Relating To Return, Resettlement 
And Reintegration 
Principle 28 
1. Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish 
conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to 
return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual 
residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall 
endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced 
persons. 
2. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of intemally displaced 
persons in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and 
reintegration. 
Principle 29 
1. Internally displaced persons who have returned to their homes or places of habitual 
residence or who have resettled in another part of the country shall not be discriminated 
against as a result of their having been displaced. They shall have the right to 
participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and have equal access to 
public services. 
2. Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or 
resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their property 
and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. 
When recovery of such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities 
shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or another 
form of just reparation. 
Principle 30 
All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate for international humanitarian 
organizations and other appropriate actors, in the exercise of their respective mandates, 
rapid and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to assist in their return or 
resettlement and reintegration. 
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Appendix B: Sample Interview and Details of 
Interviews 
Sei Lepan, North Sumatra, February 2002 
IDP Household No. 2 
Introduction: Please indicate if you are answering as an individual, as a household or 
on the behalf others. If so, how many people are you representing? 
A. Male with wife and two children 
History of displacement 
Q 1. Why do you consider yourself to be displaced? When did you come to Aceh? Or, 
how long have you lived here for? Were you affected by the violence directly? 
A. We ran away because there was no protection and no security. I was once 
surrounded by OTK [unidentified persons; orang tak dikenal. I was the imam and 
because of that GAM [the Free Aceh Movement; Gerakan Aceh Merdeka] suspected me 
and told me to leave the village and we were forced to empty the house. In Aceh, my 
friends told GAM I was a teacher, how could they do this to me? Finally the Acehnese 
friends ran away too. 
Q 2. How long have you been displaced for? 
A. 2 years 
Q 3. Is this the first time you have been displaced? 
A. First time 
Q 4. Were you displaced on your own or with your immediate family, relatives or as 
part of a group or community? 
A. Asa village 
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Q 5. At that time, did other people from your local area choose to stay? Do you know 
why? 
A. Everyone left, I was the last man. Because I was the imam, I thought the Acehnese 
would protect me 
Q 6. Where have you been displaced from originally? 
A. Desa Beurandang, Ranto Peureulak, East Aceh 
Q 7. Were you displaced from a rural or urban settlement9 
A. Village 
Duringflight 
Q 8. Did you arrive here directly from your home or was there another location(s) in 
between, for example, camp, mosque or public building? If so, how long did you stay 
there? 
A. We stayed in two places - Stabat (one day) and P. Siantar (one month) 
Q 9. What options did you have once you were forced to leave your home, for 
example, staying with extended family or friends nearby, a host community, no options? 
A. We had no options because I want to live independently. 
Q 10. What factors made you choose this destination after displacement? 
A. That this place has many people and I may be able to educate my children here. 
Needs 
Q 11. Which of the following needs have you not had access to during displacement: 
essential food and potable water; basic shelter and housing; appropriate clothing; 
essential medical attention and sanitation? 
A. Water is ok, food ok, house is not good but ok, the rest are ok 
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Q 12. Have you been prevented from exercising any of the following rights: 
the light to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, opinion and expression; 
the right to seek freely opportunities for employment and to participate in economic 
activities; the right to associate freely and participate equally in community affairs; 
the light to vote and to participate in governmental and public affairs; and 
the light to communicate in a language you understand? 
A. All are ok 
Q 13. If you have children, have they had access to education before, during and after 
displacement? 
A. Before yes, during and after no. 
Q 14. Have you been prevented from seeking safety in another part of the country or 
seeking safety in another country? 
A. No, not prevented. 
Q 15. Which of these legal documents do you possess - passport, personal 
identification document, birth certificate or marriage certificate? 
A. Personal ID and marriage licence 
Q 16. Have you had the right to know the fate and whereabouts of missing relatives? 
A. I know I have the right but I have none missing 
Q 17. Has your personal safety been threatened during displacement? If so, can you 
give details. 
A. No 
ASSiStance andprotection 
Q 18. Who has provided protection and assistance for you since displacement? 
A. Protection and assistance from an NGO [non-governmental organisation] and the UN 
[United Nations] 
Q 19. In what ways have you been assisted and protected? 
A. We got rice and money from the UN 
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Q 20. How much food and water do you now receive on a daily basis and is it 
adequate? 
A. lkg of rice from working, sometimes it is inadequate 
Q 21. Have food and water always been available when needed? 
A. Not always 
Q 22. Has protection and assistance improved or got worse overall since displacement? 
A. The assistance has declined by about 25 per cent 
Q 23. Has any person, group or organisation persecuted or punished you for making 
requests for protection and humanitarian assistance? 
A. No 
Q 24. Are you aware of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement? 
A. No 
Capacity building 
Q 25. How would you improve the protection and assistance in your location, for 
example, in the economy, education and health? 
A. For economics, planting corn, cocoa, palm oil and other crops. For education, the 
salaries are too low and we need to instil motivation. 
Q 26. Have you ever been involved or asked to help in the planning, designing or 
implementation of your own protection and assistance? 
'A. Yes, I was asked occasionally but just to motivate them, we are one and we are 
brothers. 
Q 27. How are decisions made within the camp? 
A. We decide the structure by the meeting and the advantage is that it makes business 
easier. There are no disadvantages. 
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Q 28. In terms of authority, which groups or individuals do you place trust in, for 
example, govemment departments/agencies, local organisations, intemational 
organisations, civil society leaders, ularna, other? 
A. I only trust my son 
Q 29. Do you have a source of employment while you are displaced? Please give 
details. 
A. Yes, the salary is very low even though the position is very high. I am a fanner and 
sometimes I act as a priest. 
Return or resettlement 
Q 30. Do you or the people you represent want to return to their original homes or be 
resettled in another part of the country? 
A. We want to stay here and not resettle 
Q 31. What would you need most to return to your original homes or to resettle, for 
example, security, money, transport? 
A. Money, seeds and for our settlement to be recognised by the government 
Q 32. Have you been threatened or forced to return to your home or another location 
against your will? 
A. No 
Personalprofile 
Q 33. What age group do you fall under? <17: 18>29: 30>39: 40>49: 50>59: 60>69: 
70> 
A. 73 
Q 34. Do you consider yourself/family to be Acehnese, Javanese, Batak, other? 
A. Javanese 
Q 35. What was your source of employment before displacement? 
A. I was a farmer 
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Q 36. Did this employment depend on land? 
A. Yes 
Q 37. What was your monthly income before displacement? 
A. Rp 600,000 
Conclusion 
The researcher expressed thanks for taking the time to answer the questions and asked if 
there were anything else they would like to add. 
A. Whatever you are able to do, please help, please do, to legalise our land and put it 
into our hands. 
Modifications and notes for the IDP interviews 
Overall, the structure of the interviews remained constant but changes were made in the 
order and phrasing where deemed necessary. In particular, the order of the questions 
changed slightly between the interviews in Sei Lepan and at the Polytechnic. 
Question 1 
At the Lhokseumawe Polytechnic, the interpreter indicated the IDPs used the same 
phrase every time, "afraid of the military" as the reason for displacement. When asking 
this question, the researcher also inquired if the military came directly before they left, 
or if they fled a period of time after a violent incident, that is, was the violence and 
intimidation gadual? 
Question 4 
After some interviews, it was clear that the H)Ps either did not understand or at least 
were unsure about this question. That is, at the start of the interviewing process, the 
respondents would not indicate how many other people had fled with them. Once this 
problem was established, the researcher encouraged the interpreter to probe further. 
Although the IDPs still took time to answer the question with certainty, estimates were 
given. A sub-question to No. 4., was "What did you bring with you and how did you 
-c-ome here? " 
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Question 12 
Although the IDPs always answered no, it was not certain if they fully understood, that 
is if they could not or did not want to gain employment while displaced. 
Question 13 
A sub-question was introduced, "Do you have to pay for the education? " 
Question 20 
Some had problems understanding this question, so the sub-question, "Are you ever 
hungry? " was asked. 
Question 21 
The sub-question was asked, "Is the quality of the food better here than at home/your 
village of origin? " 
Question 22 
If this question was answered 'yes' or 'no', then the sub-question, "How has it or in 
what ways has it got worse/better? " was asked. 
Question 24 
This question was rarely asked once it was established the Guiding Principles comic had 
not been distributed. 
Question 26 
A sub-question was, "would you like to get involved? " 
Question 27 
Sub-questions were "how was the committee formed? " "How often does the committee 
meet? " "If you have a problem, do you approach the committee for help? " "When was 
the leader elected? " "How similar is the committee here to the committee at your 
village? " 
Question 36 
A sub-question was, "if you own the land and if so, do you have a letter of ownership? " 
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I. - First Secretary 
American Consulate 
Medan 
Friday 9 March 2001 (notes taken) 
2. Executive Director 
Aceh NGOs' Coalition for Human Rights (Koalisi-HAM) 
Banda Aceh 
Sunday 10 March (notes taken) 
3. - General Director 
Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh (RATA) 
Banda Aceh 
Sunday 10 March(notes taken) 
4. Representative 
Global Nfinistries of the Uniting Churches in the Netherlands 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 11 March 2001 (notes taken) 
5. Project Manager 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDQ 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 11 March 2001(notes taken) 
6. Mediation Advisor for Joint Committee on Humanitarian Affairs 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDQ 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 11 March 2001(notes taken) 
7. Assistant 
Public Information Unit 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 12 March 2001(notes taken) 
8. Director 
Women's Activities for Rural Progress (Flower Aceh) 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 12 March 2001 (notes taken) 
9. Chairman 
Care Human Rights Forum (FP HAM) 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 12 March 2001(notes taken) 
10. Provincial Project Director with resident doctor 
Medecins Sans Frontiers-Holland (MSF-H) 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 12 March 2001(notes taken) 
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11. Country Director 
Save the Children-United States (SC-US) 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 13 March 2001(notes taken) 
12. Rural Development Manager 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 13 March 2001(notes taken) 
13. Banda Aceh Representative 
People's Crisis Centre (PCQ 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 13 March 2001(interpreter used, notes taken) 
14. Programme Manager 
Oxfam-GB 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 13 March 2001(notes taken) 
15. Secretary-General 
Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity (RPuK) 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 13 March 2001(interpreter used, notes taken) 
16. Representative 
Commission on Victims of Violence and Missing Persons (Kontras-Aceh) 
Banda Aceh 
Thursday 14 March 2001(notes taken) 
17. Professor 
Regional Studies Development Centre 
Syiah Kuala University 
Banda Aceh 
Thursday 14 March 2001(notes taken) 
18. Former Rector 
Syiah Kuala University 
Banda Aceh 
Friday 15 March 2001(notes taken) 
19. Deputy Director 
Institute for Civil Society Empowerment (Cordova) 
Banda Aceh 
Friday 15 March 2001(interpreter used, notes taken) 
20. Representative 
Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA) 
Banda Aceh 
Ffiday 15 March 2001(notes taken) 
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21. Executive Director 
Care Human Rights Forum (FP HAM) 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 18 March 2001(notes taken) 
22. Director of post-graduate teaching 
Department of Religion 
State Islamic Institute (IAIN) 
Banda Aceh 
(Also, imam, advisor to HDC and former member of monitoring team) 
Tuesday 19 March 200 (notes taken) 
23. Lecturer 
Department of Agriculture 
Syiah Kuala University 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 19 March 2001(notes taken) 
24. Lecturer 
Department of Econon-dcs 
Syiah Kuala University 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 19 March 2001(notes taken) 
25. Lecturer 
Department of Law 
Syiah Kuala University 
(Also Deputy Assistant for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia's Monitoring 
and Evaluation on Human Rights) 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 19 March 2001(notes taken) 
26. Representative 
Wakampa (indigenous NGO) 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 20 March 2001(notes taken) 
27. Lecturer 
Department of Economics 
Syiah Kuala University 
Banda Aceh 
Thursday 21 March 2001(notes taken) 
28. Representative 
Women's Crisis Centre 
Banda Aceh 
Thursday 21 March 2001(notes taken) 
29. Area Manager 
International Committee for the Red Cross, Indonesia (PMI) 
Lhokseumawe 
Friday, 23 March 2001(notes taken) 
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30. Executive Director 
Human Rights Advocacy Organisation (LPL, -HA) 
Lhokseumawe 
Friday, 23 March 2001(notes taken) 
31. GAM representative for the Joint Committee for Security Modalities 
Banda Aceh 
Sunday 25 March 2001 (notes taken) 
32. GoRI representative for the Joint Committee for Security Modalities 
Banda Aceh 
Sunday 25 March 2001 (notes taken) 
33. Project Assistant 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDQ 
Banda Aceh 
Sunday 25 March 2001(notes taken) 
34. Senior Management Advisor 
United States Aid and International Development-Office of Transition Initiatives 
(USAID-OTI) 
Jakarta 
Tuesday 27 March 2001 (notes taken) 
35. Head of Field Logistics Unit 
Logistics & Reserve Mobilisation Department 
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) 
Geneva 
Monday 2 December 2002(taped) 
36. Mr Stephen Woodhouse 
Regional Director for Europe 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
Geneva 
(UNICEF Representative in Indonesia 1995-2000, visited Aceh in January 2000) 
Monday 2 December 2002 (taped) 
37. Senior Desk Officer 
Bureau for Asia and the Pacific 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Geneva 
Tuesday 3 December 2002(taped) 
38. Head of Operations for East Asia 
International Corarnittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Geneva 
Tuesday 3 December 2002 (notes taken). 
334 
39. Senior Relief Officer 
Disaster Management and Co-ordination Division 
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) 
Geneva 
Tuesday 3 December 2002(taped) 
40. Special Advisor and IDP Focal Point 
Department of International Protection 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Geneva 
Tuesday 3 December 2002(taped) 
41. Assistant to the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced 
Persons 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
Geneva 
Wednesday 4 December 2002(notes taken) 
42. Assistant to the UN Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced 
Persons 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
Geneva. 
(Accompanied Dr Francis Deng on Indonesia Mission 2002) 
Wednesday 4 December 2002(notes taken) 
43. Mr Frederik Kok 
Information Officer 
Global IDP Project/Norwegian Refugee Council 
Geneva 
Wednesday 4 December 2002(taped) 
44. Mr Boassa 
Head of Divisions 
International Organisation for Nligration (IOM) 
Geneva 
77tursday 5 December 2002(taped) 
45. Deputy Head of Operations for South East Asia and the Pacific 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Geneva 
71ursday 5 December 2002(notes taken) 
46. Mr David S. Bassiouni 
Deputy Director 
Office of Emergency Programmes 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
Geneva 
Friday 6 December 2002(taped) 
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47. Ms Marie Spaak 
Humanitarian Affairs Officer 
Response Co-ordination Branch 
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
Friday 6 December 2002(notes taken) 
48. Dr Simon Bagshaw 
Research Officer and Assistant to the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons 
Internal Displacement Unit (ID Unit) 
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
Friday 6 December 2002(taped) 
49. Senior Official 
Social Welfare Department 
Medan 
Monday 3 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
50. Department Head 
Social Welfare Department 
Medan 
Tuesday 4 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
51. Lecturer with representatives of the community-based organisation (CBO), 
Candhika 
Department of Social Welfare Science 
North Sumatra University 
Tuesday 4 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
52. Second Secretary 
American Consulate 
Medan 
Tuesday 4 February 2003(notes taken) 
53. Noor Nickma 
Acehnese Businessman 
Medan 
Thursday 6 February 2003(notes taken) 
54. North Sumatra Co-ordinator with desk researcher 
Jesuit Refugee Service QRS) 
Medan 
Saturday 8 February 2003(notes taken) 
55. Focus Group Interview with Barak Induk Major IDP Comrnýittee (PIPA) 
Sei Lepan 
Wednesday 12 February 2003 (interpreter used, notes taken) 
56. Leader 
Candhika (a CBO) 
SeiLepan 
Aursday 13 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
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57. Focus Group Intcrvicw with Barak Sci Minyak IDP Committcc 
SeiLepan 
Friday 14 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
58. Aceh Co-ordinator 
Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) 
Banda Aceh 
Sunday 23 February 2003(notes taken) 
59. Area Co-ordinator and Head of United Nations Resource Centre (UNRC) with 
information officer 
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 24 February 2003(notes taken) 
60. Field Co-ordinator 
Consortium for the Assistance to Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI) 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 24 February 2003(notes taken) 
61. Programme Director 
Save the Children-United States (SC-US) 
Banda Aceh 
Monday 24 February 2003(notes taken) 
62. Co-ordinator 
People's Crisis Centre (PCQ 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 25 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
63. Lecturer 
Department of Agriculture 
Syiah Kuala University 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 25 February 2003(notes taken) 
64. Deputy Head 
Department of Agriculture 
Aceh Provincial Office 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 25 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
65. Department Head 
Department of Agriculture 
Aceh Provincial Office 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 25 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
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66. Director of post-graduate teaching 
Department of Religion 
State Islamic Institute (IAIN) 
Banda Aceh 
(Also imam, advisor to HDC and former member of monitoring team) 
Tuesday 25 February 2003(notes taken) 
67. Programme Manager 
Oxfam-GB 
Banda Aceh 
Wednesday 26 February 2003(notes taken) 
68. Fortner senior policeman and GoRl representative for the Monitoring Team on 
Humanitarian Action 
Banda Aceh 
Friday 28 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
69. Director 
Mispi (indigenous NGO) 
Banda Aceh 
Former member of the Monitoring Team on Humanitarian Action 
Friday 28 February 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
70. Secretary-General 
Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity (RPuK) 
Banda Aceh 
(Also Lecturer in Department of Law, Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh) 
Friday 28 February and 4 March 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
71. Programme Manager 
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMQ 
Banda Aceh 
Tuesday 4 March 2003(notes taken) 
72. Regional Co-ordinator 
Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity (RPuK) 
Lhokseumawe 
Saturday 8 March 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
73. Regional Co-ordinator 
People's Crisis Centre (PCQ 
Lhokseumawe 
Saturday 8 March 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
74. Leader 
Polytechnic Student Association (Badan Executive Mahas (BEM)) 
Lhokseumawe 
Tuesday 11 March 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
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75. Focus Group Interview with Polytechnic IDP Committee 
Lhokseumawe Polytechnic 
Thursday 13 March 2003(interpreter used, notes taken) 
76. Professor Sultan Barakat 
Director 
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) 
York 
(Also consultant in Aceh for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue during 1999 and 
team leader for the PRDU commissioned evaluation of the HDC, 2000-2001) 
Friday 16 July 2004(notes taken) 
339 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
Adat 
AEP 
AFP 
Antara 
ARSINS 
Bakomas PBP 
BEM 
Brimob 
CAP 
CARDI 
CBO 
CoHA 
CTA 
Daerah Istimewa 
DOM 
DPR 
DPRD 
DRC 
Dwifungsi 
EPCPT 
ERC 
EU 
FP HAM 
GAM 
Golkar 
GoRl 
HAP 
HDC 
HRW 
Humanitarian Pause 
IAIN 
IASC 
ICG 
icmc 
Traditional laws and customs 
Alternative Education Programme 
Agence France-Presse 
National News Agency 
Acelmese Refugees in North Sumatra 
National Co-ordinating Board for the Management of 
Disaster and IDPs/Refugees 
Student Organisation at Lhokseumawe Polytechnic; 
Badan Executive Mahas 
Mobile Police Brigade; Brigade Mobil Polisi. A police 
unit armed similarly to light mobile infantry 
Consolidated Appeals Process 
Consortium for the Assistance to Refugees and Displaced 
in Indonesia 
Community Based Organisation 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
Conflict Transformation Agency 
Special Region 
Military Operation Area; Daerah Operasi Militer 
People's Representative Assembly; Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat 
Regional Representative Assembly; Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Territorial Structure Organisational of the army, whereby 
troops are stationed throughout the country, with 
commands paralleling the civilian administrative system 
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and 
Transformation 
Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (UN) 
European Union 
Care Human Rights Forum 
Free Aceh Movement; Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
Functional groups; Golongan Karya. Suharto's political 
party 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
Humanitarian Action Plan 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Geneva-based third 
party in international intervention, Aceh 
Human Rights Watch 
First joint ceasefire agreement in Aceh, 2001 
State Islamic Institute; InstitutAgama Islam Keamanan. 
Government controlled Islamic University, Banda Aceh 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN) 
International Crisis Group 
International Catholic Migration Commission 
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ICRC 
IDEA 
IDP 
IFRC 
Imam 
IMC 
ITAF 
lom 
IRC 
JCHA 
icsM 
JRS 
isc 
JF/JC 
KKN 
Koalisi-HAM 
Komnas Ham 
Kontras (Aceh) 
Kopassus 
Lhokseurnawe Polytechnic 
LNG 
MP GAM 
MPR 
MSF 
MTHA 
MTSM 
Muhammadiyah 
NAD 
New Order 
NGO 
NRC 
NSPU 
OCHA 
OTI 
OTK 
Pancasila 
PCC 
Pertamina 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance 
Internally Displaced Person 
International Federation of the Red Cross 
Leader of communal prayer or mosque leader 
International Medic Corps 
International Monetary Fund 
International Organisation of Migration 
International Rescue Committee 
Joint Committee for Humanitarian Action 
Joint Committee for Security Matters/Modalities 
Jesuit Refugee Service 
Joint Security Committee, Aceh 
Joint Forum became Joint Council for Political Dialogue 
in March 2001 
Corruption, collusion and nepotism; Korupsi, kolusi dan 
nepotisme. Central policy of Refonnasi 
Aceh NGOs' Coalition for Human Rights 
Indonesia Human Rights Commission; Komisi Nasional 
Hak-hak Asasi Manusia 
Commission on Victims of Violence and Missing Persons 
(Aceh); Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang Dan Korban 
Tindakan Kekerasan 
Special Forces Command; Komando Pasukan Khusus 
Location of IDP case study group, Aceh 
Liquid Natural Gas 
Free Aceh Movement Government Council; Majelis 
Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. GAM splinter 
group 
People's Consultative Assembly; Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 700 member national body 
Medecins sans FrontWes 
Monitoring Team for Humanitarian Action 
Monitoring Team for Security Matters/Modalities 
Organisation representing Islamic modernism in 
Indonesia 
Aceh's special autonomy law; Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
Period of Suharto's rule (1966-1998) 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
North Sumatra Peasants Union 
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UN) 
Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID) 
Unidentified perpetrators of violence; orang tak dikenal 
Five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia's state 
doctrine 
People's Crisis Centre 
National Oil and Gas Mining Company; Perusahaan 
Tambang Minyak dan Gas Bumi Nasional 
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Petrus 
PIOOM 
PIPA 
PKI 
PMI 
Polri 
PRDU 
PT RGM 
Ramadan 
Reformasi 
RATA 
RI 
RPuK 
Rupiah (Rp) 
Satkorlak PBP 
Satlak PBP 
SC-us 
Sei Lepan 
SIRA 
Syiah Kuala University 
TAPOL 
Teungku 
TNI 
UK 
Ulama 
Uleebalang 
UN 
UNDP 
UNHCR 
UNHCHR 
UNICEF 
UNRC 
us 
USAID 
USCR 
UOY 
Waspada 
WB 
WFP 
Episode of state-sponsored killings, 1983-85; 
Penembakan misterius 
Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of 
Human Rights Violations (Leiden) 
Barak Induk Major IDP committee in Sei Lepan; Pentani 
Indonesia Peng Aceh 
Indonesian Communist Party; Partai Komunis Indonesia 
Indonesian Red Cross 
Indonesian Police; Kepolisian Republik Indonesia 
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, 
University of York 
Private timber company in Sei Lepan; Perusahaan 
Terbatas Raja Garuda Mas 
Muslim fasting month 
Post-Suharto period of reform, aimed at political 
liberalisation and economic transparency 
Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh 
Republic of Indonesia 
Women's Volunteer Team for Humanity 
Indonesian currency (Rp 10,000 to US$ 1, approx. at 
time of research) 
Provincial Co-ordinating Unit for the Management of 
Disaster and IDPs/Refugees; Satkorlak Satuan Koordinasi 
Pelaksana 
District Executing Unit for the Management of Disaster 
and IDPs/Refugees 
Save the Children-United States 
Location of IDP case study group, North Sumatra 
Aceh Referendum Information Centre; Sentral Informasi 
Referendum Aceh 
University, Banda Aceh 
Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 
Title of a ulama 
Indonesian National Military/Armed Forces (formerly 
ABRI); Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
United Kingdom 
Islamic Scholar or teacher and leader of Muslim 
community 
Acehnese territorial chiefs/traditional elite 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
United Nations Children's Fund 
United Nations Resource Centre, Banda Aceh 
United States 
United States Aid and International Development 
United States Committee for Refugees 
University of York 
Indonesian newspaper 
World Bank 
World Food Program 
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WHO World Health Organisation 
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